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11 Introduction
1.1 The Quest for the Historical Jesus as a Research 
Problem
This dissertation addresses some of the central methodological questions 
currently debated in historical Jesus research. The application of social-scientific 
methods, such as social memory theory and the study of oral tradition, to the 
study of the historical Jesus has considerably changed the landscape of the field, 
resulting in the questioning of older ways of conducting research in light of new 
hermeneutical and methodological insights: instead of ‘the Quest for the historical 
Jesus’, one may now speak of ‘the Quest for the memory of Jesus’1, namely, for 
the Jesus remembered and recorded in the written Jesus traditions by the early 
Christians.2 In order to understand recent developments, it is necessary to first 
take a critical look at the notion of the Quest for the historical Jesus.
 Historical Jesus research usually presupposes as its starting point the 
Enlightenment and the rise of the historical-critical study of the Bible.3 Hermann 
Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768), who distinguished between the preaching of 
Jesus and what the apostles later wrote about his words and deeds, is often 
considered the first scholar to take a critical interest in the historical Jesus and, 
more specifically, in the nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions recorded 
in the early Christian sources.4 While the field of historical Jesus research has 
1  By ‘the memory of Jesus’, I refer in a general sense to how Jesus was remembered by early Christians.
2  See. e.g. Chris Keith, Jesus’ Literacy: Scribal Culture and the Teacher from Galilee (LNTS/JSNTSup, 
413; London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2011), p. 50, who labels his viewpoint on Jesus research 
‘the Jesus-Memory Approach’. See the discussion below in this chapter and especially in Chapter 3.
3  A different starting point can be argued for, as shown by Anthony Le Donne, ‘The Quest of the 
Historical Jesus: A Revisionist History through the Lens of Jewish-Christian Relations’, JSHS 10 
(2012), pp. 63-86, with his alternative beginnings (Origen, the rabbis, maybe Josephus); Le Donne, 
nevertheless, maintains the importance of the scholarship of the Enlightenment period (Spinoza, 
Lessing, Reimarus). However, commenting on Le Donne, Kari Syreeni, ‘The Identity of Jesus 
Scholar: Diverging Preunderstandings in Recent Jesus Research’, in S. Byrskog, T. Holmén & M. 
Kankaanniemi (eds.), The Identity of Jesus: Nordic Voices (WUNT, 2/373; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2014), pp. 1-16 (8 n. 28), asks, ‘If the scope is thus widened, why not begin with the Gospels?’ 
4  See Hermann Samuel Reimarus, ‘On the Intentions of Jesus and His Disciples’, in C. H. Talbert 
(ed.), Reimarus: Fragments (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971); the citation in Gerd Theissen & Annette 
Merz, The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide (trans. John Bowden; Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1998), pp. 2-3. Reimarus’ work began to be published only after his death (1774–1778) by G. E. 
Lessing.
2undergone enormous phases of change and development since the 18th century, 
Reimarus and David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874) maintain their importance 
in standard presentations of the re search-historical narrative: they are identified 
as representatives of the First Quest for the historical Jesus, namely, the first 
research-historical school of thought in the field.5
 The starting point of a scholarly narrative, such as ‘the First Quest’, as well as any 
representation of later developments, is always a matter of social construction.6 
In terms of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, one may speak of the symbolic 
universe of a scholarly narrative within which the one telling the significant turns 
and elements of research history takes on the role of a specialist on the structure 
of the symbolic universe.7 While the social construction of a research history 
does not mean that no empirical and factual characteristics are communicated, 
it demonstrates that a research history always serves a social purpose. The sheer 
number of studies on the historical Jesus leaves the scholar no other option than 
to choose what one considers to be the most important studies; one forms a 
narrative in order to meet the challenge of his or her collective scholarly existence. 
In most cases, the basic division into three schools of thought – the First or Old 
Quest, the Second or New Quest, and the Third Quest – is considered a legitimate 
5  For contemporary histories of historical Jesus scholarship, see e.g. Stephen Neill & N. T. Wright, 
The Interpretation of the New Testament 1861–1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 
1988); N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), pp. 3-124; idem, A 
Contemporary Quest for Jesus (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002); Clive Marsh, ‘Quests of the Historical 
Jesus in New Historicist Perspective’, BibInt 5 (1997), pp. 403-37; Ben Witherington III, The Jesus 
Quest: The Third Search for the Jew of Nazareth (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2nd edn, 1997), pp. 
9-13; Theissen & Merz, The Historical Jesus, pp. 2-13; Stanley E. Porter, The Criteria of Authenticity 
in Historical-Jesus Research. Previous Discussion and New Proposals (Sheffield: Sheffield University 
Press, 2000), pp. 28-62 (55-59), who does not deem a segmented outline justified; Tom Holmén, 
Jesus & Jewish Covenant Thinking (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 8-9 n. 52, 346-47; Gerd Theissen & 
Dagmar Winter, The Quest for the Plausible Jesus: The Question of Criteria (trans. M. Eugene 
Boring; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), pp. 141-67; James D. G. Dunn, ‘Remembering 
Jesus: How the Quest of the Historical Jesus Lost Its Way?’, in T. Holmén & S. E. Porter (eds.), 
Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus (4 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 1:183-205; Le Donne, 
‘The Quest of the Historical Jesus’, pp. 63-86; Matti Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third Quest 
Please Stand Up?’, in S.-O. Back & M. Kankaanniemi (eds.), Voces Clamantium in Deserto: Essays 
in Honor of Kari Syreeni (Studier i exegetik och judaistik utgivna av Teologiska fakulteten vid 
Åbo Akademi, 11; Åbo: Painosalama, 2012), pp. 102-23; Walter P. Weaver, ‘In Quest of the Quest: 
Finding Jesus’, in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), Jesus Research: New Methodologies and Perceptions. 
The Second Princeton-Prague Symposium on Jesus Research (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), pp. 
28-57; Syreeni, ‘The Identity’, pp. 1-16. 
6  See Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-23 (104-5, 109).
7  Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).
3research-historical narrative.8
 However, the legitimacy of a straightforward division of the research-historical 
developments in historical Jesus research into clearly distinguishable Quests can 
be questioned. It can be demonstrated with regard to the account of the standard 
story of historical Jesus research that one ought to speak of more general schools 
of thought with specific references to the methodological choices and differences 
between scholars, instead of arbitrarily attempting to place every Jesus scholar 
who ever existed into a Quest based on the era when they were active. The 
research-historical narrative of historical Jesus research is more diverse than is 
often assumed, although the standard story provides a meaningful framework for 
discussion.9
 As presented by Gerd Theissen and Annette Merz,10 the standard story of 
historical Jesus research consists of three distinguishable Quests (or schools of 
thought), while also dividing the First or Old ‘liberal’ Quest into three stages: (1) 
Reimarus and Strauss gave rise to a critical historical inquiry of Jesus, the latter 
arguing that the idea of God-humanity is realized in the historical individual 
Jesus, and that ‘myth’ is the legitimate garb of this idea, universally applicable to 
humanity. (2) Heinrich Julius Holtzmann (1832–1910) and others, in the period 
of theological liberalism, emphasized literary-critical analysis and the primacy of 
Mark and the reconstructed Q source (hence, the so-called two-source theory) for 
the historical Jesus, and argued that Christian faith and dogma must be renewed 
8  Even Le Donne, ‘The Quest of the Historical Jesus’, pp. 63-86, who argues for a significant broadening 
of the research-historical horizon in historical Jesus research, does not attempt to entirely do away 
with the ‘Quests’.
9  It has been suggested that the history of historical Jesus research can be viewed in light of the concept 
of paradigm shift, coined by the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996), as a deeply social 
enterprise in which scholars with common axioms form a paradigm and find it hard to communicate 
with those who do not share those axioms (incommensurability). In Kuhnian terms, a paradigm shift 
will only occur when anomalies are found and supported by a number of acknowledged scholars 
within that thought system. See Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-23; Thomas 
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
 However, it is not clear to what degree the Kuhnian idea can be applied to the history of a 
social-scientific field, such as historical Jesus research, as it was first developed in the context of 
empirical sciences. Viewing the Quests for the historical Jesus as paradigms in Kuhnian terms may 
be helpful to a degree, but it may also give a false impression of a homogeneity of the scholarship 
conducted under the label of any given Quest. Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-
23, attempts to speak of the Quests as meaningful sociological constructions, which indicates that 
he does not employ the Kuhnian terminology uncritically.
10  Theissen & Merz, The Historical Jesus, pp. 2-13. Also, see e.g. Holmén, Covenant Thinking, p. 346, 
for different approaches to the Quests.
4in light of the analysis. In this period, the importance of the two-source theory for 
historical Jesus research was established; the First Quest was essentially literary 
and source-critical in nature. (3) Around the beginning of the 20th century, the 
original or First Quest came to a collapse through the works of Albert Schweitzer 
(1875–1965), who argued that the ‘liberal pictures’ of Jesus reflected more the 
ethical ideals of their authors than the actual historical figure,11 William Wrede 
(1859–1906), who claimed that the post-Easter faith in the messiahship of Jesus 
was projected in the unmessianic life of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark,12 and Karl 
Ludwig Schmidt (1891–1956), who explicated that, as a whole, a life of Jesus or a 
chronological structure of the story of Jesus, could not be detected in the sense of 
a biography from the small units of the Jesus tradition.13
 According to the standard story, the collapse of the First Quest was followed 
by an era which was in many cases characterized by ultimate skepticism toward 
the Jesus traditions’ ability to relate the historical Jesus and has often been labeled 
‘the No Quest’.14 However, the title No Quest does not do justice to the period, 
as books about the historical Jesus were written after Schweitzer, not only by the 
early form critics Martin Dibelius (1883–1947) and Rudolf Bultmann (1884–
1976), who were skeptical about any continuity between the historical Jesus and 
the Jesus traditions of the Gospels, as well as other scholars during the Nazi period 
(both Jewish and anti-Semitic),15 but also by many English, French and American 
scholars.16 While the ideas of Dibelius and Bultmann deserve the space devoted 
to them due to their highly influential methodological viewpoints on the nature 
and transmission of the Jesus traditions, they should not be viewed as the sole 
11  Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress from Reimarus 
to Wrede (trans. W. Montgomery; London: A. & C. Black, 1910 [1906]).
12  William Wrede, The Messianic Secret (London: Williams & Norgate, 1901 [1900]).
13  Karl Ludwig Schmidt, Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu: literarkritische Untersuchungen zur ältesten 
Jesusüberlieferung (Berlin: Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1919). See ch. 2.1 below.
14  Cf. Theissen & Merz, The Historical Jesus, pp. 6-7.
15  On Bultmann’s influence and oversimplification of his legacy, see Le Donne, ‘The Quest of 
the Historical Jesus’, pp. 63-86 (83-84). Bultmann was a vocal critic of both the German Nazi 
party and the anti-semitic Jesus studies, emphasizing the Jewishness of Jesus in a time when 
it was not popular; this must be recognized in connection with Bultmann’s skepticism toward 
reconstructions of the historical Jesus.
16  E.g. J. Klausner, C. G. Montefiore, R. Eisler, Rudolf Otto, Shailer Mathews, Shirley Jackson Case, 
Henry Cadbury, F. C. Grant, John Knox, T. W. Manson, William Manson, C. H. Dodd, C. J. 
Cadoux, Alfred Loisy, Vincent Taylor, Maurice, Goguel, Charles Guignebert. See e.g. Le Donne, 
‘The Quest of the Historical Jesus’, pp. 63-86 (84), who states that ‘…the paradigm of No Quest 
(or ‘no biography’) and New Quest is perhaps only helpful when thinking about the phases in 
German scholarship’.
5representatives of Jesus scholarship in this period. It is, therefore, more reasonable 
to speak of the abandonment of a nineteenth-century agenda than of the No 
Quest.17 Also, it has been questioned whether Schweitzer intended the end of the 
quest in the first place.18
 Especially within German scholarship from the 1950’s onward, the rise of 
the so-called Second or New Quest shifted the emphasis to ‘the return to the 
historical Jesus’, namely, the question of whether ‘the kerygmatic Christ had 
any support in the proclamation of the pre-Easter Jesus’. Methodologically, the 
New Quest adhered to the idea of ‘a critically ensured minimum of “authentic” 
Jesus tradition’, which could be arrived at via exclusion of everything that could 
be derived from both Judaism and early Christianity (‘criterion of difference or 
dissimilarity’).19 The New Quest was, according to the standard story, launched by 
one of Rudolf Bultmann’s pupils, Ernst Käsemann (1906–1998) in his 1953 lecture 
at Marburg, ‘The Problem of the Historical Jesus’, published in 1954, and based 
on a combination of a history of religions and history of tradition approaches; 
the theological purpose of later representatives of dialectical theology within the 
New Quest was ‘to bridge the gulf between revelation and history’.20 In addition 
to Käsemann, for example, Günther Bornkamm (1905–1990)21 and James M. 
Robinson (1924–2016)22 are considered important representatives of the New 
Quest.23 John P. Meier (b.1942), a major figure in the field, can also be viewed 
as a New Quest scholar, for instance, due to his heavy reliance on the criteria of 
17  See Holmén, Covenant Thinking, pp. 346-47; Marsh, ‘Quests of the Historical Jesus’, pp. 403-
37 (414); Porter, The Criteria of Authenticity in Historical-Jesus Research, pp. 47, 49, 60-62; 
Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third Quest’, p. 102-23 (108); Weaver, ‘In Quest of the Quest’, pp. 
28-57, against the label No Quest.
18  Weaver, ‘In Quest of the Quest’, pp. 28-57 (53, n. 56), argues that ‘Schweitzer did not intend to 
do so’, but he rather brought the ‘old quest’ to ‘a temporary close’ to point out that Christian 
faith cannot be put ‘in a bind by marrying it to history, which is always changing, uncertain, and 
marked by relativity’, an idea rather fitting to the contemporary theological environment, and 
left it to others to bring ‘order into the chaos of modern lives of Jesus’. The abandonment of the 
original quest must be seen in the background of the discussion on the form-critical works of 
Martin Dibelius and Rudolf Bultmann.
19  The notion of ‘authentic Jesus tradition’ that can be arrived at through the use of the authenticity 
criteria, which was especially important to the New Quest, has persisted until very recently.
20  Theissen & Merz, The Historical Jesus, pp. 7-9, 10, 12.
21  Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1960).
22  James M. Robinson, A New Quest for the Historical Jesus (London: SCM, 1959).
23  Wright, Victory of God, pp. 28-82, argues that, in the work of the Jesus Seminar scholars (e.g. 
Robert Funk, Burton Mack, John Dominic Crossan), the methods of the New Quest period still 
exist and, thus, labels such scholars as representatives of ‘The New “New Quest”’.
6authenticity as the driving methodological force of his project, although his five-
volume study began to be published during the heyday of the so-called Third 
Quest in 199124 and often grants him a place within that category.25
 More recent Jesus scholarship, which took the original separation of the 
historical Jesus and his first followers’ belief in Christ, reflected in the Jesus 
traditions, as an axiom, is often vaguely labeled the Third Quest.26 Rather than 
taking the title as a reference to all Jesus scholarship since the 1980’s or so, it can 
be viewed in line with the title’s original coinage as ‘a meaningful sociological 
construction’ or ‘a Kuhnian paradigm’, not to denote ‘the right way’ of doing 
serious scholarship, but to point out the differences between different kinds of 
scholarship.27 Kankaanniemi proposes that, instead of viewing the Jesus Seminar 
(including scholars like Robert W. Funk and John Dominic Crossan) as part 
of the Third Quest, one should deem their work separately under the category 
‘the Jesus Seminar Quest’ in order to distinguish their methodological axioms 
(especially, regarding the skepticism towards the canonical Gospels as historical 
sources) from those of such ‘Third Questers’ as James D. G. Dunn, E. P. Sanders, 
and N. T. Wright, who place critical yet optimistic trust in the canonical Gospels.28 
While clarifying the differences in outlook on source-material between the afore-
mentioned ‘Third Questers’ and the Jesus Seminar, one must remain cautious 
about proposing a naïve two-path narrative of historical Jesus research. Syreeni 
24  See John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, I: The Roots of the Problem and 
the Person (New York: Doubleday, 1991), pp. 167-95; idem, A Marginal Jew, II: Mentor, Message, 
and Miracles (New York: Doubleday, 1994); idem, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, 
III: Companions and Competitors (New York: Doubleday, 2001); idem, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking 
the Historical Jesus, IV: Law and Love (AYBRL; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2009); idem, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, V: Probing the Authenticity of the 
Parables (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016).
25  Cf. e.g. Witherington, The Jesus Quest, pp. 197-232, who views Meier a prime example of Third 
Quest scholarship; also, Wright, A Contemporary Quest for Jesus, pp. 30-31. 
26  The title Third Quest was coined by N. T. Wright in Neill & Wright, Interpretation, p. 379ff in 1988; 
Theissen & Merz, The Historical Jesus, p. 10.
27  So Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-23 (123). Though one needs to remain 
cautious of a straightforward application of the Kuhnian terminology to historical Jesus research. 
Cf. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
28  Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-23 (123). For the list of other scholars, 
placed in such a Third Quest paradigm, see Wright, A Contemporary Quest for Jesus, pp. 30-31: 
Caird, Brandon, Betz, Hengel, Vermes, Meyer, Chilton, Riches, Harvey, Lohfink, Borg, Sanders, 
Oakman, Theissen, Horsley, Freyne, Charlesworth, Witherington, Meier, de Jonge, Dodd, Yoder, 
Bowker, Derrett, Maccoby, Dunn, O’Neill, Farmer, Schüssler-Fiorenza, Bammel, Moule, Rivkin, 
Buchanan, Leivestad, Zeitlin, Stanton, Neusner, Raymond, Brown, Johnson, O’Collins, and Colin 
Brown.
7reminds that ‘it is doubtful that all Jesus scholars are willing to categorize 
themselves as representatives of just one of two paths [Funk/Jesus Seminar or 
Wright/Third Quest]’.29
 The three features of the Third Quest scholarship, suggested by Theissen 
and Merz,30 further demonstrate the relative arbitrariness of neat divisions of 
historical Jesus research into clearly distinguishable Quests: (1) The Jewishness of 
Jesus. While it must be acknowledged that this is not an innovation of the Third 
Quest,31 the Third Quest is seen in opposition to the tendency of much of the 
earlier scholarship to distance Jesus from Judaism with the methodical failure of 
‘criterion of double dissimilarity’, namely, the authenticity criterion which was 
commonly used to severe Jesus from both Second Temple Judaism and early 
Christianity.32 While Third Quest scholarship may not have introduced new 
methods as such, it produced several different portraits of a Jewish Jesus. The 
variety of views on how exactly the Jewishness of Jesus plays out is demonstrated, 
for example, in Witherington, whose categories are but one example of how the 
scholarly narrative can be constructed: Jesus as a Jewish Cynic (e.g. Burton Mack; 
John Dominic Crossan); Jesus as an eschatological figure (e.g. E. P. Sanders; here, 
for instance, Dale C. Allison could be added); Jesus as a ‘man of spirit’ (Marcus 
Borg, Geza Vermes, Graham H. Twelftree); Jesus as a prophet of social change 
(Gerd Theissen; Richard Horsley); Jesus as a sage of Jewish Wisdom (e.g. Elizabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza; Ben Witherington); Jesus as a marginal Jew or Jewish Messiah 
(John P. Meier; James D. G. Dunn, N. T. Wright, Markus Bockmuehl, Peter 
Stuhlmacher).33 By including the Jesus Seminar (Funk, Mack, Crossan) in the 
Third Quest, Witherington becomes subject to the criticism that such inclusivism 
of multifaceted methodological starting points completely robs the Third Quest of 
29  Syreeni, ‘The Identity’, pp. 1-16 (6-8). For instance, James D. G. Dunn does not fit neatly into the 
Third Quest, as his work differs methodologically from much of the previous scholarship. See the 
discussion below.
30  Theissen & Merz, The Historical Jesus, pp. 10-11.
31  See Holmén, Covenant Thinking, pp. 8-11, on Schweitzer, Wrede, the New Quest, and Jewish 
scholarship, which all recognized the Jewishness of Jesus. Also, Bultmann noted the Jewishness 
of Jesus contrarily to the German anti-semitic sentiments of the earlier half of the 20th century.
32  Holmén, Covenant Thinking, pp. 8-9, on Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen. Erster 
Band (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960). Also, see E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), pp. 27-47.
33  Witherington, The Jesus Quest, pp. 58-238. Like indicated above, John P. Meier can just as well be 
viewed as a New Quest scholar.
8its meaning.34 Regarding the Jewishness of Jesus within what is often considered 
Third Quest scholarship, Tom Holmén’s work is also of importance; he argues 
that, while viewing himself a true Jew, the historical Jesus neither engaged nor was 
interested in Jewish covenant path searching or the path markers of first-century 
Judaism due to his message of the kingdom of God.35
 (2) Attention to non-canonical sources. In principle, there has been a consensus 
within much of historical Jesus research in recent decades that all historical 
sources should be used in reconstructing the historical Jesus or, at least, that no 
source can be abandoned before evaluating its historical value; this view, which 
follows the original usage of the label the Third Quest by N. T. Wright, holds that 
the canonical Gospels are of primary importance due to their historical value. 
However, there are other scholars of this period who emphasize the Jewishness of 
Jesus but prefer other sources over the canonical ones, for instance, John Dominic 
Crossan of the Jesus Seminar for whom the ‘earliest stratum of the Gospel of 
Thomas’ is central.36 While some scholars placed within the Third Quest remain 
convinced of the value of the traditional methodological tools for studying the 
sources, such as the criteria of authenticity,37 there are others who are more 
34  So Porter, The Criteria of Authenticity in Historical-Jesus Research, p. 56; Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the 
Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-23 (111).
35  Holmén, Covenant Thinking. Holmén and others propose a meaningful methodical starting point, 
namely, the continuum approach which asserts that the methods used in studying the historical 
Jesus should provide a picture of Jesus, which is not only at home in first-century Judaism but 
also explains the origin of the beliefs of the early church. This approach distances itself from 
earlier approaches which attempted to find a Jesus distinct from his Jewish and early Christian 
contexts; the continuum approach also clearly differs from the pictures of Jesus that are based on 
a heavy use of the criterion of dissimilarity (e.g. John P. Meier), as well as those that see Jesus in 
his Jewish context, while alienating him methodically from early Christian beliefs (e.g. Theissen 
& Winter, The Plausible Jesus). The continuum approach, albeit not yet a detailed set of tools, 
seems to be a plausible framework for studying the historical Jesus, as it avoids pictures of Jesus 
foreign to first-century Judaism and early Christianity. See e.g. Tom Holmén, ‘Doubts About 
Double Dissimilarity’, in Bruce D. Chilton & Craig A. Evans (eds.), Authenticating the Words 
of Jesus (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 47-80; idem, ‘An Introduction to the Continuum Approach’, in 
Holmén (ed.), Jesus from Judaism to Christianity: Continuum Approaches to the Historical Jesus 
(LNTS; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2007), pp. 1-16; idem, ‘Jesus in Continuum from Early Judaism 
to Early Christianity: Practical-Methodological Reflections on a Missed Perspective’, in James H. 
Charlesworth (ed.), Jesus Research: New Methodologies and Perceptions. The Second Princeton-
Prague Symposium on Jesus Research (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), pp. 201-12.
36  John Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1991). See e.g. Witherington, The Jesus Quest, pp. 42-57, on the reconstruction 
and use of sources by the members of the Jesus Seminar, e.g. Robert W. Funk, Honest to Jesus: Jesus 
for a New Millennium (San Fransisco: Harper, 1996); Robert W. Funk & Roy D. Hoover (eds.), The 
Five Gospels: The Search for the Authentic Words of Jesus (New York: Macmillan, 1993). 
37  While Witherington, The Jesus Quest, considers John P. Meier an exemplary Third Quest scholar, 
9skeptical of these methods.38
 (3) Interest in social history. According to Theissen and Merz, Third Quest 
scholarship places great importance on explaining the life and fate of Jesus in 
light of the tensions characteristic of the Jewish context of the first century. The 
social continuity between the earliest pre-Easter followers of Jesus, in Theissen’s 
words ‘itinerant preachers’, and post-Easter Christianity is recognized and studied 
extensively.39 It should be noted, however, that the social-scientific viewpoints were 
already taken seriously by some scholars in earlier periods, which undermines 
any rigid notion about a clearly distinct Third Quest. For example, Joachim 
Jeremias (1900–1979) applied social-scientific methods extensively in his study of 
the Jewish society of Jesus’ time (or ‘the Jewishness of Jesus’) well before the title 
Third Quest was coined.40 One may legitimately ask whether it is necessary to find 
a Quest into which each individual scholar can be placed.
 In the most recent years, some of the long-standing axioms of the previous 
schools of thought in historical Jesus research have been questioned by what will 
hereafter be called the memory approach to historical Jesus research.41 Generally, 
the memory approach refers to the growing recent emphasis on the concepts of 
individual and social memory, as well as the oral transmission and performance of 
the Jesus traditions in early Christianity. Within this approach, the Jesus traditions 
are often viewed as a series of oral performances framed by the social memory of 
early Christian communities; this notion undermines the divorce of the historical 
there are methodological grounds for viewing Maier’s project in continuation with the New 
Quest, which further blurs the lines between the Quests. For Meier the criteria of authenticity are 
the foremost method in reconstructing the historical Jesus. 
38  N. T. Wright is generally skeptical of using the criteria as guarantors of the authenticity of 
individual Jesus traditions, while he indicates that ‘the criterion of double similarity/dissimilarity’ 
can be applied positively. See Wright, Victory of God, pp. 132-33.
39  See e.g. Gerd Theissen, Die Religion der ersten Christen. Eine Theorie des Urchristentums (Gütersloh: 
Kaiser, 3rd rev edn, 2000); Theissen & Merz, The Historical Jesus, p. 10.
40  Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-23 (108), argues that Jeremias can be seen 
‘probably more comfortably at home within the Third Quest’. See Joachim Jeremias, Jerusalem zur 
Zeit Jesu: Kulturgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum neutestamentlichen Zeitgeschechen (Leipzig/
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 3rd edn, 1962).
41  I include in the memory approach the following scholars: James D. G. Dunn, Richard A. Horsley, 
Rafael Rodríguez, Chris Keith, Dale C. Allison, and Anthony Le Donne, as well as Samuel Byrskog 
and Richard Bauckham, whose works are focused on the question of eyewitness testimony and 
memory. Arguably, space permitting, other scholars could be included: Jens Schröter, Christine 
Jacobi, Alan Kirk, Bart Ehrman, etc. My presentation and analysis intends to be broader than that 
of e.g. Eric Eve, Behind the Gospels: Understanding the oral tradition (London: SPCK, 2013), pp. 
108-34 (108), who lists J. D. G. Dunn, Richard Horsley, Jonathan Draper, and Rafael Rodríguez as 
different representatives of ‘memory trend’. See Ch. 3 below. 
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Jesus from the early Jesus movement’s notions about him, as recorded in the early 
Christian sources. Consequently, the memory approach questions the original 
separation of the historical Jesus and his first followers’ belief in Christ, namely, 
the separation between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. For example, 
James D. G. Dunn, who is often viewed as a Third Quest scholar but is in this 
study considered part of the memory approach due to his distinct methodological 
choices, argues that the Jesus of history cannot be separated from the Christ of 
faith due to the historical memories about Jesus, as recorded in the Jesus traditions 
and transmitted by his first followers on whom he had an impact.42 Dunn’s work 
can be viewed as reasserting the central idea of Martin Kähler (1835–1912) 
that there is no ‘historical Jesus’ apart from the Christ of faith provided by the 
Gospels.43
 In contrast with much of the scholarship conducted under the labels of the 
previous Quests, however they may be defined, the memory approach rejects 
some of the historically central literary methods of historical Jesus research. 
First, it maintains that one cannot access the historical Jesus via the study of the 
authenticity of the literary Jesus traditions by using the criteria of authenticity; 
the tendency of abandoning the criteria of authenticity altogether as verification 
of ‘what comes from Jesus historically’ goes hand in hand with the emphasis on 
memory. Rather than attempting to separate the ‘authentic’ Jesus traditions from 
the ‘inauthentic’ traditions, the Jesus traditions are construed as instances of oral 
performances and memories or interpretations of the historical Jesus recorded by 
his first followers.44 Second, the notion of the Jesus traditions being construed not 
42  See James D. G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered (Christianity in the Making 1; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2003); idem, ‘Remembering Jesus’, pp. 183-205 (187): ‘In direct contrast to this deeply rooted 
suspicion of faith as a barrier to and perversion of any historical perspective on Jesus [that 
Christian (post-Easter) faith pervades all our chief sources for the life and mission of Jesus; and 
that this faith prevents the present-day quester from seeing Jesus as he was, or even as he was 
seen by his disciples pre-Easter], my proposal is that the quest should start from the recognition 
that Jesus evoked faith from the outset of his mission and that this faith is the surest indication of the 
historical reality and effect of his mission.’
43  Cf. Martin Kähler, Die sogenannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche, biblische Jesus (Leipzig, 
1892); Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 126-27 (126 n. 99), asserts that this is the only point he 
adopts from Kähler. On this point, also see Syreeni, ‘The Identity’, p. 1-16 (12).
44  On this see, e.g. Rafael Rodríguez, ‘Authenticating Criteria: The Use and Misuse of a Critical 
Method’, JSHJ 7 (2009), pp. 152-67; Dale C. Allison, Constructing Jesus: Memory, Imagination, and 
History (London: SPCK, 2010); Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, for the ‘Jesus-memory approach’ in contrast 
with the traditional ‘criteria approach’; see also Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, 
Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity (London: T & T Clark, 2012). Some challenges to this 
recent trend are presented e.g. in Tobias Hägerland, ‘The Future of Criteria in Historical Jesus 
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merely as literary sources in the traditional sense leads the memory approach (or 
at least most scholars within it) to question the legitimacy of traditional source-
theoretical hypotheses and, more precisely, the so-called Two-(or Four-)Source 
theory,45 which has been one of the cornerstones of historical Jesus research 
for a long time. The relationships between the Synoptic Gospels are no longer 
necessarily explained through reference to the Evangelists’ use of hypothetical 
literary sources, such as the Q, as the Jesus traditions are viewed as a result of a 
complex interplay between oral and textual communication in early Christianity.46
 Specifically, the memory approach is in conversation with early form criticism 
and its alternatives on the nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions 
and the historical Jesus.47 Like the form critics Dibelius and Bultmann, who 
emphasized the anonymously transmitted flexible pre-gospel oral tradition, for 
Research’, JSHJ 13 (2015), pp. 43-65. Also, see the answers to these and other criticisms in Chris 
Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus: Current Debates, Prior Debates 
and the Goal of Historical Jesus Research’, JSNT 38 (2016), pp. 426-55. See the discussion in Ch. 
3 below.
45  By which I refer to the standard source critical theory according to which Matthew and Luke 
used, besides Mark, another common literary source, the Q. The Q partially explains the 
material, which Matthew and Luke have in common, yet is not found in Mark. Accordingly, 
both authors used their own specific sources (L, M) in addition to Mark and Q (hence, the four-
source hypothesis). See e.g. John S. Kloppenborg, Excavating Q: The History and Setting of the 
Sayings Gospel (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000); idem, Q, the Earliest Gospel: An Introduction to the 
Original Stories and Sayings of Jesus (London: Westminster John Knox, 2008); Paul Hoffmann, 
John S. Kloppenborg, and James M. Robinson (eds.), The Critical Edition of the Q (Hermeneia; 
Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000); Christopher Heil, Das Spruchevangelium Q und der historische 
Jesus (Stuttgarter Biblische Aufsatzbände, 58; Stuttgart: Verlag Katolisches Bibelverk, 2014). The 
existence of Q has been questioned recently by e.g. Michael Goulder, ‘Is Q a Juggernaut?’, JBL 115 
(1996), pp. 667-81; Mark S. Goodacre, ‘Fatigue in the Synoptics’, NTS 44 (1998), pp. 45-58; idem, 
‘A Monopoly on Marcan Priority? Fallacies at the Heart of Q’, SBLSP (2000), pp. 538-622; idem, 
The Case against Q: Studies in Markan Priority and the Synoptic Problem (Harrisburg: Trinity, 
2002); Jeffrey Peterson & John C. Poirier (eds.), Marcan Priority without Q: Explorations in the 
Farrer Hypothesis (LNTS; London: T & T Clark, 2015).
46  See e.g. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 210-38, on different Gospel accounts not primarily as results 
of the Evangelists’ use of literary sources but as literary accounts of oral retellings of oral Jesus 
traditions; Rafael Rodríguez, Structuring Early Christian Memory: Jesus in Tradition, Performance 
and Text (LNTS/JSNTSup, 407; London: T & T Clark, 2010), pp. 25-26, 35-37, on the written 
Gospels as ‘oral-derived texts’ and instances of the Jesus tradition, not as editions or versions of 
one another. In contrast, see Allison, Constructing, who does not give up the two-source theory 
but rather uses the theory extensively in his analysis of the Jesus traditions. See the discussion in 
Ch. 3.
47  I include the views of Rainer Riesenfeld and, especially, Birger Gerhardsson (‘formal controlled 
tradition’, ch. 2.2), Erhardt Güttgemanns and, more importantly, Werner H. Kelber (‘radical 
discontinuity between orality and textuality’, ch. 2.3), and Kenneth E. Bailey (‘informal controlled 
oral tradition’, ch. 2.4) among the main alternatives for the early form-critical views of Martin 
Dibelius and Rudolf Bultmann (ch. 2.1) on the nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions in 
early Christianity.
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example, Dunn, Horsley, and Rodríguez within the memory approach place 
great emphasis on the study of the Jesus traditions in light of oral tradition and 
studies on orality, while also being critical of form criticism. Also, the memory 
approach closely relates to the distinct alternatives for the views of Dibelius and 
Bultmann by Birger Gerhardsson and Werner H. Kelber, who both take the role 
of the pre-Gospel oral tradition at face value; while Gerhardsson argues for a rigid 
transmission of the oral Jesus tradition based on memorization, an important 
concept which is recognized within the memory approach, Kelber emphasizes 
early Christian orality and the nature of the Jesus traditions in a way that comes 
close to the memory approach’s emphasis on the Jesus traditions as instances of 
early Christian social memory.48
 The aforementioned rejection or neglect of the traditional literary and source-
critical methods by the memory approach also creates a meaningful discussion 
between the memory approach and form criticism and its alternatives. On the one 
hand, the form criticism of Dibelius and Bultmann did not focus on literary or 
source criticism, but had its main emphasis on the flexible pre-Gospel oral Jesus 
traditions, which were, according to their view, anonymously transmitted in early 
Christian communities and could be linked with specific Sitze im Leben (‘settings 
in life’) in those communities. The form-critical notion of a perfect correlation 
between a Jesus tradition and its Sitz im Leben comes close to a presentist view of 
social memory theory, which is widely discussed within the memory approach.49 
On the other hand, critical of form criticism, Gerhardsson’s rabbinic model of 
memorization and transmission argued for the historical reliability of the Synoptic 
Jesus traditions in a relatively straightforward fashion with no specific regard for 
the criteria of authenticity or source-critical hypotheses.50 While neither form 
criticism nor the rabbinic model are held tenable by the memory approach, both 
viewpoints serve as important starting points for the current discussion on the 
nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions in early Christianity and historical 
Jesus research.
 Of form criticism’s alternatives, Kelber, for whom the Q hypothesis was, at least, 
originally central, seems to accept a rather traditional source-critical starting 
48  See ch. 2.2, 2.3; cf. esp. the view of Rafael Rodríguez, ch. 3.4 below.
49  See ch. 2.1; ch. 3.1 below.
50  See. ch. 2.2 below.
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point, which is not foreign within the memory approach.51 Nevertheless, in his 
criticism of ‘print culture assumptions’, including traditional literary methods, 
such as the criteria of authenticity, prevalent in much of historical Jesus research, 
Kelber gravitates toward a redefinition of the Jesus traditions in light of an oral 
hermeneutic, which makes his view a significant dialogue partner with the 
memory approach’s take on the historical Jesus.52 Also, Kenneth E. Bailey’s analogy 
of ‘informal controlled oral tradition’ between the Middle-Eastern village life of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century and first-century Palestine attempts 
to bypass literary and source-critical questions related to historical Jesus research 
by focusing on the mechanisms of oral tradition; his view has been discussed by 
some within the memory approach.53
 As a result, within historical Jesus research, there is an ongoing debate on 
the processes of the transmission of the Jesus traditions and the continuity 
or discontinuity between the levels of (1) the historical Jesus to whom there is, 
according to the memory approach, no access, (2) the period of oral (and literary) 
Jesus traditions – or memories of Jesus, as many would phrase it – until the 
writing of the Gospels, and (3) the period of the written Gospels.54 The amount 
of literature concerning the period of the oral transmission of the Jesus traditions 
and the role of memory in the process is ever-increasing.55 Any meaningful 
51  See ch. 2.3; cf. e.g. Richard A. Horsley, ch. 3.3 below.
52  See ch. 2.3 below.
53  See ch. 2.4; cf. esp. the view of Rafael Rodríguez, ch. 3.4.
54  See the classic distinction of three ‘stages’, e.g. in Meier, A Marginal Jew, I, p. 167: Stage I, roughly 
28–30 CE; Stage II, roughly 30–70 CE; Stage III, roughly 70–100 CE.
55  See e.g. Alan Kirk & Tom Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, and Text: Uses of the Past in Early 
Christianity (SBLSS, 52; Atlanta: SBL, 2005); Werner H. Kelber & Samuel Byrskog (eds.), Jesus 
in Memory: Traditions in Oral and Scribal Perspectives (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2009); 
Rodríguez, Structuring; idem, Oral Tradition and the New Testament: A Guide for the Perplexed 
(London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2014); Richard A. Horsley, Text and Tradition in Performance 
and Writing (BPC, 9; Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2013); Sandra Hübenthal, Das Markusevangelium 
als kollektives Gedächtnis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014); Michael F. Bird, The 
Gospel of the Lord: How the Early Church Wrote the Story of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014); 
Ruben Zimmermann, Puzzling the Parables of Jesus: Methods and Interpretation (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2015); Bart D. Ehrman, Jesus Before the Gospels: How the Earliest Christians Remembered, 
Changed, and Invented Their Stories of the Savior (New York: HarperCollins, 2016); Samuel 
Byrskog, Raimo Hakola, Jutta Maria Jokiranta (eds), Social Memory and Social Identity in the 
Study of Early Judaism and Early Christianity (NTOA, 116; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2016); Alan Kirk, Q in Matthew: Ancient Media, Memory, and Early Scribal Transmission of the 
Jesus Tradition (LNTS/JSNTSup, 564; London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2016). Also, see James 
D. G. Dunn, The Oral Gospel Tradition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), which includes 15 of his 
essays and articles from the past decades. See Ch. 3 below.
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representation of scholarly developments is always, of necessity, carefully defined 
and limited in its scope.
 Due to these recent developments in historical Jesus research, it is reasonable 
to pose the question as to whether a new phase has begun, whether a coherent 
methodological shift has occurred. While skeptical of ‘traditional’ research-
historical nomenclature, such as ‘the Fourth Quest’ as a continuation of the 
standard narrative due to the problematic nature of any neat division of the 
history of historical Jesus research into ‘Quests’, one may legitimately ask whether 
the memory approach to the Jesus traditions and its rejection of the traditional 
methods constitutes a constructive methodological alternative, namely, a way 
forward for historical Jesus research.56 It seems clear that the memory approach 
finds it hard to communicate with much of previous scholarship. Is it time to 
abandon a literary approach to the Jesus traditions and focus one’s efforts on 
studying the early Christian memories of Jesus? How should the methodological 
diversity within the memory approach be reckoned with? Is the memory approach 
a new beginning or a dead end for historical Jesus research?
1.2 Purpose of the Dissertation
The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whether the memory 
approach consti tutes a methodologically coherent school of thought in historical 
56  Jonathan Bernier, The Quest for the Historical Jesus after the Demise of Authenticity: Toward 
a Critical Realist Philosophy of History in Jesus Studies (LNTS/JSNTSup, 540; London: 
Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2016), pp. 162, considers the question of quests a matter of 
continuity between Second Temple Judaism and Jesus and Jesus and Christianity; he 
suggests that, while ‘[t]he Third Quest sought to dispense with the myth of rupture between 
Judaism and Jesus, and for the most part, it succeeded in this aim,’ ‘[t]he Fourth Quest…
is focused upon dispensing with the myth of a rupture between Jesus and Christianity’. 
 However, the problematic nature of such Quest language becomes apparent when one 
considers that there are scholars usually placed within the Third Quest who address the 
very problem that, in Bernier’s estimation, is to be the focus of the Fourth Quest, namely, 
‘dispensing with the myth of a rupture between Jesus and Christianity’. See e.g. Holmén, 
‘An Introduction to the Continuum Approach’, pp. 1-16; idem, ‘Jesus in Continuum from 
Early Judaism to Early Christianity’, pp. 201-12, who argues for a continuum approach 
in order to avoid pictures of Jesus foreign to first-century Judaism and early Christianity. 
 Also, there are others suggesting that a Fourth Quest for the historical Jesus is necessary. See 
e.g. Ernst Baasland, ‘Fourth Quest? What Did Jesus Really Want?’, in T. Holmén & S. E. Porter 
(eds.), Handbook, pp. 1:31-56, who argues that a ‘Fourth Quest’ is needed, and that it should 
concentrate on ‘Jesus’ focus, his program and vision, which he accomplished in both words and 
deeds’. I fail to see how historical Jesus research conducted with such a focus would distinguish 
itself enough from other schools of thought in order to deserve the new label ‘Fourth Quest’.
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Jesus research. In other words, this dissertation explores how the basic tenets 
of the memory approach differ from earlier scholarship and whether one may 
speak of a new beginning in the field of historical Jesus research. The focus of 
the dissertation is on research-historical developments. In order to meaningfully 
approach the question of the methodological school of thought in historical Jesus 
research, the research-historical discussion is focused on the debate on the nature and 
the processes of the transmission of the Jesus traditions in early Christianity, which 
is a central topic to both earlier historical Jesus research and the methodological 
formation of the memory approach.57 Rather than attempting to discuss the 
whole history of historical Jesus research, in other words, all the ‘Quests’ for the 
historical Jesus with regard to this debate, the scope of this research is limited to 
a few significant viewpoints from approximately the last one hundred years, as 
this period is specifically relevant for the rise and development of the memory 
approach.
 First, the survey of earlier research (Ch. 2) covers the views of the early form 
critics Martin Dibelius and Rudolf Bultmann (Ch. 2.1), as well as some of their 
most significant critics (Ch. 2.2–2.4). The basic tenets of Dibelius and Bultmann on 
the pre-Gospel oral Jesus traditions are a meaningful research-historical starting 
point, as their viewpoints, having been globally very influential for decades, 
elicit strong direct critical reactions from the main focus of this study, namely, 
the memory approach to the historical Jesus and the Jesus traditions.58 Three 
alternative models for the form-critical viewpoints are presented and critiqued: 
the formal controlled tradition (Ch. 2.2: Harald Riesenfeld, Birger Gerhardsson), 
the radical discontinuity view (Ch. 2.3: Erhardt Güttgemanns, Werner H. 
Kelber), and the informal controlled tradition (Ch. 2.4: Kenneth E. Bailey). 
 Second, a whole chapter is devoted to the memory approach (Ch. 3), namely, 
the scholars who apply memory studies in one way or another to the study of the 
historical Jesus. The focus of this chapter is on the individual and social aspects 
57  These processes took place during the time span from Jesus’ public activity (AD 28–30) to the 
writing of the Gospels, which include, first and foremost, the four canonical Gospels (roughly 
from the 60’s onwards) and, secondly, the Gospel of Thomas, the Gospel of Peter, and some other 
gospels, of which only some fragments survive (for example, preserved in Papias’ five-volume 
work The Expositions of the Sayings of the Lord from near the beginning of the second century). 
On Papias’ fragments, see Michael W. Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English 
Translations (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 3rd edn, 2007), pp. 722-67.
58  See e.g. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, who argues strongly against the ‘criteria approach’ to the historical 
Jesus, which he claims to have derived its basic axioms from the early form critics.
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of memory (Ch. 3.1); the bulk of the chapter consists of an analysis of the studies 
that apply the conceptual category of memory (Ch. 3.2: James D. G. Dunn; 3.6: 
Dale C. Allison), social memory theory (Ch. 3.3: Richard A. Horsley; 3.4: Rafael 
Rodríguez; 3.5: Chris Keith; 3.7: Anthony Le Donne), and various studies on 
orality and oral tradition (esp. Dunn, Horsley, Rodríguez) to the question of the 
transmission of the Jesus traditions. Also, the question of eyewitness testimony, 
the role of early Christian eyewitnesses, and the specific category of individual 
memory, eyewitness memory, is addressed in this chapter (Ch. 3.8: Samuel 
Byrskog, Richard Bauckham). The differences between the memory approach and 
the earlier scholarship are analyzed with regard to the models of transmission and 
the reconstructions of the media situation in the first-century context.59 
 It is the purpose of this research-historical study to allow the different schools 
of thought and approaches to speak for themselves. First, the proponents of each 
approach are introduced with some necessary historical background. Second, 
the proponents’ ideas are presented from the primary sources and subsequent 
accounts of them written by other scholars. Third, some critique and evaluation 
is provided on each individual view and each school of thought as a whole.60 An 
in-depth analysis of the research-historical developments enables one to evaluate 
the contemporary state of historical Jesus research and to answer whether the 
memory approach constitutes a methodologically coherent school of thought in 
the field. 
 The main research questions of this dissertation are the following: 
1. What is the significance of the early form-critical views and their alternatives 
on the question of the transmission of the Jesus traditions in early Christianity 
for historical Jesus research?
 
2. How does the memory approach attempt to distinguish itself from 
earlier scholarship, namely, form criticism and its alternatives, with regard 
59  By ‘reconstructions of the media situation in the first-century context’ I refer to the various 
scholarly reconstructions of, for instance, the levels of literacy and education, the relationship 
between orality and textuality, oral tradition and written texts, in the first-century context where 
the transmission of the Jesus traditions originally took place. Cf. e.g. Eve, Behind, pp. 1-14.
60  I am aware of the difficulty of placing several individual scholars with distinctive ideas and 
viewpoints under one title. I intend to acknowledge the diversity within each school of thought 
while upholding certain (widely used) categories and general lines of thought in order to present 
a coherent account of the research-historical developments.
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to the question of the transmission of the Jesus traditions and the task of 
reconstructing the historical Jesus?
 
3. Does the memory approach constitute a methodologically coherent school of 
thought in historical Jesus research?
 
Some of the subquestions that are discussed with regard to the memory approach 
are the following: 
 
A. How are source-critical hypotheses, such as the Two-(or Four-)Source 
theory, viewed within the memory approach?
 
B. What is the role of the criteria of authenticity in studying the Jesus traditions 
within the memory approach?
 
C. Does the memory approach shed new light on the question about the 
distinction between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith?
 
D. Is the memory approach a new beginning or a dead end for historical Jesus 
research?
1.3 Methodological Considerations
This dissertation is not like many other theses as, instead of a cursory or 
introductory repre sentation of the relevant research history, the bulk of the study 
is devoted to research-histori cal developments. Rather than directly applying any 
specific method or set of methods to the Jesus traditions61 in the primary early 
Christian sources, the dissertation critically discusses some of the historical-
critical tools and methods that have been traditionally used and, more recently, 
61  The plural form ‘Jesus traditions’ is employed to denote a middle ground between the idea of 
a single stream of ‘tradition’ from Jesus to the Gospels on one hand and the notion of specific 
‘trajectories’ leading, for example, from Q to the Gospel of Thomas on the other. There are many 
identifiable paths of tradition in the Jesus traditions, but the concept of trajectory is theoretically 
problematic unless carefully defined. Especially Bultmann’s notion of one specific ‘Synoptic 
tradition’ is also rejected on the grounds of the two-source theory, which includes at least two 
distinct streams (Mark and Q). A major concern for the present study is how the various paths of 
tradition are best described.
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questioned in the study of the historical Jesus. This methodological focus is seen, 
for example, in the discussion on the memory approach which rejects the source-
critical two-source theory and the criteria of authenticity. Also, this study evaluates 
the plausibility of the emphasis of the memory approach that the Jesus traditions 
should be construed, not primarily as literary sources, but as memories of Jesus or 
instances of oral performances of the Jesus traditions, but does not directly engage 
in a historical-critical analysis of those traditions.
 The dissertation is based on a combination of paradigmatic and progressive 
understandings of scientific inquiry. There are distinguishable methodological 
shifts, which can be viewed in terms of the questioning and abandoning of 
certain shared axioms within the scholarly community. For instance, the turn 
from a classical form-critical understanding of the anonymous and flexible 
Jesus tradition (Dibelius, Bultmann) to a more controlled and inflexible idea of 
memorization and transmission (Gerhardsson) and, further, towards the memory 
approach’s categorical inclusion of concepts like orality and memory (Dunn, 
Horsley, Rodríguez, Keith, Allison, Le Donne) and eyewitness testimony (Byrskog, 
Bauckham) to explain the processes of transmission, can be viewed as kinds of 
methodological shifts, while it should be recognized that new concepts and ideas 
are never universally adopted and accepted.62 
 However, the cumulative and progressive nature of the scientific study is 
also recognized.63 The different schools of thought are not always to be seen in 
complete opposition to each other, even when the central arguments of a previous 
‘school’ are seriously questioned. More knowledge is gained about the topic under 
scrutiny through the introduction of new insights and methods by scholars who 
base their work, at least in part, on the work of their predecessors. For example, 
Birger Gerhardsson, who was very critical of the basic axioms of the form-critical 
understanding of the Jesus traditions by Dibelius and Bultmann, did not think 
62  For example, Gerhardsson’s ideas were not initially well received; also, there remains dissent from 
acceptance of the usefulness of the so-called ‘memory studies’ for studying the Jesus traditions 
and the historical Jesus. 
63  Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-23 (104): ‘[T]here is the idea of progression 
imbedded in the idea of science with an implicit axiom that we do know more about the subject 
than we did ten years ago. If none else, then at least some dysfunctional hypotheses have been 
excluded with all the money spent on the research projects. Very close to the idea of progression 
is the idealistic, yet not totally incorrect, understanding of scientific process as an accumulation of 
knowledge proceeding with time.’ Also, see the referenced article for the defense of the progressive 
view of the accumulation of scientific knowledge: Alexander Bird, ‘What is Scientific Progress?’, 
Nous 41 (2007), pp. 92-117.
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he was abandoning their insights altogether. Gerhardsson accepted the general 
pattern of the form-critical paradigm, namely, that the Synoptic tradition passed 
through a period of oral transmission.64
 While the social construction of the following research-historical account is 
acknowledged, the choice of the particular scholars and schools of thought is not 
intended to be arbitrary but to reflect an attempt towards an empirical and factual 
representation of the important research-historical turns and developments of 
distinct schools of thought.65 Albeit much broader in scope, the account critically 
engages the basic chronology presented, for example, in Eric Eve,66 starting from 
early German form criticism and working its way to the memory approach and 
the recent discussions on the role of memory therein. However, Eve’s account is 
specifically focused on ‘the oral tradition behind the Gospels’ and is not engaged 
in historical Jesus research. In the conclusion of his study, Eve only outlines some 
rather vague guidelines for studying the historical Jesus.67 Thus, a more specific 
set of guidelines for historical Jesus research is clearly on the agenda of this 
dissertation.
 Regarding the starting point of his research-historical account, namely, the form-
critical viewpoints of Dibelius and Bultmann, Eve states boldly, ‘[a]ny discussion 
of oral tradition has to begin with form criticism, for only by understanding form 
criticism’s strengths and weaknesses can we appreciate what subsequent proposals 
are reacting to and how far they succeed in advancing our understanding’.68 Such 
64  See the discussion in ch. 2.2 below; e.g. Samuel Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, in Kelber and Byrskog 
(eds.), Jesus in Memory: Traditions in Oral and Scribal Perspectives (Waco: Baylor University Press, 
2009), pp. 1-20 (11).
65  Cf. Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-23 (105-106, 109).
66  See Eve, Behind. 
67  See Eve, Behind, pp. 13-14, on the consequences of Eve’s account of the ancient media situation for 
the Jesus tradition; also, Eve, Behind, pp. 181-83, for the rather vague implications of Eve’s account 
for the study of the historical Jesus. Eve employs the concept of memory (both individual and 
social memory) and concludes that, regardless of misremembering, distortions, reinterpretations, 
blending and confusion of separate incidents and even of the source of material, the historical 
Jesus is not ‘forever lost to us’ (p. 181). Eve (pp. 181-83) explicitly joins the scholars (Allison, 
Rodríguez), who believe that the use of the criteria of authenticity is fundamentally misconceived, 
and argues that recent memory studies suggest that ‘[a] sounder method might be to look for 
recurring features of the tradition, to start with the (perhaps rather hopeful) working assumption 
that the Gospel narratives have not totally distorted the memory of Jesus (and so can be used with 
caution to interpret the material they contain)…’
68  Eve, Behind, p. 15. See also Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 73-78. Christopher Tuckett, ‘Form 
Criticism’, in Kelber and Byrskog (eds.), Jesus in Memory, pp. 21-38, is also a telling critique of 
form criticism.
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a strong statement is an exaggeration, since obviously a different starting point 
in the scholarly narrative could be chosen: for example, when discussing the oral 
tradition in relation to the Gospels, the German philosopher Johann Gottfried 
Herder (1744–1803) is often credited as the first scholar to discuss an oral source 
behind the Gospels.69 Basically, anyone at least from Reimarus onwards could be 
chosen as the starting point for the current study’s research-historical account on 
the debate over the nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions, but spanning 
the research history all the way to the so-called First Quest or oral studies of the 
period would require a much more spacious treatment than is possible here.
 All the same, bearing in mind the narrative of historical Jesus research, it is 
reasonable to also begin the present discussion with the ‘No Quest’ period 
scholars Dibelius and Bultmann, who paid much attention to what they construed 
as the pre-Gospel oral tradition, not only for the practical reason of space. 
Dibelius and Bultmann, who can be characterized as scholars with ‘minimalist’ 
or ‘skeptical’ viewpoints on the Jesus traditions and the historical Jesus,70 have 
subsequently drawn much attention from the memory approach, which can be 
generally characterized as more of a ‘maximalist’ or ‘optimistic’ viewpoint of 
the historical Jesus.71 It has been pointed out that the form critics, specifically 
and more intensively than earlier scholarship, focused on the pre-Gospel oral 
tradition and the origin and sources of the Jesus tradition,72 which is a relevant 
69  Herder is mentioned at the beginning of the accounts, for example, by Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 
pp. 192-93; Birger Gerhardsson, ‘The Secret of the Transmission of the Unwritten Jesus’, NTS 51 
(2005), pp. 1-18 (1).
70  Harvey K. McArthur, In Search of the Historical Jesus (New York: Scribner’s, 1969), used exactly 
the categories of ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ in giving the two different stories of contemporary 
historical Jesus scholarship: first, along with Bultmann, there were the ‘minimal lives’ of Jesus 
arrived at with ‘an anonymous oral tradition’ approach by those who fell into the New Quest 
according to the standard meta-narrative (Günther Bornkamm, Reginald H. Fuller, Samuel 
Sandmel, pp. 161-93); secondly, there were the ‘maximal lives’ suggested by those who did not 
so much represent the New Quest of the standard meta-narrative (e.g. Vincent Taylor, Ethelbert 
Stauffer, pp. 194-206). T. W. Manson was viewed as a representative of ‘substantial eyewitness 
material’ approach to the Synoptic sources (pp. 23-32), while Birger Gerhardsson’s view was labeled 
as ‘professionally transmitted oral tradition’ (pp. 33-40). See the discussion in Kankaanniemi, 
‘Will the Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-23 (109-10).
71  See Ch. 3; e.g. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy; also Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 33: ‘contemporary media 
criticism is, in many ways, a reaction against twentieth-century form criticism’. By media criticism, 
Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 22, refers to ‘the analysis of the function and dynamics of various 
media of communication (speech, writing, ritual, etc.), and especially of the significance of shifts 
from one medium to another (e.g. from oral to written expression)’. The field of memory studies 
is clearly important for what Rodríguez considers media criticism. See Rodríguez, Structuring.
72  Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 33.
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focus with regard to the central concerns of the memory approach. Regardless of 
the skepticism imbedded in the symbolic world73 of Dibelius and Bultmann, it was 
the Jesus tradition that they aimed to study historically.74
 Like any other scientific study, historical Jesus research is a field where one’s 
cultural, social, religious, and scholarly identities play a significant role.75 There 
is no ‘natural’ or ‘pure’ way of understanding, which would completely rid one 
from the theological, philosophical, cultural, and other attitudes present in his or 
her symbolic world.76 While the principle of striving for ‘objectivity’ serves as a 
corrective and remains the goal, ‘objectivity’ is never fully achieved.77 One must 
73  For the concept symbolic world, see Kari Syreeni, ‘Wonderlands: A Beginner’s Guide to Three 
Worlds’, SEÅ 64 (1999), pp. 33-46.
74  Cf. Theissen & Merz, The Historical Jesus, pp. 5-6: Dibelius and Bultmann were not only influenced 
by their predecessors and contemporaries like Wrede, Schmidt and Schweitzer but also drew 
from the dialectical theology and existentialist philosophy of the time (esp. Bultmann). Basically, 
dialectical theology insisted that God and the world only touch at the events of Jesus’ cross and 
resurrection, in which God acts and which also forms the ‘Christian kerygma’; this results in 
an uninterested, even skeptical, attitude towards the historical Jesus’ deeds and teachings. The 
Christian existentialist viewpoint emphasized that human beings find ‘authenticity’ in answering 
to God’s call in ‘the kerygma of the cross and resurrection of Jesus’.
75  This aspect of the study of the historical Jesus has been recognized by many. See e.g. Holmén, 
Covenant Thinking, p. 8; Wright, Victory of God, pp. 117-21; Kankaanniemi, ‘Will the Real Third 
Quest’, pp. 102-23; Syreeni, ‘The Identity’, pp. 1-16 (15). Also, note the criticism by Syreeni 
(pp. 4-5), of James H. Charlesworth, who seems to use the label ‘Jesus Research’ to refer to the 
special, even superior, nature of recent (Third Quest?) scholarship, while deeming the earlier 
periods as inferior; it should be acknowledged that, despite the development of methods and new 
archaeological, sociological and other findings, recent scholarship stands on the shoulders of the 
previous generations of scholars.
76  While not discussed further in this study, the hermeneutical model of the three worlds articulated 
by Syreeni, ‘Wonderlands: A Beginner’s Guide to Three Worlds’, pp. 33-46; idem, ‘The Identity’, 
pp. 1-16 (2 n. 6), is helpful at pointing out the interactions between the levels of textual world, 
symbolic world, and real world of the texts and their interpreters. The textual world refers to 
the textual reality which can be described and analyzed with linguistic, rhetorical and stylistic 
methods; the symbolic world entails the invisible social, psychological, and cognitive processes 
which are present both in everyday interaction and when producing and interpreting a text (or a 
research history, for that matter). The text has multiple contexts in which it is read during history. 
The symbolic world functions much like Berger and Luckmann’s notion of the symbolic universe: 
the real world refers to the ‘concrete world’, which can be described and studied with natural 
scientific methods. See Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. Even though 
these levels of reality inevitably interact with each other, one must make a conscious effort not to 
forget the otherness of the objects of study (e.g. historical sources, concepts etc.) by reducing them 
to the subject of the study (e.g. the historian’s mindset, identity, favorite ideas).
77  Epistemologically, this study is grounded in a notion of complexity between ‘data’ and ‘fact’, namely, 
the dynamic structure of consciousness in Bernard Lonergan, ‘Cognitional Structure’, in Collection: 
Papers by Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988), pp. 205-21: when approaching 
data, the human mind works through a complex process of experiencing, understanding, judging 
and deciding. Also, see Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), p. 5ff. 
 In Lonerganian terms, Ben Meyer, Reality and Illusion in New Testament Scholarship: A 
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not lose sight of the epistemological starting point of any historical study: it can, 
at best, only point to probabilities.78 If the current scholar’s identity is somehow 
reflected in this study, it hopefully functions as ‘a reliable source’ rather than a 
hindrance when studying the research-historical developments of historical Jesus 
research.79
Primer in Critical Realist Hermeneutics (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1994), p. 142, argues 
against both naïve realism and overemphasized subjectivity for a form of ‘critical realism’, which 
insists ‘on the empirical (data), the intelligent (questioning and answering), the rational (the 
grasp of evidence as sufficient or insufficient, the personal act of commitment) as – all of them 
together – entering into true judgement’. The citation also in Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 110. 
In his magnum opus on the historical Jesus, Dunn (p. 111) adopts the basic thrust of Lonergan’s 
epistemology: ‘[T]he data themselves are never “raw”: they have already been “selected” 
by the historical process; they are “selected” again by the way they have been discovered and 
brought to present notice; they come with a context, or various contexts already predisposing 
interpretation; the interpreter’s framework of understanding or particular thesis causes certain 
data to appear more significant than others…But all that being said, there is an otherness, 
an “over-against-us” character to the data, and also to the events to which they bear witness. 
And the task of seeking to describe and evaluate the data and to reach some sort of judgment 
regarding the facts…is not only viable, but in the case of the great event(s) of Jesus necessary.’ 
 On ‘critical realism’, also see Ben Meyer, Critical Realism in the New Testament (Princeton 
Theological Monographs, 17; Allison Park: Pickwick, 1989); Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 110-11; 
N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis, Fortress, 1992), pp. 31-46. 
For a recent attempt at appropriating critical realism for historical Jesus research, see Bernier, The 
Quest for the Historical Jesus; on Wright’s critical realism, see Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. 
Pitts, ‘Critical Realism in Context: N. T. Wright’s Historical Method and Analytic Epistemology’, 
JSHJ 13 (2015), pp. 276-306; Jonathan Bernier, ‘A Response to Porter and Pitts’ “Wright’s Critical 
Realism in Context”’, JSHJ 14 (2016), pp. 186-93; and the critical response to Bernier by S. E. Porter 
and A. W. Pitts, ‘Has Jonathan Bernier Rescued Critical Realism?’, JSHJ 14 (2016), pp. 241-47. 
 In contrast, see the hermeneutical discussion from the viewpoint of postmodern historiography 
in Anthony Le Donne, The Historiographical Jesus: Memory, Typology, and the Son of David 
(Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2009), pp. 1-39. Specifically, Anthony Le Donne, The 
Historical Jesus: What Can We Know and How Can We Know It? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2011), pp. 3-10 (5-7), 134: ‘[Within a postmodern paradigm] [t]he historian’s job is to tell the 
stories of memory in a way that most plausibly accounts for the available mnemonic evidence…
the historical Jesus is not veiled by the interpretations of him. He is most available for analysis 
when these interpretations are most pronounced. Therefore, the historical Jesus is clearly seen 
through lenses of editorial agenda, theological reflection, and intentional counter-memory.’ 
 I find Dunn’s understanding and application of ‘critical realism’ to the study of the historical 
Jesus to come very close to Anthony Le Donne’s view of ‘postmodern historiography’.
78  For an apt hermeneutical framework for historical criticism, see Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 
99-136 (103-5); on probabilities, see e.g. Meier, A Marginal Jew, I, pp. 167-68.
79  See Syreeni, ‘The Identity’, pp. 1-16 (15): ‘Preunderstanding is simply the prerequisite of 
understanding. In happy cases, a scholar’s personal identity is a resource in finding aspects of the 
historical reality that mainstream scholarship tends to ignore.’
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2 Form Criticism and Its Critics
2.1 Form Criticism
In order to understand the current state of historical Jesus research and, more 
specifically, what is in this study categorized as the memory approach to the 
study of the historical Jesus and the Jesus traditions, one needs to understand 
the views of the early form criticism of the twentieth century on the pre-Gospel 
oral Jesus tradition and its transmission.80 While the abandonment of ‘the First 
Quest’ (hence, ‘the No Quest’ at least in German scholarship) can be seen in the 
background of the discussion of the works of both Martin Dibelius and Rudolf 
Bultmann, it is sufficient for the purposes of this study to acknowledge that the 
early form critics argued for a much more ‘minimalist’ view of the historical Jesus 
than several contemporary and subsequent scholars.81 After the beginning of the 
twentieth century, in the wake of Albert Schweitzer and William Wrede, the form 
criticism (Formgeschichte, ‘form history’) of the Gospels was first espoused by 
Karl Ludwig Schmidt82 and, most notably, Dibelius and Bultmann,83 who aimed 
80  In their studies of the Jesus traditions, the proponents of the memory approach react directly to 
some of the influential ideas of Dibelius and Bultmann. See e.g. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy; Rodríguez, 
Oral Tradition.
81  See McArthur, In Search of the Historical Jesus, pp. 161-206, who used the categories of ‘minimal 
lives’ and ‘maximal lives’ to denote the two trends of the historical Jesus scholarship, placing 
Bultmann into the former. Of the contemporaries of Dibelius and Bultmann, one may place 
into the category of ‘maximalist¨ view of the historical Jesus, for example, Vincent Taylor, The 
Formation of the Gospel Tradition: Eight Lectures (London: Macmillan, 2nd edn, 1949); Thomas 
W. Manson, ‘The Quest of the Historical Jesus – Continued,’ in Studies in the Gospels and Epistles 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962).
82  Karl Ludwig Schmidt, Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu. Schmidt’s initial work was never translated 
into English. For a thorough account and critique, see David R. Hall, The Gospel Framework: 
Fiction or Fact? (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1998). The three form critics were seen together at a very 
early stage, for example, by Henry J. Cadbury, ‘Between Jesus and the Gospels’, HTR 16 (1923), 
pp. 81-92, who affirmed the basic tenets of the then-new method. Though it has been rightly 
noted that ‘Schmidt’s influence is greatly eclipsed’ by Dibelius and Bultmann (Rodríguez, Oral 
Tradition, pp. 33, 123), the term ‘separate oral units’ nevertheless stemmed from his argument, 
which proposed a radical ‘rejection of the outline’ of the Gospels. Schmidt argued for a Gospel 
tradition that consisted of fragments in free circulation; the Evangelists were responsible for the 
structure of the Gospels; as a whole, a life of Jesus or a chronological structure of the story of Jesus, 
could not be detected in the sense of biography; the Gospel tradition consisted of single stories, 
which Schmidt labeled pericopae (singular, pericope); these stories could only rarely be placed 
in spatial-temporal contexts. See Taylor, The Formation of the Gospel Tradition, pp. 12-13; Eve, 
Behind, pp. 15-16; Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 74.
83  See Martin Dibelius, Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums (Tübingen: Mohr, 2nd rev. edn, 1933); 
idem, From Tradition to Gospel (trans. B. L. Woolf; Cambridge: James Clark, 2nd rev. edn, 1971); 
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to study the Jesus traditions historically in a context of skepticism toward the 
historical Jesus.84 According to the basic assumption of form criticism, there was 
a discoverable link between the form of separate units of oral Jesus tradition and 
their social setting (Sitz im Leben, ‘setting in life’) in early Christianity. Sitz im 
Leben was used by form critics as a sociological concept which referred to ‘typical 
uses to which the material was put by the community, such as preaching, teaching, 
apologetics, argumentation and polemics’.85 The separate units of tradition could 
be ‘classified according to their form’.86 Form criticism aimed to elaborate the 
origin and history of the material by comparing the Gospel forms with Jewish and 
Hellenistic parallels and by attempting to deduce how the written Gospel form 
differed from the ‘pure oral form’.87 Despite ‘a general family resemblance’, Dibelius 
and Bultmann cannot be lumped together as a completely coherent group, as will 
become apparent in the following analysis.88
2.1.1 Martin Dibelius
Despite Schmidt’s obvious importance, Martin Dibelius (1883–1947) is usually 
considered the pioneer of the form-critical study of the Synoptic Gospels. Dibelius 
mentioned Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), Franz Overbeck (1837–1905), 
Georg Heinrici (1844–1915), and Hermann Gunkel (1862–1932) as some of the 
influences behind his work.89 For Dibelius, Herder’s notion of folk poetry was 
important, since it underscored ‘das naivschöpferische Element in den biblischen 
Schriften’.90 As time went on, some of those writings, especially the ones from 
the first century CE, began to be dealt with not as ‘Literatur…, die vom Willen 
Rudolf Bultmann, Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhöck & Ruprecht, 
3rd edn, 1958); idem, The History of the Synoptic Tradition (trans. J. Marsh; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1963). Schmidt’s work had not yet been published, when Dibelius was writing the first edition of 
his seminal work Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums.
84  Theissen & Merz, The Historical Jesus, pp. 5-6; also, McArthur, In Search of the Historical Jesus, 
pp. 161-206.
85  Eve, Behind, pp. 15-16.
86  Taylor, The Formation of the Gospel Tradition, p. 10.
87  Eve, Behind, p. 16; on the Rabbinic and Hellenistic parallels see, e.g. Dibelius, Formgeschichte, 
pp. 130–78. One of Bultmann’s main concerns was to study the relationship of the primitive 
Palestinian and Hellenistic Christianity (see e.g. Bultmann, Geschichte, p. 5).
88  Samuel Byrskog, Story as History – History as Story (WUNT, 123; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 
pp. 34-37 (34).
89  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 4-6.
90  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 4. Dibelius, From Tradition, p. 5: ‘the naïve and creative element in 
the biblical writings’.
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der Schriftsteller geschaffen wird, sondern um Gestaltungen, die aus Dasein und 
Betätigung literaturfremder Kreise mit Notwendigkeit hervorgehen’.91
 Further, Overbeck’s differentiation of primitive Christian literature from 
patristic literature, as well as Heinrici’s definition of the Synoptic Gospels as 
Sammelgut (‘collected material’ as opposed to ‘literature proper’), stimulated 
Dibelius’ formulation of the form-critical method. In the field of Old Testament 
study, the work of Herrmann Gunkel had proved that it was indeed possible to 
analyze such a Sammelgut and trace it back to the minutest perceptible forms of 
tradition.92 Dibelius described Gunkel’s method in the following way: ‘…indem 
aus der Form auf die ursprüngliche Bestimmung und praktische Verwendung 
des Stückes, auf seinen Sitz im Leben geschlossen wurde, gelangte man zu einer 
im eigentlichen Sinn formgeschichtlichen Behandlung der volkstümlichen 
Gattungen, die aus den Schriften des Alten Testaments erhoben werden konnten’.93 
 Basically, Dibelius had a twofold objective. First, he sought to explain the origin 
of the Jesus tradition by penetrating into a period previous to the writing of the 
Gospels and their written sources. Secondly, he attempted to clarify the intention 
and interest of the earliest tradition. For what purpose did the first churches 
recount the stories about Jesus, pass them from mouth to mouth as independent 
narratives, or copy them? Further, the purpose was to ask why the churches would 
collect the sayings of Jesus, learn them by heart, and write them down.94
 According to Dibelius, the Evangelists were collectors and editors of the 
tradition rather than real authors of literature; the Gospels and any literary 
sources behind them were only Kleinliteratur, unliterary writing not intended for 
publication. The Jesus tradition was transmitted by anonymous individuals with 
91  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 4–5. Dibelius, From Tradition, p. 5: ‘[not as] literature created by the 
mind of the author, but formulations which necessarily come from the presence and activity of a 
circle strange to literature’.
92  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 5. For the roots of form criticism of the Synoptic Gospels in Old 
Testament scholarship and, especially the work of Herrmann Gunkel, see Martin J. Buss, Biblical 
Form Criticism in Its Context (JSOTSup, 274; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999), ch. 12; Robert 
C. Culley, ‘Oral Tradition and Biblical Studies’, in John Miles Foley (ed.), Oral-Formulaic Theory 
(New York/London: Garland, 1990), pp. 189-225 (189-200).
93  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 5; idem, From Tradition, pp. 5–6: ‘A method of handling popular 
categories in accordance with the history of their form (in proper sense of the term), i.e. in 
accordance with the way in which these categories could be distinguished in the writings of the 
Old Testament, was only reached when, from the form in which the detail was cast, a conclusion 
could be drawn as to the original purpose and the practical application of the detail, in a word, as 
to its “Sitz im Leben,” or place in the stream of life.’
94  Dibelius, From Tradition, p. v.
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no literary intent, who sometimes introduced creative changes into the traditions. 
These individuals did not make personal impressions on the tradition, which 
developed according to its own impersonal laws. These laws made it possible to 
determine each tradition’s Sitz im Leben. The different forms were developed in 
accordance with the practical uses into which they were put. Dibelius modeled a 
growing tradition, which would be expanded, for example, by conglomeration, 
secular motifs and narrative techniques, and mythological material.95
 Dibelius was not satisfied with ‘[a]n analytical method which starts from the 
texts and goes back to the sources and isolated elements of tradition’, but rather 
preferred ‘a constructive method which attempts to include the conditions and 
activities of life’ of the first Christian communities.96 Dibelius asked how these 
conditions and activities correlated with the forms of the Gospel material. He 
took for granted that Jesus’ words, actions and the narrative of his death would be 
first rehearsed in the circle of Jesus’ disciples, who then propagated the traditions 
in different settings of preaching.97 
 Preaching was the primary use of the tradition for Dibelius; it included all 
forms of Christian propaganda. The tradition was present in ‘Missionspredigt, 
kultische und katechetische Predigt’.98 Dibelius viewed the phrase ‘eyewitnesses 
and ministers of the word’ in the Lukan prologue (Lk. 1:2) as a reference to a 
single group of early Christian preachers,99 whose preaching set in motion the 
growth of the tradition from which the Gospel material was later derived by the 
Evangelists.100
 It was not the task of the preachers to explain the life of Jesus (‘das Leben Jesu 
erzählen’) but to proclaim the salvation which had come about in Jesus Christ 
(‘das in Jesus Christus erschienene Heil’).101 Dibelius viewed the mission speeches 
95  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 1-8; cf. Taylor, The Formation of the Gospel Tradition, pp. 11-12; Eve, 
Behind, pp. 16-17, 20.
96  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 10; idem, From Tradition, p. 10; cf. Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 5-6.
97  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 9-10.
98  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 9-16 (13-14).
99  Cf. Eve, Behind, p. 17. Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 11, notes, nevertheless, that ‘es kann aber 
auch nicht seine Meinung sein, daß beide Gruppen identisch waren, denn es hat natürlich in 
steigendem Maße Prediger gegeben, die keine Augenzeugenschaft für sich in Anspruch nehmen 
konnten. Aber für den Anfang scheint es ihm festzustehen, daß die, die es erlebt hatten, es auch 
verkündigten, als „Diener des Wortes”. Sie waren die Missionare, Prediger und Lehrer, die die 
Botschaft von Jesus Christus hinaustrugen, um die Welt zu gewinnen.’
100  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 9-14; idem, From Tradition, pp. 11-15.
101  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 14.
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in Acts as representatives of early Christian sermons which contained this very 
message, the early Christian Kerygma; repetition of exhortation to repentance 
and conversion was central to these sermons which were the author’s way of 
emphasizing ‘die Einheit der christlichen Predigt’ over ‘die Verschiedenheit’.102 
Dibelius did not grant much historical value to the sermons in Acts, but rather 
emphasized the author’s role in composing them after consciously accepting a 
scheme of early Christian sermon, which consisted of the Kerygma, that is, the 
preaching of Jesus Christ, scriptural proof from the OT, and the exhortation.103 
 Dibelius argued, further, that Paul used technical terms for receiving and 
handing on of traditions; a clear example of this was 1 Cor. 15.3-5, in which Paul 
seemed to be transmitting a rather fixed formula he had received from elsewhere. 
The contents of this tradition varied within different churches (Palestinian Jewish, 
Hellenistic Jewish, Gentile), but without excep tion included the Passion account 
at the center of the Kerygma. Different laws would have applied to the handing on 
of narrative material and Jesus’ sayings.104
 Dibelius carried out an analysis by which he was able to classify five different 
forms in the tradition: paradigms, tales (Novellen), legends, exhortations 
(Paränese), and myths. First, the paradigms were the most primitive form, which 
originally existed as independent, brief, and simple narratives and were formulated 
by the eyewitnesses of Jesus’ ministry; they were relatively reliable historically. 
Nevertheless, the paradigms came into being for the purpose of preaching and, 
thus, did not convey ‘neutral information’. Since the paradigms were formu lated 
for preaching, they did not have deductible original pure form; they tended to 
expand in the course of the tradition. The paradigms always end in the high point 
of either a word or a deed of Jesus; they offer no biographical material. Only so 
much detail is provided as is nec essary for the deed or word of Jesus. The actors in 
the paradigms function as impersonal types, whose words are only significant for 
preaching in order to convert and instruct..105 Di belius gave eight examples of the 
102  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 15-16. Cf. the speeches by Peter and Paul in e.g. Acts 2; 3; 14.15-17; 
17.22b-31.
103  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 15-16.
104  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 16-22. Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 21, stresses the centrality of 
the Passion narrative for preaching: ‘Wenn die Predigt Zeugnis vom Heil war, so konnte unter 
allen Erzählungsstoffen nur diesem einen, der Leidensgeschichte, tragende Bedeutung in der 
Verkündigung zukommen.’
105  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 34-66; idem, From Tradition, pp. 37-69. Taylor, The Formation of the 
Gospel Tradition, pp. 63-87, labeled this form the Pronouncement Story.
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paradigms, which for him represented ‘the type in notewor thy purity’106 and ten 
stories which were of ‘a less pure type’107.
 Secondly, the tales consisted of the miracle stories that were transmitted 
primarily for the sake of the miracle they narrated.108 As Dibelius put it, ‘Die 
Novellen handeln von Jesus dem Thaumaturgen…Was dort [in den Paradigmen] 
Gelegenheit ist, bei der Jesus Forderung und Verkündigung ausspricht, ist hier 
Selbstzweck, der im Mittelpunkt der Schilderung steht und alles beherrscht: das 
Wunder.’109
 The tales were individual stories that were complete in themselves; they were 
not didactic or conditioned by the praxis of preaching in any way, and also lacked 
the paradigmatic focus. Dibelius argued that a separate group of storytellers 
developed the tales, both as narratives for the sake of narrative art and as 
examples for Christian miracle-workers. While some of the tales may originally 
have circulated as paradigms and only later have become expanded narratives, 
other tales were affected by secular motifs: Dibelius referred to a tendency of folk 
tradition to adopt contemporary stories of miracle-workers to define well-known 
figures.110 Dibelius listed nine tales in Mark,111 five longer miracle stories in John 
106  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 40; the expression is original in the English edition, Dibelius, From 
Tradition, p. 43. The healing of the paralytic (Mk 2.1ff.), the question of fasting (Mk 2.18ff.), the 
rubbing of the ears of corn (Mk 2.23ff.), the healing of the withered hand (Mk 3.1ff.), the relatives 
of Jesus (Mk 3.20ff., 30ff.), blessing the children (Mk 10.13ff.), the tribute money (Mk 12.13ff.), 
the anointing in Bethany (Mk 14.3ff).
107  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 40; the expressions about ‘purity’ of the forms are original in the 
English edition, Dibelius, From Tradition, p. 43. The healing in the synagogue (Mk 1.23ff.), the 
call of Levi (Mk 2.13ff.), Jesus in Nazareth (Mk 6.1ff.), the rich young man (Mk 10.17ff.), the 
sons of Zebedee (Mk 10.35ff.), the blind man of Jericho (Mk 10.46ff.), cleansing the temple (Mk 
11.15ff.), the question of the Sadducees (Mk 12.18ff.), the inhospitable Samaritans (Lk. 9.51ff.), 
and the man with the dropsy (Lk. 14.1ff.).
108  Dibelius had established some of the miracle narratives as paradigms, since he believed they were 
not told for the sake of the miracle but rather underscored, in a paradigmatic manner, a saying 
of Jesus or a reaction to which the miracle led.
109  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 76.
110  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 66-100; idem, From Tradition, pp. 70-103. On the historical reliability 
of the tales, Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 99, comments: ‘Der farbige Realismus der Novellen 
entspricht nicht den Bedürfnissen der Predigt, sondern den Erwartungen von Menschen, die an 
ähnliche Geschichten von Wundertätern, Propheten, Lehrern gewöhnt waren. Darum ist diese 
Art als Ganzes minder geschichtlich als die paradigmatische. Immerhin lassen sich, wenn einer 
Novelle ein Paradigma zugrunde liegt, historische Grundlagen oder Ansatzpunkte vermuten. 
Und nur wenn eine nichtchristliche Geschichte als Urbild der christlichen Novelle glaubhaft 
gemacht werden kann, ist die Zuverlässigkeit der christlichen Erzählung von vornherein in 
Frage gestellt.’
111  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 67-68. The leper (Mk 1.40-45), the storm (Mk 4.35-41), the demons 
and the swine (Mk 5.1-20), the daughter of Jairus and the woman with the issue (Mk 5.21-43), 
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narrated in ‘the tale style’,112 and one story in Luke.113
 Thirdly, Dibelius classified as legends those narratives which neither represented 
a Christian edifying formulation like the paradigms nor had been developed 
according to the secular narrative motifs of the tales.114 The legends were described 
by Dibelius as ‘fromme Erzählungen von einem heiligen Mann, an dessen Taten 
und Schicksalen man Interesse hat’.115 The legends found in the Gospel tradition 
intended to meet a twofold purpose: first, they narrated something of the virtues 
and fate of the people surrounding Jesus; secondly, they intended ‘to know Jesus’ 
in a similarly glorifying fashion.116 While Dibelius thought that the legends often 
contained ‘ungeschichtlichen Mehrung des Wunderhaften’ and were expanded 
by biographical analogies when defining the life of the hero, he did not deny the 
possibility of historicity of all legends; historical confirmation simply was not the 
interest of the narrators of the legends.117
 Dibelius argued that, in addition to the three aforementioned narrative 
categories, there was paraenetic material, that is, the exhortations or sayings of 
Jesus that appear outside a narrative framework.118 These words of Jesus were, 
the feeding of the five thousand (Mk 6.35-44), the walking on the sea (Mk 6.45-52), the man, 
deaf and dumb (Mk 7.32-37), the blind man of Bethsaida (Mk 8.22-26), the epileptic boy (Mk 
9.14-29).
112  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 67-68. The marriage at Cana (Jn 2.1ff.), the son of the royal official 
(Jn 4.46ff.), the lame man at Bethzatha (Jn 5.1ff.), the man born blind (Jn 9.1ff.), the raising of 
Lazarus (Jn 11.1ff.).
113  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 67-68. The raising of the widow’s son at Nain (Lk. 7.11ff.).
114  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 101-29; idem, From Tradition, pp. 104-32.
115  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 101; idem, From Tradition, p. 104: ‘religious narratives of a saintly 
man in whose works and fate interest is taken’.
116  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 112. In the Gospels, examples of legends of the former kind (of the 
people surrounding Jesus) include, for example, Peter’s walking on the Sea (Mt. 14.28-33), the 
incident of Nathanael (Jn 1.45-51), the story of Zacchaeus (Lk. 19.1-10), and the passage about 
Martha and Mary (Lk. 10.38-42); the legends of latter kind (of Jesus himself) include, in Dibelius’ 
estimation, Jesus’ birth narratives (as four independent legends), Jesus as twelve years old (Lk. 
2.41ff.), and the narrative of the thankful Samaritan (Lk. 17.12-19). See Dibelius, Formgeschichte, 
pp. 117-24.
117  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 105-6.
118  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 234-65; idem, From Tradition, pp. 233-65. On Dibelius’ notion 
of paraenesis, see Wiard Popkes, ‘Paraenesis in the New Testament’, in James Starr & Troels 
Engberg-Pedersen (eds.), Early Christian Paraenesis in Context (BZNW, 125; Berlin/New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), pp. 13-46 (14-15). Popkes points out that Dibelius was a major 
contributor to the idea that paraenesis can be defined as a genre and a literary form, which makes 
it possible to speak of certain texts as paraenetic. Dibelius argued that paraenesis is a series of 
disconnected exhortations, which were composed and used like a ‘treasure box’. The unifying 
formal element is the ‘einheitliche Adressierung’ (‘uniform group of addressees’). However, 
Dibelius’ view has been problematized in subsequent scholarship. The notion of paraenesis as a 
literary genre (a Gattung) is not maintainable due to (1) the absence of the term παραίνεσις in 
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accordingly, transmitted separately by a different law from that of the narrative 
material, which Mark included in his Gospel; there was an early tradition of Jesus’ 
words circulating within the primitive circles of missionary activity.119 These 
words of Jesus were handed down by Christian teachers, and gradually gathered 
into collections, such as Q (the literary source said to have been used by Matthew 
and Luke in addition to Mark).120 
 Dibelius used the paraenetic material found, for example, in Paul, James, 1 Peter, 
1 Clement, the Didache, and the Shepherd of Hermas,121 to exemplify the primitive 
Christian teachers’ habit of spreading the ethical teaching, while preserving and 
gathering, consciously or unconsciously, the Jesus tradition.122 The collections 
of the words of Jesus could be used as ‘einen Schatz von Mahnungen und 
Belehrungen’, directed towards ‘die verschiedensten alltäglichen Verhältnisse’.123 
Dibelius argued that Jesus’ words were originally gathered together for a hortatory 
end, to give the churches advice, help, and commandment ‘mit den Worten des 
Meisters’.124 All this material was viewed as being inspired by the Spirit or the risen 
Lord; thus the primitive Christians did not distinguish between the preaching of 
Jesus and the preaching about Jesus; the material consisted of both genuine words 
of Jesus and other Christian exhortation.125
 In addition, Dibelius argued for the existence and gradual increase of an 
early Christ mythology.126 He first described the non-mythological nature of the 
oldest witnesses of the formation of the Gospel tradition, the paradigms, and 
the works of the classical period (e.g. Hesiod, Erga), (2) the insufficiency of the proof-texts used 
(e.g. Ps-Isocrates, To Demonicus) and (3) the lack of comparable ancient literary productions. See 
Popkes, Paraenesis, pp. 13-46 (15, n. 10-12). Popkes, Paraenesis, pp. 13-46 (41, 42-43) concludes 
that too strict definitions should be avoided for paraenesis, yet proposes a definition for the New 
Testament usage (including e.g. Mt. 5–7 in the Jesus traditions): ‘Paraenesis is [1] clear, concrete, 
benevolent guidance that [2] reminds of practices to be pursued or avoided in the Christian way 
of life, [3] expresses a shared, articulated world view, and [4] does not anticipate disagreement’.
119  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 234-39.
120  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 237, 244-47.
121  Examples include Rom. 12.14; 13; Jas 5.12; Did. 1.3ff., etc. These exhortations were not explicitly 
attributed to Jesus as in the Gospels.
122  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 239-44.
123  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 241; idem, From Tradition, p. 240: ‘a storehouse of warnings and 
teachings directed…towards the most varied everyday relationships…’ Cf. Popkes, ‘Paraenesis in 
the New Testament’, pp. 13-46, and the discussion above.
124  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 247.
125  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 242. This viewpoint was later embraced, for example, by Dennis 
Nineham, The Gospel of St Mark (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963).
126  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 265-87; idem, From Tradition, pp. 266-86.
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pointed out that the story of Jesus in it self did not have a mythological origin; 
within the tradition, the mythological formulation was not thoroughgoing.127 
However, the early Christian preachers and teachers, including Paul, created ‘ein 
Christus-mythus’, which rested to an extent upon the notion of dualism be tween 
the revelation of the Son of God and the human tradition of His earthly life.128 
Mark, who was the first to create a connected account of Jesus’ entire ministry, 
expressed a Christ-mythology in passages like the Transfiguration of Jesus (Mk 
9.2-13); he had at least a need of making room within the earthly life of Jesus 
for a mythology of Christ.129 Dibelius sums up his view of the relationship of the 
tradition within the Gospel to the Christian mythology:
Also ist das Markus-Evangelium seinem letzten Gepräge nach gewiß 
ein mythisches Buch — aber was von der Prägung gilt, gilt nicht vom 
Material: die in dem Evangelium gesammelte Tradition ist nur zum 
kleinsten Teil, in den Epiphanie-Geschichten und in einigen Novellen, 
mythischen Charakters; in der Mehrzahl ihrer Stücke erscheint Jesus 
nicht als mythische Person.130
 Dibelius argued that Mark was the first collector of material who created a 
connected account of Jesus’ entire ministry in the Greek language, while there 
may have been predecessors who collected sayings material. Dibelius viewed 
Mark as a relatively faithful user and reproducer of the tradition: while making 
way for the possibility of viewing Jesus as the Messiah, he indicated why Jesus 
was not recognized as such.131 Mark’s Gospel thus constituted a book of secret 
epiphanies.132 The Passion story was an exception to the rule that the Jesus 
tradition originally circulated as isolated units; it functioned, in its own category, 
as an early connected account.133
127  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 265-68.
128  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 265-68. Dibelius, From Tradition, p. xv, defines myth as ‘a story 
which deals with a particular relation and action of a god’.
129  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 275-77.
130  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 279.
131  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 225-26, referred to the idea of ‘Das Messiasgeheimniss in der 
Evangelien’ by Wrede.
132  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 219-34; idem, From Tradition, pp. 218-30. Eve, Behind, p. 20: 
‘unrecognized revelations of God at work in Jesus’.
133  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 178-218; idem, From Tradition, pp. 178-217; so already Schmidt, 
Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu; cf. Taylor, The Formation of the Gospel Tradition, p. 13.
32
 While outlining the different forms of the tradition quite specifically, Dibelius 
was less explicit about his model of oral tradition and the relationship between 
oral and written stages. Dibelius’ model was focused on the motifs and impersonal 
laws, which caused the different forms of tradition to be transmitted within early 
Christianity, where there was a strong escha tological expectation concerning the 
near future.134 Dibelius referred to folklore, and especial ly Herder’s understanding 
of it, to explain what the different types or forms of the tradition were like, but he 
payed less attention to the processes of folkloric transmission of traditions.135 
Regarding the laws which the different forms of tradition followed, Dibelius used 
the folkloric understanding of the community as the impersonal transmitter of 
the tradition; it was the entire community, or the rather vague groups of which 
that community consisted (preachers, teachers, storytellers), which collected, 
shaped and passed on the Jesus tradition, ruling out any individual influence on 
the tradition. Dibelius’ work will be critiqued below after presenting the views of 
Rudolf Bultmann, the other major proponent of early form criticism.
2.1.2 Rudolf Bultmann
Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976) mentions William Wrede (1859–1906), Herrmann 
Gunkel and Julius Wellhausen (1844–1918) as some of his major influences.136 
Wellhausen, who is better known for his work on the Old Testament, had shown 
in his studies on the Synoptic Gospels that the tradition consisted of individual 
stories or groups of stories, which had been joined together in the Gospels by 
the editors. Bultmann valued Wellhausen’s conclusion that it was not enough to 
assume that these editors used simply an oral tradition. It was necessary to dis-
cover what the original units of the Synoptic Gospels were, both sayings and 
stories, to try to establish what their historical setting was.137
 Bultmann shared many of his ideas with Dibelius. He believed that there 
was an analogy between the Synoptic tradition and folklore’s theory of the 
formation of tradition by an anonymous community. The tradition had developed 
according to impersonal laws. The editors of the Gospels did not produce proper 
134  Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 9-10, 241; idem, From Tradition, pp. 10-11.
135  For Herder’s view, see Werner G. Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of its Problems 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1972), pp. 79-83; also, Eve, Behind, p. 20. 
136  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 1-3; idem, History, pp. 1-3.
137  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 2-3. 
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literature, but only Kleinliteratur. Bultmann also saw a correlation between the 
forms of the tradition and their sociological settings; Sitz im Leben was not an 
individual historical event, but a typical situation or occupation in the life of the 
community.138
 Despite the family resemblance, Bultmann’s methodology differed from that of 
Dibelius. As opposed to Dibelius’ ‘constructive’ method, Bultmann’s approach was 
‘analytic’ in that he preferred to start with analyzing the particular elements in 
the Gospel tradition, aiming to de duce life-settings from the analysis, rather than 
assuming the typical uses of the tradition a priori. Bultmann did recognize the 
inevitable circularity of the form-critical task: ‘Aus den Formen der literarischen 
Überlieferung soll auf die Motive des Gemeinschaftslebens zurück geschlossen 
werden, und aus dem Gemeinschaftsleben heraus sollen die Formen verständlich 
gemacht werden.’139
 More than Dibelius, Bultmann emphasized the necessity of making judgements 
about the historical authenticity of the material. Generally, his more thorough 
analysis of the pericopae, which aimed to assign each unit of the tradition to either 
a Palestinian or a Hellenistic setting within early Christianity, led to skeptical 
conclusions. While Dibelius had been relatively op timistic about the importance 
and historical reliability of certain elements in the pre-Synoptic tradition (for 
example, the paradigms), Bultmann argued that one can know practically noth-
ing about the life and person of Jesus.140 Of course, Dibelius’ overall conclusion 
about the his torical Jesus was not much more optimistic.141 This conclusion was 
understandable within the symbolic world of the time, influenced by the exegetical 
and theological-philosophical cur rents that had initially led to the collapse of the 
First Quest.142
 Bultmann classified the Gospel pericopae as apophthegms (Apophthegmata), 
dominical sayings (Herrenworte), similitudes (Gleichnisse), miracle stories 
138  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 1-8; idem, History, pp. 1-7.
139  Bultmann, Geschichte, p. 5; idem, History, p. 5: ‘The forms of the literary tradition must be used 
to establish the influences operating in the life of the community, and the life of the community 
must be used to render the forms themselves intelligible.’
140  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 5-7, with judgements about the material throughout the work.
141  See Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 300: ‘Von jenen erwähnten Ausnahmen abgesehen, verweigern 
unsere Texte die Antwort, wenn man sie nach dem Charakter, nach der „Persönlichkeit”, nach 
den Eigenschaften Jesu fragt.’ 
142  Cf. e.g. Theissen & Merz, The Historical Jesus, p. 6, on the dialectical and existentialist viewpoints, 
which influenced the early form critics’ work along with the historical-critical viewpoints of, for 
instance, Wrede and Schweitzer.
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(Wundergeschichten), and historical stories and legends (Geschichtserzählung und 
Legende). The apophthegms were Jesus’ sayings that were set in a brief context. 
They corresponded to Dibelius’ paradigms, but were not developed in preaching, 
but rather in argumentation, apologetics and polemics of the Palestinian church; 
debates with outsiders and settling of issues within the community were the 
contexts of origin. Bultmann argued that the apophthegms had a Palestinian 
origin, since they were formulated in the rabbinic style and did not include many 
Hellenistic ideas. Some of them may have included genuine sayings of Jesus, or at 
least may have demonstrated the overall sense of his sayings. The narrative settings 
had been created to clarify the views that the Christian community wanted 
to ascribe to Jesus. In accordance with his analytical method, he concluded all 
this from the content of the apophthegms. For example, it seemed implausible 
to Bultmann that, in Mk 2.23-28, the Pharisees would be in a cornfield on the 
Sabbath, waiting to catch the disciples of Jesus plucking ears of corn; they protest 
against the disciples (‘the post-Easter community’), but Jesus nevertheless 
provides the vindication.143
 Bultmann divided other sayings of Jesus into subcategories, being more 
specific in his analysis of the sayings material than Dibelius.144 The logia, which 
depict Jesus as the teacher of wisdom, were parallel to the similar sayings in the 
143  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 8-73; idem, History, pp. 11-69. Contrary to Bultmann’s skeptical view, 
it has been argued by Sven-Olav Back, ‘Jesus and the Sabbath’, in T. Holmén & S. E. Porter (eds.), 
Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus (4 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 3:2597-633 (2607-
8), that the charge of the Pharisees against the disciples is historically plausible; plucking was 
commonly viewed as harvesting, and the prohibition of harvesting (Exod. 34.21) was observed 
by both the ‘priestly’ and ‘non-priestly’ schools of thought, including the Pharisees; the action 
of plucking of grain on the Sabbath was considered הָכאָלְמ (‘work’) and a violation of both the 
Pharisaic and common Sabbath halakhah. Back, ‘Jesus and the Sabbath’, pp. 3:2597-633 (2618-20) 
points out some problems in Bultmann’s idea that the Sitz im Leben of the ‘controversy dialogues’ 
such as Mk 2.18-20 and 2.23-26 was the apologetics and polemics of the primitive Palestinian 
church (cf. e.g. Bultmann, History, p. 50). For example, it is difficult to imagine a post-Easter 
community (‘disciples’) being attacked for not fasting and then defending itself with a reference 
to Jesus’ physical presence (Mk 2.18-19a); the alternative, namely, that the community originally 
referred to Jesus’ ‘spiritual’ or ‘mystical’ presence, but was later reinterpreted as being ‘physical’ 
(through the addition of 2.19b-20), is not any more likely. Further, regarding Mk 2.23-26, the 
criticism by the Pharisees does not require an origin in the post-Easter community, since it 
is entirely plausible to think that it is Jesus, the teacher held responsible for the actions of his 
disciples, who is being criticized, not the disciples. See also the dissertation, Sven-Olav Back, 
Jesus of Nazareth and the Sabbath Commandment (Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 1995).
144  Throughout his work, Bultmann offers extensive lists of the sayings material in the Synoptic 
Gospels, as well as, what he thinks is the parallel material elsewhere in Jewish and other literature. 
See e.g. Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 73-179; idem, History, pp. 69-166.
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proverbial literature of different peoples (esp. oriental literature), even though 
many of the Synoptic logia, attributed to Jesus, were reminiscent of traditional 
Jewish proverbs, in other words, Old Testament and Jewish me shalim.145 Regarding 
the genuineness of the logia, Bultmann argued that there are several pos sibilities: 
Jesus may sometimes have taken a popular proverb and altered it (he could even 
sometimes have coined one himself); often times secular proverbs could have 
been turned into Jesus’ sayings by the church when setting them into the context 
of the tradition. Sayings which were handed down for edification and warning 
could easily be treated as dominical. Some genuine ones could still be detected on 
the basis of features that went beyond popular wisdom to something new.146
 Bultmann suggested that many of the prophetic and apocalyptic logia were 
originally Jewish sayings, which had been espoused by the Christian tradition 
and attributed to Jesus. Only the sayings that implied imminent eschatological 
expectation could go back to Jesus,147 though even some of them had been 
refashioned in the light of the community’s experience. Like Dibelius, Bultmann 
saw no distinction between the church’s attitude towards sayings of the earthly 
Jesus and sayings of the risen Lord, which were spoken from the mouths of the 
Christian prophets.148 Further, the legal sayings and church rules comprised rules 
for church discipline in the Palestinian church. This material, like other sayings 
material, included, in Bultmann’s view, genuine sayings of Jesus, Jewish sayings 
adapted to a Christian use, and new inventions attributed to Jesus. Bultmann 
thought that these sayings were collected and modified into a catechism at a late 
written stage of tradition; this catechism was then used by Mark as a source for 
such material.149’
 Bultmann also analyzed the different kinds of figurative speech in the Jesus 
145  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 73-113; idem, History, pp. 69-108. Bultmann’s lists mainly contain 
rabbinic parallels; thus Eve, Behind, p. 22, rightly notes that by ‘Jewish’ Bultmann seems to have 
meant ‘rabbinic’.
146  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 105-6. Bultmann considers a saying the more authentic the more 
it contains individual content and shows Jesus as the preacher of repentance and the coming 
kingdom.
147  This may be due to Bultmann’s overall concern (present also in Dibelius) to discover a Jesus (an 
eschatological preacher of repentance) and a primitive church that are religiously superior to 
contemporary Judaism and Hellenistic paganism. On Bultmann’s overall concern regarding the 
historical Jesus, see e.g. Theissen and Winter, The Plausible Jesus, pp. 19-26, 95-121, 132-36; cf. 
Eve, Behind, pp. 27-28.
148  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 113-38; idem, History, pp. 108-30.
149  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 138-61; see also the ‘Ich-Worte’ on pp. 161-76.
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tradition, such as similitudes, metaphors and story parables. Among other things, 
he discussed the formal characteristics of the parables: narration is generally 
concise and often times fulfills what is called the law of stage duality (only two 
actors or groups of actors appear in the narrative). The contexts and applications 
linked with them in the Gospels were often less important; sometimes this kind of 
material had been allegorically expanded.150
 Regarding the narrative material, Bultmann first dealt with the miracle stories, 
which correspond to Dibelius’ tales. The miracle stories were changed and 
developed in the course of the tradition; in some cases the miraculous element 
had enlarged. While historical events may be the basis of some of the healing 
stories, their narrative forms resulted from the development of the tradition. 
Bultmann did not exclude the possibility that the OT stories contributed to the 
miracle stories in the Jesus tradition; neither did he deny that the church may have 
originated some of the stories and projected them back onto the pre-Easter Jesus. 
Nevertheless, it was more probable that folk stories of miracles were introduced 
to the Jesus tradition; the Gospel miracle stories display stylistic similarity to 
the Jewish and Hellenistic parallels. Further, some of the miracle stories were 
probably ascribed to Jesus in the Palestinian church, as some of the apophthegms 
mention miracles; others must have been developed in a Hellenistic context, since 
they represented a Hellenistic ‘divine-man’ Christology. New ideas, editions (such 
as geographical references) and expansions were introduced to the stories within 
the Christian tradition.151
 Bultmann categorized a large amount of the narrative material into historical 
stories and legends, viewing the latter much like Dibelius. Here, too, the question 
of origin was central: did the material have a Palestinian or Hellenistic origin? For 
example, the temptation story, recorded in Mk 1.12-13, is regarded as a Palestinian 
form, which encapsulates a Hellenistic idea of Son of God, while Peter’s words 
in the confession narrative (Mk 8.27-30) could not have been formulated in any 
other place than the Palestinian church, where Peter was a re spected leader.152 
Like Schmidt and Dibelius, Bultmann treated the Passion Narrative as an early 
continuous narrative; he viewed the primitive version as somewhat less extensive 
150  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 179-223; idem, History, pp. 166-205; cf. Eve, Behind, p. 23.
151  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 223-60; idem, History, pp. 209-44.
152  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 260-82; idem, History, pp. 244-62.
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than Dibelius.153 Bultmann argued that dogmatic and apologetic ideas had affected 
the Easter sto ries,154 and that the idea of virgin birth, a motif foreign to Judaism, 
was added in a Hellenistic setting.155
 Bultmann acknowledged the diversity of the narrative material; hence, no 
unified origin or tradition history could be traced from their form. Palestinian 
messianic expectations and Hellenistic motifs gave rise to some of the individual 
units; within the Christian tradition, there was a tendency to view the life of 
Jesus through the Christian faith and worship. Other tendencies which could be 
detected in the legendary material included, for example, individu alization of 
characters by naming them, introduction of novelistic details, the law of repeti-
tion, and the use of the numbers two and three.156
 No clear boundary was drawn between the oral and written stages of the Jesus 
tradition by Bultmann, who basically held that the same laws would operate in 
both the oral tradition and the written tradition.157 Bultmann argued that the 
Gospel of Mark was the result of the process, in which groups of sayings material, 
controversy and miracle narratives, parables, and other material had developed 
into written sources that could be used by Mark. In accordance with the form 
critics’ low estimation of the primitive Christian literary capacities, Mark was 
not viewed as a master of his material; he nevertheless managed to create a ‘book 
of secret epiphanies’158 and put together the Hellenistic Kerygma about Christ, 
found, for example, in Phil. 2.6ff. and Rom. 3.24 within the Pauline corpus, and 
the Jesus traditions, originated in the Palestinian church.159
2.1.3 Critique & Evaluation
The presuppositions and the methodical choices of the two form critics have been 
broadly discussed in subsequent literature, with the degree of agreement varying 
153  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 282-308; idem, History, pp. 262-84. Bultmann, History, p. 279, states, 
‘there was a primitive narrative which told very briefly of the arrest, the condemnation by the 
Sanhedrin and Pilate, the journey to the cross, the crucifixion and death. This was developed at 
various stages, in part by earlier stories that were available and in part by forms that had newly 
appeared.’
154  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 308-16; idem, History, pp. 284-91.
155  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 316-28; idem, History, pp. 291-301.
156  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 329-47; idem, History, pp. 302-17; Eve, Behind, p. 24.
157  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 6-8, with judgements throughout the work.
158  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 356-57, agrees with Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 225-26, on the 
nature of Mark’s Gospel.
159  Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 348-92; idem, History, pp. 321-50.
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from the adoption of form criticism to a complete rebuttal of it.160 Some critique 
160  See e.g. Henry J. Cadbury, ‘Between Jesus and the Gospels’, pp. 81-92; Erich Fascher, Die 
Formgeschichtliche Methode: Eine Darstellung und Kritik. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des 
synoptischen Problems (Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1924); Ernest F. Scott, ‘The New Criticism 
of the Gospels’, HTR 19 (1926), pp. 143-63; Burton Scott Easton, The Gospel before the Gospels 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1928); John J. Collins, ‘Form Criticism and the Synoptic Gospels: A 
Summary Study and Criticism’, TS 2 (1941), pp. 388-400; Taylor, The Formation of the Gospel 
Tradition; Wilfred L. Knox, The Sources of the Synoptic Gospels (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1953, 1957); Harald Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings: A 
Study in the Limits of ‘Formgeschichte’ (London: Mowbray, 1957); idem, The Gospel Tradition 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970); Birger Gerhardsson, Memory & Manuscript: Oral Tradition and 
Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity (Lund: Gleerup, 1961); idem, 
Tradition & Transmission in Early Christianity (Lund: Gleerup, 1964); idem, The Reliability of 
the Gospel Tradition (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001); Edgar V. McKnight, What is Form 
Criticism? (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969); Howard M. Teeple, ‘The Oral Tradition that Never 
Existed’, JBL 89 (1970), pp. 56-68; Morna Hooker, ‘Christology and Methodology’, NTS 17 
(1970), pp. 480-87; idem, ‘On Using the Wrong Tool’, Theology 75 (1972), pp. 570-81; John C. 
Meagher, ‘Die Form- und Redaktionsungeschickliche Methoden: The Principle of Clumsiness 
and the Gospel of Mark’, JAAR 43 (1975), pp. 459-72; Graham N. Stanton, ‘Form Criticism 
Revisited’, in Morna Hooker & Colin Hickling (eds.), What about the New Testament? Essays in 
Honour of Christopher Evans (Festschrift C. Evans; London: SCM, 1975), pp. 13-27; Stephen H. 
Travis, ‘Form Criticism’, in I. Howard Marshall (ed.), New Testament Interpretation: Essays on 
Principles and Methods (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1977), pp. 153-64; E. Earle Ellis, ‘New Directions in 
Form Criticism’, in E. Earle Ellis, Prophecy and Hermeneutic in Early Christianity: New Testament 
Essays (WUNT, 18; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1978), pp. 237-53; idem, ‘The Synoptic Gospels and 
History’, in Bruce Chilton & Craig A. Evans (eds.), Authenticating the Activities of Jesus (NTTS, 
28; Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 49-57; Erhardt Güttgemanns, Candid Questions Concerning Gospel 
Form Criticism: A Methodological Sketch of the Fundamental Problematics of Form and Redaction 
Criticism (trans. William G. Doty; Pittsburgh: Pickwick, 1979); Walter Schmithals, ‘Kritik der 
Formkritik’, ZTK 77 (1980), pp. 149-85; Reiner Blank, Analyse und Kritik der formgeschichtlichen 
Arbeiten von Martin Dibelius und Rudolf Bultmann (Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt, 1981); Rainer 
Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer: Eine Untersuchung zum Ursprung der Evangelien-Überlieferung 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1981); Werner H. Kelber, The Oral and the Written Gospel: The 
Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 2-8; idem, ‘The Case of the Gospels: Memory’s Desire and 
the Limits of Historical Criticism’, Oral Tradition 17 (2002), pp. 55-86; idem, ‘Rethinking the 
Oral-Scribal Transmission/Performance of the Jesus Tradition’, in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), 
Jesus Research: New Methodologies and Perceptions. The Second Princeton-Prague Symposium on 
Jesus Research (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), pp. 500-30 (502-9); E. P. Sanders & Margret 
Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels (London: SCM, 1989), pp. 127-134; Robert C. Culley, 
‘Oral Tradition and Biblical Studies’, in John Miles Foley (ed.), Oral-Formulaic Theory (New 
York: Garland, 1990), pp. 189-225; Vernon K. Robbins, ‘Form Criticism: New Testament’, ABD 
2 (1992), pp. 841-44; Wright, People of God, pp. 418-27; Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 34-38; 
idem, ‘Review of Rudolf Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition’, JBL 122 (2003), pp. 
549-55; idem, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition: Reflections on James D. G. Dunn’s 
Jesus Remembered’, JSNT 26 (2004), pp. 459-71; idem, ‘A Century with the Sitz im Leben. From 
Form-Critical Setting to Gospel Community and Beyond’, ZNW 98 (2007), pp. 1-27; Darrell L. 
Bock, ‘Form Criticism’, in David Alan Black & David S. Dockery (eds.), Interpreting the New 
Testament: Essays on Methods and Issues (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2001), pp. 106-
27; Theissen and Winter, The Plausible Jesus, pp. 95-121; Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 127-
28, 192-95, 248-49; Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness 
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and evaluation of the subsequent discussion is provided here on the different 
elements of the form-critical constructions of Dibelius and Bultmann about the 
nature and transmission of Jesus traditions, as well as their consequences for the 
task of studying the historical Jesus. The fuller information now available has 
questioned the plausibility of most aspects of their theories, while some of their 
ideas remain, if no more, as meaningful starting points for discussion.
 First, the assumption of especially Bultmann that the tradition existed in 
detectable ‘pure’ or ‘original’ forms has been considered untenable; it is more 
reasonable to think that the traditions existed in multiple and modified forms 
from the start.161 It has been pointed out that not many Gospel pericopae actually 
illustrate ‘the ideal types’ of the forms, which indicates the necessity of ‘a more 
nuanced approach to form’.162 While this criticism is broadly justified, some 
concern has been raised about the critics’ tendency to somewhat undermine 
the Evangelists’ redactional activity by viewing many of the parallel versions of 
traditions simply as ‘oral variants’; it is reasonable to ask whether all literary work 
on the part of the Gospel authors can be viewed merely as reproduction of the 
version of oral tradition known to them.163 Also, the rejection of the notion of 
Testimony (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), pp. 241-49; idem, ‘Gospel Traditions: Anonymous 
Community Traditions or Eyewitness Testimony’, in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), Jesus Research: 
New Methodologies and Perceptions. The Second Princeton-Prague Symposium on Jesus Research 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), pp. 483-90; Terence C. Mournet, Oral Tradition and Literary 
Dependency: Variability and Stability in the Synoptic Tradition and Q (WUNT, 195; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2005); idem, ‘The Jesus Tradition as Oral Tradition’, in Kelber and Byrskog (eds.), 
Jesus in Memory: Traditions in Oral and Scribal Perspectives (Waco: Baylor University Press, 
2009), pp. 39-61; Christopher Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, in Kelber and Byrskog (eds.), Jesus in 
Memory, pp. 21-38; Arland J. Hultgren, ‘Form Criticism and Jesus Research’, in T. Holmén & 
S. E. Porter (eds.), Handbook, pp. 1:649-71; Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 27-70 (30-35); idem, ‘The 
Indebtedness of the Criteria Approach to Form Criticism and Recent Attempts to Rehabilitate 
the Search for an Authentic Jesus’, in Chris Keith & Anthony Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, 
and the Demise of Authenticity (New York: T & T Clark, 2012), pp. 25-48; Eve, Behind, pp. 15-32; 
Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 33-34; Bird, Gospel, pp. 113-24.
161  Travis, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 153-64 (158-59); Blank, Analyse und Kritik, p. 201; Kelber, Oral and 
Written, pp. 29, 59, 62; Sanders & Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels, p. 127; Gerhardsson, The 
Reliability, p. 83; Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 128, 193-95, 201; Mournet, Oral Tradition and 
Literary Dependency, pp. 71-72; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 246; Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 
21-38 (33); Eve, Behind, p. 28; cf. Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 2-4, as well as comments throughout 
the text. Dibelius did note, however, different levels of ‘purity’, for instance, when categorizing the 
paradigms into ‘the type in noteworthy purity’ and ‘a less pure type’. See Dibelius, Formgeschichte, 
p. 40; idem, From Tradition, p. 43.
162  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 246. See Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 201, on the point made by 
Kelber, Oral and Written: ‘if Jesus said something more than once there is no “original”’.
163  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (33-34); cf. Kelber, ‘The Case of the Gospels’, pp. 55-86 (64); 
Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 248-49; Mournet, Oral Tradition and Literary Dependency, pp. 71-
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‘original form’, may not in all cases rule out the possibility of finding an earlier 
form of a Markan tradition.164 
 Another major point of criticism is the strict correlation between a form and 
Sitz im Leben as suggested by Dibelius and Bultmann. There are no grounds to 
think that one tradition is only linked with one context; rather, the traditions 
could have had different functions in different contexts,165 while diverse forms 
could be employed in the same context.166 The one-to-one correlation between a 
form and Sitz im Leben has been shown to be a false assumption in the cases of 
oral poetry and oral tradition in general.167 
 Dibelius’ constructive method which assumed the conditions and activities of 
the life of the first Christian communities (‘social settings’) has been criticized 
for being based on too little evidence. Against Dibelius’ notion that the primitive 
tradition was mainly formulated by means of preaching, it has been argued by 
Erhardt Güttgemanns, for example, that Dibelius relied too much on the value 
of Luke 1.1-4 as a historical source, his concept of preaching was too idealized 
to have the supposed sociological explanatory power, and the speeches of Acts, 
as Lukan constructions, cannot be used to support Dibelius’ viewpoint.168 While 
Güttge manns’ criticism of Dibelius’ rather idealistic notion of preaching as a 
‘sociological setting’ is probably valid, the notion of impossibility of any sequence 
72. Cf. the discussion below on the the memory approach (Ch. 3).
164  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (34, 216 n. 70). Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21–38 (26, 
211 n. 28), refers to the classic example about fasting in Mk 2.18-20, ‘where the saying in v. 20, 
apparently allowing a reintroduction of fasting after the “bridegroom” (=Jesus?) has gone away, 
seems to be a secondary addition to an earlier tradition reflected in vv. 18-19, where Jesus says 
that fasting is inappropriate in the new situation (by implication that of his ministry).’ On the 
view that Mk 2.18-20 reflects the Sitz im Leben of the post-Easter community, however, see the 
criticism in Back, ‘Jesus and the Sabbath’, pp. 3:2597-633 (2618-20), also referred to above.
165  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (35), points to the tradition of the Last Supper, which may 
have been used by early Christians in the context of the cult as a story repeated at the Eucharist 
(so Dibelius, From Tradition, p. 205; Bultmann, History, p. 265), but it was also used by Paul 
as a part of community paraenesis to the Corinthians in 1 Cor. 11. See Theissen & Merz, The 
Historical Jesus, p. 109.
166  Stanton, ‘Form Criticism Revisited’, pp. 13-27 (23); Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer, pp. 12-13; Theissen 
& Merz, The Historical Jesus, p. 109; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 246; Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, 
pp. 21-38 (35); Eve, Behind, p. 28.
167  On oral poetry, see Ruth Finnegan, Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance and Social Context 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 260; on oral tradition in general, Jan Vansina, 
Oral Tradition as History (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 101: oral traditions 
‘often serve multiple purposes and uses’. The citation also in Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 246; 
Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (35, 216 n. 78).
168  Eve, Behind, p. 21; Güttgemanns, Candid Questions, pp. 297-302; cf. Dibelius, From Tradition, 
pp. 10-17.
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(or ‘a skeleton outline’) in the pre-Markan tradition apart from the Passion 
Narrative, has been brought to question by many.169
 Bultmann’s use of the Sitz im Leben also seems too vague. First, he did not 
specifically explain what Sitz im Leben he aimed to link to which of the forms, 
though his final summary on the development of the tradition may offer some 
clarification on what could have been demonstrated in the previous sections.170 
Secondly, Bultmann’s categories of life-settings (apologetic, polemic, paraenesis, 
church discipline and propaganda) do not bear any more of the sociological 
weight put on them than Dibelius’ notion of preaching; as such, they function 
as very general categories for early Christian communal life and do not explicitly 
correlate with the particular forms ascribed to them.171
 Rather than demonstrating the correlation of the life-settings with the forms, 
both Dibelius and Bultmann overemphasized the distinction between Palestinian 
and Hellenistic settings.172 The simplified distinction is untenable, since it 
169  On the notion that Mark’s framework actually conforms to the pattern found in Acts, particularly 
in Acts 10.37-43 in the speech of Peter in Cornelius’ house, see Charles Harold Dodd, The 
Apostolic Preaching and its Developments. Three Lectures with and Appendix on Eschatology 
and History (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1936), pp. 17-35, 46-52; idem, New Testament 
Studies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953), pp. 1-11. For the defense and further 
articulation of Dodd’s position, see Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings, pp. 10-
11; Robert W. Guelich, ‘The Gospel Genre’, in Peter Stuhlmacher (ed.), Das Evangelium und 
die Evangelien. Vorträge vom Tübinger Symposium 1982 (WUNT, 28; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1983), pp. 183-219 (209-13); Donald Guthrie, New Testament Introduction (Leicester: Apollos, 
rev. edn., 1990), pp. 76-78); Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 284-88; contra Dennis E. Nineham, 
‘The Order of Events in St. Mark’s Gospel – an Examination of Dr. Dodd’s Hypothesis’, in Dennis 
E. Nineham (ed.), Studies in the Gospels. Essays in Memory of R. H. Lightfoot (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1955), pp. 223-39; idem, The Gospel of St Mark; Güttgemanns, Candid Questions; pace Tuckett, 
‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (28-29). Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (29, 213 n.40), entertains 
that some of the narrative elements (such as the chreia) may not be secondary and that his 
general view (i.e. the ordering of events in the written Gospels are results of later editing process 
during the writing the Gospels), ‘applies only to the ordered narratives of our present Gospels 
taken as wholes’. So also, Eve, Behind, p. 31: ‘It [the lack of essential chronological relation or 
organizing framework] is indeed suggested by a comparison of the Synoptic Gospels, where one 
Evangelist may use a pericope in a context quite different from that in which it appears in the 
work of another. It is also suggested by the structure of the Gospels, in which one incident often 
follows another without any essential connection or substantial narrative link.’
170  Eve, Behind, p. 25; cf. Bultmann, History, p. 368.
171  Eve, Behind, p. 25. In many respects sympathetic towards the form-critical categorization of 
the Jesus traditions, Manson, ‘The Quest of the Historical Jesus – Continued,’ p. 5, nevertheless 
pointed out: ‘We can list these stories in the Gospels. We can label them…But a paragraph in 
Mark is not penny the better or the worse as historical evidence for being labeled, “Apophthegm,” 
or “Pronouncement Story” or “Paradigm”.’ Reference in Bird, Gospel, p. 122. 
172  Martin Hengel, Judentum und Hellenismus: Studien zu ihrer Begegnung unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung Palästinas bis zur Mitte des 2. Jh.s v. Chr (WUNT, 10; Tübingen: Mohr, 2nd rev. 
edn, 1973); idem, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in Palestine during the Early 
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underestimates the effect of Hellenism in the first-century Palestine.173 Also, the 
Dead Sea Scrolls undermine the model of Palestinian implying ‘early’ versus 
Hellenistic implying ‘late’, since many ideas previously considered ‘Hellenistic’ 
have been shown from the Scrolls to be present within first-century Palestinian 
Judaism.174 In particular, Bultmann’s idea of the apophthegms as ‘Palestinian’ 
fails to recognize the chreiai, which occur widely in the Greco-Roman literature 
and Hellenistic world and display very close parallels to such stories.175 It now 
appears problematic to associate Palestinian with rabbinic, as Bultmann did, since 
the rabbinic material cannot do justice to the diversity of Palestinian Judaism.176 
Bultmann’s assignation of the majority of the miracle stories to a Hellenistic 
origin simply on account of their apparently Hellenistic form is also questioned.177 
Bultmann did not attempt to draw a social distinction between a rural Galilean 
setting and an urban Greco-Roman setting, which could possibly have been 
more fruitful than mere identification of different traditions as Palestinian or 
Hellenistic.178
 Likewise, the assumption of homeostasis179, the anthropological idea of a perfect 
Hellenistic Period (trans. John Bowden; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974); idem, Juden, Griechen, und 
Barbaren (Stuttgart: KBW, 1976); Gerhardsson, The Origins of the Gospel Traditions (London: 
SCM), pp. 13-14; Wright, People of God, pp. 420-21; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 247-48; Tuckett, 
‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (29-31); Eve, Behind, pp. 25-26; cf. e.g. Dibelius, Formgeschichte, 
pp. 130-78; Bultmann, Geschichte, p. 5, as well as judgements about the origin of traditions 
throughout the text.
173  See esp. Hengel, Judentum und Hellenismus, pp. 120-52, who argues that Hellenistic culture deeply 
affected Palestine and was accepted by a great number of Jews in the period after Alexander the 
Great’s victory at Issos in 333 BCE. See also Hengel, Juden, Griechen, und Barbaren.
174  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (30).
175  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (30, 214 n. 49); Sanders & Davies, Studying the Synoptic 
Gospels, p. 137. Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 150-64, also mentioned the parallel between the 
Paradigm and chreia in the second German edition of his work, but nevertheless ignored it due 
to supposedly differing contents.
176  Cf. Birger Gerhardsson’s view below (Ch. 2.2.2), on the assumption that the basic pedagogical 
methods of the later rabbinic period would have existed among Palestinian Jews before 70 CE.
177  Eve, Behind, p. 26. The Gospel miracle stories owe, according to Eve, more to their use by the 
Evangelists than to their origin and tradition history.
178  Eve, Behind, p. 25.
179  The concept was initially used by Jack Goody & Ian Watt, ‘The Consequences of Literacy’, in J. 
Goody (ed.), Literacy in Traditional Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 
pp. 27-68, and has basically been understood as denoting that societies and groups performing 
oral traditions only preserve those parts of the tradition that are relevant to the present situation. 
Goody & Watt, ‘The Consequences’, pp. 27-68 (31), did nevertheless express some reservations by 
pointing out certain factors (such as formalized patterns of speech, recital under ritual condition, 
etc.) that ‘may shield at least part of the content of memory from the transmuting influence of the 
immediate pressures of the present’. See Byrskog, Story as History, p. 132.
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correspondence between the traditions and their use within the society that hands 
them on, was overemphasized by the form critics, who argued that there was no 
real interest in the past and the earthly Jesus within early Christianity: prophetic 
oracles would be merged with Jesus’ original sayings (especially according to 
Bultmann) and main attention was directed towards the future (an emphasis of 
Dibelius).180 Even though the form-critical notion must not be denied that ‘Jesus 
traditions were used and developed by early Christians in ways that related to 
their own concerns’,181 it has been shown that historical information, including 
archaic features, can be preserved in oral tradition without a clear function in the 
community.182 In fact, some of the preserved traditions do not reflect positively 
the views of the community. The reality that some traditions may be handed on by 
some in the community to communicate with others within the same community 
undermines the form-critical notion of the collective, which anonymously handed 
on the traditions; there may have been a situation where individual members of 
the community wanted to speak to the other members of the community.183 It 
is problematic, especially in the work of Bultmann, that the Gospel controversy 
stories involving Jesus and his opponents are often taken to reflect similar 
controversies in early Christianity; the reasoning pushes the circularity (present 
in any historical investigation) too far, since the possibility of there being ‘archaic 
features’ in the controversy traditions is ruled out at the outset.184
180  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 131-33; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 246; idem, ‘Gospel Traditions: 
Anonymous Community Traditions or Eyewitness Testimony’, pp. 483-99 (485-86); Tuckett, 
‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (34-35). Cf. Eve, Behind, p. 29, who, while noticing that early 
Christians were not completely uninterested in the earthly Jesus, is inclined to think that 
the form critics’ characterization of the preserved Gospel material was generally correct in 
acknowledging that the material was such that ‘would serve the practical interests of the Church’. 
Regarding Bultmann’s skeptical decisions about the ‘historicity’ of the forms, Eve, Behind, p. 32, 
notes nevertheless: ‘It is simply an assumption that proposing a present function for a piece of 
tradition automatically discredits its historicity, although it is an assumption Bultmann appears 
to have shared with Maurice Halbwachs.’ See also Barry Schwartz, ‘Christian Origins: Historical 
Truth and Social Memory’, in A. Kirk & T. Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, and Text: Uses of 
the Past in Early Christianity (SBLSS, 52; Atlanta: SBL, 2005), pp. 43-56 (47-51). Eve, Behind, pp. 
29-30, does not deem form criticism’s attempt to link form and social setting convincing.
181  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (37).
182  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 246; idem, ‘Gospel Traditions: Anonymous Community Traditions or 
Eyewitness Testimony’, pp. 483-99 (485-86); Byrskog, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition’, 
pp. 459-71 (468-70); Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (34-35); Vansina, Oral Tradition as 
History, pp. 121-22.
183  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (35); Byrskog, ‘A Century with the Sitz im Leben’, pp. 1-27 
(16).
184  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (35). For example, Bultmann, History, pp. 12, 16, viewed 
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 Furthermore, the form critics’ notion of regular and identifiable development 
of the tradition (for Dibelius and Bultmann its expansion and elaboration, 
for Vincent Taylor its abbreviation and smoothing out) cannot be relied on.185 
Bultmann’s idea that the ways the oral tradition developed can be derived from 
the written tradition was demonstrated unsuitable by E. P. Sanders, who himself 
subscribed to Bultmann’s assumption that oral and written developments 
were comparable.186 Sanders concluded from his study of the later manuscript 
tradition of the canonical Gospels and the non-canonical Gospel tradition: 
There are no hard and fast laws of the development of the Synoptic 
tradition. On all counts the tradition developed in opposite directions. It 
became both longer and shorter, both more and less detailed, and both 
more and less Semitic...Dogmatic statements that a certain characteristic 
proves a certain passage to be earlier than another are never justified.187
While demonstrating the weakness of the form critics’ notion of ‘laws of 
tradition’, Sanders himself becomes subject to criticism for not paying attention 
to the differences between oral and literary stages of tradition. It can certainly be 
questioned whether his study applies to the nature of oral tradition as oral.188 
 Bultmann’s analysis was mainly focused on his observations regarding the 
tendencies within the written tradition, which he tried to justify by the idea that 
there was no significant difference between the oral and written stages of the 
tradition.189 Without any distinction between the stages, Bultmann seems to have 
the Sabbath controversy stories as early Christian attempts to justify their own practices, 
which is questionable due to the lack of evidence that the question of Sabbath observance 
was controversial within early Christianity. See e.g. Back, ‘Jesus and the Sabbath’, pp. 3:2597-
633; Tuckett, ‘Jesus and the Sabbath’, in Tom Holmén (ed.), Jesus in Continuum (WUNT, 289; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), pp. 411-42.
185  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 247; Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (33); Eve, Behind, p. 28; cf. 
Taylor, The Formation of the Gospel Tradition, pp. 119-26, 202-9.
186  E. P. Sanders, The Tendencies of the Synoptic Tradition (SNTSMS, 9; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969); cf. e.g. Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 2-4.
187  Sanders, The Tendencies, p. 272. The citations are also found in Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 
21-38 (33, 215 n. 64).
188  See e.g. Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 7; Robbins, ‘Form Criticism: New Testament’, pp. 841-44 
(842); Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 248; Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (33); cf. Sanders, The 
Tendencies, p. 8: ‘the tendencies of the one are presumably the tendencies of the other’. This issue 
is a recurring theme in this study.
189  Eve, Behind, p. 26. How Matthew and Luke redacted Mark and Q was central to Bultmann’s 
analysis.
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treated orality as a kind of writing that consisted of layers that can be excavated; 
his analysis of the changes that the Evangelists made to their sources is plausible 
as much as the written form is concerned, but fails as a description of an oral 
process, which can be illustrated as a series of performances rather than an editing 
of a written text.190 
 It has been argued that the form critics failed to demonstrate how the Jesus 
traditions could have been transmitted purely orally for decades; this led them to 
underestimate the literary capacities of early Christians, especially the Evangelists. 
While the world of early Christianity was predominantly oral, written texts 
were also used in relation to oral traditions.191 In an ancient context, writing was 
sometimes used as an aid for memorization of what was orally communicated.192 
While the overall rate of literacy was probably very low (approximately only 10 
per cent of the population or less) in Jewish Palestine,193 there could have been 
individuals within the earliest Jesus movement from the classes that could read 
and write.194 The question of whether or to what extent writing served as a control 
190  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 194-95; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 248-49; Mournet, ‘The Jesus 
Tradition as Oral Tradition’, pp. 39-61 (43-46); Eve, Behind, pp. 26–27. However, one needs to 
be cautious about viewing all the parallel material in the Gospels simply as ‘oral variants’. Cf. the 
comments above; Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (33-34).
191  Travis, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 153-64 (159); Ellis, ‘New Directions in Form Criticism’, pp. 237-53 
(242-47); idem, ‘The Synoptic Gospels and History’, pp. 49-57 (53-54); Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, 
p. 248; Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (31, 214 n. 56); cf. also Eve, Behind, pp. 8-14.
192  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 116; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 287–88. This is not to be taken 
as an underestimation of the role which memorization had among illiterate ancient people who 
were still, through oral communication and memorization, capable of familiarizing themselves 
with the content of written texts, such as the Hebrew Scriptures. See Eve, Behind, pp. 11-12. 
193  For a low level literacy, see e.g. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 71-123 (123): ‘Although almost all 
first-century Palestinian Jews were aware of texts and their power, and indeed organized their 
identity around (holy) texts, illiteracy was the rule of the day.’ Also, Eve, Behind, pp. 10-11; cf. 
Alan Millard, Reading and Writing in the Time of Jesus (Biblical Seminar, 69; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic, 2001), who argues for a widespread literacy. Larry W. Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman 
Textuality and the Gospel of Mark: A Critical Assessment of Werner Kelber’s The Oral and the 
Written Gospel’, BBibRes 7 (1997), pp. 91-106 (95-96, n. 13-15), suggests a widely-shared literacy 
as well as influence of the writing, reading, and hearing of texts within Jewish circles. However, 
see C. Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture and the Emergence of the First Written Gospel’, in 
Chris Keith & Dieter T. Roth (eds.), Mark, Manuscripts, and Monotheism (London: Bloomsbury 
T&T Clark, 2014), pp. 22-39 (35-36 n. 60): ‘If he [Hurtado] means that many Jews were literate, 
that is incorrect…Hurtado is correct about the cultural influence of texts, however, and here 
Stock’s distinction between “textuality” and “literacy” is important.’ On literacy, see further 
Catherine Hezser, Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine (TSAJ, 81; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001). 
On textuality/literacy, Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models 
of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983), p. 7.
194  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 288; Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer, pp. 497-98.
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on the transmission of Jesus traditions remains debated.195 However, by the point 
of the writing of Mark’s Gospel it had definitely gradually become something more 
than what is indicated by the form-critical idea of mere collection and organizing 
of traditions by unliterary men.
 Moreover, the comparability of the Jesus traditions with folklore traditions has 
been demonstrated to be a false assumption. It has been pointed out by several 
critics that the two kinds of material differ significantly from each other; it takes 
long periods of time, even generations, for folklore traditions to evolve, whereas 
the development of Jesus traditions must have happened roughly between 30 CE 
and 70 CE, namely, within about one generation.196 Folklorists themselves no 
longer subscribe to the idea of ‘romanticism’, which assumed the folk as a collective 
creator of folk traditions.197 The role of authoritative individuals in transmitting 
the tradition in cooperation with the community cannot be overlooked.198
 Herder’s view of folklore, embraced by Dibelius, has been sharply criticized for 
being based, not on empirical studies, but rather on a ‘romantic’ view of history, 
which falsely ‘equated life with orality, orality with the folk, and the folk with 
either the lower classes or the nation’.199 Güttgemanns has argued that Herder took 
over the Grimm brothers’ notion of the collective origin of fairy tales and used 
it to explain folk poetry as the product of living oral tradition.200 The underlying 
195  Eve, Behind, pp. 8-14, takes a rather skeptical view, arguing that the notes taken by the few 
literate early Christian teachers and preachers ‘remained little more than an aide-memoire’ in the 
predominantly oral culture. If such earlier notes were available to Mark decades later, the whole 
period of oral transmission could be bypassed; there just is no way of verifying whether this 
happened. On the other hand, Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 289, while stressing the importance 
of memorization, entertains a more optimistic notion of literary notes: ‘They [notebooks for the 
private use of Christian teachers] would simply have reinforced the capacity of oral transmission 
itself to preserve the traditions faithfully. They should not be imagined as proto-Gospels, though 
they may account for some of the so-called Q passages…’ Also, see Keith, ‘Early Christian Book 
Culture’, pp. 22-39 (31 n. 42, 37), who emphasizes the role of early Christian manuscripts in the 
maintenance and articulation of group identity.
196  Ellis, ‘New Directions in Form Criticism’, pp. 237-53 (244); idem, ‘The Synoptic Gospels and 
History’, pp. 49-57 (54-55); Sanders & Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels, p. 129; Gerhardsson, 
The Reliability, p. 40; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 247; idem, ‘Gospel Traditions: Anonymous 
Community Traditions or Eyewitness Testimony’, pp. 483-99 (487-88); Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, 
pp. 21-38 (32).
197  See e.g. Finnegan, Oral Poetry, pp. 30-41.
198  Blank, Analyse und Kritik, pp. 200-1; Byrskog, ‘Review of Rudolf Bultmann’, pp. 549-55 (554); 
Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 247; Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (36-37); Eve, Behind, p. 28; 
cf. the discussion on Dibelius and Bultmann above.
199  Güttgemanns, Candid Questions, p. 127; Ellis, ‘The Synoptic Gospels and History’, pp. 49-57 (54); 
Eve, Behind, p. 20; cf. also Culley, ‘Oral Tradition and Biblical Studies’, pp. 189-225 (191-94).
200  Güttgemanns, Candid Questions, pp. 184-93; Eve, Behind, pp. 20-21.
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‘romanticism’ of collectivity in Dibelius’ work, therefore, overemphasized 
the creativity of anonymous communities and refused to acknowledge the 
possibility of gifted lower-class individuals originating folk poetry.201 Along with 
Dibelius, Bultmann did not ground his view of the transmission of tradition on 
a solid theory of oral tradition. Throughout his work, examples from folklore are 
mentioned, but no reference is made to the results of empirical studies; Bultmann 
also seems to have subscribed to a ‘romantic’ notion of folklore, which assumed 
an anonymous community formation of the tradition.202
 Regardless of all the criticism leveled at Dibelius and Bultmann, some of their 
basic ideas have not been completely abandoned, even though they need some 
qualifications. In particular, the basic form-critical notion of the separability 
of the individual units of Jesus traditions is still widely accepted, even by many 
otherwise highly critical of the method.203 This notion has been qualified over the 
decades with different theories about how some individual units and pericopae 
were joined together prior to the writing of the Gospels.204 It is generally accepted 
as too simplistic to view the tradition as consisting of totally random individual 
units, only joined together for the first time by Mark (and then Matthew and 
Luke).205
 It is further suggested that a linear development from strictly isolated 
201  Güttgemanns, Candid Questions, pp. 184-93; Eve, Behind, pp. 20-21. Eve, Behind, p. 21, refers to 
Ruth Finnegan’s critique of the ‘romantic’ view of folk tradition. See Finnegan, Oral Poetry, pp. 
30-41.
202  Eve, Behind, p. 26.
203  E.g. Stanton, ‘Form Criticism Revisited’, pp. 13-27 (14); Sanders & Davies, Studying the Synoptic 
Gospels, pp. 123-24; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 242-43; Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 
(28); cf. also Eve, Behind, pp. 30-32.
204  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (28). Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (28, 213 n. 36), 
notes Mk 2:1–3:6 and Mk 4:1-34 as typical examples often mentioned in relation to the matter. 
The Q tradition in Mt. and Lk. is often taken as a major exception to this, since it is argued that 
Q indeed existed as a written document prior to Mt. and Lk. See e.g. Kloppenborg, Excavating Q; 
idem, Q, the Earliest Gospel; Hoffmann, Kloppenborg, and Robinson (eds.), The Critical Edition 
of the Q. For viewpoints that question the existence of Q, e.g. Goulder, ‘Is Q a Juggernaut?’, pp. 
667-81; Goodacre, ‘Fatigue in the Synoptics’, pp. 45-58; idem, ‘A Monopoly on Marcan Priority? 
Fallacies at the Heart of Q’, pp. 538-622; idem, The Case against Q; Peterson & Poirier (eds.), 
Marcan Priority without Q.
205  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (28); Gerd Theissen, The Gospels in Context: Social and 
Political History in the Synoptic Tradition (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1992), p. 4: rather than simply 
being transmitted in isolation, the pericopes ‘could be separated and reappear in new contexts’. 
Also Gerhardsson, The Reliability, p. 48: ‘The history of the origins of the synoptic tradition is not 
only the history of how the various parts arose and were assembled, but also the history of the 
interaction between the whole and the parts, between the total view and the concrete formation of 
the material, which certainly took place during the entire tradition formation process.’
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individual units through collections of matching material to the full Gospels 
also needs to be qualified in light of the interaction between the tradents and an 
audience.206 It cannot be overlooked that the target audience of the tradition must 
have presupposed some prior knowledge about Jesus. Indeed, one part of the 
tradition may be uttered on any one occasion, but that does not mean ‘isolated’ 
transmission in the sense of the audience not having any idea of other parts of 
the Jesus tradition. Despite acknowledging a certain degree of isolation within the 
tradition, it is reasonable to ask what point there would have been to utter a miracle 
story or even a connected Passion account if Jesus had no prior significance for 
the audience.207 Further, if some prior interest in Jesus’ significance is granted 
for the target audience,208 the question arises whether the possibility of any prior 
expectation of a chronological sequence in the tradition by the audience can be 
ruled out.209 Of course, the existence of this kind of an interest or expectation as 
such would not say anything definite about the historicity of the tradition.
 Another point where the form critics’ endeavor may not be totally invalidated 
relates to the analysis of the content of the ‘forms’ conducted by both Dibelius and 
Bultmann. Both have been criticized for failing to identify clear common formal 
features and generalized Sitz im Leben in much of the material, for example, in 
relation to the group of stories labeled ‘leg ends’.210 Also, a lot of the categorization 
of Jesus’ sayings is done on the basis of the content, not form.211 This does not, 
206  Eve, Behind, pp. 30-32; Mournet, Oral Tradition and Literary Dependency, pp. 72-73.
207  Eve, Behind, p. 32. 
208  See e.g. Manson, ‘The Quest of the Historical Jesus – Continued’, p. 6: ‘It is at least conceivable 
that one of the chief motives for preserving the stories at all, and for selecting those that were 
embodied in the Gospels, was just plain admiration and love for their hero. It is conceivable that 
he was at least as interesting, for his own sake, to people in the first century as he is to historians 
in the twentieth.’ The reference in Bird, Gospel, p. 36.
209  Cf. Donald Guthrie, New Testament Introduction (Leicester: Apollos, rev. edn., 1990), pp. 77-78, 
who can be viewed as taking the idea of ‘prior significance’ further by arguing for the possibility 
of a pre-Markan historical sequence and pointing to the church’s interest in such a sequence: 
‘There are no grounds, therefore, for maintaining that interest was lacking merely because such 
a sequence held no importance for the life and worship of the church. Would not the form of 
passion narrative have led people to expect some sequence in the remainder of the material? And 
would not catechetical instructions have fostered such an expectation? Since one third of Mark 
comprises the passion and resurrection narrative, is it not reasonable to suppose that the earlier 
material existed in some equally connected form?’
210  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (31); cf. Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 101: ‘fromme 
Erzählungen von einem heiligen Mann, an dessen Taten und Schicksalen man Interesse hat’; e.g. 
Lk. 2.41-49; in Bultmann, ‘Geschichtserzählung und Legende’.
211  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (31); see also already Easton, The Gospel before the Gospels, 
p. 74, who points out that in some of Jesus’ sayings there is no formal difference but the 
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however, invalidate the analysis completely, because the form and its content 
inevitably overlap to an extent and no rigid distinction can be easily maintained 
between the two.212 Therefore, the study of the major types of the material, that is, 
‘synchron ic form criticism’, can be viewed as meaningful, even with the differing 
categories of ‘forms’ that have been identified by different scholars.213
 The criticisms of Dibelius’ and Bultmann’s attempts to link form with Sitz im 
Leben set aside, it is not impossible to deduce something about the sociological 
realities from the tradition as a whole, which indicates continuity to a certain 
degree with classical form-criticism.214 Especially, Gerd Theissen’s studies have 
been leading the way in the sociological study of individual traditions in the 
Gospels. Theissen has proposed possible situations in early Christianity through 
an analysis, not so much of the literary forms, but of the ideological, geographical, 
and temporal perspectives that are suggested within individual traditions, as well 
as of the socio-political setting of the time.215 Resulting from this, Sitz im Leben as 
a sociological concept denoting a generalized situation for similar texts, does not 
perfectly correspond to Theissen’s sociological analysis of individual traditions. 
Yet even if the terminology has been re-articulated and the analysis conducted 
differently, it has been shown that the sociological study of the traditions has an 
enduring value.
 In sum, some of form criticism’s insights remain useful starting points for 
discussion with qualifications. This does not, however, change the reality that 
categorization is based more on content.
212  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (31).
213  See e.g. Sanders & Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels, pp. 146-86, who identify ‘chreiae’, 
‘miracle stories’ and ‘parables’ as illustrations of form-critical method; Wright, People of God, pp. 
429-35, who mentions at least four categories of the material: ‘Prophetic Acts’, ‘Controversies’, 
‘Parables’, and ‘Longer Units’. Eve, Behind, p. 31, views the form of the Paradigm as distinctive 
and imaginably a result of frequent oral use. He also identifies ‘Miracle Stories’, ‘Parables’ and 
‘Similitudes’ as recognizable forms, though that ‘may owe as much to their content as to their 
tradition history’. Also, Eve, Behind, p. 31, is critical of the ‘sayings form’: ‘For use in argumentation, 
preaching, instruction or any other such scenario proposed by the form critics, isolated sayings, 
or even sayings collections, would need to be embedded in some wider discourse (as we indeed 
find paraenetic material to be when it is deployed in the New Testament epistles).’
214  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (35-36).
215  E.g. Gerd Theissen, Soziologie der Jesusbewegung: Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte des 
Urchristentums (Theologische Existenz Heute, 194; Munich: Kaiser, 1977); idem, The Gospels 
in Context; idem, Die Religion der ersten Christen. Eine Theorie des Urchristentums; idem, ‘Die 
politische Dimension des Wirkens Jesu’, in Bruce J. Malina & Gerd Theissen (eds.), Jesus in 
neuen Kontexten (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2002), pp. 112-22. Sociological study of the Gospels 
and other New Testament writings has gained more and more scholarly attention in the last few 
decades.
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Dibelius and Bultmann’s models have become outdated; they do not offer a 
plausible method for explaining the transmission of Jesus traditions and the 
relationship between oral tradition and the Gospels within early Christianity. The 
early form criticism by Dibelius and Bultmann does not leave the scholar of the 
historical Jesus with much to work with. One of the most influential alternative 
viewpoints, namely, the so-called rabbinic model, is discussed next.
2.2 Formal Controlled Tradition216
A significant counter proposal to Dibelius’ and Bultmann’s form-critical views 
came from two Swedish scholars, Harald Riesenfeld217 (1913–2008) and his 
student Birger Gerhardsson218 (1926–2013), who can be viewed as representatives 
of a contrary trend of scholarship during the so-called New Quest.219 Deriving 
their basic influences from the work of Scandinavian Old Testament scholars,220 
both scholars argued against early form criticism’s basic tenet of flexible 
anonymous community tradition: the Jesus traditions were formally controlled 
and handed down in manners reminiscent of later rabbinic teaching and 
mnemonic techniques in the period of oral tradition. This was possible as even the 
Galilean village people were familiar with Scripture and the teaching methods of 
the time.221 Neither Riesenfeld nor Gerhardsson placed much emphasis on literary 
216  The main content of this chapter was published in T. Havukainen, ‘Birger Gerhardsson on the 
Transmission of Jesus Traditions – How Did the Rabbinic Model Advance a Scholarly Discourse?’, 
Iesus Aboensis: Åbo Akademi Journal for Historical Jesus Research 1 (2015), pp. 49-63.
217  Professor of NT exegetics in Uppsala 1953–1979. Harald Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its 
Beginnings: A Study in the Limits of ‘Formgeschichte’ (London: Mowbray, 1957); idem, The Gospel 
Tradition (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970).
218  Professor of exegetical theology in Lund University 1965–1992. Gerhardsson, Memory & 
Manuscript: Oral Tradition and Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity 
(Lund: Gleerup, 1961); idem, Tradition & Transmission in Early Christianity (Lund: Gleerup, 
1964). A combined edition of Gerhardsson’s two works, referenced in this dissertation, was 
published in 1998 by Eerdmans (Grand Rapids).
219  Cf. McArthur, In Search of the Historical Jesus, pp. 23-40, who pointed out that besides the ‘minimal 
lives’ of Bultmann, Bornkamm and others, there were scholars like Manson and Gerhardsson, 
whose attitude towards the Jesus traditions was much more optimistic. See Kankaanniemi, ‘Will 
the Real Third Quest’, pp. 102-23 (109-10).
220  On the ‘Uppsala School’ in OT scholarship, including e.g. Gerhardsson’s OT professor 
Ivan Engnell, G. W. Ahlström, H. S. Nyberg, Helmer Ringren, and Geo Widengren, see Geo 
Widengren, ‘Tradition and Literature in Early Judaism and in the Early Church’, Numen 10 
(1963), pp. 42-83 (43-44); Gerhardsson, ‘The Secret of the Transmission of the Unwritten Jesus 
Tradition’, NTS 51 (2005), pp. 1-18 (1-2); Samuel Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20 (4-5).
221  Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings; idem, The Gospel Tradition; Gerhardsson, 
Memory; idem, Tradition; contra e.g. Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 1-8; Bultmann, Geschichte, pp. 
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or source criticism in their studies of the oral Jesus traditions. While offering a 
brief account of Riesenfeld’s view, this chapter’s main focus is on Gerhardsson’s 
work, as he is especially a seminal figure in research history, his ideas regarding 
the Jesus traditions, transmission, and memory being widely discussed in recent 
scholarship.222
2.2.1 Harald Riesenfeld
In contrast to Dibelius and Bultmann, Harald Riesenfield argued on the basis of 
the book of Acts and certain New Testament Epistles that a Sitz im Leben, distinct 
from ‘preaching’ and other form-critical notions, must be sought for the Gospel 
tradition; for instance, the Epistles do not often quote the Jesus tradition in the 
same way as the Gospels do.223 Riesenfeld noticed the Greek equivalents of the 
rabbinic technical language of ‘receiving’ and ‘handing on’ tradition used in the 
New Testament (παραλαμβάνειν; παραδιδόναι), but against the form critics 
he argued that this language was not used of the transmission of vague folklore 
material. Instead, it described the ‘rigidly controlled transmission of matter from 
one who has the mastery of it to another who has been specially chosen to learn it’, 
namely, a fixed tradition, which was taught by the teacher and memorized by his 
students. The tradition was not transmitted by an anonymous community, but by 
particular qualified individuals, such as Paul and the ‘eyewitnesses and ministers 
of the word’ (Lk. 1.2). According to Riesenfeld, the rabbinic concept of oral Torah 
functioned as a close analogy to the social environment in which the tradition was 
1-8. In the supplementary notes of the 1958 edition of his Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, 
Bultmann reacted to Riesenfeld’s then new position, deeming it ‘nicht haltbar’; see Bultmann, Die 
Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition. Ergänzungsheft zur 3. durchgesehenen Auflage (Göttingen: 
Vandenhöck & Ruprecht, 1958), p. 5. On Riesenfeld, see also Gerhard Delling, ‘Geprägte Jesus-
Tradition im Urchristentum’, Communio Viatorum 1 (1961), pp. 59-71.
222  See e.g. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 197-98; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 249-52; Byrskog, 
‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20; Matti Kankaanniemi, The Guards of the Tomb (Matt 27:62–66 and 28:11–
15): Matthew’s Apologetic Legend Revisited (Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2010), pp. 60-
61; Eve, Behind, pp. 33-46; Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 34-36; also, other articles in Kelber and 
Byrskog (eds.), Jesus in Memory, which offer an interdisciplinary and in many ways sympathetic 
assessment of Gerhardsson’s work. Gerhardsson’s thesis has been further elaborated, especially, 
by Rainer Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer; idem, ‘Jesus as Preacher and Teacher’, in Wansbrough (ed.), 
Jesus and the Oral Gospel Tradition (JSNTSup, 64; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), 
pp. 185-210; and Samuel Byrskog, Jesus the Only Teacher: Didactic Authority and Transmission 
in Ancient Israel, Ancient Judaism and the Matthean Community (ConBNT, 24; Stockholm: 
Almquist & Wiksell, 1994); idem, Story as History.
223  Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings, pp. 10-16.
52
formed.224
 Riesenfeld proposed community worship as the Sitz im Leben for the 
transmission of the Gospel tradition. The early Christian community would have 
treated the tradition as a holy ‘New Torah’, since it had originated from Jesus who 
had taught his disciples in the manner of a rabbi.225 The rabbinic teaching technique 
involved learning the material by heart, namely, memorizing it; the notion of the 
memorization of the material by the disciples was indicated by its memorable 
formulation in the Gospels. Riesenfeld applied the idea of memorization both to 
the words and deeds of Jesus, as Jesus would supposedly have discussed his deeds 
with his disciples. Regardless of the reality that the tradition was shaped by the 
community, it originated essentially from Jesus.226 Gerhardsson elaborated and 
developed the different as pects of Riesenfeld’s account much further.
2.2.2 Birger Gerhardsson
Gerhardsson’s dissertation is of the greatest importance, although his subsequent 
articles fur ther elucidated and somewhat qualified his viewpoints.227 Gerhardsson 
first presented the comparative material for his model of the transmission of 
traditions within early Christiani ty.228 He focused on the Jewish Torah of the 
Tannaitic (ca. 10–220 CE) and Amoraic periods (ca. 220–500 CE) and outlined a 
distinction between the transmission of the written and oral Torah, emphasizing 
the role of the latter.229 Gerhardsson deliberately chose this comparative material.230 
224  Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings, pp. 17-20.
225  Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings, pp. 22-24.
226  Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings, pp. 24-27.
227  Gerhardsson, Memory; see also, idem, Tradition; idem, The Origins of the Gospel Tradition 
(London: SCM, 1979); idem, ‘Der Weg der Evangelientradition’, in Stuhlmacher (ed.), Das 
Evangelium und die Evangelien. Vorträge vom Tübinger Symposium 1982 (WUNT, 28; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1983), pp. 79-102; idem, The Gospel Tradition (ConBNT, 15; Lund: Gleerup, 1986); 
idem, ‘Illuminating the Kingdom: Narrative Meshalim in the Synoptic Gospels’, in Wansbrough 
(ed.), Jesus and the Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 266-309; idem, ‘Secret’, pp. 1-18. Gerhardsson’s 
three articles (1979, 1983, 1986) were published in a combined English edition, Gerhardsson, 
The Reliability of the Gospel Tradition (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001).
228  The scope of this dissertation does not allow a thorough presentation and analysis of 
Gerhardsson’s rabbinic source material; here the focus is on his basic analogy between the formal 
method of transmission, namely, memorization and replication of teaching, and early Christian 
transmission of ‘the Gospel tradition’.
229  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 19-189 (19-42).
230  See esp. Gerhardsson, Memory, p. 30; cf. Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20 (6). Criticizing 
Gerhardsson of choosing the rabbinic material on grounds of an anachronistic supposition of its 
pre-70 origin is this unwarranted. See the discussion below.
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He recognized that the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE and the Bar-Kokhba 
Re volt, ending in 135 CE, would have changed rabbinic views and actions; no 
significant new teaching techniques were introduced after 70 CE.231 He also looked 
at the transmission tech niques of the Hellenistic groups, due to the Hellenistic 
influences on Palestinian Judaism and the Jewish educational system.232
 Gerhardsson understood the Torah as ‘the whole of the authoritative, sacred 
tradition (doctrine); not merely that which is codified in sacred Scripture, but also 
that which is carried forward in sacred oral tradition (הנשמ in a wide meaning)’, 
and used the term Torah ‘without qualification, as a collective designation for the 
Jews’ sacred authoritative tradition (doc trine) in its entirety’.233 On the one hand, 
the written Torah was not to be taken to denote merely the Pentateuch (with or 
without the Prophets and the Writings), but rather any authori tative transmission 
in written form. The oral Torah, הנשמ, on the other hand, referred to au thoritative 
transmission in oral form and includes both ‘repetition’ and ‘that which is repeat-
ed’.234
 Regarding the written Torah, Gerhardsson recognized the duality between a 
general tendency of the dynamic adaptation of the content of the text (e.g. targums 
and midrashic literature)235 in the different life situations of the Jewish people and 
a tendency to detailed, static reproduction of the text. Aware of the imaginative use 
of the texts in various contexts, Gerhardsson was focused on the most important 
contexts in which the text would have been reproduced in its traditional state.236 
First, there was the professional context, where the Jewish scholars deliberately 
and methodically preserved the text free from distortion.237 Secondly, the Torah 
was passed on in the context of elementary education in which the accuracy of the 
text played an important role, even though the preservation was not the primary 
231  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 77-78. For example, Gerhardsson (p. 77) argued that Rabbi Aqiba (ca. 
40–137 CE) made important contributions ‘in connection with the re-editing of the traditional 
material in the oral Torah’ and ‘was the first to create a mishnah which could strictly be called 
published’, but his mishnah did not ‘represent a total innovation in method for transmission, 
learning, and study’.
232  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 22-27, 86-89, 150.
233  Gerhardsson, Memory, p. 21. Italics original.
234  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 27-28. Gerhardsson (p. 27) pointed out the Tannaitic Rabbis’ tendency 
to use different terms for the study of the two disciplines: ארק for ‘to study the written Torah’ (or 
ארקמה תא ארק) and הנש for ‘to study the oral Torah’ (or הנשמה תא הנש).
235  Gerhardsson, Memory, p. 41: ‘[t]he tendency toward liberal (which is by no means the same as 
disrespectful) treatment of the Divine Word’…
236  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 40-42.
237  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 42, 43-55.
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objective.238 Third, the correct reproduction of the text was of a great importance 
in the context of public worship, where the sacred texts were read (ארק) as sacred 
rites; though the primary purpose of liturgical reading was not the preservation of 
the text of the Torah, the regular reading of it as an unaltered entity functioned as 
an important context of preservation.239
 Gerhardsson was primarily interested in the transmission of the oral Torah, 
which took place in different contexts within Judaism, the ‘college’ or ‘school’ 
(שרדמ תיב) being the most important one. While the sacred tradition was part of 
the daily lives of the Jews, the activity of methodical transmission and preservation 
of the oral Torah took place within the scholarly circles. By ‘schools’ Gerhardsson 
referred, not to buildings as such (though sometimes the ‘schools’ functioned 
in connection with the synagogues), but to the activity of programmatic and 
methodical transmission of the oral Torah by learned specialists, who also carried 
the sacred tradition to the communities in a disciplined fashion.240 
 It was argued by Gerhardsson that the transmission of the oral Torah was 
carried out in a fashion that was similar to the transmission of the written Torah. 
He pointed out, on the one hand, that the most important material in the oral 
Torah, (for example, midrashic focal texts, halakhah statements and haggadah 
passages), was formulated in a fixed way and could thus be labeled the oral text 
tradition. On the other hand, Gerhardsson paid attention to the ‘com plement of 
interpretative material’, which was more dynamic and flexible: each item of oral 
text (e.g. a הכלה, which is a chapter or a tractate of תוכלה) was accompanied by an 
interpre tative exposition (דומלת). Like in the case of the written Torah, the oral 
Torah was carried and handed on by the means of memorization; the teachers and 
pupils would have had access to the vast oral traditional material by the means of 
the memory, which functioned in the categories of the saying and narrative forms. 
While the oral Torah had an interpreting, particularizing, complementing, and 
sometimes modifying relation to the written Torah, the only major difference was 
that in the case of the former an oral text was learned by repetition and in the case 
238  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 42, 56-66.
239  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 42, 67-70.
240  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 72-78. Gerhardsson (p. 73) listed the home (with its habits and 
customs of worship, and the character of its teaching), the synagogue and the Temple (with their 
public worship on feast-days, Sabbaths, and possibly, on certain ordinary weekdays), the places 
in which school teaching was carried on, and the court sessions, as the most important centres 
for the preservation of the Torah, stressing especially the role of schools.
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of the latter a written text was learned from reading.241
 The distinction between the activities of memorization and interpretation 
by the teacher and his students in the Rabbinic schools was emphasized by 
Gerhardsson; they would never be confused, memorization always preceding 
interpretation. The basic method of transmission of the oral Torah was employed 
on all educational levels, and it consisted of two phases: the traditionist repeated 
the oral text for the students, and then required them to interpret it. Knowledge of 
the oral Torah was considered incomplete without interpretation, though on the 
lowest level of education this interpretation was often rudimentary.242 
 Gerhardsson devoted a considerable space for outlining how the mechanical 
Mishnah teaching was carried out and memorized. While he recognized that ‘[i]
t is scarcely possible to reconstruct in detail the method used by the mishnah 
teachers’, a basic impression could be drawn from the source material: the teachers 
spelled out the oral texts numerous times for their pupils, ‘with expressive 
articulation, careful pronunciation and faithful traditional cantil lation’, and the 
pupils had to repeat it several times, in chorus and individually, after which the 
mistakes were corrected by the teacher.243 This basic impression can be further 
explicated by more specific details of the theory and practice of transmission: 
the general principle of ‘learn first, and then understand’ denotes conservation 
of the authentic words of the teacher, which is aimed at via condensation and 
abridgment,244 various mnemonic techniques,245 the help of written notes,246 
techniques of repetition, and measures to maintain the vast received and learned 
oral text material.247
 In the last chapter of his section on the transmission within Rabbinic Judaism, 
Gerhardsson divided the material of the oral Torah into the sayings tradition 
241  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 79-83, 113-14; cf. Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20 (7).
242  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 93-112, 113-19.
243  Gerhardsson Memory, p. 115.
244  For example, Gerhardsson, Memory, p. 137, on the principle of הרצק ךרד (‘in the shortest way’) as 
a common pedagogical tendency in Rabbinic Judaism. Condensation and abridgment included 
the attempt to summarize teachings epigrammatically, in synthetic summaries and inclusive 
fundamental statements, as well as the attempt to express oneself concisely and elliptically.
245  Gerhardsson, Memory, p. 153 contends: ‘Elements of the tradition are grouped together with the 
help of a conscious mental connection, such as a definite catch-word. If the traditionist is sure of 
his catch-words he is able to call to mind entire blocks of material.’
246  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 157-63, pointed out that while Rabbinic students could use private 
notes to aid their memory, writing down the oral Torah was not approved officially; the written 
versions of the oral Torah were not considered authoritative.
247  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 168-70. 
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and the narrative tradition.248 Doctrinal material and additional inspired words 
and episodes concerning the deeds of the rabbis were typically introduced to 
the process of transmission. The students memorized brief halakhic statements 
with other new sayings; the fixing of the doctrinal statements in different forms 
at different stages of the process resulted in different forms of the same tradition. 
Haggadic material also came to include additional sayings, which the teachers 
wished their students to memorize. Sayings only spoken by the teacher on one 
occasion or in an everyday discussion, and even free and peripheral sayings, were 
sometimes incorporated into the tradition due to the students’ reverence for their 
doctrinal authorities.249
 Gerhardsson argued that the rabbinic narrative tradition was tendentious like 
any ancient tradition: it had an ‘intention of preserving and spreading, in one way 
or the other, the many-faceted wisdom of the Torah in face of all the situations of 
life’.250 The eyewitness reports of the teachers’ words and actions were important 
for the formulation of most of the narrative tradition (with the exception of the 
imaginative haggadah type of material); after witnessing his teacher’s words and 
deeds, the student was able to illustrate the way the doctrinal authori ty would settle 
particular questions ‘by repeating or applying a narrative tradition concerning 
the procedure of an earlier teacher’.251 Thus, Gerhardsson accounted a process of 
transmis sion, which was based on solidity and flexibility, rigid memorization and 
dynamic adaptation to new questions and situations.
 Gerhardsson employed the rabbinic methods, while trying to avoid imposing 
them inflexibly on early Christianity. He began by asking how the Jesus tradition 
was handed on after the apostolic period.252 Both Papias and Irenaeus subscribed 
to the language of memorization and receiving of traditions. The early church 
held a traditional conception of the origins of the Gospels, which emphasized 
discipleship and memory: all four Gospels were derived from ‘reliable traditionists 
who stand at one [Jesus’ disciples] or two [the Apostles’ disciples] removes from 
Jesus Christ’.253 The early writers were not very specific about the literary category 
(Gattung) of the Gospels, which were written down as an emergency measure, 
248  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 171-89.
249  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 174-81.
250  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 181-82 (182).
251  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 183-84 (184).
252  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 194-207.
253  Gerhardsson, Memory, p. 194.
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a reflection of the ancient skepticism toward the written word.254 Several factors 
indicate that, during the first period of the church (approx. until 250 CE), the 
Gospels were regarded as ‘Holy Word’ (ἱερὸς λόγος) or ‘oral (messianic) Torah’, 
which functioned mainly orally, rather than as ‘Holy Scriptures’ (ἱεραὶ γραφαί).255 
Gerhardsson argued that the majority of the disciples came ‘from that section 
of the people which looked to the learned Pharisees as its teachers and spiritual 
leaders’; in line with the Pharisaic distinction between oral and written Torah, the 
disciples began to compile collections of the Gospel material from oral tradition, 
also using written notes.256 Further, the doctrinal discussions at the time, for 
instance, in Irenaeus and Papias, showed that the Gospels were transmitted mainly 
orally and from memory, with a special notion of the individual traditionist from 
whom the traditions were derived.257
 The Lukan author was central to Gerhardsson’s argument.258 He rejected ‘an 
extremely tenaciously-held misapprehension among exegetes’ (most notoriously 
by Dibelius and Bultmann) that an early Christian author must be either a 
purposeful theologian or a fairly reliable historian. Luke was a purposeful 
theologian with an apologetic interest of demonstrating the reliability of the 
tradition on the basis of the eyewitnesses; this did not undermine his faithfulness 
to the tradition and his relative reliability as a historian.259
 According to Gerhardsson, Luke-Acts depict Jerusalem as the center for the 
254  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 194-97.
255  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 197-207 (200). Gerhardsson suggested, first, that the Apostolic 
Fathers’ somewhat confusing way of using the Gospel material (as to, for example, the formulae 
of quotation, the source of references, the wording of the so-called quotations) showed that the 
Gospel (τὸ εὐαγγὲλιον) was not regarded as written word of God in the same way as the OT. 
Secondly, he argued that, during the first two centuries, the NT text was not copied with the same 
precision as later, despite the care and respect shown for the tradition; certain types of textual 
variants, such as assimilations and harmonizations, could only be explained by the notion that 
the texts of the Gospels were not fixed in the smallest detail. Third, Gerhardsson indicated that 
the use of the codex form instead of the scroll, which was the supreme and undisputed vehicle 
of the written divine word in the Greco-Roman world and Judaism, suggested that the Gospel 
literature was oral in nature and based on notebooks.
256  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 201-2.
257  Gerhardsson, Memory, 202-7.
258  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 208-61.
259  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 208-13 (209); cf. e.g. Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 10-11; Bultmann, 
Geschichte, p. 52. Gerhardsson’s initial work may give the impression that the Lukan account 
is to be taken almost at face value; later he somewhat modified his position by deeming Luke’s 
presentation as ‘simplified and even tendentious’, yet maintaining the view that the Gospel 
traditions were reliably transmitted by people who were well informed about Jesus’ words and 
deeds. See e.g. Gerhardsson, Reliability, pp. 61-63.
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teaching of the apostles.260 In Luke the twelve apostles are the witnesses to Jesus’ 
earthly ministry and resurrection; this gives them the authority to witness and teach 
‘the word’ in the name of their teacher Jesus, in a way reminiscent of the rabbinic 
disciples’ way of speaking in the name of their masters.261 In Luke’s presentation, 
‘the word’ functions as an analogy to the rabbinic oral Torah.262 The speeches in 
Acts summarize the contents of ‘the word’,263 although Israel’s Scriptures were also 
taken over by the church.264 In a rabbinic manner of study, the apostles engaged in 
‘the service of the word’ (διακονία τοῦ λόγου), which included teaching and dis-
cussion to find its meaning.265 While there are similarities between Gerhardsson’s 
study of Rabbinic Judaism and his presentation of Luke’s view, the Christo-centric 
(rather than Torah-centric) nature of early Christianity is emphasized: the Lukan 
Jesus sets the example of midrashic exegesis,266 and the apostles carry on with 
Christological interpretation of Scrip tures, using the message of Christ as a tool 
for examining Scriptures.267
 Gerhardsson depicted Paul as a witness to the delivery of the Gospel tradition; 
the picture generally agrees with that of Luke-Acts.268 Gerhardsson shared with 
Harald Riesenfeld the notion of Paul’s use of technical language of transmission.269 
Such language, occasionally used in the form of fixed formulas,270 would not have 
been employed when referring to hearing gossip or preaching.271 Gerhardsson 
argued that Paul’s preaching (kerygma), which he says to have received directly 
260  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 214-20, also p. 334: ‘An intensive work on the logos was also carried 
on in other churches, but the Jerusalem church was the centre of the early Christianity and 
the leaders of this congregation was considered as the highest doctrinal authority of the whole 
Church.’ Gerhardsson, Reliability, p. 50, later somewhat modified this position.
261  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 220-25.
262  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 224-25: ‘[The word] encompasses not only the cardinal points in the 
history of salvation (the suffering, death and resurrection of Christ), but in fact everything which 
Christ both did and taught, and everything which happened to him, from the beginning of his 
public ministry: everything of which the Apostles are eyewitnesses.’
263  Cf. Acts 2.22-36; 3.12-26; 4.8-12; 5.29-32; 10.34-43.
264  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 225-34.
265  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 234-45.
266  E.g. Lk. 4.16f., 24.27, 32, 44-45.
267  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 227-34 (228-30).
268  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 262-323; cf. Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20 (9); Eve, Behind, p. 37.
269  E.g. παραλαμβάνειν; παραδιδόναι; cf. Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings, pp. 
17-20; contra Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 16-22. Riesenfeld argued that this language was not 
used of the transmission of vague folklore material.
270  E.g. 1 Cor. 11.23-25; 15.3-7.
271  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 13-14, 265-66, 281-83, 288-91. See e.g. 1 Cor. 11.2, 23-25; 15.1, 3-7; 
Gal. 1.9; 1 Thess. 2.13; 4.1; 2 Thess. 2.15; 3.6.
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from the Lord (Gal. 1.11-12), was to be distinguished from Paul’s teaching 
(didache): the former mainly concerned Paul’s preaching of the law-free Gospel 
to the Gentiles, while the latter included what he received from the tradition and 
passed on in his teaching.272 Paul’s teaching originated from Jerusalem and was 
probably handed on to him by Peter during Paul’s visit to the city (Gal. 1.18). Paul’s 
seeking of recognition for his apostleship and Gospel from Jerusalem indicates 
that he respected the city as the doctrinal center of the original apostles (Gal. 
2.1-2, 9).273 Paul nevertheless acted as an individual with authority to handle the 
Jesus tradition. For Paul it was due to his encounter with the risen Christ that he 
could view himself as a part of the chain of authoritative apostles.274 As a former 
Hillelite Pharisee, he transmitted and interpreted the tradition in the same way 
as the oral Torah.275 Gerhardsson argued that the evidence from Paul supports 
that authoritative individuals, not an anonymous collective, transmitted and 
interpreted the Gospel tradition, which in essence derived from Jesus himself.
 In the final chapter of Memory & Manuscript, Gerhardsson outlined a brief 
sketch of the origins of the Gospel tradition on the basis of the previous chapters. 
He argued that the origins of the tradition lie, first, in Jesus of Nazareth, namely, 
his teaching, works, suffering, death, and his disciples’ experiences of the empty 
tomb and, secondly, in the Torah, which Jesus as a historical figure held sacred 
and, through interpretation, wished to ‘transform into the messianic Torah’.276 The 
tradition was transmitted and written down by Jesus’ followers, who regarded him 
as more than an earthly teacher: the Messiah, Christ, the Son of Man, the Son of 
God, the Lord etc. Gerhardsson argued that such high views can be disconnected 
from neither the impression Jesus had made on his disciples nor from his own 
understanding of his ministry, position, and person; such a notion of authority 
would lead the earliest Christians to transmit the tradition accurately.277
 Gerhardsson stressed that, like any Jewish teacher in that context, Jesus 
required his disciples to commit his teachings to memory.278 Within the earliest 
272  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 262-73 (273).
273  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 274-80.
274  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 280-82
275  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 288-323 (302-6). According to Gerhardsson, Paul produced his 
doctrinal, ethical, and ecclesiastical ‘Talmud’ on the basis of the Scriptures and the ‘Mishnah’, 
which was the Gospel tradition, and communicated it to the early Christian congregations.
276  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 324-35 (327).
277  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 324-25.
278  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 326-29.
60
church in Jerusalem, Jesus’ closest disciples (the collegium of Apostles) were the 
first authorities of the Gospel tradition. It was their responsibility to intensively 
study the Scriptures (‘midrash exegesis’) and discuss doctrinal questions. In a 
rabbinic manner, both authoritative sayings of Jesus and narrative accounts of his 
deeds were memorized, repeated, expounded, and applied.279
 Gerhardsson rejected the form-critical idea that the primary modes of 
transmission were preaching, exhortation, and apologetics.280 The traditions were 
probably used in all these and other activities like prayer, sacred meals, charitable 
activity, exorcism, and healing. However, the essential Sitz im Leben for the 
‘actualization’, collection, and fixing of the tradition took place when it was taught 
in a manner reminiscent of the rabbinic teaching techniques. The collegium of 
apostles in Jerusalem presented the tradition on the basis of eyewitness ac counts, 
relating their teaching to the Scriptures.281 Gerhardsson did not address the 
question of interpretation of the tradition in these situations.
 Besides the technical transmission and the reliability of the tradition, the change 
and variability in the tradition was addressed by Gerhardsson.282 He allowed for 
the change and development of the tradition to a certain degree. Jesus might have 
delivered some of his sayings in more than one version; there was the category 
of ‘theme and variations’ in Jewish teaching. Also, most of the Gospel material is 
haggadic and was not transmitted as literally as halakhic material.283 Furthermore, 
adaptations might have occurred at an early stage when the material was gathered. 
The complex translation process (mainly from Aramaic to Greek) may also have 
resulted in variations. The possibility of small alterations due to faulty memoriza-
tion could not be excluded. The material was also subject to redaction when it was 
interpreted and placed in new contexts.284
 To sum up Gerhardsson’s position, Jesus and his first followers purposefully 
279  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 329-32.
280  See Dibelius, Formgeschichte, pp. 9-16. ‘Preaching’ was the primary use of the tradition according 
to Dibelius. ‘Eyewitnesses and ministers of the word’ in Lk. 1.2 was taken as a reference to a 
group of early Christian preachers, whose preaching initiated the growth of the tradition from 
which the Gospel material was later derived by the Evangelists.
281  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 330-31, 335; also Gerhardsson, Reliability, pp. 41-44.
282  Gerhardsson, Memory, p. 334: ‘[i]f the gospel tradition was carried in this way, how can there be 
variations between different parallel traditions?’
283  This raises the question as to where the literally transmitted halakhic material is found.
284  Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 334-35. Gerhardsson allowed, for instance, that the baptism and 
temptation narratives were creations of Christian scribes. See Gerhardsson, Reliability, pp. 49-58 
(55-56).
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aimed at the accurate transmission of the Jesus traditions. Within the Gospels, 
the traditions are interpreted and do not offer a completely historically accurate 
picture of what actually happened during Jesus’ earthly ministry. The Jesus 
traditions are nevertheless basically reliable: they are not the result of the creative 
work of the anonymous community in its changing circumstances and needs, like 
Martin Dibelius and Rudolf Bultmann had argued.
2.2.3 Critique & Evaluation
Gerhardsson’s view evoked a heated scholarly debate.285 His rabbinic model 
285  For discussions and criticisms of Gerhardsson’s view, see e.g. William D. Davies, ‘Reflections 
on a Scandinavian Approach to the “Gospel Tradition”’, in Neotestamentica et Patristica. 
Freundesgabe Oscar Cullmann (NovTSup, 6; Leiden: Brill, 1962), pp. 14-34; McArthur, In Search 
of the Historical Jesus, pp. 33-40; Peter H. Davids, ‘The Gospels and the Jewish Tradition: Twenty 
Years After Gerhardsson’, in R. T. France and D. Wenham (eds.), Gospel Perspectives, Vol. 1: 
Studies of History and Tradition in the Four Gospels (Sheffield: JSOT, 1980), pp. 75-99; Riesner, 
Jesus als Lehrer, passim; idem, ‘Jesus as Preacher and Teacher’, pp. 185-210; Kelber, Oral and 
Written, pp. 8-14; idem, ‘Conclusion: The Work of Birger Gerhardsson in Perspective’, in Kelber 
and Byrskog (eds.), Jesus in Memory, pp. 173-206; E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, p. 15; E. 
P. Sanders & Margret Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels, pp. 129-32; Donald Guthrie, New 
Testament Introduction, pp. 1031-35; Jacob Neusner, ‘In Quest of the Historical Rabban Yohanan 
ben Zakkai’, HTR 59 (1966), pp. 391-413; idem, ‘The Rabbinic Traditions About the Pharisees 
Before A.D. 70: The Problem of Oral Transmission’, in Neusner (ed.), The Origins of Judaism, 
Vol. 2: The Pharisees and Other Sects (New York: Garland, 1990), pp. 160-62; Philip S. Alexander, 
‘Orality in Pharisaic-Rabbinic Judaism at the Turn of the Eras’, in Wansbrough (ed.), Jesus and 
the Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 159-84; Ben F. Meyer, ‘Some Consequences of Birger Gerhardsson’s 
Account of the Origins of the Gospel Tradition’, in Wansbrough (ed.), Jesus and the Oral Gospel 
Tradition, pp. 424-40; Shemaryahu Talmon, ‘Oral Tradition and Written Transmission, or the 
Heard and Seen Word in Judaism of the Second Temple Period’, in Wansbrough (ed.), Jesus and 
the Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 121-58; Barry W. Henaut, Oral Tradition and the Gospels: The 
Problem of Mark 4 (JSNTSup, 82; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), pp. 41-53; Byrskog, 
Jesus the Only Teacher, passim; idem, Story as History, passim; idem, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20; 
Martin Jaffee, ‘Oral Tradition in the Writings of Rabbinic Oral Torah: On Theorizing Rabbinic 
Orality’, Oral Tradition 14 (1999), pp. 3-32; idem, Torah in the Mouth: Writing and Oral Tradition 
in Palestinian Judaism, 200 BCE–400 CE (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), passim; idem, 
‘Honi the Circler in Manuscript and Memory: An Experiment in “Re-Oralizing” the Talmudic 
Text’, in Kelber and Byrskog (eds.), Jesus in Memory, pp. 87-111; Harm W. Hollander, ‘The Words 
of Jesus: From Oral Traditions to Written Record in Paul and Q’, NovT 42 (2000), pp. 340-57 
(342-44); Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 197-98; idem, The Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 213-29; 
Michael F. Bird, ‘The Formation of the Gospels in the Setting of Early Christianity’, WTJ 67 
(2005), pp. 113-34; idem, Gospel, pp. 83-90; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 249-52; Tuckett, ‘Form 
Criticism’, pp. 21-38; Terence C. Mournet, ‘The Jesus Tradition as Oral Tradition’, in Kelber and 
Byrskog (eds.), Jesus in Memory, pp. 39-61; David E. Aune, ‘Jesus Tradition and the Pauline 
Letters’, in Kelber and Byrskog (eds.), Jesus in Memory, pp. 63-86; Loveday Alexander, ‘Memory 
and Tradition in the Hellenistic Schools’, in W. Kelber and S. Byrskog (eds.), Jesus in Memory: 
Traditions in Oral and Scribal Perspectives; Alan Kirk, ‘Memory’, in Kelber and Byrskog (eds.), 
Jesus in Memory, pp. 155-72; Kankaanniemi, Guards, pp. 59-62; Rodríguez, Structuring, passim; 
idem, Oral Tradition, pp. 34-36; Eve, Behind, pp. 33-46.
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received much criticism immediately after its publication,286 the initial reactions 
by Morton Smith and Jacob Neusner in particular being so dismissive that 
Gerhardsson was largely denied a hearing for some time.287 However, these early 
criticisms must be read in light of subsequent discussion; an important indication 
of the unfairness of the early dismissals is Neusner’s own preface for the 1998 
edition of Gerhardsson’s work, where he apologizes for initially following Smith’s 
simplistic misrepresentation of Gerhardsson’s view.288
 The most common criticism against Gerhardsson is anachronism: Gerhardsson 
is accused of naïvely reading later rabbinic techniques into the first-century 
situation.289 This criticism is, however, at least partly unwarranted, as has been 
more recently argued by several scholars.290 First, although Gerhardsson later 
admitted to have written his dissertation at a time when scholarship was more 
optimistic about the use of rabbinic material to illustrate earlier periods,291 he 
never suggested that it should simply be read back into Jesus’ time. Rather, even 
though the pedagogical techniques were refined after 70 and 135 CE, completely 
new methods were not invented by the rabbis. Thus, the rabbinic materials would 
have conveyed the basic idea of what first-century Jewish teaching methods were 
like.292
286  For the lists of early reviews, see Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. xxiii, xxiv. See esp. the sympathetic 
yet critical early review by Joseph A. Fitzmyer, ‘Note: Memory and Manuscript: The Origins and 
Transmission of the Gospel Tradition’, TS 23 (1962), pp. 442-57.
287  See Morton Smith, ‘A Comparison of Early Christian and Early Rabbinic Tradition’, JBL 82 
(1963), pp. 169-76 (176), who famously deemed Gerhardsson’s thesis ‘impossible to conceive’; 
Neusner, ‘In Quest of the Historical’, pp. 391-413. Even in his 2011 article for the Handbook for the 
Study of the Historical Jesus, Arland J. Hultgren, ‘Form Criticism and Jesus Research’, pp. 1:649-
71 (671), is able to state in quite a dismissing fashion: ‘Their viewpoint [that of Riesenfeld and 
Gerhardsson], however, has not been accepted beyond a small circle of scholars.’ My impression 
is that Gerhardsson has received much more attention and credit in recent scholarship than such 
a statement accounts for.
288  Neusner, ‘Foreword’, in Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. xxv-xlvi.
289  Most notably, Smith, ‘Comparison’, pp. 169-76; also Talmon, ‘Oral Tradition and Written 
Transmission’, pp. 121-58 (132-33); Davids, ‘The Gospels and the Jewish Tradition’, pp. 75-
99 (76-81); Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 14; Terence C. Mournet, Oral Tradition and Literary 
Dependency, p. 64.
290  See e.g. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 198; Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (125-27); Bauckham, 
Eyewitnesses, pp. 250-51; Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20 (6); Eve, Behind, p. 39.
291  See Gerhardsson’s preface for the 1998 edition of his work, Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. xii-xiii. 
Gerhardsson’s rabbinic source material is not dealt with in detail here, as such a discussion would 
require an in-depth critique in light of recent scholarship of the rabbinic literature, a task outside 
the scope of this dissertation.
292  See e.g. Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. xii-xiii, 30, 77-78; idem, Tradition, pp. 14, 16-21; also idem, 
Reliability, p. 73. All italics are mine.
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 Secondly, Gerhardsson paid attention to the larger context of Greco-Roman 
education, assuming that mechanical methods of oral transmission were not 
explicitly Jewish or rab binic.293 It has been confirmed by other scholars that these 
methods, such as memorization and replication of teaching, were common in 
the wider ancient world at the time.294 The basic historical analogy may thus hold 
despite the charge of anachronism: the core elements of the mechanical teaching 
method, employed by Jewish rabbis, probably existed prior to 70 CE, and can 
illuminate early Christian transmission of traditions.295 It is only fair to mention 
that the Jewish rabbis probably were not the first to use memory in education.
 There is, nevertheless, more to be said with regard to the question of 
anachronism. Gerhardsson’s rather optimistic view of the continuity between 
Pharisaism and Rabbinic Judaism has more recently led to the criticism that he 
seems to have assumed, like the form critics, that before the writing of the Gospels 
the Jesus traditions were purely oral and did not make use of writing.296 While 
the Pharisees probably had an oral tradition independent of Scripture,297 the 
notion of a purely oral transmission of ‘oral Torah’298 is probably a later Amoraic 
construction (from the third century CE onwards) and should be applied to 
neither the Pharisaism of the pre-70 CE period nor to the transmission of the 
Jesus traditions in the same period.299 Martin Jaffee has argued extensively that, 
293  E.g. Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 22-27, 86-89, 150; cf. Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20 (6).
294  Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer, ch. 3; Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (126); Alexander, ‘Memory and 
Tradition in the Hellenistic Schools’, pp. 113-53 (135-39, 152); so also Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, 
pp. 250-51; Eve, Behind, p. 39. On ‘memorization’ as a method of instruction in the Greco-
Roman world, see e.g. Quintilian, Inst. Orot. 1.3.1; 2.4.15; Seneca, Contr. 1. pref. 2, 19; Plutarch, 
lib. Educ. 13; Philo, Vît. Mos. 1.48; Xenophon, Symp. 3.5-6; Diogenes Laertius, Vît. 10.1.12; Craig 
S. Keener, A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), p. 28; idem, 
The Gospel of John: A Commentary (2 vols.; Peabody: Hendrickson, 2004), pp. 1:57-62.
295  See e.g. Davies, ‘Reflections on a Scandinavian Approach’, pp. 14-34 (10, 33-34); Alexander, 
‘Orality in Pharisaic-Rabbinic Judaism’, pp. 159-84; Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (126-27). When 
asked about his impression of Gerhardsson’s view at a meeting with the Historical Jesus Research 
group (Åbo Akademi) in Helsinki on January 4, 2015, Craig A. Evans commented on the basic 
analogy, ‘…there is reasonable evidence to believe that there was some continuity from the proto-
rabbinic phase to the post-70 era’. Evans indicated that Gerhardsson is ‘more right than wrong’.
296  Davids, ‘The Gospels and the Jewish Tradition’, pp. 75-99 (79); Talmon, ‘Oral Tradition and 
Written Transmission’, pp. 121-58 (146-48); Eve, Behind, pp. 39-40; cf. Gerhardsson, Memory, 
pp. 71-78, 79-83, 113-14.
297  Cf. Mk 7.1-15 and Josephus, Ant. 13.297-298; Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (126).
298  According to Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 251, Gerhardsson ‘may…have been misled by the 
rabbis’ principle of exclusively oral transmission of “oral Torah” (expressed in b. Gittin 60a: 
‘Words orally transmitted you may not write’)’.
299  See esp. Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth, ch. 7; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 251; Eve, Behind, pp. 39-40.
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despite the general preference of a living teacher over written books in antiquity, 
there never was a purely oral process of transmission.300 In the Jewish circles, 
the Pharisees wrote down their ‘traditions of the fathers’,301 and there were other 
highly literate Jewish groups at the time of Jesus (for example, the Qumran 
community).302 The transmission of rabbinic material always involved an interplay 
between oral performance and written text.303 Retrospectively, it seems, therefore, 
that Gerhardsson’s rabbinic model did not take the role of written text seriously in 
the pre-70 CE period.
 This criticism of Gerhardsson raises the question as to whether the historical 
Jesus or the disciples could have displayed the literary skills required by the 
rabbinic-type transmission situation, envisaged by Gerhardsson. After all, Jesus 
originated and mainly ministered in ru ral Galilee, which probably had a low rate 
of literacy,304 and according to the Jesus traditions, called as his leading disciples 
three fishermen, Peter, James, and John, of whom literacy might not have been 
required.305 As for the disciples, Gerhardsson argued for a picture contra dictory 
to that of the Jesus traditions: the majority of the disciples probably came ‘from 
that section of the people which looked to the learned Pharisees as its teachers 
and spiritual lead ers’,306 which indicates that they were probably familiar with the 
Pharisaic teaching methods. However, Gerhardsson’s explanation in Tradition & 
Transmission, namely, that the disciples are merely depicted as ‘uneducated’ in 
the Gospels for ideological purposes, is somewhat wanting. First, his allowance 
of such ideological changes may undermine his basic task of trying to establish 
the reliability of the tradition.307 Secondly, besides his recognition that ‘[t]
he Christian Church has always regarded the twelve as unlearned men of the 
300  Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth, passim; idem, ‘Oral Tradition in the Writings of Rabbinic Oral Torah’, pp. 
3-32 (23-24): ‘Rabbinic oral-performative tradition must be imagined as a diverse phenomenon, 
incorporating aspects of rote memorization of documents (fixed-text transmission) and more 
fluid oral performative aspects (free-text transmission)’. Also, p. 24, n. 30: ‘…I do not follow him 
[Gerhardsson] in claiming a total absence of written textuality for either tradition’.
301  Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth, ch. 3.
302  Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth, ch. 2.
303  See e.g. Jaffee, ‘Oral Tradition in the Writings of Rabbinic Oral Torah’, pp. 3-32; idem, Torah in the 
Mouth, passim; Eve, Behind, pp. 39-40.
304  See e.g. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 71-123; idem, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (35-36); 
Hezser, Jewish Literacy; also, Eve, Behind, pp. 10-11; contra Millard, Reading and Writing. Cf. ch. 
2.1.3; 2.3.2.
305  Eve, Behind, pp. 40-41.
306  Gerhardsson, Memory, p. 202.
307  Eve, Behind, pp. 40-41; cf. Gerhardsson, Tradition, pp. 24-26.
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people’, Gerhardsson speaks of the development that must have taken place in the 
disciples’ educational skills during the decades of leading the work of the church.308 
This explanation begs the question, as to how exactly Gerhardsson viewed 
the historical situation. Were the disciples familiar with the Jewish (Pharisaic) 
teaching methods due to their background (unlike the Jesus traditions indicate), 
or did their learning increase gradually? Despite this ambiguity, Gerhardsson 
makes a fair point regarding ‘the development of specifically Christian exegesis 
and theology’ prior to the writing of the Gospels: the phenomenon needs to be 
explained and cannot be bypassed with light remarks about the education level of 
Jesus’ disciples at the time of their call.309
 As for the historical Jesus, Gerhardsson’s analogy between the teaching 
role of Jesus and the title ‘rabbi’ has a ring of historical truth to it. Although it 
remains debated whether or to what extent writing served as an actual control 
on the transmission of Jesus traditions,310 Jesus’ role as a Jewish teacher indicates 
that a rabbi-pupil relationship may reflect to some degree Jesus’ relation to his 
disciples. While Jesus’ charismatic prophetic leadership does not suggest the 
typical attributes of a rabbi or scribe,311 and there are direct claims in the Gospel 
material that Jesus did not teach like a scribe,312 ‘rabbi’ is not a completely 
inadequate definition of his ministry of teaching; while Jesus surely was not ‘a 
convenient Jewish rabbi’ but rather fitted into many categories of leadership (such 
as sage, healer, prophet), teaching was a very central activity in his ministry, ῥαββί 
308  Gerhardsson, Tradition, p. 25. The work would have included preaching, teaching, searching the 
Scriptures, discussions on doctrinal questions, and exercising discipline and apologetics.
309  Gerhardsson, Tradition, pp. 25-26. Italics are original. See Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 288; 
Riesenfeld, Jesus als Lehrer, pp. 497-98, who argue that there could have been individuals within 
the Jesus movement who were from classes that could read and write.
310  Gerhardsson, Memory, p. 201-2; idem, ‘Illuminating’, pp. 266–309 (307), argued that written 
notebooks, such as collections of Jesus’ sayings or accounts of his life, could have been used in as 
aids to memory by early Christians prior to the full written Gospels. However, see Eve, Behind, 
pp. 8-14: the notes ‘remained little more than an aide-memoire’; cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 
289: the notebooks would reinforce the capacity of oral transmission to preserve the traditions 
faithfully. Also, see Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (31 n. 42, 37), who, while 
not denying that early Christian manuscripts could sometimes function as aids to memory, 
emphasizes ‘their broader social significance’ in maintaining and articulating group identity. Cf. 
ch. 2.1.3; 2.3.2.
311  Martin Hengel, The Charismatic Leader and His Followers (trans. J. C. G. Greig; Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1981), pp. 42-57; Charles K. Barrett, Jesus and the Gospel Tradition (London: SPCK, 1967), 
pp. 9-10; in Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (124); idem, Gospel, p. 85. 
312  Cf. Mk 1.22; Mt. 7.29; Smith, ‘Comparison’, pp. 169-76 (172); in Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 
(124); idem, Gospel, p. 85. 
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being the most frequently used title for Jesus in the traditions preserved in the 
Gospels.313
 Recent scholarship suggests that Jesus’ teaching method seems to have 
conveyed, at least to some audiences, that he was a scribal-literate Jewish teacher, 
although in reality he may only have appeared as one.314 It may not be too far-
fetched to assume some Pharisaic-scribal kind of influence on the disciples from 
Jesus; teaching and behavior were taken as a challenge by and led into rivalry 
with the Pharisees, who were held in high regard as local religious authorities.315 
This raises the question as to why Jesus would have employed drastically different 
methods from those of his opponents.316 Also, would it have been impossible 
for the disciples to reflect, at least, a growing interest in a pedagogical method 
typical in that context? After all, Gerhardsson originally never said that Jesus 
was a Tannaitic-type rabbi and his disciples were themselves formally educated 
Pharisees, although he did imply that they were not ‘uneducated’ in the sense 
that the Gospels indicate.317 Gerhardsson’s model did, therefore, draw scholarly 
attention to important historical features concerning Jesus as a Jewish teacher and 
his disciples, often neglected within the form-critical paradigm.
 Some have objected to Gerhardsson’s thesis on the grounds of there being no 
clear presentation of a rigid handing of traditions by Jesus and his followers in 
313  See e.g. Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth (trans. I. McLuskey, F. McLuskey, J. M. Robinson; 
London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1973), pp. 57, 83, 96-97; Bruce D. Chilton, Profiles of a Rabbi 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989); idem, Rabbi Jesus (New York: Doubleday, 2000); Bird, ‘Formation’, 
pp. 113-34 (126); cf. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 165-88, on Jesus’ literacy; for ῥαββί in the Gospels, 
see BDAG (2000), p. 902. 
314  See Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 165-88 (188), who argues this on the basis of ‘the various early 
Christian Jesus-memories that appear in the sources’.
315  On the Pharisees, see Meier, A Marginal Jew, III, pp. 289-388 (339): ‘All Gospel sources testify 
to Jesus’ interaction with Pharisees during the public ministry. The tone of the interaction is 
often adversarial…both Jesus and the Pharisees were competing to influence the main body of 
Palestinian Jews and win them over to their respective visions of what God was calling Israel to 
be and do at a critical juncture in its history.’ However, see also the notions in Meier, A Marginal 
Jew, III, p. 340, that there are expansions on the Pharisees’ roles in the Gospels of Matthew and 
John as part of their polemical agendas. 
316  See Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 165-188, who argues that Jesus may not have been taken as a serious 
scribal-level authority by his rivalries due to his lack of formal education, but nevertheless had 
to be reckoned with publicly in order to demonstrate that he was not one of the scribal-literate 
authorities; however, these situations could have the exact opposite effect, leading many in the 
audience to conclude that Jesus was one of such formally educated authorities. 
317  Cf. Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 201-2: the majority of the disciples probably came ‘from that 
section of the people which looked to the learned Pharisees as its teachers and spiritual leaders’. 
Also, Gerhardsson, Reliability, p. 73: ‘I have never said that Jesus was only a rabbi, still less that 
he was a rabbi of the late Tannaitic type…’
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the New Testament.318 It is, however, not clear how strong of an objection the 
lack of such evidence really is. Eve points out that ‘if it were the case that Jesus 
and his followers were using the teaching and learning techniques common 
to their culture…there would be no particular reason for the New Testament 
authors to draw attention to the fact; they would be more likely simply to take it 
for granted’.319 In fact, the Gospel material does depict Jesus using his disciples to 
transmit his teachings to others during his lifetime, which suggests at least some 
form of memorization on the part of the disciples.320 Indeed, it is not implausible 
to argue that the use of rabbinic-like terminology in the NT321 ‘provides at least 
one significant point of contact between the transmission of traditions in early 
Christianity and rabbinic Judaism’.322
 In line with Gerhardsson, some scholars have aimed to present other historical 
evidence of systematic memorization in the tradition process.323 Some of the 
suggestions are not com pelling. Bird is probably right in contending that Riesner’s 
suggestion, that the references to Jesus’ house in the Gospel of Mark explicitly 
refer to ‘Jesus’ school of teaching’, is far-fetched.324 Also, Riesenfeld’s suggestion, 
that Paul prepared himself for apostolic work by committing the Jesus tradition to 
memory during his three-year stay in Arabia, seems some what oversimplified.325 
Although Paul probably would have reflected the Jesus traditions against his own 
background in Pharisaism, there is no clear evidence that he actively memo rized 
the tradition specifically during that time in Arabia. However, Byrskog’s notion 
of the Matthean community does not strike as unimaginable. According to him, 
318  Smith, ‘Comparison’, pp. 169-76 (174-75); Barrett, Jesus and the Gospel Tradition, pp. 9-10; 
Sanders & Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels, p. 142; Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 14; Dunn, 
Jesus Remembered, p. 198; cf. Eve, Behind, p. 43.
319  Eve, Behind, p. 43, despite his rather skeptical view on Gerhardsson’s overall thesis.
320  See e.g. Mk 6.7-13; Lk. 9.1-6; 10.1-16; Mt. 9.36–10.15; Davids, ‘The Gospels and the Jewish 
Tradition’, pp. 75-99 (84); Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (126). This is admitted also by Dunn, 
Jesus Remembered, p. 198, who nevertheless maintains that the model of memorization does not 
account for ‘divergencies in the tradition’.
321  The terminological connections are presented in Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (126).
322  Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (126); cf. Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition, p. 16; Gerhardsson, 
Memory, pp. 290-91; idem, Tradition, p. 7. However, note the criticism by Eve, Behind, p. 41, 
that the NT usage of παράδοσις of the Christian tradition is entirely Pauline, and Paul’s use 
may reflect his Pharisaic background more than the teaching methods of Jesus and his disciples 
(already in Smith, ‘Comparison’, pp. 169-76). 
323  See Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (125); also idem, Gospel, pp. 85-86.
324  Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (125); cf. Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer, pp. 437-39; e.g. Mk 2.1, 3.20, 9.33.
325  Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (125); idem, Gospel, pp. 85-86; cf. Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition, 
pp. 17-18; also, already Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings, pp. 19-20.
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the community focused on Jesus as the teacher and applied his teachings to their 
community life, as they transmitted them in a careful and controlled manner. This 
suggestion is possible, given the pedagogic atmosphere of the time.326
 While some role of memorization in the process of transmission is widely 
recognized, Gerhardsson’s model does not seem to take into account the variation 
that has taken place within the Jesus traditions.327 In other words, there seems to 
have been no real concern among the Synoptic authors to preserve memorized 
material in a fixed form.328 Gerhardsson allowed some variability and flexibility 
and would probably consider such changes compatible with his theory of 
verbatim learning, paralleled within the rabbinic tradition; one of his central 
ar guments was that most of the Gospel tradition consists of haggadic material, 
which is often transmitted with more variation in wording than halakhic 
material.329 Nevertheless, while it has been pointed out that the rabbinic material 
neither remained stable in the course of trans mission nor aimed at preservation 
of the ipsissima verba but rather formulaic summaries,330 it is debatable whether 
the variations in the Synoptic material really resemble the ones in the rabbinic 
material referred to by Gerhardsson.331 Therefore, Gerhardsson’s model of 
flexibility and variation needs to be qualified.
 There were probably ‘differences between eyewitness memories’ and ‘the ways 
the individual members of the twelve told the traditions/memories’ from the 
beginning; the Jesus traditions must have been told and retold by other teachers 
‘in the absence of eyewitnesses already during the first period’.332 This would 
326  Byrskog, Jesus the Only Teacher, pp. 235, 329, 401; pace Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (125).
327  E.g. E. Earle Ellis, ‘The Synoptic Gospels and History’, in Chilton & Evans (eds.), Authenticating 
the Activities of Jesus (NTTS, 28; Leiden: Brill, 1999) pp. 49-57 (56); Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 
p. 198; Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (124-25); Eve, Behind, pp. 41-42; also, see Kankaanniemi, 
Guards, p. 60 n. 179: ‘The most poignant criticism against Gerhardsson’s theory concerns the 
differences in Synoptic descriptions of the same events and sayings.’
328  Eve, Behind, pp. 41-42; cf. e.g. Mt. 5.3-11; Lk. 6.20-26; Mt. 6.9-13; Lk. 11.2-4.
329  Eve, Behind, p. 42; cf. Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 334-35; idem, Tradition, pp. 31-47; idem, 
‘Illuminating’, pp. 266-309 (298-99); idem, Reliability, pp. 51-57, 71, 79-81; ‘The Secret’, pp. 1-18 
(15-16). It is questionable whether Gerhardsson succeeded in demonstrating the analogous 
‘haggadic’ and ‘halakhic’ materials in the Jesus traditions.
330  Alexander, ‘Orality in Pharisaic-Rabbinic Judaism’, pp. 159-84 (172-76, 182); Eve, Behind, p. 42.
331  Eve, Behind, p. 42, points out that ‘[i]f Gerhardsson were content to argue that the Jesus tradition 
preserved the gist rather than the wording of Jesus’ sayings this might not be too problematic 
for him, but he makes a point of distinguishing between the way the Gospel tradition preserved 
Jesus’ words and the way other New Testament writers as Paul use the gist of Jesus’ teaching in 
paraphrase’.
332  Kankaanniemi, Guards, p. 62; also see Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 201, on Kelber, Oral and 
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inevitably have resulted in some variation in the traditions, as well as flexibility 
and freedom in the communities in which the different versions of eyewitness 
memories and interpretations of the traditions were told and retold. When 
different versions of the same story were heard from the twelve by other teachers, 
some freedom must have been taken in the retelling.333
 It is also argued that the process of transmission cannot be viewed as ‘systematic 
impartation of encyclopedic knowledge’, in other words, ‘rigid’, due to the itinerant 
and urgent nature of Jesus’ mission to proclaim the kingdom.334 This criticism, 
however, partly misses the point; it is at the very heart of Gerhardsson’s thesis 
that the formal process of teaching and transmission of tradition was a separate 
activity from its use in other contexts,335 imaginably also in proclamation to 
‘other villages’ which ‘desperately had to hear the gospel of the kingdom’.336 The 
tenability of Gerhardsson’s model is not so much determined by the social use of 
the tradition, say, in urgent situations of proclamation, as by whether or not there 
could have, besides that, existed a systematic setting for handing on of traditions 
among the disciples of Jesus. It is not unimaginable that Jesus would have applied 
the basic pedagogical method of his time when with his disciples, although neither 
the effect of the social use of the tradition on its transmission nor the flexibility in 
its telling cannot be done away with.337
 Another major criticism of Gerhardsson’s thesis, namely, that his notion of the 
controlling collegium formed by the twelve apostles in Jerusalem is implausible, 
has been presented by several scholars.338 First of all, it needs to be acknowledged 
that Gerhardsson never claimed Jerusalem to be the sole context of ‘the work 
Written, that ‘oral retelling of Jesus’ words will already have begun during Jesus’ lifetime’.
333  Kankaanniemi, Guards, pp. 62-63. Kankaanniemi, Guards, pp. 59-60, is sympathetic to 
Gerhardsson’s model in many respects, while adhering to what he labels ‘the reconstruction of 
the so-called Scandinavian school and Dunn-Bailey-Wright model of the informal controlled 
transmission of traditions’.
334  Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (125), referring to Crossan, The Historical Jesus, p. xxxi: ‘Jesus left 
behind him thinkers not memorizers, disciples not reciters, people not parrots’.
335  Cf. e.g. Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 330-31, 335; idem, Reliability, pp. 41-44; Byrskog, Story as 
History, p. 174; idem, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20 (10).
336  Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (125).
337  It does not occur implausible to me that there could have been both conservative forces (esp. 
authoritative individuals) and significant flexibility involved in the process of transmission.
338  E.g. Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34 (125); Davies, ‘Reflections on a Scandinavian Approach’, pp. 
14-34 (25-27); Davids, ‘The Gospels and the Jewish Tradition’, pp. 75-99 (87); Kelber, Oral and 
Written, p. 14; Eve, Behind, pp. 40-41, 44-45; Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 36; cf. Gerhardsson, 
Memory, pp. 214-20, 330-31, 334.
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of the word’, although he stressed the centrality of the leaders of the Jerusalem 
church.339 He somewhat qualified his position later by stating that the evangelists 
took their traditions from different sources.340
 In contrast to the criticism, Loveday Alexander contends that such a collegium 
could have existed on the analogy of Hellenistic schools. Luke’s picture would 
have had to make sense to his audience, and such a collegium is what would be 
expected in the light of Hellenistic school tradition. Also, the need to develop 
the tradition would not have been left to ‘chances of memory’ because of its 
importance as a bearer of the community’s identity.341 This argument is, however, 
inconclusive regarding the historicity of the collegium: it could have been the case 
that Luke coined the idea exactly because of the expectations of his community. 
On the other hand, even Eve, who otherwise deems Gerhardsson’s model too 
scribal and related to the medium of writing, admits that such a collegium would 
not be impossible to envisage if orally operated.342
 Aside from the criticism of the medium of writing, the important role 
of controlling authorities during the transmission process should not be 
underestimated.343 Rafael Rodríguez is probably right in contending that 
Gerhardsson’s reading of Acts 15 as ‘a regular description of early Christian 
general session’, as opposed to ‘a special, ad hoc gathering of the Jerusalem 
church to settle a significant, persistent problem that was not typical for the early 
Christians’, is too speculative.344 Rodríguez argues further that, in his letters, Paul 
provides authoritative doctrinal and pragmatic pronouncements independently 
of Jerusalem, which alone suggests a broader distribution of authority within 
early Christianity than the collegium of the twelve in Jerusalem.345 However, the 
339  Gerhardsson, Memory, p. 334: ‘An intensive work on the logos was also carried on in other 
churches, but the Jerusalem church was the centre of the early Christianity and the leaders of this 
congregation was considered as the highest doctrinal authority of the whole Church’.
340  Gerhardsson, Reliability, p. 50.
341  Alexander, ‘Memory and Tradition in the Hellenistic Schools’, pp. 113-53 (152); cf. Eve, Behind, 
p. 41.
342  Eve, Behind, p. 41.
343  Eve, Behind, p. 45, admits that ‘it would be odd indeed if the Twelve ceased to have any function 
within a year or two of Jesus’ death or if certain persons did not come to have much more control 
over the tradition than others’.
344  Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 36; cf. Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 245-61.
345  Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 36.
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authority and eyewitness status of the twelve346 is clearly articulated by Paul,347 
who himself seems to have been reluctant to break the authority structure of early 
Christianity ‘during the dynasty of the twelve’ by freely creating Jesus traditions.348 
This is not to be taken as an understatement about the flexibility of the process 
due to different tellings and variant forms of the traditions, which were based on 
the same episodes and also found in the written Gospels eventually.349
 All in all, Gerhardsson’s model attempted to turn the scholarly attention to 
‘the profoundly mnemonic character of written and, above all, oral tradition’, 
and introduced ‘neglected diachronic aspects into the form-critical program’.350 
Unfortunately, these aspects of his work were neglected for a long time. Despite 
the reservations expressed by some, for example, that is difficult to imagine 
Gerhardsson’s theory to describe the whole tradition process from Jesus’ earthly 
preaching to the written Gospels in detail,351 his basic analogies regarding the 
transmission of tradition and the role of memory in education are historical in 
nature, and as such they seem plausible.
 Some of the commendable aspects in Gerhardsson’s model have been 
recognized by scholars otherwise very critical of his theory. Werner Kelber, a chief 
critic of Gerhardsson, is able to comment appreciatively, ‘Gerhardsson…advanced 
an explanatory model that was suited to demonstrate the historical concreteness 
of the traditioning processes and the actual techniques that were operative in the 
transmission and reception of the tradition’.352 Also, Eric Eve, who is not convinced 
346  On the historicity of the twelve, see J. P. Meier, ‘The Circle of the Twelve: Did It Exist During 
Jesus’ Ministry’, JBL 116 (1997), pp. 635-72; idem, A Marginal Jew, III, pp. 125-97; James E. 
Charlesworth, Jesus within Judaism (New York: Doubleday, 1988), pp. 136-38; also Sanders, Jesus 
and Judaism, p. 326. 
347  E.g. 1 Cor. 9.1-5; 15.3-11; Gal. 1.11-19; 2.1-10. Especially, that of Peter.
348  Kankaanniemi, Guards, pp. 60-62 (62). That Paul does not seem to create sayings is indicated 
by 1 Cor. 7.12. It seems plausible that ‘the Jesus traditions Paul assumed that his churches knew 
derived mostly from Jerusalem’.
349  Cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 21: ‘while they [the twelve] were important traditionists, they 
were by no means the only ones…the “common folk” cannot be ruled out from the telling of 
stories…authorities can influence but not entirely control speech to the extent imagined by 
Gerhardsson’. However, also Kankaanniemi, Guards, p. 62, who regrets that, by the critics of ‘the 
Scandinavian approach’, the notion of control exercised by the twelve is often taken to denote a 
defense of wooden literalism.
350  Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20 (11).
351  See Eve, Behind, p. 45; Mournet, Oral Tradition and Literary Dependency, p. 64. Especially, when 
differences between rural Galilee where Jesus ministered, Jerusalem where the twelve gathered, 
and the Gentile cities where Paul ministered, are taken into account.
352  Kelber, ‘Conclusion: The Work of Birger Gerhardsson in Perspective’, pp. 173-206 (177).
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of Gerhardsson’s overall account of the oral tradition behind the Gospels, 
contends, ‘that the primitive Church would have been concerned to preserve 
traditions about Jesus and would have regarded some persons as particularly 
authoritative tradents is a priori more probable than form criticism’s assumptions 
to the contrary’.353 Finally, Rafael Rodríguez, who deems Gerhardsson’s conception 
of transmission too rigid and inflexible, says, ‘Gerhardsson…rightly recognized 
that the early Christians thought they were passing on Jesus’ actual teachings and 
accounts of his actual life…Jesus’ disciples preserved his teaching by committing it 
to memory and transmitting his teaching in memorized form…This…represents 
a significant advance over NT scholarship’s form-critical legacy’.354
 In sum, Gerhardsson tried to turn the scholarly attention to the reality that 
the transmission process of the Jesus traditions is to be related to the historical 
techniques of transmission such as memorization and replication. His work, which 
was initially rejected and denied a hearing, enabled later scholars to recognize 
that there were authoritative individuals exercising control over the transmission 
process, as opposed to the form-critical notions of anonymous community: 
the first Christians committed to memory what they believed were Jesus’ actual 
teachings and accounts of his life. Later views that cohere with Gerhardsson 
have had an impact on research, which Gerhardsson himself did not have due 
to the initial rejection of his theses. This view of the Jesus traditions results in 
the possibility of reconstructing a much more substantial picture of the historical 
Jesus than had been possible within the form-critical paradigm of Dibelius and 
Bultmann. The work of Werner H. Kelber, another central figure in the study of 
the nature and transmission of Jesus traditions, is analyzed in the next section.
2.3 Radical Discontinuity between Orality and 
Textuality
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the rise of the redaction-critical 
study of the Gospels gave new impetus to explaining the transmission of the Jesus 
traditions; viewpoints, which differed considerably from both the form-critical 
ideas of Dibelius and Bultmann and Gerhardsson’s view, began to be offered. 
With the increased emphasis on the gospel authors as individuals with systematic 
353  Eve, Behind, p. 45.
354  Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 35.
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literary and theological agendas, the form-critical notion of the Evangelists 
as ‘mere collectors and editors’ of the traditions was by and large abandoned. 
Therefore, the Gospels were no longer viewed as the end-products of the evolution 
of the oral tradition, but rather as something new, written and differentiated from 
the previous oral tradi tion.355
 Influenced by the redaction-critical emphases, particularly two scholars, 
Erhardt Güttge manns356 and Werner H. Kelber357, argued against a form-critical 
understanding of ‘orality’ and oral tradition as fixed and accessible as such 
through the written text; drawing from inter disciplinary studies such as folklore, 
linguistics, and orality, a radical discontinuity was en visaged to have existed 
between the pre-Gospel ‘orality’ of the Jesus traditions and the later written 
‘textuality’ of the Gospels.358 A brief account of Güttgemanns’ view is provided 
first, as his interest in the oral and written media of communication was important 
for Kelber. The main focus of this chapter is, nevertheless, on the work of Kelber, 
as Güttgemanns’ critique, already dealt with in this dissertation,359 was largely 
focused on the problems of form criticism. Kelber’s viewpoints, while in many 
respects reminiscent of Güttgemanns, have been given more heed in subsequent 
scholarship.360
355  On early redaction criticism of Mark, see esp. Willi Marxsen, Mark the Evangelist: Studies in 
the Redaction History of the Gospel (trans. J. Boyce, D. Juel, W. Poehlmann, R. A. Harrisville; 
Nashville and New York: Abingdon Press, 1969), who argued that the earlier theories about 
anonymous transmission of the pre-Gospel traditions could not explain the unity of the 
Gospels; ‘an individual, an author personality’, pursuing ‘a definite goal with his work’ needs to 
be accounted for (p. 18).
356  Güttgemanns, Candid Questions (1979) is the English translation from the German original, 
Güttgemanns, Offene Fragen zur Formgeschichte des Evangeliums. Eine methodologische Skizze 
der Grundlagenproblematik der Form- und Redaktionsgeschichte (BevT, 54; Munich: Kaiser, 
1970). The following brief account of Güttgemanns’ view is based on Eve, Behind, pp. 48-51.
357  Kelber’s most important contribution on the subject, The Oral and Written Gospel: The 
Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q, was originally 
published in 1983 (Fortress). The 1997 edition, referenced in this dissertation, includes a new 
somewhat modified introduction by the author. Also see e.g. the following articles, Kelber, 
‘Mark and Oral Tradition’, Semeia 16 (1979), pp. 7-55; idem, ‘Narrative as Interpretation and 
Interpretation of Narrative: Hermeneutical Reflections on the Gospels’, Semeia 39 (1987), pp. 
107-33; idem, ‘Jesus and Tradition: Words in Time, Words in Space’, Semeia 65 (1995), pp. 139-
67; idem, ‘The Case of the Gospels: Memory’s Desire and the Limits of Historical Criticism’, Oral 
Tradition 17 (2002), pp. 55-86; idem, ‘The History of the Closure of Biblical Texts’, Oral Tradition 
25/1 (2010), pp. 116-40; idem, ‘Rethinking the Oral-Scribal Transmission/Performance of the 
Jesus Tradition’, in Charlesworth (ed.), Jesus Research, pp. 500-30.
358  This model is labeled ‘the media contrast model’ by Eve, Behind, pp. 47-65.
359  Cf. ch. 2.1.3.
360  See e.g. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 199-204; Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 37-39; Bird, 
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2.3.1 Erhardt Güttgemanns
One of Erhardt Güttgemanns’ (b.1935) main ideas was that, through being 
incorporated into a written Gospel, the Jesus traditions began to represent a 
new genre; therefore, form criticism’s narrow concept of Sitz Leben as a direct 
window to the social history of each form of tradition via the written text needed 
to be rejected.361 On the basis of linguistic studies, Güttgemanns argued that 
the oral and the written media were two different modes of communication; a 
characteristic of the latter was, for example, its function of freeing language from 
the immediate context of utterance.362 Arguing for a discontinuity between the 
oral and written levels of tradition, Güttgemanns referred to the work of Albert 
Lord on Balkan oral epics, supposing that Lord’s investigation applied to oral 
tradition universally.363
 Güttgemanns relied on both Willi Marxsen’s redaction-critical work and the 
linguistic notion of a Gestalt, which basically denoted that a literary composite 
(for example, a Gospel) was more than the sum of its parts, namely, the 
individual traditions; therefore, the nature of the whole could not be derived 
from the tradition history of its parts.364 Güttgemanns seriously questioned the 
demonstrability of any notion of pre-Markan redactional phases and outlined a 
sharp contrast between the written Gospel and the oral tradition that preceded 
it.365 Many aspects of Güttgemanns’ view were accepted by Kelber, who further 
elaborated the distinction between the oral and written media.
2.3.2 Werner H. Kelber
In his most significant work, The Oral and the Written Gospel, Werner H. Kelber 
(b.1935) outlined his view of the relationship between the oral pre-Markan 
Jesus tradition and the written Gospel of Mark. While referring to the work of 
Güttgemanns,366 Kelber relied heavily on ‘American and British specialists on oral 
Gospel, pp. 91-92.
361  Güttgemanns, Candid Questions, pp. 96-125.
362  Güttgemanns, Candid Questions, pp. 196-99.
363  Güttgemanns, Candid Questions, pp. 204-10.
364  Güttgemanns, Candid Questions, pp. 277-90.
365  Güttgemanns, Candid Questions, pp. 333-42.
366  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 1-2.
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culture’, such as Milman Parry (1902–1935)367, Albert B. Lord (1912–1991)368, 
Walter Ong (1912–2003)369, Ruth Finnegan (b.1933)370, and Jack Goody (1919–
2015)371, as well as several folkloric studies372. Kelber began with the common 
view that Mark was a groundbreaking written account of the life and ministry of 
Jesus, setting a precedent for many subsequent accounts; he also argued, mainly 
on the basis of Ong’s work, for the conceptual categories of ‘orality’ and ‘textuality’ 
to explain the Greco-Roman context of transmission.
 For Kelber, Bultmann’s ‘model of evolutionary progression’ and Gerhardsson’s 
‘model of passive transmission’ were important starting points, though he 
considered both of them inadequate on the basis of their descriptions of 
oral process in terms of written records. Kel ber labeled his own view of oral 
transmission as ‘a process of social identification and pre ventive censorship’.373 
The difference between speech and writing was central to Kelber, who posited 
that ‘oral and written compositions come into existence under different circum-
stances’.374 The content of the spoken word is influenced by the presence of an 
immediate au dience, while an author of the written text is detached from 
any immediate social context and can, therefore, ‘exercise controls over his 
compositions’; further, ‘textual composition and transmission…enjoy a measure 
of freedom from mnemonic imperatives and social pressure’, to which the speaker 
is, besides linguistic devices, always bound.375
 According to Kelber, the pre-Gospel orality can only be explained by the 
367  Milman Parry, ‘Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse-Making, I: Homer and Homeric 
Style’, HSCP 41 (1930), pp. 73-147; idem, ‘Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse-Making, 
II: The Homeric Language as the Language of an Oral Poetry’, HSCP 43 (1932), pp. 1-50; idem, 
‘Whole Formulaic Verses in Greek and Southslavic Heroic Songs’, TAPA 64 (1933), pp. 179-97. 
368  Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales (HSCL, 24; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1960).
369  E.g. Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1958); idem, Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness 
and Culture (Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell University Press, 1977).
370  E.g. Ruth Finnegan, ‘How Oral is Oral Literature?’, BSOAS 37 (1974), pp. 52-64; idem, Oral 
Poetry.
371  Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977); Goody & Watt, ‘The Consequences of Literacy’, pp. 27-68.
372  See Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 1-2, for references to the journals of folkloric studies, p. 35 n. 
12.
373  Specifically, on Bultmann, see Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 2-8; on Gerhardsson, pp. 8-14; on 
Kelber’s own view, pp. 14ff. 
374  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 14-17 (14).
375  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 15. 
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reality that Jesus himself operated as an oral teacher, not a reader or writer.376 In 
the Jesus tradition, Jesus is only described as writing something in the ‘(textually 
precarious) story of the adulterous woman’ (Jn. 8.1-11), in which ‘Jesus’ “writing” 
is a parody of formal, literary writing’; also, in another Johannine passage (Jn. 
7.15), Jesus is depicted as ‘a man of literacy and probably scriptural knowledge 
(grammata oiden), but without formal rabbinic schooling (mē memath ēkōs)’.377 
The theological interests of the author had clearly shaped the Matthean Jesus into 
an authoritative Rabbinic interpreter of the Torah; Jesus was clearly not a leader 
of a school of tradition, but rather a prophetic speaker and eschatological teacher. 
Kelber contended, ‘His message and his person are inextricably tied to the spoken 
word, not to texts…the impact Je sus made on friends and foes alike was to no 
small degree due to his choice of implementa tion of the oral medium.’378
 Kelber argued that Jesus, being an oral performer, did not speak with textual 
preservation in mind, but rather risked his message on the oral medium; 
therefore, his words would not only be misunderstood, but they would also vanish 
immediately after their utterance. Nevertheless, Kelber believed that the origins 
of the tradition go back to Jesus’ orally performed words. He disagreed with the 
Bultmannian notion of the post-Easter beginnings of the tradition, as part of Jesus’ 
teaching would have been passed on already during his lifetime. In light of Kelber’s 
concept of ‘oral hermeneutics’, this passing on also undermined Bultmann’s idea 
of the post-Easter period as the point of departure for christological development; 
the early Christians, speaking in Jesus’ name, would function as carriers of his 
authority and voice, presumably beginning during his lifetime.379
 This did not mean, however, that there was any form of controlled or verbatim 
process of transmission. Jesus mainly recruited rural Galileans, not the urban 
middle class people. His message was never intended to be recorded for the sake 
of educated readers. In fact, Kelber did not think there was any reason ‘to revive 
the romantic notion of the simple, or even boor ish, Galilean fishermen’ of the 
tradition or the picture of Peter and John as non-literate and common men (Acts 
376  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 18-22.
377  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 18
378  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 18
379  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 19-20. Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 40 n. 183, referred for example 
to W. Marxsen, The Beginnings of Christology (trans. Paul Achtemeier and Lorenz Nieting; 
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), in which ‘[t]he thesis of the post-Easter beginnings of christology 
has been further undermined’.
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4.13); oral habits would have been natural for the earliest followers of Je sus, who 
would have had only ‘tenuous connections with literate culture’.380
 Kelber also somewhat downplayed Gerhardsson’s emphasis on the role of 
the twelve as transmitters of traditions. The transmission cannot be limited to 
the twelve, even though they were important traditionists. Other teachers and 
prophets must have had a role in the process, as had been indicated for example 
by Gerd Theissen and Eugene Boring.381 In addition to the people in official 
leadership roles, Kelber emphasized the role of the ‘common folk’ in ‘the telling of 
stories’. Although the authorities could have an influence, they could not entirely 
control the process of transmission simply because the people ‘who were healed 
or exorcized, impressed or offended by Jesus became the potential carriers of 
tradition’.382 In fact, Kelber found neither any indication that Jesus’ words were 
intended to be memorized by authorities, nor that Jesus would have been insistent 
on verbatim repetition and memorization. Accordingly, Gerhardsson’s model of 
‘passive transmission’ in isolation from social involve ment was unrealistic and 
failed as a model for both oral transmission and the writing of Mark’s Gospel.383 
While Kelber did not completely reject the notion of the existence of writ ten 
documents during the oral period (for instance, the Q tradition, other sayings 
collections, anthologies of short stories, parables, and miracles), he did not think 
they had any role of transcending ‘an essentially oral state of mind’; texts were not 
always used or copied verba tim in the written form, but rather through hearing, 
which blurred the ‘lines of orality and tex tuality’.384
 Kelber argued that the survival and continuity of the transmitted words was 
dependent on their social relevancy and acceptability; with the concept of social 
identification he contested the view of the verbatim memorization of tradition, 
380  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 21; cf. ch. 2.2; Gerhardsson, Memory, 201-2; idem, Transmission, pp. 
24-26, from whose viewpoint it can be inferred that the Jesus traditions preserved in the Gospels 
depict the disciples as ‘unliterary’ for ideological reasons.
381  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 41 n. 185, 186, referred, for example, to Gerd Theissen, ‘Itinerant 
Radicalism: The Tradition of Jesus Sayings from the Perspective of the Sociology of Literature’, 
RR 2 (1975), pp. 84-93, [which is the English translation of the German original Theissen, 
‘Wanderradikalismus: Literatursoziologische Aspekte der Überlieferung von Worten Jesu im 
Urchristentum’, ZTK 70 (1973), pp. 245-71], and M. Eugene Boring, Sayings of the Risen Jesus: 
Christian Prophecy in the Synoptic Tradition (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982).
382  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 21.
383  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 21-22.
384  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 23.
78
basically denoting that orally recited traditions, such as sayings, miracles, parables, 
and apophthegmatic stories, were adapted in characteristic speech forms to the 
present needs of an audience by the speaker; this was the only way to grant them 
the possibility of survival.385 Social identification questioned the early form-critical 
notion of limiting ‘form’ to a specific setting in life. Kelber insisted that such a 
restriction did not accurately depict the real life of oral discourse: ‘Distinct forms 
of speech can and do function in more than one social setting.’386 Specifically, 
Kelber understood ‘form’ as formal patterns of oral thinking.387
 According to Kelber, the social realities and flexibility of oral transmission 
cannot be ac counted for, unless discontinuity (forgetting and rejection) is given 
due heed along with con tinuity (remembrance and transmission). He argued for 
the concept of preventive censorship, which in the most extreme cases meant that 
‘a tradition that cannot overcome the social threshold to communal reception 
is doomed to extinction’.388 Preventive censorship may cause an oral tradition to 
shrink and be condensed through the speaker only emphasizing the elementary 
elements; the audience in turn may try to protect themselves from forgetting 
by focusing merely on the core of the tradition. Kelber outlined a model of oral 
transmission, which exhibited both ‘conservative urge for preservation’ and 
almost careless ‘predisposition to abandon features not socially approved’; this 
process would show flexibility in becoming compatible with social needs.389
 Kelber outlined some of the problems he saw in the form-critical idea of the 
uniform evolution of the Synoptic tradition.390 He abandoned the form-critical 
insistence of original form, which betrayed ‘the bias of textuality’ and ignored oral 
behavior. The concepts of original form and ipsissima vox were useless and invalid 
descriptions of oral life, simply because each oral performance was a unique 
creation and an authentic speech act in itself, as had been shown by the works of 
Parry and Lord.391
 Moving on to discuss ‘Mark’s oral legacy’, Kelber argued that speaking did ‘set 
linguistic standards for the synoptic tradition’, and ‘oral features’ were imported 
385  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 24-26
386  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 25-26.
387  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 27.
388  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 29.
389  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 29-30.
390  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 32-33, accuses redaction-critical study of the Gospels of similarly 
assuming the feasibility of ‘regression from the gospel’s text to prior textual stages’.
391  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 30-34 (30); cf. e.g. Lord, Singer of Tales, p. 101.
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into the Gospel of Mark. Orality had significantly contributed to the Gospel, 
which makes it possible to study the written Gospel’s oral legacy. While in a sense 
killing the spoken language, the written medium froze and preserved the oral 
forms, which can be studied with the distinct features of oral life in mind. Kelber 
focused specifically on the feature of storytelling, which for him represented ‘the 
pre-Markan mode of language’; he categorized Mark’s ‘brief tales’ into four types: 
heroic stories (healing stories), polarization stories (exorcisms), didactic stories 
(apophthegmata), and parabolic stories. The last type was of special interest for 
Kelber, who thought it was ‘essential for an understanding of the gospel both as 
textualization of oral materials and as narrative’.392
 First, the ten heroic (healing) stories in Mark393 displayed both uniformity of 
composition and variability of narrative exposition. Albeit attempting to treat 
these stories as ‘a matter of recall more than of record’, Kelber argued, on the 
basis of the Gospel text, for the three component parts, exposition of healing (for 
example, ‘arrival of healer and sick person’), performance of healing (for example, 
‘utterance of healing formula’), and confirmation of the healing (for example, 
‘admiration/confirmation formula’), dividing each into ‘a series of auxiliary 
motifs’.394 Even though the healing stories frequently employ commonplace 
structures, they nevertheless portray features of variability, which are inseparable 
from any activity of oral transmission; the healing stories betray the plurality, 
uniformity, and variability, which can only be accounted for by viewing the stories 
as oral production, in which no performance by a narrator is the original or the 
permanent one.395
 Kelber also outlined the oral mode of dramatization in the healing stories. In 
line with Bultmann, he recognized the principle of scenic duality; typically only 
two personalized actors (Jesus and the sick person or a group of people) are in 
the focus of these stories with ‘single-stranded’ plots. Also, the character of 
Jesus is undeveloped in these stories, which underlines their oral character; the 
healing stories emphasize Jesus’ heroism, thus simplifying and reducing him to 
392  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 44-45 (45).
393  Peter’s Mother in Law (Mk 1.29-31); the Leper (1.40-45a); the Paralytic (2.1-12); the Man with a 
Withered Hand (3.1-6); Jairus’s Daughter (5.21-24, 35-43); the Woman with a Hemorrhage (5.25-
34); the Syrophoenician Woman (7.24-30); the Deaf Mute (7.31-37); the Blind Man of Bethsaida 
(8.22-26); the Blind Bartimaeus (10.46-52).
394  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 46.
395  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 46-51; cf. Lord, Singer of Tales.
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one dimension. The oral medium is not interested in the complexity and ordinary 
life of Jesus, but it rather remembers him as a heroic performer of extraordinary 
deeds with ‘an enlarged status’, yet retaining a touch of his human frailty.396 Kelber 
even referred to the Jesus of the heroic stories as ‘a genuine manifestation of oral 
christology’.397
 Secondly, the three exorcisms, namely, the polarization stories398 were dealt 
with separately from the healing stories by Kelber, although these stories display 
heroic tendencies similar to those of the healing stories. Again, Kelber detected 
three different component parts, confrontation (for example, ‘meeting of exorcist 
and possessed’), expulsion (for example, ‘command to exit’), and acclamation (for 
example, ‘choral formula’), as well as ‘a series of auxiliary features’. The exorcism 
stories are both uniform in compositional structure and variable in narrative 
performance; the oral composition narrates thematic commonplaces such as 
expected endings, while the same story can be told in different ways depending 
on the social conditions of the oral performance. Kelber pointed out the sharp 
adversary relationship between Jesus and the forces of evil in each story; the agōn, 
the contest, was ‘a hallmark of oral culture’, and conflict was a lot more favorable 
for the functioning of the oral medium than the ambiguous and complex 
ordinary life. While exemplifying the same ‘oral christology’ of heroism as the 
healing stories, the exorcisms fail to move from ideological simplicity to complex 
theological reflection.399
 Thirdly, Kelber labeled ‘the apophthegmatic tradition’ as the didactic stories, 
which include controversies, double-controversy dialogues, and biographical tales, 
each culminating in a memorable saying of Jesus. Referring to both Bultmann 
and Dibelius, Kelber found six examples400 of this kind of tradition, which betray 
evidence of pre-Markan formulation.401 The didactic stories are a form of speech 
with an educational function; they combine story with ethical statement, being 
396  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 51-52.
397  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 52. Italics original.
398  The exorcism at the Synagogue of Capernaum (Mk 1.21-28); the exorcism of the Gerasene 
Demoniac (5.1-20); the exorcism of the Epileptic Boy (9.14-29).
399  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 52-55.
400  Table Fellowship with Sinners (Mk 2.15-17); the Issue of Fasting (2.18-19); Plucking of Corn on 
Sabbath (2.23-28); the Issue of Divorce (10.2-9); the Issue of Possessions (10.17-22); Payment of 
Taxes (12.13-17)
401  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 55; Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 83 n. 34 refers to Bultmann, 
Geschichte, pp. 39-73 (‘apophthegmata’) and Dibelius, From Tradition, pp. 37-69 (‘paradigms’).
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purposefully created for the purpose of oral communication. Kelber argued that 
such ethical directives would have made no sense apart from their social settings; 
indeed, the storyteller would focus on the personalization and actualization 
of the essential things to be remembered, instead of trying to offer generalized 
principles.402
 Fourthly, Kelber discussed in particular six parabolic stories403 of the Gospel 
of Mark, while he recognized that parabolic discourse was present across the 
Gospel.404 Kelber indicated that Mark associates ‘Jesus, the oral performer 
exclusively with parabolic speech (4.33-34)’.405 There was, however, neither a 
uniform compositional structure nor one synchronic pattern in the six Markan 
stories (or the Synoptic parables in general). Kelber noticed that the parabolic 
stories are ordinary and realistic in nature, drawing from the agricultural world 
of Galilean peasant society and first-century Jewish life; he pointed to a problem 
that this ordinariness (or ‘notion of parabolic realism’) raises for the mnemonic 
process: while speakers and hearers could recognize themselves in the stories that 
narrate the mundane everyday life, this feature, and its lack of the striking and 
extraordinary features, would hardly have guaranteed enduring transmission. 
However, Kelber noted that there is much more to the parables than just ‘parabolic 
realism’, namely, memorable contrasts, for example, between the triple failure and 
triple success of the seed in the parable of the Sower.406
 Further, in explaining the mnemonic process of the parabolic stories, Kelber 
employed Paul Ricoeur’s concept of ‘extravagance’, which basically meant that, in 
a parable, the extraordinary is found within the ordinary; the concept ‘promotes 
intensification and exaggeration, risks paradox and hyperbole, and strains 
or transgresses the hearers’ sense of realism’.407 Despite acknowledging that 
‘extravagance’ is only moderately developed or nonexistent in most of the Markan 
parables, Kelber argued that all parables share a metaphorical quality: the meaning 
of a parable ‘lies outside its own narrated world’.408 Due to this hermeneutical 
402  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 55-57.
403  The Sower (Mk 4.3-8); the parable of the Reaper (4.26-29); the parable of the Mustard Seed (4.30-
32); the parable of the Wicked Tenants (12.1-11); the parable of the Fig Tree (13.28); the parable 
of the Doorkeeper (13.34).
404  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 57-64.
405  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 58.
406  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 58-59.
407  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 60-61 (60).
408  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 61.
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quality, parables are like unfinished products dependent on their social contexts 
of oral performance and the interaction between the speaker and the hearers. 
Therefore, parabolic language is ‘a quintessential oral form of speech’; parabolic 
speech lacks both the original form and the original meaning, every instance of 
telling and interpretation being a unique interaction between the speaker and the 
audience.409
 Kelber followed the form-critics Schmidt, Dibelius, and Bultmann in viewing 
the Passion narrative as an exception to the linking of individual units in Mark’s 
composition; there was no trace of the activity of incorporating ‘oral forms’ 
into the account, which is a coherent and tightly plotted story of Jesus’ death. 
However, Kelber emphatically rejected the form critics’ and others’ notion of a 
pre-Markan version of the Passion narrative from the period close to the actual 
events; he rather viewed the coherence and realism of Mark’s story as indications 
of his narrative competence. The mutually exclusive theories offered to explain 
the nature and development of the Passion narrative only pointed out, according 
to Kelber, that ‘decompositioning’ does not successfully explain its extraordinary 
textuality. Kelber did not believe that the narrative coherence indicated any 
closeness to the events; he found neither a plausible setting, nor a formal parallel to 
a supposed ‘extended pre-Markan Passion narrative’. For example, it was unlikely 
that such a written passion narrative would have developed from the distinct 
oral formula of 1 Corinthians 15.3b-5.410 On the contrary, Kelber contended that 
‘orality’, which normally tended towards heroism, could not handle the ‘antiheroic’ 
death of the Messiah; indeed, the tragic event could only be written about from a 
distance. Accordingly, the Passion narrative was composed by Mark to promote 
his theological agenda and show the meaning and necessity of Jesus’ death in the 
divine plan with the help of the Scriptures.411
409  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 62.
410  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 185-199 (186-191).
411  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 197-199. Eve, Behind, pp. 51-60 (57), refers to the criticism of 
Thomas J. Farrell, ‘Kelber’s Breakthrough’, in L. H. Silberman (ed.), Orality, Aurality and Biblical 
Narrative (Semeia 39; Decatur, GA: Scholars Press, 1987), pp. 27-46 (40-41), who argues that 
Mark does not depict Jesus’ death as ‘unheroic’. Kelber, ‘Biblical Hermeneutics and the Ancient 
Art of Communication: A Response’, in Silberman (ed.), Orality, pp. 97-105 (102-3), modifies this 
position by suggesting that Mark’s Passion narrative redefines heroism in light of the cross. On 
refusal of literary sensibilities in Roman antiquity to promote graphic descriptions of crucifixion, 
see Martin Hengel, Crucifixion: In the Ancient World and the Folly of the Message of the Cross 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), pp. 38, 77-81; citations in Joel B. Green, ‘The Death of Jesus’, in 
Holmén & Porter (eds.), Handbook, pp. 3:2383-408 (2389), who thinks Kelber overemphasizes 
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 Kelber argued that, apart from the Passion narrative, the single oral stories of 
Mark’s Gospels were the backbone of his entire narrative of the life of Jesus.412 In 
Mark’s connected narrative, individual units are linked together by stereotypical 
connective devices,413 which are derived from the Gospel’s oral building blocks; 
in addition to their connecting function, these devices create the sense of 
suddenness and urgency in Mark’s narrative.414 The Gospel has an oral flavor 
to its overall composition, which is indicated by several stylistic and rhetorical 
features: folkloristic triads (three disciples separated from within the twelve, three 
predictions of passion and resurrection by Jesus, the disciples asked three times to 
wake in Gethsemane, etc.), the use of third person plural instead of the passive, the 
direct speech instead of indirect speech, constant repetition, a colloquial version of 
Koine Greek removed from Attic elegance, and description of characters in action 
with minimum character development.415 In light of all the characteristics of oral 
story telling, Kelber concluded that Mark’s style is closer to that of a speaker than 
a writer.416
 Kelber also attempted to acknowledge the ‘integrative powers’ of Mark’s oral 
legacy, which Kelber believed had brought the individual units together, forming 
the chapters 1–13 of the Gospel. However, he did not go as far as to follow the view 
originally posed by Herder that there existed an oral gospel, which would inevitably 
result in the written Gospels due to the dissemination caused by the continual 
delivery of the oral gospel; Kelber insisted that, since Herder’s day, redaction and 
literary criticism had demonstrated that the authors of the Synoptic Gospels were 
literarily competent and responsible for the distinct theological views present in 
their works. Furthermore, he pointed out that the analogies between Homeric 
epics (such as Iliad and Odyssey) and the Gospels, as well as between the Yugoslav 
epic singers417 and the Gospels, should not be overemphasized. For one thing, Iliad 
and Odyssey are oral po etry in metric language distinct from the prose narrative 
of the Gospels; for another, both the Homeric epics and Yugoslav epics stemmed 
from centuries-old oral cultures, while Mark’s oral legacy represented a tradition 
this aspect.
412  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 64-70.
413  For example, archestai with infinitive verbs of action and speaking, the adverbial eythus, the 
iterative palin, the abundant use of paratactic kai, etc.
414  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 64-65.
415  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 66-70.
416  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 68.
417  Such as Avdo Mededović, who was popularized by the studies of Parry and Lord.
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still at a very early stage. Also, Mark’s compositional ac tivity bound heterogeneous 
units into a coherent narrative, while orality tends to gather ho mogeneous 
material.418 Kelber did not, however, consider it ‘intrinsically implausible that 
Mark imposed his writing authority upon an unorganized oral lore’.419
 After denying any possibility of a step-by-step progression of oral tradition 
toward the written Gospel, Kelber moved on to discuss the nature of Mark’s 
textuality.420 He argued sharply: ‘To the extent that the gospel draws on oral 
voices, it has rendered them voiceless.’421 Mark’s work of writing meant that the 
oral performer and the audience no longer were part of the process of making 
the message; the writing process resulted in ‘a subversion of the homeostatic 
balance’, decontextualization and distancing of the message from the social life.422 
In the process, Mark consistently describes the disciples, who had been the oral 
representatives (as opposed to ‘writers’) of Jesus and his oral message, as failing 
to comprehend Jesus’ message; the sharp critique of the oral authorities marks the 
departure from oral norms and habits towards the written textuality, the greatest 
example of the failure of oral tradition being the fleeing of the disciples and the 
failure of the women to deliver the message of the Empty Tomb. Also, Jesus’ family 
is described very negatively, even in a hostile light.423 Furthermore, Mark’s critique 
of the prophets in Mark 13:21-23 is taken by Kelber as a general rebuttal of the 
Christian prophets, who were the most powerful carriers of the present authority 
of Jesus through the oral medium.424 Compared to Matthew and Luke, Mark also 
presents less of Jesus’ ‘oral words’ in order to further silence the oral tradition.425
 Kelber argued that Mark’s written textuality was kind of a reorientation. He 
employed Güttgemanns’ notion of Mark’s Gospel as a Gestalt, namely, that, after 
being detached from their oral settings and placed into the written narrative, the 
pericopae were changed in both nature and meaning. For instance, the parables, 
having entered ‘a veritable maze of hermeneutical complications’, could no longer 
be interpreted separated from their immediate literary contexts.426 Mark’s Gospel 
418  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 77-80.
419  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 79.
420  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 90-105.
421  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 91.
422  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 92-94 (92).
423  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 96-98, 102-4.
424  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 98-99.
425  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 100-2
426  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 105-115 (111).
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was, as had been pointed out previously in connection with the parabolic stories, 
written as a ‘written parable’ throughout, Mark 4.10-12 constituting a kind of 
hermeneutical key to the entire Gospel text.427
 Moving on to discuss Paul and Q, Kelber set Mark’s preference of the written 
medium in sharp contrast with the orality he supposed was maintained in both 
Paul and the Q tradition. First, Paul’s letters were written with an oral-aural 
mindset, as opposed to visual imagery; hearing was necessary for the receiving 
of Paul’s message, namely, the gospel (Gal. 3.2), which needs to be viewed in light 
of oral hermeneutics.428 Second, Paul’s polemical stance to ward the law had first 
and foremost to do with its written nature; the written, fixed law (‘let ter’) was in 
principle opposed to Paul’s oral gospel, which was characterized by freedom in the 
Spirit.429 With regard to the oral hermeneutic of the Q tradition, Kelber insisted 
that it de picted Jesus as a prophetic authority, whose ever-present proclamation 
made distinction be tween neither the pre-Easter and the post-Easter Jesus, 
nor the sayings of Jesus and those of his followers. The focus on Jesus’ sayings, 
the specific omission of the Passion narrative, and the relative lack of narrative 
elements in Q point towards an oral hermeneutic, indicating a di rect presence of 
Jesus with his followers, a feature lacking in the historically distanced, textu al, and 
even regressive narrative of Mark’s Gospel.430
 Kelber’s distinction between the pre-Gospel orality and the later written 
textuality resulted in a rather skeptical view towards the methods often used in 
the study of the historical Jesus. Kelber insisted that, while the early Christians 
would have been interested in ‘recapturing the “real story”’, there was no ‘high 
competency in preserving the life and person of Jesus’ within the early Christian 
oral culture of storytelling. Jesus had to enter language and could only continue 
to exist within its bounds; the oral medium would exercise control over the kind 
of Jesus that would be preserved and transmitted. Brevity and conciseness being 
virtues of Mark’s oral legacy, Jesus was simplified, heroized, and depicted as a 
visually impressive figure in a world of conflict. Therefore, Kelber took for granted 
that this oral process, in which the tellers and hearers played a crucial role, 
427  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 117-129.
428  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 140-51.
429  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 151-64; on Paul, also pp. 165-77, pp. 203-6.
430  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 201-3, 209. Kelber, ‘The Case of the Gospels’, pp. 55-86 (70-72, 78-
81), has later undermined the two-source hypothesis and the existence of Q, which questions his 
arguments concerning the oral hermeneutics of Q in Oral and Written. See Eve, Behind, p. 60.
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would refuse to preserve the historical Jesus in the ‘modern’ sense; oral mentality 
recognizes neither the categories of ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ when it comes to 
Jesus’ words, nor submits to the search for ‘the real Jesus’ behind the texts. Even 
though this does not mean complete loss of ‘rapport with actuality’, the process 
of transmission is fashioned for mnemonic purposes and immediate relevancy; 
historical accuracy and reliability are always subordinate to oral expediency and 
social identification.431
2.3.3 Critique & Evaluation
Kelber’s view has evoked both negative and positive responses; his work is 
critiqued and evaluated here in light of the subsequent scholarly discussion.432 
First, the criticisms raised against Kelber’s case are presented and evaluated; 
Kelber’s notions of orality and literacy, his reconstructions of the historical Jesus 
and the disciples, his understanding of the ‘oral hermeneutics’ of Mark, Paul, and 
Q, as well as his use of the concepts preventive censorship and social identification 
are addressed. Second, after these problematic areas, the particular strengths of 
431  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 70-77 (70-71). 
432  See e.g. Joanna Dewey, ‘Oral Methods of Structuring Narrative in Mark’, Int 43 (1989), pp. 32-44; 
idem, ‘Textuality in an Oral Culture: A Survey of the Pauline Traditions’, Semeia 65 (1994), pp. 
37-65; Paul J. Achtemeier, ‘Omne Verbum Sonat: The New Testament and the Oral Environment 
of Late Western Antiquity’, JBL 109 (1990), pp. 3-27; Larry W. Hurtado, ‘The Gospel of Mark: 
Evolutionary or Revolutionary Document’, JSNT 40 (1990), pp. 15-32; idem, ‘Greco-Roman 
Textuality’, pp. 91-106; idem, ‘Oral Fixation and New Testament Studies? “Orality,” “Performance” 
and Reading Texts in Early Christianity’, NTS 60 (2014), pp. 321-40; Byrskog, Jesus the Only 
Teacher, pp. 24, 319-20, 323-24, 331-49; idem, Story as History, pp. 33-34, 128-44 (131-38); idem, 
‘The Transmission of the Jesus Tradition’, in Holmén & Porter (eds.), Handbook, pp. 2:1465-95 
(1487-88); John Halverson, ‘Oral and Written Gospel: A Critique of Werner Kelber’, NTS 40 
(1994) pp. 180-95; Risto Uro, ‘Thomas and oral gospel tradition’, in Risto Uro (ed.), Thomas at 
the Crossroads: Essays on the Gospel of Thomas (Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1998), pp. 8-32 (8-
19); Harm W. Hollander, ‘The Words of Jesus: From Oral Traditions to Written Record in Paul 
and Q’, NovT 42 (2000), pp. 340-57; Gerhardsson, Reliability, pp. 114-23; idem, ‘The Secret’, pp. 
1-18; Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 199-204; idem, ‘Remembering Jesus’, pp. 1:183-205; Matti 
Myllykoski, ‘Mark’s Oral Practice and the Written Gospel of Mark’, in Jiři Mrázek & Jan Roskovec 
(eds.), Testimony and Interpretation: Early Christology in Its Judeo-Hellenistic Milieu (Festschrift 
P. Pokorný; JSNTSup, 272; London, T & T Clark, 2004), pp. 97-113; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, 
pp. 283, 316; Rodríguez, Structuring, passim; idem, ‘The Embarrassing Truth About Jesus: The 
Criterion of Embarrassment and the Failure of Historical Authenticity’, in Keith & Le Donne 
(eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, pp. 132-51 (144-45); idem, Oral Tradition, 
pp. 37-39; Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 16-17, 166; idem, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39; 
Eve, Behind, pp. 61-65; Horsley, Text and Tradition, pp. 220-45; Bird, ‘Formation’, pp. 113-34; 
idem, Gospel, pp. 91-92; Hübenthal, Das Markusevangelium, pp. 24, 31-37, 41-42; Kirk, Q in 
Matthew, pp. 2-3, 18-20. Also, see the early review by Thomas E. Boomershine in JBL 104 (1985), 
pp. 538-40.
87
Kelber’s theory are presented. Kelber’s notions of the multiformity and the nature 
of tradition, the congruency of his viewpoints with social memory theory and 
the memory approach, and his emphasis on the significance of Mark’s Gospel are 
discussed at the end of the chapter.
 To begin with the most common criticism, shared by a wide range of scholars, 
it has been argued that Kelber’s distinction between orality and textuality in 
the earliest Christianity is too sharp and radical.433 This criticism has to do with 
Kelber’s general reconstruction of the ancient media context. While Kelber’s 
emphasis on orality is important in showing the inade quacy of a modern literate 
mind-set for studying oral transmission,434 his view of the early Christian and 
Greco-Roman context is weakened by problems in both method and conclu sions. 
As pointed out by Hurtado, Kelber’s work does not rely on historical analyses of 
the Greco-Roman media context per se, but is built upon studies (such as Ong 
and Lord) on the advent of literacy and textuality as well as oral communication 
in illiterate or marginally liter ate cultures; thus, Kelber’s case for the pre-Markan 
orality of the Jesus traditions rests upon whether the context can be viewed as 
such a culture.435
 It has been indicated that Kelber’s case would be better off had he, instead 
of studying folklore, Homeric rhapsodists, and socio-anthropological studies, 
433  See e.g. Hurtado, ‘The Gospel of Mark’, pp. 15-32; idem, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106; 
also Uro, ‘Thomas and oral gospel tradition’, pp. 8-32 (15-19); Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 
128-29; Gerhardsson, Reliability, pp. 115-23; idem, ‘The Secret’, pp. 1-18; Myllykoski, ‘Mark’s 
Oral Practice’, pp. 97-113 (101-2); Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 202-3; Eve, Behind, pp. 61-63; Bird, 
Gospel, p. 91-92; also, Meier, A Marginal Jew, I, p. 193 n. 62, who states that ‘Kelber exaggerates 
the gap between the oral and written forms of the Gospel’. Cf. many of the voices in Semeia 
39 (1987), in which see esp. T. E. Boomershine, ‘Peter’s Denial as Polemic or Confession: The 
Implications of Media Criticism for Biblical Hermeneutics’, pp. 47-68. 
434  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 200: ‘The distinction [between oral and written, between oral 
performance and literary transmission] is important, not least since it requires modern literary 
scholars to make a conscious effort to extricate their historical envisaging of the oral transmission 
of tradition from the mind-set and assumptions of long-term literacy.’ In his revised introduction 
to the 1997 edition of Oral and Written, Kelber qualified his position by deeming the initial ‘Great 
Divide’ between orality and textuality in antiquity exaggerated, yet maintained that such a strong 
thesis was necessary to resist ‘typographic modes of thought’ in scholarship. Albeit addressing 
many of his critics in the revised introduction, Kelber ignores the severe criticism in Hurtado, 
‘The Gospel of Mark’, pp. 15-32; idem, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106. See Kelber, Oral 
and Written, pp. xix-xxxi. 
435  Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, 91-106 (93). Hurtado (p. 93) points out that Kelber’s view of 
orality, based on Ong and others, could be contested in light of the works available at the time. 
See the criticism and references to orality studies in Halverson, ‘Oral and Written Gospel’, pp. 
180-95 (181-83). 
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looked for parallels in sources from Second Temple Judaism and Greco-Roman 
antiquity of the first century.436 To be sure, Kelber did not consider the context 
of the earliest Christianity completely foreign to literacy or textuality; he gave a 
brief account of the use of writing in the ancient near east, concluding, first, that 
Christianity ‘sprang up in a milieu that both in its Jewish and in its Hellenistic 
loyalties had long set a high premium on the written word’437 and, second, that ‘[t]
hroughout antiquity writing was in the hands of an élite of trained specialists, and 
reading required an advanced education available only to few’.438 While evidence 
supports both of these conclusions, it also points further to a period of widespread 
influence of textuality in the Hellenistic age; the literary environment was ‘rich 
and varied’ and produced a great number of letters.439 This is not an objection 
to the general observation that ‘orality’, namely, the spoken word, rhetoric, 
performance of theatrical works, reading of literary texts aloud, et cetera,440 were 
436  Bird, Gospel, p. 92; see Talmon, ‘Oral Tradition and Written Transmission’, pp. 121-58; Alexander, 
‘Orality in Pharisaic-Rabbinic Judaism’, pp. 159-84; David E. Aune, ‘Prolegomena to the Study of 
Oral Tradition in the Hellenistic World’, in Wansbrough (ed.), Jesus and the Oral Gospel Tradition, 
pp. 59-106; Gerhardsson, Reliability, pp. 85 n. 56, 116-17. Gerhardsson, Reliability, p. 85 n. 56, 
asks, ‘why we should elevate the type which A. B. Lord investigated in Yugoslavia to the status of 
standard model of “orality,” “oral tradition,” “oral composition,” “oral literature,” or the like, when 
after all the world is full of alternatives’. Also, Uro, ‘Thomas and oral gospel tradition’, pp. 8-32 
(17): ‘…universal claims based on the preliterary period of Greece and twentieth-century Balkan 
practice may also be misleading.’
437  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 16.
438  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 17.
439  See Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (94-95), who takes this as an indication of 
a wide popular literacy and education; cf. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 71-123, who does not think 
there is evidence for a wide-spread literacy anywhere in the ancient world. Nevertheless, Keith 
(e.g. p. 81ff.) retains that religious devotion did not require literate education and textuality had 
a great impact in the period. See Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 85 n. 61: ‘Some scholars who stress 
(appropriately) that Jewish and early Christian cultures were oral/aural unfortunately press this 
matter too far in their descriptions of this oral/aural environment as something antithetical to 
textuality.’
440  On the question whether the ancient people did read silently, see Paul J. Achtemeier, ‘Omne 
verbum sonat’, pp. 3-27, who famously argued that literature was produced by dictation and read 
by recitation; however, for a thorough discussion of the weaknesses of that view, see e.g. Frank D. 
Gilliard, ‘More Silent Reading in Antiquity: Non omne verbum sonat’, JBL 112 (1993), pp. 689-
96; M. F. Burnyeat, ‘Postscript on Silent Reading’, The Classical Quarterly 47 (1997), pp. 74-76; 
A. K. Gavrilov, ‘Techniques of Reading in Classical Antiquity’, The Classical Quarterly 47 (1997), 
pp. 56-73; Alessandra Fusi, ‘The Oral/Literate Model: A Valid Approach for New Testament 
Studies?’ (PhD Thesis; The University of Sheffield, 2003); also, William A. Johnson, Readers and 
Reading Culture in the High Roman Empire: A Study of Elite Communities (Classical Culture and 
Society; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 7 n. 12, who labels Achtemeier’s paper ‘a 
naïve summary of the debate’. References in Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 43, 126 n. 19. Also, see 
Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (24-31), who discusses Johnson’s work in detail 
and, besides his recognition of the limits of Johnson’s study, concludes (p. 27), ‘[Johnson’s] study 
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greatly valued by the people of the Greco-Roman world in the same era; however, 
this orality should not be taken ‘as a basis for minimising the place of texts and 
the activities associated with them (writing, reading, copying etc.)’.441 Indeed, one 
can speak of a system of interaction between oral communication and written 
manuscripts, wherein the latter bear specific symbolic and social significance; in 
such an interaction, reading cannot be reduced to a cognitive act or a process, 
but should instead be viewed as ‘the negotiated construction of meaning within a 
particular sociocultural context’.442 Even if the actual reading was only done by the 
educated, this ‘construction’ must have also influenced the populace.
 More specifically, Kelber’s approach to the earliest Christian movement as 
an oral sub-culture to the more ‘literate’ Judaism of particularly the Qumran 
community is misleading.443 While the Qumran community was probably more 
scribal-oriented than the earliest Christian movement, it is not self-evident that 
the latter formed an oral sub-culture, dominated by ‘pre-literate orality’, within 
the Greco-Roman Jewish Palestine. While evidence seems to agree with Kelber’s 
general conclusion that the overall rate of literacy was probably low within Jewish 
circles, textuality was in fact valued and more widely-shared than he allows.444 
is thoroughly convincing in drawing out the ways in which reading practices were embedded in 
larger cultural realities that both shaped those practices and gave them meaning.’
441  Hurtado, ‘Oral Fixation’, pp. 321-40 (323), who argues against some historical oversimplifications 
made by the advocates of ‘performance criticism’ of the New Testament.
442  William A. Johnson, ‘Toward a Sociology of Reading in Classical Antiquity,’ AJP 121 (2000), 
pp. 593–627 (603); reference in Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (26). Italics are 
original. Ancient reading practices are more accurately addressed with the concepts of ‘reading 
communities’ or ‘reading cultures’.
443  Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (95); on the setting and relevancy of Qumran, 
see Talmon, ‘Oral Tradition and Written Transmission’, pp. 121-58; cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, 
pp. 16-17.
444  For the level of literacy, see Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 71-123; idem, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, 
pp. 22-39 (35-36); Hezser, Jewish Literacy; also, Eve, Behind, pp. 10-11; contra Millard, Reading 
and Writing in the Time of Jesus.
   See the references in Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (95-96, n. 13-15), who, 
despite some ambiguity, succeeds in emphasizing the wide-spread textuality. On the importance 
of the synagogue as a particularly important institution in promoting an appreciation of texts, 
see Josephus’ references to the Jewish emphasis upon popular levels of education, Josephus, 
Apion 1.60; 2.171-78, 204. Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (96 n. 15), comments, 
‘Even if somewhat idealized, Josephus’ statements likely reflect cultural values characteristic of 
first-century Jewish society.’
   However, Hurtado’s points need to be qualified with Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, 
pp. 22-39 (35-36 n. 60): ‘If he [Hurtado] means that many Jews were literate, that is incorrect…
Hurtado is correct about the cultural influence of texts, however, and here Stock’s distinction 
between “textuality” and “literacy” is important.’ Nevertheless, I find the following statements 
generally plausible, as far as textuality is concerned: Gerhardsson, Reliability, p. 115: ‘The society 
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One cannot view ‘orality in the Second Temple Judaism and early Christianity as a 
“lack of influence of textuality”’.445 The early Christian identity was dependent on 
the written texts, namely, the manuscripts, which enabled and reflected ‘a specific 
reading community’; even though early Christian communities did not share the 
social status and wealth of the elite in the higher Roman empire, ‘the sociological 
principle that their revered texts were bound up with their concepts of who they 
were was as true for synagogues reading Torah, Pauline churches reading epistles, 
and Justin Martyr’s church reading the Gospels and prophets as it was for Pliny, 
Galen, Gellius, and their friends reading antiquarian Greco-Roman texts’.446 In the 
earliest Christianity, there was no pure orality but rather various ‘oralities’ and 
interactions with scribal practices or written textuality.447
 Though it is not contested by most NT scholars that the oral medium was 
the primary means of transmission of the pre-Markan Jesus traditions, Kelber’s 
characterization of the context is questionable; it does not take into account the 
reality that ‘[early Christian oral tradition] exists within a culture with a strong 
literacy as well as vigorous orality’.448 Even if the early Christian culture is viewed 
as ‘predominantly oral’, it cannot go without notice that oral versions of a tradition 
would not vanish after the writing and the content of the written versions would 
usually be transmitted orally.449 A sharp distinction between oral and written 
transmission is hard to imagine, as any strand of tradition could have ‘oscillated 
from oral to written forms at various stages in its transmission and amid multiple 
where Jesus appeared…was no preliterary society. Nothing indicates that the formative mileu of 
Jesus was not at all or only to a small degree influenced by the written word’; idem, ‘The Secret’, 
pp. 1-18 (17): ‘Writing, reading, and listening to written texts had for many centuries influenced 
the way in which Jews, especially leaders and teachers, thought and expressed themselves.’ Cf. 
ch. 2.1.3; 2.2.3.
445  Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (35-36), referencing Hurtado, ‘The Gospel pf 
Mark’, pp. 15-32 (17).
446  Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (31).
447  Samuel Byrskog, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition: Reflections on James D. G. Dunn’s 
Jesus Remembered’, in Robert B. Stewart & Gary R. Habermas (eds.), Memories of Jesus: A 
Critical Appraisal of James D. G. Dunn’s Jesus Remembered (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 
2010), pp. 59-78 (75); Bird, Gospel, p. 92; Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (93-98); 
Øivind Andersen, ‘Oral Tradition’, in H. Wansbrough (ed.), Jesus and the Oral Gospel Tradition 
(JSNTSup, 64; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), pp. 17-58; also, Uro, ‘Thomas and oral 
gospel tradition’, pp. 8-32 (17). Cf. also ch. 2.2.3 above on Birger Gerhardsson’s view.
448  Andersen, ‘Oral Tradition’, pp. 17-58 (47); reference in Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 
91-106 (97 n. 19).
449  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 202.
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streams of preservation’.450 Linked with this is Gerhardsson’s notion that both oral 
and written texts can be both fixed and flexible.451
 Connected to Kelber’s reconstruction of the context is his view of the historical 
Jesus as an oral performer and teacher, as opposed to a reader or writer.452 While 
it was certainly the case that Jesus mainly operated orally as a speaker as Kelber 
insists,453 viewing him simply as an oral performer of parabolic material that is 
comparable to nineteenth-century folklore does not fully do justice to him as 
a Jewish teacher of the first-century; one needs to take into ac count that Jesus’ 
teaching method seems to have conveyed, at least to some audiences, even a 
scribal-level of literacy.454 In fact, Gerhardsson’s view seems to be closer to the 
first-century situation in indicating that Jesus was a Jewish ‘rabbinic’ teacher, 
who taught in meshalim, formulated pointed sayings; this may indicate a greater 
degree of memorability than Kelber’s picture of Jesus allows, although one must 
not directly link Jesus with the rabbis of the later periods.455
 Furthermore, Kelber gives a somewhat oversimplified picture of the disciples.456 
While the Jesus traditions depict the disciples as ‘unliterary men’, it is not clear 
that this picture is not in need of any revision. As already indicated in this study, 
one need not think of the disciples as a bunch of formally educated Pharisees to 
recognize that, as Jewish men, they would have been strongly influenced by Jewish 
Scriptures, and would have had more than ‘tenuous connections with literate 
culture’.457 In any case, the disciples’ relationship with Jesus was pedagogical in 
nature and must have had an impact on them; the possible development of their 
literary and educational skills in the course of time cannot be ruled out.458 Even in 
a context of low overall literacy, it is not impossible to imagine that some of the 
450  Bird, Gospel, p. 92.
451  Gerhardsson, Reliability, pp. 117-18.
452  Cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 18-22.
453  Contra e.g. Hollander, ‘The Words of Jesus in Paul and Q’, pp. 340-57 (351), who argues ‘we do 
not know for sure whether Jesus was an oral performer, a teacher’. 
454  See Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 165-88, who is himself sympathetic to many aspects of Kelber’s 
account; cf. ch. 2.2.3 above.
455  Gerhardsson, Reliability, p. 120; Eve, Behind, p. 63; cf. e.g. Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 18.
456  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 21-22, 41 n. 185, 186; cf. Gerhardsson, Memory, pp. 201-2; the 
discussion above in ch. 2.2.3.
457  Cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 21.
458  Cf. Gerhardsson, Tradition, pp. 25-26, who indicates that an explanation is needed for the 
development of Christian exegesis and theology prior to the writing of the Gospels, namely, 
in the period when at least some of the disciples were still alive. On the development of early 
Christian book culture, see Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39.
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earliest members of the Jesus movement could read and write.459 The differences 
between Kelber and Gerhardsson’s views of Jesus and the disciples stem from their 
different reconstructions of the literary context; while Kelber’s view of low literacy 
is supported by evidence,460 he seems to have underestimated the influence of 
texts and textuality in the context.461 Despite the low-level literacy, early Christian 
manuscripts had a broad significance in the maintenance and articulation of the 
early Christian group identity.462
 Besides the inaccurate notion of orality, Kelber’s views of the oral hermeneutics 
of Mark, Paul and Q are problematic. Kelber’s argument that Mark’s textuality 
was a clear departure from oral practices, and the writing of the Gospel intended 
to ‘silence’ the oral Jesus traditions, is untenable for several reasons.463 First, 
Mark cannot be viewed in objection to sayings material simply because he did 
not include as much of it as Matthew and Luke did later. Too much of sayings 
material would not have fitted his ‘fast-paced dramatic narrative’; also, at the time 
of writing, there were no standard precedents for the amount of sayings material 
that Mark should have included in his Gospel.464 Second, it is not reasonable to 
take the condemnation of false prophets in Mark 13.21-22 as a general rebuttal of 
all Christian prophets due to their capacity as carriers of Jesus’ authority via the 
oral medium.465 This is a matter of reconstruction with no definite answer: while 
some have suggested that Mark may have referred to ‘sign prophets’ mentioned 
in Josephus’ writings466 or the propaganda of Vespasians’ supporters while he was 
459  Cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 288; Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer, pp. 497-98.
460  Eve, Behind, pp. 63: ‘Kelber envisages a situation rather closer to a primarily oral culture with 
very low levels of literacy. Recent scholarship would tend to support Kelber’s view here.’
461  It is debated whether writing served as a control of the transmission of Jesus traditions. On the 
role of written notes, see e.g. Eve, Behind, 8-14, who takes a rather skeptical view, and Bauckham, 
Eyewitnesses, p. 289, who is more optimistic. 
462  See Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (37), who, while not denying that early 
Christian manuscripts could function as aids to memory, reminds that ‘[m]anuscripts were 
integral factors in the maintenance and articulation of group identity, often becoming shorthand 
expressions of the group identity.’
463  Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (98-99); Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 202-3; 
Eve, Behind, pp. 61-62; cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 90-105.
464  Eve, Behind, p. 61; cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 100-2.
465  Cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 98-99, who claims this, although he (p. 98) first admits, ‘Whether 
one dates the prophets before or after the fall of the temple, they are in any case closely bound 
up with the turbulence of the Roman-Jewish war.’ See Myllykoski, ‘Mark’s Oral Practice’, pp. 97-
113 (102): ‘…it is difficult to perceive how Mark could have thought to overcome, or silence, the 
oral prophecy by a written gospel story, even though it is likely that he was fighting against “false 
prophets”’.
466  Eric Eve, The Jewish Context of Jesus’ Miracles (JSNTSup, 231; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
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attempting to get on the imperial throne467, others contend Mark’s statements 
betray evidence of ‘a Christian preoccupation with the parousia hope’ and, thus, 
warn against those making statements about the return of Christ.468 Whatever the 
context of Mark’s condemnation, no clear indication is given that the warning had 
particularly to do with the oral medium. Third, as Eve points out, the absence 
of the resurrection event in Mark need not speak anything about Mark’s media 
preferences, since other explanations can be given; for instance, Mark could have 
‘conceived the resurrection as an immediate translation to heaven’.469 Fourth, 
Kelber’s argument against any form of pre-Markan existence of the Passion 
narrative has been argued to be weak; it seems likely that some version of a pre-
Markan Passion narrative did exist.470
 Further, Kelber’s argument that Mark portrays the disciples negatively in 
order to highlight the failure of oral tradition is not sustainable.471 Many different 
explanations for the negative image of the disciples have been given, none of them 
emphasizing Mark’s preference of textuality over oral authorities of the Jesus 
traditions: an underlying Christological polemic, a desire to create dramatic irony, 
a need for a narrative foil, an emphasis on the impossibility of salvation by human 
2002), pp. 296-325; in Eve, Behind, p. 61 n. 44. For messianic pretenders in the era of Jewish war, 
see Josephus, War 2.433-48, 4.503-44; for ‘sign prophets’ with reference to the later stages of the 
siege, War, 6.285-300.
467  Theissen, The Gospels in Context; Eric Eve, ‘Spit in Your Eye: The Blind Man of Bethsaida and the 
Blind Man of Alexandria’, NTS 54 (2008), pp. 1-17; in Eve, Behind, p. 61 n. 45.
468  Richard T. France, The Gospel of Mark (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), p. 528-29, who 
presents the references in Josephus, yet indicates that a more exclusively Christian use may be 
intended by Mark.
469  Eve, Behind, p. 61.
470  See e.g. William R. Telford, ‘The Pre-Markan Tradition in Recent Research (1980-1990)’, in F. 
Van Segbroeck, C. M. Tuckett, G. Van Belle and J. Verheyden (eds.), The Four Gospels 1992. 
Festschrift Frans Neirynck (vol. 2; BETL, 100B; Leuven: University Press, 1992), pp. 693-723 (702); 
Christopher Bryan, A Preface to Mark. Notes on the Gospel in Its Literary and Cultural Settings 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 133-35; Halverson, ‘Oral and Written Gospel’, pp. 
180-195 (191-94); Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (92); Byrskog, Story as History, 
p. 141 n. 251; contra Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 185-99.
471  See e.g. Dewey, ‘Oral Methods’, pp. 32-44 (42); Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 
(100); Mournet, Oral Tradition and Literary Dependency, pp. 84-86; Eve, Behind, pp. 61-62; cf. 
Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 96-98, esp. p. 97: ‘This leads us to suggest that the dysfunctional role 
of the disciples narrated the breakdown of the mimetic process and casts a vote of censure against 
the guarantors of tradition. Oral representatives and oral mechanism have come under criticism.’ 
 Although Kelber somewhat qualified his view of the ‘Great Divide’ in the introduction to the 
1997 edition of Oral and Written, he still maintained ‘Mark’s polemic against the disciples…as an 
estrangement from the standard-bearers of oral tradition’ (p. xxv). This is pointed out by Dunn, 
Jesus Remembered, p. 203 n. 165.
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means and on divine omnipotence, pastoral encouragement, et cetera.472 It has 
been argued that, due to Mark’s nature as oral narrative, ‘a first-century audience 
hearing the Gospel would probably take the negative portrayal of the disciples 
much less seriously than contemporary Marcan scholars do’.473
 Kelber’s understanding of Mark’s textuality as a silencing force is further 
undermined by the fact that Mark betrays many characteristics of ancient 
oral narrative. Mark both uses originally oral units of material, which Kelber 
admitted,474 and as a whole reflects methods of composition for oral performance 
in front of a listening audience, not for individual readers.475 On the basis of her 
analysis of Mark in light of the depictions of oral narrative in Plato, Dewey has 
shown that, for example, the episodic, aggregative (for instance, frequent use 
of kai) and visual nature of narrative, the lack of linearity in plot and character 
development, and the use of ‘acoustic respionses’ (‘backward and forward echoes’) 
in both small and large sections of the narrative, betray evidence that Mark’s 
Gospel was built upon an oral storytelling tradition.476 Thus, Mark’s textuality is 
not a radical departure from oral narrative, but rather ‘profoundly influenced by, 
and allied with, the nature of oral narrative’.477
 Mark’s principled ‘objection’ to oral tradition, as envisaged by Kelber, can be 
easily con strued as contradictory to what he said elsewhere about Mark’s oral 
legacy and style.478 To be sure, Kelber did distinguish between primary and 
secondary orality: the former referred to orality in isolation from textuality, while 
472  Eve, Behind, p. 61, lists all these possible explanations, referring to C. Clifton Black, The Disciples 
According to Mark: Markan Redaction in Current Debate (JSNTSup, P27; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 
1989). For more literature on the disciples in Mark, see Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 
91-106 (100 n. 28).
473  Dewey, ‘Oral Methods’, pp. 32-44 (42); reference also in Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, 91-
106 (100), who agrees with many aspects of Deweys’ analysis.
474  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 44-89, ‘Mark’s Oral Legacy’.
475  Dewey, ‘Oral Methods’, pp. 32-44; Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (98-99); also, 
Hurtado, ‘Oral Fixation’, pp. 321-40, who stresses that this is to be differentiated from ‘oral 
composition’, where texts are created each time in oral performance.
476  Dewey, ‘Oral Methods’, pp. 32-44. In her study of Plato and Mark, Dewey employs Eric A. 
Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge: Belknap of Harvard University, 1963). Kelber, Oral and 
Written, pp. 95-96, does discuss Havelock’s work in relation to the alphabetization of the Greek 
language and the rise of literacy, but ignores important aspects. Cf. Byrskog, Story as History, p. 
130.
477  Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (99). Also, Byrskog, Story as History, p. 130: ‘The 
gospels, then, while indeed gaining from the feed-back of literacy, are as stories reflective of an oral 
mind-set.’ Italics original.
478  As pointed out by Eve, Behind, p. 59.
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the latter meant the oral performance, for which Mark’s Gospel was written (or 
orality based on a written text).479 However, regardless of the secondary orality, 
Kelber’s notion of the disruption of oral legacy is difficult to maintain, while 
arguing for an intentional oral element in the Gospel’s composition.480 The concept 
of ‘secondary orality’ does not ease the overemphasized tension between Mark’s 
textuality and ‘pre-Markan (primary) orality’.481 This problem remains, although 
Kelber has somewhat qualified his position in his subsequent writings, stating that 
Mark was not only attempting to downgrade the pre-Gospel oral tradition, but 
also reacting against other written documents (such as the sayings gospels like Q 
and the Gospel of Thomas).482
 Kelber’s view of Paul’s media preferences also has to be judged as flawed.483 
Paul most likely did not deliberately choose ‘an oral-aural mindset’, as opposed 
to written textuality, for the delivery of his message; the numerous references to 
speech and hearing in his letters are probably reflections of his media context.484 
While Kelber agrees with Sanders’ – in its time – groundbreaking conclusion 
that the law in Paul does not refer to legalism or attempts to ‘earn God’s favor’ 
or salvation by good works,485 he nevertheless imagines a sharp distinction be-
tween the written law and Paul’s oral gospel message. However, Paul hardly 
objected to the law mainly due to its written nature, but was, in both Galatians 
and Romans, primarily op posed to the kind of Jewish particularism, which would 
479  Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 217-18; cf. Eve, Behind, p. 59. Eve, p. 59 n. 34, points out that Kelber’s 
use of ‘secondary orality’ differs from that of Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the 
Word (New Accents; London and New York: Routledge, 2002), who uses the term as a reference 
to ‘orality in electronic broadcast media’.
480  See Byrskog, Story as History, p. 141 n. 249.
481  Eve, Behind, pp. 59: ‘He [Kelber] fully accepted that Mark was probably written for oral 
performance, but such a performance would be an instance of secondary orality, meaning orality 
not mediated by texts in the course of its transmission. This distinction seems fair enough as 
far as it goes, but it is far from clear that it entirely meets the case. While Kelber may be correct 
to suggest that Mark did not write in order to preserve the oral tradition, the fact that he was 
prepared to make such an extensive use of it is a little odd if he objected to it so much in principle.’ 
Cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 213, 217-18.
482  See Kelber, ‘Narrative as Interpretation’, pp 107-28 (107-19); Kelber, ‘Biblical Hermeneutics’, pp. 
97-105 (100); Eve, Behind, p. 60.
483  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 203-4; Eve, Behind, p. 62.
484  Eve, Behind, p. 62; cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 140-51.
485  Kelber, Oral and Written, p. 151; cf. E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of 
Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), p. 482: ‘[t]he reason for not keeping the Law 
which Bultmann adduces (that keeping it is itself sinning, because it leads to sin: boasting before) 
is notably not in evidence.’
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exclude Gentiles from the people of God.486 On the one hand, regarding Galatians, 
it would have been fatal for Paul’s Gentile mis sion had he not objected to the 
circumcision of his Gentile converts as a requirement of church membership; in 
Romans, on the other hand, Paul’s argument against the law has more to do with 
its incapability to empower one to do what is right than with its written nature; 
re ceiving the Spirit, not aural commandments, is the solution. Even if Paul wrote 
Romans as a substitute for a personal visit and oral presence, the letter cannot be 
construed as a presenta tion of Paul’s ‘oral hermeneutics’ due to the complexity of 
its argument and its nature as a written letter.487
 Moreover, Kelber’s original argument that Q was a collection of sayings, to 
which early Christian prophets contributed orally in order to directly address the 
audience with Jesus’ au thority,488 ignores the reality that Q is usually considered 
a written document with a literary history, not an oral sayings collection; this 
alone undermines the distinction between oral and written authority.489 Kelber’s 
distinction fails to recognize that both oral and written tradition can ‘effect a re-
presentation (making present again) of ancient teaching’.490
 Further, the old notion, adopted by Kelber, that there was no difference 
between the words of the historical Jesus and his followers (for example, early 
Christian prophets), has been argued to be false.491 Kelber’s argument that no 
true sense of the past, for example, of the historical Jesus, is transmitted orally, 
since every oral performance is unique and mainly construed with the audience’s 
needs in view, is exaggerated.492 In fact, some oral societies do betray an awareness 
486  See e.g. James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 
128-61; on Paul’s media preferences in general, also Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 204: ‘Paul would 
certainly not have recognized such distinctions.’
487  Eve, Behind, p. 62.
488  Cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 201-7. However, see Kelber, ‘The Case of the Gospels’, pp. 55-86 
(70-72, 78-81), which undermines the two-source hypothesis and the existence of Q, questioning 
his argument in Oral and Written.
489  See Uro, ‘Thomas and oral gospel tradition’, pp. 8-32 (13-15), esp. p. 14: ‘The combination of oral 
mentality and the genre of Q in this way is problematic. One can, for example, refer to several 
recent analyses in which this “prophetic self-consciousness of Q” has been identified as a decisive 
factor in the document’s literary history…The impression given by these recent analyses is not 
that ‘prophetic’ redaction of Q is a literary byproduct of a process which was predominantly 
an oral and free transmission of Jesus’ sayings. Rather the redaction seems to have been deeply 
involved in a literary process…’
490  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 204; on Kelber’s notions on the Christian prophets, see Halverson, 
‘Oral and Written Gospel’, pp. 180-95.
491  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 131-33; cf. the discussion in ch. 2.1.3.
492  Cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 24-26, 30-34; Lord, Singer of Tales, p. 101.
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of historical truth, even if not simply for the sake of the history itself; historical 
information, including archaic features, can be preserved in oral tradition without 
a clear function in the community.493 Even though the Jesus traditions were 
related to early Christians’ own concerns494 and social control of the traditions 
that were central to the community’s identity must have been exercised,495 there 
was no perfect correspondence between the traditions and their use within early 
Christian contexts. Some traditions that were either ‘non-functional’ (dissimilar 
to Christian interests) or even ‘counter-functional’ (possibly embarrassing 
or harmful to Christian interests) could be preserved in the early Christian 
communities.496 For example, despite Mark’s framing of his story as an oral 
narrative, it cannot be ruled out that the negative portrayals of the disciples and 
Jesus’ family in the Gospel have their core in historical events, and were, despite 
their possible ‘counter-functionality’, passed on among other Jesus traditions by 
the early Christian communities.
 Kelber pushes the principles of social identification and preventive censorship 
too far, as they easily undermine the nature of oral presentation. When depicting 
the context of the pre-Markan oral tradition, it needs to be noted, as Hurtado does, 
that oral composition ‘is usually not composed fully impromptu, but is prepared 
in various ways beforehand with a view to the audience’.497 It is difficult to imagine 
493  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 131; idem, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition’, pp. 459-71 
(468-70); Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 246; idem, ‘Gospel Traditions: Anonymous Community 
Traditions or Eyewitness Testimony’, pp. 483-99 (485-86); Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 
(34-35); Vansina, Oral Tradition as History, pp. 121-22; cf. ch. 2.1.3.
494  Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (37).
495  Gerd Theissen, The New Testament: A Literary History (Fortress: Minneapolis, 2012), pp. 21-25 
(22): ‘The handing on is not arbitrary, but is influenced by the hearers, whose social control of the 
tradition is all the more rigorous the more important it is for the identity of the society.’
496  Interestingly, in his 2012 work, Theissen, The New Testament, pp. 21-25 (22 n. 10), upholds 
the principle of preventive censorship, for which he had argued from the 1970’s onwards (e.g. 
in Theissen, ‘Wanderradikalismus’, pp. 245-71). It is, however, doubtful whether the principle 
of preventive censorship is congruent with Gerd Theissen and Dagmar Winter’s quest for the 
plausible Jesus, to which the criterion of dissimilarity is essential. Theissen and Winter, The 
Plausible Jesus, alienate the historical Jesus methodically from early Christian beliefs by arguing 
that the traditions, which are dissimilar to the early Christian beliefs, are more likely to derive 
from the historical Jesus. One must ask whether the use of the criterion of dissimilarity is 
meaningful if the principle of preventive censorship is upheld. Does not the principle make the 
quest for traditions dissimilar to the early Christian interests pointless?
497  Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (101); Hurtado (p. 101) concludes, ‘in oral 
compositions, the author has considerably more control over the composition than Kelber 
recognizes, and in written compositions for oral performance the anticipated audience exerts 
more influence than Kelber grants.’
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that the Jesus traditions, over which authoritative individuals could exercise some 
control, would have been told and retold in such a fluid and flexible manner that 
one could speak of the uniqueness of the content of each oral performance and a 
complete adaptation of the traditions to the audience and social pressure. While 
one may not imagine as rigid a model of control as Gerhardsson did, there were 
individuals exercising control over the oral transmission.498 Jesus’ role as the 
originator of the traditions and the teacher of the disciples, who would commit 
his teachings to memory in a memorable form, cannot be overlooked. Thus, 
when emphasizing the tradition’s ‘predisposition to abandon features not socially 
approved’, Kelber seems to have downplayed his own notion of a ‘conservative 
urge to preservation of essential information’, which is evident in the memorable 
forms of the traditions.499
 Nevertheless, Kelber’s overall theory has considerable strengths, which are 
not nullified by the previous criticisms; none of the issues have pulled the rug 
completely out from under Kelber’s case. It is significant that Kelber draws more 
scholarly attention towards the notion of the multiformity of the Jesus traditions; 
while not being the first scholar to pay attention to the fact,500 Kelber acknowledges 
‘a plurality of authentically original, genuine versions of a saying or group of 
sayings’, and recognizes that, besides the early Christians, Jesus himself could utter 
the same saying or parable in a different form on various occasions.501 Although 
one may not speak of the uniqueness of each rendition, as Kelber did, this is an 
important point regarding the variability in the process of transmission; the 
recognition of multiformity leans toward a notion of ‘oral tradition as a context of 
communication rather than simply as a medium of communication’, which could 
be studied like a written text.502 This view embraces the category of memory rather 
498  Eve, Behind, p. 45; Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 35, admit this, while in many ways positive 
towards Kelber; cf. ch. 2.2.3 on Gerhardsson’s view.
499  Cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 29-30.
500  Already, for instance, Gerhardsson, Manuscript, pp. 334-35, did note that Jesus may have 
delivered some of his sayings in more than one version; however, his overall account did not do 
justice to such a notion of variability.
501  Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 38-39. See the subsequent article, Kelber, ‘Jesus and Tradition’, pp. 
139-67 (151); however, already Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 25-26: ‘Distinct forms of speech can 
and do function in more than one social setting.’ 
502  Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 38-39. Italics original. Kelber, ‘Jesus and Tradition’, pp. 139-
67 (159), refers to tradition as ‘biosphere in which speaker and hearers live. It includes texts 
and experiences transmitted through or derived from texts. But it is anything but reducible to 
intertextuality. Tradition in this broadest sense is largely an invisible nexus of references and 
identities from which people draw sustenance.’
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than that of tradition, further undermining the early form-criti cal notion of the 
original form linked with the particular social setting.503 Consequently, Kel ber’s 
view has been applauded for being broadly consistent with social memory theory 
and the memory approach to the Jesus traditions and the study of the historical 
Jesus.504
 Furthermore, even if not as rigid and fixed as Kelber envisaged, the kind of 
textuality that Mark’s Gospel created later has to be taken seriously. Albeit in 
an environment of complex interactions between orality and textuality, Mark 
nevertheless was a pioneering example of revolutionary textuality, which later 
on enabled early Christians to read texts ‘liturgically in the manner that non-
Christian Jews read the Hebrew sacred texts in synagogue and elite Romans 
read their classics in the context of meals’.505 Mark simply was ‘a major step in 
the transmission of the Jesus tradition’,506 giving, granted unintentionally, an 
impetus for the reception-history of that tradition in the form of manuscripts, 
which ‘nurtured, shaped, and maintained various (often competing) Christian 
identities’; thus, while wrong about many aspects of Mark’s textuality, Kelber 
was right in indicating that Mark’s writing was significant and related to early 
Christian identity.507
 In short, Kelber’s view cannot be excluded from the recent conversation on 
the nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions. Although his original split 
between orality and textuality displayed a fallacy in method,508 Kelber has more 
503  Eve, Behind, p. 64. Cf. the comments in Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 316 n. 60: ‘[Kelber, ‘The Case 
of the Gospels’, pp. 55-86] insists that “remembering” in the Jesus tradition and the Gospels was 
overwhelmingly controlled by present needs and aspirations. This absorption of the past into the 
present gives Kelber’s approach an important continuity with form criticism.’
504  Eve, Behind, pp. 65, 132-33; cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 70-77, where Kelber argues that 
the oral process refuses to preserve the historical Jesus in the ‘modern’ sense and rejects the 
categories of ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’, as they are foreign to the mnemonic purposes; this 
does not mean that nothing can be known of history, only that historical accuracy is subordinate 
to oral principles. Kelber himself has embraced what Eve labels ‘the social memory approach’. 
505  Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (38).
506  Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (105-6), despite his sharp criticism of Kelber’s 
view of Markan textuality.
507  Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (38-39). Of course, Kelber was not the first 
scholar to speak about the significance of Mark’s Gospel.
508  Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (94), complained: ‘Kelber’s attempt to attribute 
the distinctive hermeneutics and “psychodynamics” of the orality of oral cultures to oral 
communication in literate cultures…seems to go against the studies from which he has derived 
the categories of orality and textuality…Lord, Ong and the others Kelber refers to all deal in 
terms of oral cultures (in which writing technology is either not known or not yet fully in place). 
Kelber tries to attribute the characterization of these oral cultures to the early Christian groups in 
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recently become more sensitive to both the similarities between oral tradition 
and written tradition and their mutual influence in the ancient past.509 It has been 
suggested by some within the memory approach that Kelber’s contribution to 
the discussion, beginning from The Oral and Written Gospel, is a game-changer 
in relation to the pre-Gospel oral tradition.510 While not giving up the source-
critical two-source theory (the primacy of Mark, existence of Q), Kelber’s work 
questioned many of the presuppositions of the so-called Third Quest, including 
what he viewed as an overemphasis on literary sources and the use of the criteria 
of authenticity. The work of Kenneth Bailey, another contributor to the discussion 
on the transmission of the Jesus traditions in early Christianity, is the final view, 
discussed in this chapter.
2.4 Informal Controlled Oral Tradition
Less than a decade after Werner Kelber’s initial work, another approach to the 
nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions in early Christianity emerged. 
Starting in 1991, Kenneth E. Bailey (1930–2016) argued for informal controlled 
oral tradition. In his two relatively brief articles, Bailey attempted to find a median 
position between Bultmann’s flexible ‘informal uncontrolled oral tradition’ and 
Gerhardsson’s inflexible ‘formal controlled oral tradition’: there was a rather 
inflexible core in each tradition with a community-controlled freedom in how 
individuals would tell the stories. In contrast to other strictly historical and 
theoretical models, Bailey’s approach offered examples of oral transmission in a 
culture which was supposedly comparable to the first century Jewish Palestine; 
on the basis of his experiences of teaching in the Middle East for four decades,511 
the pre-Markan period, but this would be justified only if he could show that the early Christians 
were situated in such an oral culture.’
509  See Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (33-34); cf. the collection of essays in Werner 
Kelber, Imprints, Voiceprints, and Footprints of Memory: Collected Essays of Werner H. Kelber 
(RBS, 74; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013).
510  Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 39, who thinks it is only a slight exaggeration to speak of a ‘Kelber 
revolution in NT scholarship’.
511  Bailey noted about his career, which consisted of teaching the New Testament in seminaries and 
institutes in Egypt, Lebanon, Jerusalem and Cyprus, that his ‘academic efforts have focused on 
trying to understand more adequately the stories of the Gospels in the light of Middle Eastern 
culture’. See Kenneth E. Bailey, Jesus Through Middle Eastern Eyes: Cultural Studies in the Gospels 
(Downers Grove: Intervarsity, 2008), p. 11. Bailey’s other academic titles include, for instance, 
Kenneth E. Bailey, Poet & Peasant and Through Peasant Eyes: A Literary-Cultural Approach to the 
Parables in Luke (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980); idem, Finding the Lost: Cultural Keys to Luke 
15 (St. Louis: Concordia, 1992); idem, ‘Women in Ben Sirach and in the New Testament’, in R. 
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Bailey contended that the rural Middle Eastern village life and the ways of 
communication therein had not drastically changed over the course of two 
millennia.512 The purpose of this section is to find out whether Bailey’s suggestion 
and his anecdotal evidence holds up to critical scrutiny in light of more theoretical 
approaches and historical data. Bailey’s view is first represented from his two 
articles; then, the criticism against his view is presented and evaluated.513
2.4.1 Kenneth E. Bailey
Bailey started his account by stating that both ‘the Bultmannian’ and ‘the 
Scandinavian’ models of oral transmission exist in the Middle East of modern 
times. The former, namely, the informal uncontrolled oral tradition, or ‘rumour 
transmission’, takes place, for example, when tragedies and atrocity stories are 
being told and elaborated; the latter, that is, the formal controlled oral tradition 
exists among the Muslim sheiks, who memorize the entire Qur’an, and among the 
Eastern Orthodox clergy, who memorize their extensive liturgies. The former form 
of tradition results ‘from natural human failings’, while the latter ‘is a carefully 
nurtured methodology of great antiquity’ still practiced by both Christians and 
Muslims.514
 In addition to these two kinds of transmission, Bailey argued for a third 
phenomenon, an ancient method of transmission, namely, informal controlled oral 
tradition, which was still at work in the Middle East. Regarding such transmission, 
Bailey focused on the setting, func tions, the kinds of material retained, the 
controls exercised by the community, and the tech niques for introducing new 
material. First, the setting of transmission was an informal evening gathering of 
villagers, haflat samar, the Arabic samar being a cognate of the Hebrew shamar 
(‘to preserve’). The haflat samar was, according to Bailey, an informal ‘party 
of preservation’ in which there was neither specific teacher nor student, but in 
A. Coughenour (ed.), For Me to Live: Essays in Honor of James Leon Kelso (Festschrift J. L. Kelso; 
Cleveland: Dinnon/Liederbach, 1972).
512  Kenneth E. Bailey, ‘Informal Controlled Oral Tradition and the Synoptic Gospels’, Themelios 20 
(1995), pp. 4-11, originally published in AJT 5 (1991), pp. 34-54; idem, ‘Middle Eastern Oral 
Tradition and the Synoptic Gospels’, ExpTim 106 (1994), pp. 363-67. Bailey borrowed the idea 
of ‘median position’ from C. H. Dodd, The Founder of Christianity (London: Macmillan, 1970), 
and attempted to offer a concrete methodological model, which he thought Dodd’s work lacked.
513  The most important critic of Bailey is Theodore J. Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory of Oral 
Tradition: A Theory Contested by Its Evidence’, JSHJ 7 (2009), pp. 3-43.
514  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (4-5).
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theory anyone could participate in the telling of poems and other traditional 
materials; in reality, the older, more gifted, and socially prominent men would do 
the reciting.515 Bailey attempted to support his view of the setting and the reciters 
by his own experience in the village of Kom al-Akhdar in the south Egypt, where 
he had asked someone about the village traditions; although this person was ‘in 
his sixties’ and ‘seemed to be an appropriate person to ask’, he was interrupted 
by others after only a few remarks because he was not originally from the same 
village; thirty-seven years of living in that village, Bailey recounts, had not made 
that person an appropriate reciter.516
 Bailey argued that five different kinds of material were transmitted in this 
setting: short proverbs, story riddles, poetry, parables, and accounts of the 
important figures in the history of the village or community. For example, in 
support of the transmission of poetry, Bailey re ferred to the so-called zajal, which 
was ‘a distinct unlettered form of verse, composed by in telligent villagers’, who 
were ‘not necessarily literate’ and performed at festive occasions like weddings; 
an example of a zajali, a man skilled to create such village verse ad lib, was a 
sev enteenth-century Maronite monk, who composed a complete history of the 
Maronite church in zajal; this work was transmitted orally for over 200 years.517
 Bailey’s account allowed for different levels of flexibility for the different kinds 
of material. The strictest level of control was exercised by the community over 
the recitation of poems and proverbs: no flexibility was allowed, and any mistakes 
made by the reciter were subject to public correction. In the other extreme were 
jokes, casual news, and atrocity stories, which were not central to the identity of 
the community; this type of material floated and died ‘in a state of total instability’, 
being totally flexible. Most importantly, there was the material that fell between 
the two extremes; some flexibility, that is, individual interpretation of the tradition 
was allowed for parables and recollections of historical people and events, central 
to the community’s identity. This material was at the core of Bailey’s interest; there 
was both control over the basic features of the material (such as the central thrust 
and flow, the basic scenes, the names, the proverbs cited, the conclusions, and the 
punch lines) and flexibility in style and detail.518
515  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (5-6); idem, ‘Middle Eastern’, pp. 363-67 (364).
516  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (6).
517  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (7).
518  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (7-8). Bird, Gospel, p. 93, points out that Bailey’s model comes close 
to Øivind Andersen’s view, namely, that oral transmission operates in a setting that is ‘structured 
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 For example, Bailey cited one of his own experiences from sitting in a haflat 
samar and hearing the ‘Shann’ story.519 Bailey linked another example of ‘some 
flexibility’ with this occasion. Ten years after hearing the ‘Shann’ story, he had 
asked the Palestinian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Egyptian village boys in his class in 
Beirut about the story; all – except the Egyptian who had not heard it – knew the 
story and could list the items that must be preserved in an authentic transmission: 
the punch-line had to be repeated verbatim, the three basic scenes could not be 
changed (except the order of the last two), and the basic flow and the conclusion 
had to remain the same.520 In his second article, Bailey seemed to allude to the 
same kinds of experiments when he stated that he had ‘watched the students 
instinctively form the controlling community and together explain to me the 
acceptable boundaries for a given story’.521
 Bailey found additional support for the material with ‘some flexibility’ (or 
both continuity and freedom) in a historical narrative that was important to 
an individual village. ‘Father Makhiel of the village of Dayr Abu Hennis’ had 
provided Bailey with a story about the founding of the village, all the way from 
the fourth century CE; according to the story, the village had been founded when 
Christian monks established a monastery near Antinopolis, a city built by the 
Romans in the second century CE. The monks of the monastery were known for 
making baskets with three handles; the three handles, which stood for the Trinity, 
enabled them to ‘witness’ about their faith, as they sold the baskets in the market. 
‘To change the ba sic story-line while telling that account in the village of Dayr 
Abu Hennis’, Bailey asserted, ‘is unthinkable’.522
 Regarding the techniques for introducing new material into the tradition, 
Bailey gave an account of an occasion in Beirut at a public lecture in 1967. The 
Rev. Ibrahim Dagher, whom Bailey labeled ‘[t]he official head of the Protestants 
in Lebanon’ and ‘an authentic reciter of the informal controlled oral tradition of 
but open’. See Andersen, ‘Oral Tradition’, pp. 17-58 (19). 
519  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (7): ‘Sixteen years ago, seated in a haflat samar, someone responded 
to the group conversation with ‘Wafaqa Shannun Tabaqa’ (Shann was pleased to accept Tabaqa). 
I immediately sensed that this was the punch-line of a story, and the story was unknown to me. 
So I asked, in good biblical fashion, ‘What mean ye by these things?’ The circle quickly sensed 
the formal nature of what was happening, and someone said, ‘Rev. Dagher knows the story.’ In 
fact, they all knew it, but the ranking patriarch was given the honour of telling the story to the 
newcomer.’
520  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (7).
521  Bailey, ‘Middle-Eastern’, pp. 363-67 (366).
522  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (8).
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his community’, told a parable related to the Pales tinian-Lebanese conflict and the 
war in June 1966. In the parable, a camel was trying to enter a Bedouin’s tent; 
however, instead of the conclusion and the punch-line that everyone expect ed, 
namely, that the camel would drive the Bedouin out of the tent, Dagher’s ending 
had the camel jerk his neck and strike the top of the tent, so that it collapsed on 
the Bedouin and the camel. Bailey gave an explanation for what Dagher meant 
with the revised ending of the story, which entered the informal controlled oral 
tradition and ‘survived in Protestant circles and was retold all across the Middle 
East’.523 Bailey claimed that Dagher’s rendering of the parable was so unforgettable 
that the version he provided in the article had ‘recorded above at least 80 per 
cent of Rev. Dagher’s ipsissima verba’ even eighteen years after Bailey heard the 
parable.524
 In order to demonstrate how the informal controlled oral tradition functioned 
in practice, Bailey also related four stories about the nineteenth century Scottish 
Presbyterian missionary John Hogg (in Egypt ca. 1854–1886), who founded 
Protestant congregations in Egypt. Bai ley’s point was to compare the stories 
found in the biography of Hogg written by his daughter Rena L. Hogg525 a few 
decades after Hogg’s death to the oral traditions that Bailey himself encountered 
in the same villages between 1955 and 1965. Bailey argued that these stories were 
transmitted and preserved in the informal controlled oral tradition for about 
ninety years. Each individual account would be primarily preserved in the village 
of origin, while the more dramatic stories would circulate more widely from 
village to village; the stories about Hogg’s words and deeds were central to the 
community’s identity, became a part of its tradition, and were passed on in the 
hafalat samar (hafalat being the plural of haflat).526
523  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (9): ‘We the Lebanese have welcomed our Palestinian brothers into 
Lebanon, but there is danger lest they break down the social and political structures of Lebanon 
and bring the whole country crashing down around our ears.’
524  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11. Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (27 n. 21-22), remarks that 
Bailey has reduced the ‘ninety percent’ of the original AJT article to ‘80 per cent’ and revised ‘22 
years ago’ to ‘eighteen years ago’ in the version published in Themelios (cited in this dissertation).
525  Rena L. Hogg, Master Builder on the Nile: Being a Record of the Life and Aims of John Hogg, D.D., 
Christian Missionary (New York: Flemming Revell, 1914). Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, 
pp. 3-43 (8 n. 10), points out a contradiction concerning the date of John Hogg’s death in Rena 
Hogg’s biography: John Hogg is first (pp. 283-86) said to have died in February of 1886, but 
subsequently a list of key dates in his life (p. 294) mentions February 27, 1885 as the day of his 
death.
526  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (8).
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 Bailey offered brief accounts of the Hogg stories, which he claimed to have 
found ‘told in almost the same way’527 as Rena Hogg had found them in 1910, 
when she dipped into the tradition.528 Bailey records first an incident of a village 
guard urinating on Hogg’s head.529 Second, somewhat surprisingly, Bailey 
recounts, however, a story not included in Rena Hogg’s work: Hogg’s response 
to a ‘trouble-maker’, who offers him dried cow manure.530 Third, Bailey employs 
another story not included in Hogg’s biography, a story about children singing 
a taunt song to Hogg.531 Fourth, Bailey tells about Hogg’s encounter with a band 
of robbers.532 In his second article, Bailey claimed to have heard these stories ‘[f]
527  See Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (7 n. 8), who indicates that, while this wording 
is found in the 1995 reproduction of Bailey’s article that appeared in Themelios (cited in this 
dissertation), Bailey initially used the phrase ‘almost the identical wording’ in the original 
version of his article published in AJT.
528  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (9). Bailey, ‘Middle-Eastern’, pp. 363-67, does not cite any Hogg stories.
529  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (8): ‘One village proudly told of how he [Hogg] was preaching in 
a village courtyard and the mayor, anxious to cause trouble, sent a village guard up onto the 
adjoining roof to urinate on him. Hogg stepped aside, took a handkerchief from his pocket, 
wiped his head and continued preaching without looking up. The mayor was so shamed and 
impressed that after inquiry and study he joined the infant church and became one of its leaders.’
530  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (8): ‘In a trouble-maker’s home in the village of Nazlet al-Milk Hogg 
was asked, ‘Dr Hogg, do you seek to obey what is written in the Gospels?’ ‘I do,’ answered Hogg. 
‘Very well then,’ they said, ‘in the Gospel it says that the evangelist is to eat what is set before him. 
Do you accept that?’ ‘Yes,’ came the reply, whereupon they placed in front of him a dried cow 
manure patty of the type that village homes use for cooking fuel and said to him, ‘Very well, then, 
eat this!’ Hogg reflected momentarily and answered quietly, ‘Da akl in-nar. Eddini akl al-bashar 
wa akulha’ (This is food for a fire. Give me food for people and I will eat it). The present writer 
is fully confident that the above Arabic sentence is a record of Hogg’s exact words spoken once 
over a hundred years ago and here recorded for the first time.’
531  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (8): ‘In the village of al-Muti’ah he anchored his houseboat on the river 
at the edge of the village. After some time village children began gathering and in turn composed 
a taunt song which they sang every time he came down from or returned to the houseboat. The 
taunt song was along the following lines: Mister John Hogg is too tall. Crack his head and see 
him fall. Hour after hour, day after day, this became tiresome. Hogg decided that something 
had to be done. So he purchased a large sack of hard candy and told the children that he really 
appreciated their song. Would they sing it for him? Delighted, the children then sang the song 
with gusto. He then expressed gratitude and passed out hard candy to the singers as a reward. 
This continued for a number of days until the sack of hard candy was finally finished. On the 
next occasion they sang the taunt song as usual. He offered his usual thanks and praise, but there 
was no candy. The children complained, ‘Where is our candy?’ He answered, ‘I don’t have any 
more candy.’ They responded testily, ‘Well, if you don’t give us any candy we won’t come here 
and sing your song for you!!’ The candy was not forthcoming and so the children stomped off, 
never to return. The incident occurred about 1870. It was proudly reported to me in 1961 by the 
al-Muti’ah Evangelical community, complete with taunt song.’
532  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (8-9): ‘Before the First World War John Hogg’s daughter dipped into 
this same oral tradition and in her biography of him told how he was waylaid at night by a band 
of robbers who demanded valuables. He quickly surrendered a gold watch and his money, but 
indicated that he had a treasure worth far more. They were curious. He pulled a small book from 
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rom the grandchildren of Rena Hogg’s informers’ with about ninety percent of 
the same words; Bailey indicated that he could either read these stories in English 
from Rena Hogg’s book or hear them told in Arabic by the village communities.533
 Besides these stories about John Hogg, Bailey attempted to support his case by 
an account about a groom, who was accidentally shot at his own wedding in 1958. 
Bailey recalled having himself missed the wedding in which the incident is said to 
have occurred.534 Bailey mentioned that he only heard about the incident a week 
later upon his return to the village, when an account of the story was related to 
him by several people from different sociological levels: a boatman on the river, a 
young boy in the street, the village guards, the mayor, and a preacher. The different 
versions of the stories varied in detail, but the climaxes were remarkably similar: 
‘Hanna [the groom’s friend] fired the gun. The gun did not go off. He lowered 
the gun. The gun fired [durib al-bundugiyya – passive]’.535 Bailey contended that 
the divine passive in the climax of the account indicated that the community 
had together decided that it was God not Hanna, who had fired the gun, and 
consequently blood revenge was not required. To the police, Bailey noted, the 
villagers told a different version of the account: ‘[a] camel stepped on him’, which 
was not intended as a deception of the authorities but was rather a sophisticated 
phrase of Middle Eastern double-talk, meaning the matter had been settled among 
the members of the community and no further involvement from the police was 
wanted. The community had made the theological decision about the nature of the 
incident and condensed the story accordingly; although all details were private1y 
and unofficially given to the police, they could not get any other summary of the 
event than the same climax from any of the five thousand villagers.536
 Furthermore, Bailey referred to his own experiences of preaching in Middle 
Eastern churches. He argued that a central core of information in a story new to 
his pocket and spent the entire night telling them of the treasures it contained. By morning the 
band, convicted of the evil of their ways, sought to return his watch and money and pledged 
themselves to give up highway robbery. Hogg took the watch but insisted that they keep his 
money, and indeed then financed the gang personally.’
533  Bailey, ‘Middle Eastern’, pp. 363-67 (366).
534  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (9): ‘At village weddings hundreds, or even thousands, of rifle 
rounds are fired into the air in celebration. Much of the ammunition is old and the guns are 
fired carelessly. At times, as in this case, tragedy results. In the celebrations after the wedding 
ceremony a friend of the groom fired his rifle. The gun did not go off. He lowered the gun and 
then the defective bullet fired, passing through the groom [Butrus] who was killed instantly.’
535  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (9).
536  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (9).
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the community entered the community’s oral tradition in a particular way. Starting 
with an elder in the front row shouting across the church, the congregants would 
repeat the central thrust of the story told by the preacher with a punch-line a few 
times to each other. According to Bailey, the preacher could not continue until this 
had taken place; the villagers had to learn the stories in order to be able to share 
them across the village. Bailey took this process as evidence for how informal 
controlled oral tradition functioned, solidified, and orally recorded information 
for transmission; the core of the material would remain ‘relatively inflexible’, while 
there would be ‘a community-controlled freedom to vary the story according to 
individual perspectives’.537
 At the end of his first article, Bailey presented some conclusions of the informal 
controlled oral tradition for Synoptic studies. He stated that the ‘ministers of 
the word’ (ὑπηρέται…τοῦ λόγου) in Luke 1.2 were to be taken as eyewitnesses. 
According to Bailey, the informal controlled oral tradition could function in 
the villages of Palestine until the Jewish-Roman war disrupted the sociological 
structures in which the oral tradition was transmitted. Bailey held that anyone 
over twenty years of age would have naturally become an authentic reciter of 
the tradition by the time of the destruction; however, after the disruption, the 
method had to be refined and only the eyewitnesses of the historical Jesus could 
be qualified as ‘ministers of the word’. Bailey indicated that these specifically 
designated authoritative witnesses would ensure the ‘authenticity’ of the tradition 
to the end of the first century. Bailey explained that the ‘corruption’ evident in 
the apocryphal gospels became possible through the destruction of the earliest 
controlling communities.538
 In sum, Bailey attempted to outline a method that both ensured the 
‘authenticity’ and allowed for the freedom and variability of the Jesus traditions. 
Bailey argued that the Synoptic material primarily consists of the same forms 
that were preserved by informal controlled oral tradition: proverbs, parables, 
poems, dialogues, conflict stories, and historical narratives. These materials were 
remembered by early Christians, as their Christian identity was by and large 
defined and affirmed by Jesus’ words and deeds; they were interested in history, 
the historical Jesus, and the preservation of the Jesus traditions due to what they 
537  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (10).
538  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (10).
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believed about Jesus.539
2.4.2 Critique & Evaluation
Although Bailey’s two relatively short articles appeared in somewhat less 
prominent journals (Asia Journal of Theology/Themelios & Expository Times) 
and do not present a full-fledged historical model, his viewpoints have attracted 
some significant attention and critique, and deserve, therefore, discussion and 
evaluation.540 Bailey’s ‘informal controlled oral tradition’ has gained a following 
among such heavyweight historical Jesus scholars as James D. G. Dunn and N. 
T. Wright; for both Dunn and Wright, Bailey serves as ‘the third way’ between 
Bultmann and Gerhardsson. According to Dunn, Bailey ‘provides an explanatory 
model for the Jesus tradition’,541 whereas Wright believes Bailey’s view can ‘be taken 
as a working model’ for the authentic oral preservation of the Jesus traditions.542 
Rafael Rodríguez suggests that the impact of Bailey can be compared to that of 
Kelber, although ‘Bailey’s work in no way compares to Kelber’s in terms of volume 
or its sophistication’.543 Rodríguez may, however, exaggerate the significance of 
Bailey’s original work, as the attention it has gained is largely due to Dunn and 
Wright. Bailey’s theory has also met severe criticism, the loudest of the critical 
voices being Theodore J. Weeden, who finds Bailey’s case unconvincing and 
attempts to demolish its theoretical foundation.544 
 Weeden’s main criticism has to do with the tenability of Bailey’s anecdotes from 
modern Middle Eastern village life; the stories with no concrete support from 
539  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (10).
540  See e.g. Dale C. Allison, Jesus of Nazareth: Millenarian Prophet (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), p. 
73 n. 280; Byrskog, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition’, pp. 459-71 (465); Gerhardsson, 
‘Secret’, pp. 1-18 (4-7); Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 252-63; Markus Bockmuehl, Seeing the 
Word: Refocusing New Testament Study (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006), p. 175 n. 26; Paul R. Eddy 
and Gregory A. Boyd, The Jesus Legend: A Case for the Historical Reliability of the Synoptic Jesus 
Tradition (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007), pp. 262-63 n. 84; Kelly R. Iverson, ‘Orality and the 
Gospels: A Survey of Research’, CBR 8 (2009), pp. 71-106 (91); Mournet, ‘The Jesus Tradition 
as Oral Tradition’, pp. 39-61; McIver, Memory, Jesus, and the Synoptic Tradition, pp. 115-17; J. 
S. Kloppenborg, ‘Memory, Performance, and the Sayings of Jesus’, JSHJ 10 (2012), pp. 97-132 
(112-117); Eve, Behind, pp. 66-85; Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 47-50; Bird, Gospel, pp. 92-95.
541  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 205-10 (210); also idem, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory of Oral Tradition: 
Critiquing Theodore Weeden’s Critique’, JSHJ 7 (2009), pp. 44-62 (44), in which Dunn laments, 
‘Unfortunately KB’s [Kenneth Bailey’s] presentation of his thesis appeared in not so prominent 
journals and did not attract the attention it deserved.’
542  Wright, Victory of God, pp. 133-36 (136).
543  Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 50-51.
544  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43.
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socio-anthropological study are said to not carry the methodological weight of 
the ‘informal controlled oral tradition’.545 This criticism has, foremost, to do with 
how Bailey handles his comparative material, namely, the John Hogg stories and 
other anecdotes. 
 (1) Bailey’s Use of the Hogg Stories. Weeden begins by presenting what he thinks 
are some critical flaws in Bailey’s use of Rena Hogg’s book. Regardless of what 
Bailey says about comparing the written and oral versions of the Hogg stories, 
there is a great discrepancy between the stories cited by Rena Hogg and those 
cited by Bailey; only two of the four Hogg accounts used by Bailey are found 
among the thirteen stories included in Rena Hogg’s biography of her father: the 
urinating incident and the robber band incident.546 As only these two stories are 
comparable, Bailey does, ac cording to this criticism, place too much weight on the 
comparability of the two sources of the Hogg stories.547
 To add insult to injury, Weeden argues that Bailey’s description of neither one 
of the two stories matches Rena Hogg’s version. Regarding the urinating incident, 
Weeden presents Rena Hogg’s version, which he thinks differs considerably from 
the version Bailey claims to have heard recited later.548 Weeden believes both 
accounts ‘likely refer to the same incident’, since Rena Hogg would have used ‘vile 
water’ as a euphemism for urinating. This does not, however, mean that the story 
would be told with ‘almost the identical wording’549 by Rena Hogg; a comparison 
of the two accounts does not support Bailey’s method of informal controlled oral 
tradition in which the indispensable and non-variable aspects of the story would 
be maintained. Weeden presents the differences between the two versions. First, 
Bailey’s version has John Hogg preaching outside in the courtyard when the mayor 
of the village, ‘anxious to cause trouble’, sends a guard to urinate on his head. In 
545  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (37): ‘Judged against a sound social-scientific 
methodology, Bailey’s methodology for making a convincing case for his theory by citing 
anecdotal experiences, without any documented verification by independent, impartial and 
reliable observers, leaves much to be desired.’
546  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (8-9).
547  Cf. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (9): ‘Rena Hogg dipped into that tradition in 1910. I dipped into 
the same tradition in 1955-65 and found the same stories told in almost the same way.’
548  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (10): ‘Not infrequently the filth of the streets was 
flung after him [John Hogg] by the way, and words as filthy were called loudly in contempt and 
derision as he passed, while on one occasion vile water was poured on his head through a gap in 
the ceiling of a room from which his audience had been forcibly ejected.’
549  Cf. Bailey’s initial phrase ‘almost the identical wording’ in the original version of Bailey, ‘Informal’, 
published in AJT.
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Rena Hogg’s account, John Hogg is inside a room from which his audience has 
been ejected; inside the room, ‘vile water’ is ‘poured on his head through a gap 
in the ceiling’. The latter account lacks any mention of the mayor, the urinating 
guard, or the motivation for urinating on Hogg’s head.550 This leads Weeden 
to argue that ‘[t]he basic flow of the story and its basic scene have significantly 
changed in the course of the story’s recitation in the Hogg-founded communities 
from 1910 to the 1950s-60s’.551 Second, what Bailey argued was the ‘inviolable’ 
punch line of the story, namely, the transformation of the mayor, has been either 
neglected by Rena Hogg or added to the story later on.552 Weeden argues that 
Bailey’s account has drastically changed the picture of John Hogg; he is idealized 
‘as a great Christian evangelical’, who ‘remains undeterred’ when humiliated. On 
the basis of these ‘significant differences’, Weeden concludes that it is informal 
uncontrolled oral tradition that accurately defines the process of transmission of 
the urinating incident.553
 However, Weeden’s critique of Bailey’s use of the urinating incident has 
problems of its own. Highly critical of how Weeden views Bailey’s overall case and 
the two Hogg-stories in particular, Dunn gives three valid points against Weeden’s 
view of the urinating incident.554 Weeden fails, first, when he tries to depict Rena 
Hogg as telling the story as if her version has a conclusion that does not match that 
of Bailey; Rena Hogg’s version should be treated as an allusion to the incident, not 
as an account of it, namely, as a story that can be compared to that of Bailey.555 
Second, Weeden mistakenly assumes that the ‘punch line’ is the focal point 
of Bailey’s story, whereas the key point, which is the stable core Bailey stresses, 
in both versions is ‘the shameful indignity to which Hogg was subjected’.556 In 
line with Eve, it is reasonable to explain the lack of John Hogg’s response and 
the mayor’s conversion in Rena Hogg’s version by the process of legendization, 
which took place after the incident and is demonstrated in Bailey’s version. This 
550  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (10-11); esp. Table 1 on p. 11.
551  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (11).
552  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (11). Weeden, p. 11 n. 11, points out that Rena 
Hogg may have found the incident in his father’s correspondence, which would explain many 
of the differences between her and Bailey’s account. This would indicate drastic changes in the 
story between John Hogg’s description of the incident in his correspondence and when Bailey 
encountered the story. 
553  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (12).
554  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (50-51).
555  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (50-51); so also, Eve, Behind, p. 75.
556  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (51).
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process retained the context of hostility towards John Hogg, as well as some other 
similarities,557 while also adding new elements.558 Third, Weeden operates here 
(as in his overall critique) on a flawed understanding of oral tradition, which 
represents a literary mindset; in an oral culture, there is no ‘original version’ to 
which subsequent versions can be compared, nor can traditions be evaluated in 
terms of exact similarity, as the same stories are told in different ways.559 Bird also 
points to the same problem in Weeden’s critique: Weeden fails to appreciate ‘the 
nature of oral tradition as a rehearsal of the same story, continuous in outline, but 
always with variation in detail’.560 Given these parameters, one can hardly speak of 
a completely ‘uncontrolled’ oral tradition with regard to the urinating incident.561
 With respect to the robber band incident, Weeden insists that Bailey’s case is 
weakened by the way Bailey reports the story and how Rena Hogg assesses its 
authenticity. Providing Rena Hogg’s version of the story, Weeden indicates that 
both the conclusion and summary punch lines differ from Bailey’s version.562 
Despite the obvious similarities, unlike Bailey, Rena Hogg defines the robbers as 
‘Copts and Moslems’. More importantly to Weeden, as a result of John Hogg’s talk 
to them about his ‘small book’, the robbers are ‘converted’ in Hogg’s version, but 
557  For example, the unpleasant liquid descending from a) someone standing on a roof, or b) 
someone standing in the space above the ceiling.
558  Eve, Behind, pp. 75-76.
559  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (50-51). See the discussions on the question of ‘original version’ 
in the previous chapters, esp. on Kelber’s view.
560  Bird, Gospel, pp. 93-94 n. 88.
561  Contra Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (12).
562  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (13); esp. Table 2 on pp. 14-15; Hogg, Master Builder, 
pp. 214-15: ‘At a village many miles distant from Assiut [Hogg’s home base] Dr. Hogg had been 
paying one of his periodic visits. The evening meeting was over and the missionary had sat late 
in conversation with his host and his friends, when to the amazement of all he rose to bid them 
adieu. In vain they urged him to spend the night with them, expatiating on the length of the 
way and the robbers that infested the district. He would neither await the daylight nor accept an 
escort. His work necessitated his reaching Assiut by morning, and in the Lord’s keeping he was 
as safe as with armed men. He had not walked far in the dense darkness when he was accosted by 
a robber band who demanded his gold watch and purse. These he surrendered without demur, 
surprising his marauders with the gratuitous information that he had with him still another 
treasure that he would gladly add to their store. To their chagrin all that he drew from his pocket 
was a small book, but his audience were soon so entranced by the magic of his tongue and of 
that priceless Word, that their greed speedily vanished, their consciences awoke, and they began 
to hunger for salvation. Before morning dawned the whole band had been converted and were 
eager to return to him his stolen goods. But the purse he refused, and as one and all, Copts and 
Moslems alike, had decided to abandon their life of rob bery, he supported them liberally from 
that time forward out of his own pocket until they had learned to earn an honest living and had 
become respected and God fearing members of the Church!’
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Bailey says they were only ‘convicted of their evil ways’. Also, Rena Hogg provides 
the punch line that her father supported the converted robbers ‘until they had 
become respected members of the Church’; Bailey’s version lacks any conclusion 
that they became members of the Church. Weeden concludes that these differences 
alone are too great to support Bailey’s case; they ‘violate two canons of informal 
controlled oral tradition’.563
 Moreover, Weeden argues that what Bailey fails to mention about Rena Hogg’s 
comments in relation to the robber band incident seriously questions Bailey’s use 
of the biography as a comparative material for the authentic preservation of oral 
tradition.564 On the one hand, Rena Hogg’s preface to the robber band incident 
casts a shadow of doubt on the reliability of the account: Hogg states that the story 
shows ‘how fact and fancy mingle in such current lore’, and that ‘[t]he story has 
many versions and we tell it as related by a fine old patriarch’.565 On the other hand, 
she recounted another version of the story after the previous version, indicating 
that the previous version was not the original story.566
563  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (13, 15).
564  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (15-21).
565  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (16); Hogg, Master Builder, p. 214.
566  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (16-17); Hogg, Master Builder, pp. 215-16: ‘It 
seems heartless to destroy so romantic a tale, but the original story itself deserves preservation 
as recounted by the chief actors Dr. Hogg and Mr. Shenoodeh Hanna, his companion on the 
historic occasion. Their story runs as follows: After a hasty breakfast on a hot Saturday in June, 
the two friends left the ‘Ibis’ [their boat] at sunrise to walk to the village of Tahta two and a half 
miles distance from the river. They were warmly received by the only Protestant in the place, 
and his house was so continuously crowded by eager listeners that for once Egyptian hospitality 
seemed swamped by the tide of interest, and the bodily wants of the preachers were completely 
overlooked. All day long they read and sang and preached and prayed, the changing audience 
fresh and eager, the speakers weaker and fainter with the passing hours, and all proposals to 
leave were overborne by the host’s repeated assertion that he would feel forever disgraced if his 
guests should quit his house without food. At last, after fourteen hours of fasting, a sumptuous 
meal was spread, and of this the famished men partook with more speed than wisdom before 
starting out with a suitable escort to ride to the river. A jolting donkey is no happy sequel to a 
hasty meal, and Dr. Hogg, finding his companion unable to ride and his escort restive under 
enforced delay, decided that they would complete their journey on foot and unaccompanied. 
The servants with some polite demur gladly availed themselves of the reprieve, and the two 
preachers started riverward alone. When they reached the water’s edge the boat was not in sight, 
and whether the landing lay north or south they could not tell. Some men when accosted misled 
them, either by mistake or of set purpose, their lack of a lantern perhaps arousing suspicions, 
and the night wore on in fruitless and solitary wanderings. Suddenly they observed on the river 
bank a man, innocent of clothes and bearing a gun, who started towards them till arrested by 
the sight of their shouldered umbrellas, which in the starlight passed easily for firearms. The 
younger man [Shenoodeh Hanna] was distracted with fear, and still more so when he heard the 
sound of swimmers in the river perhaps coming to join their naked friend in some bloody deed. 
The two wanderers walked on as if unheeding, but when a little distance was gained, turned 
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 After giving this account of the incident, Rena Hogg continues by explaining 
that her father and Hanna had different understandings of who the men were; 
whereas John Hogg thought they were simply guarding their melon crop, Hanna 
believed, as the later version has it, they were highway robbers. Hanna even 
included this version in his ‘thrilling’ sermon a few days later.567 From the changes 
that have taken place in what Weeden calls ‘the historically original, fundamental, 
unalterable components’, he concludes that the band of robbers incident (or the 
‘melon growers’ incident?) fails to support Bailey’s methodology. To Weeden, 
Rena Hogg’s comments undermine any notion of the informal controlled oral 
tradition, ‘constantly practiced in Middle Eastern village communities to preserve 
the original, historical authenticity, the faithful transmission of oral tradition 
integral and indispensable to the respective communities’.568
 Weeden’s critique of the robber band incident is much more substantial than of 
the urinating incident. Dunn notes that Weeden is ‘justified in drawing attention 
to the issues concerning the correlation between the story and the event which 
gave rise to the story and provides an appropriate warning against reading 
historical events too quickly from the stories to which the events gave rise’.569 
This call for caution does not, however, mean that Weeden’s critique is overall 
satisfying. While in this case one can speak of Bailey’s and Rena Hogg’s versions 
of the story, Weeden misses the point that the similarities between the two 
versions are not unlike the ones in the Synoptic Gospels, which often give variant 
versions to make different points. As argued by Dunn, Hogg’s ‘converted’ and 
inland, running rapidly to reach a point invisible from the beach. Avoiding Scylla, they came as 
it seemed upon Charybdis—a group of smokers, three men and a boy, two of them armed and 
with the usual vicious guard of watch-dogs. Dr. Hogg thought it best to throw himself frankly 
on their protection, and as the dogs sprang forward with a threatening welcome, “Call off your 
dogs”, he cried, “and I shall tell you a story that will make you laugh”. A discussion followed, 
and they were soon received within the smoking circle to spend the remainder of the night in 
this strange company. As sleep was distant, it was proposed to pass the time in songs and tales, 
and Mr. Shenoodeh chose a Bible story that gave him the opportunity of dwelling on the sin of 
murder and the fearful punishment awaiting the guilty, a tale which brought from one of his 
listeners the confession that only his brother’s intervention had prevented him from shooting at 
Mr. Shenoodeh on his first approach. Towards morning the air grew cold, and the missionary, 
made anxious by his young friend’s cough, dug a deep hole for him in the sand and buried him to 
the neck, after which both secured some broken sleep. At dawn one of their guard accompanied 
them to the boat, lying miles from the spot at which they had encamped, and received for the 
service a backsheesh that sent him away blessing their memory.’
567  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (17-18); Hogg, Master Builder, pp. 17-18.
568  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (15-16).
569  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (53); so also, Eve, Behind, pp. 82-83.
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Bailey’s ‘convicted’ are within the boundaries of telling the same story differently, 
a phenomenon Weeden does not recognize; instead, he assumes again that there 
is one ‘original’, ‘historically accurate’, and ‘faithfully transmitted’ version of any 
story and, further, that the ‘punch line’ is the same as the conclusion. This is not 
the case in the Synoptic tradition, which is Bailey’s point of comparison, where 
the reference is often to the focal point of the story.570 Dunn legitimately stresses 
what Bailey attempts to illustrate with the robber band incident: how the memory 
of John Hogg had been established during his ministry in Egypt, and how it was 
preserved by telling the story for decades.571
 Again, Weeden does not recognize the nature of the process of legendization, 
which must have taken place and which explains the two subsequent oral-
traditional versions of Rena Hogg’s long ‘archetypical’ account. Eve notes that the 
changes in the stories do not result as much from introducing new elements (or 
mingling ‘fact and fancy’) as from a process in which facts are transmuted into 
legend; as a result, the two versions are focused on the essentials, and an edifying 
thrust is added to the story: Shenoodeh Hanna is left out, all groups are merged into 
a single band of robbers, and Hanna’s Bible recitation ‘eliciting a confession’ has 
become Hogg’s reading ‘to effect a stunning confession’ to emphasize John Hogg as 
the missionary hero.572 It is noteworthy that the band of robbers does not become, 
for instance, a tribe of robbers, and no miraculous elements are introduced to the 
incident.573 The process of legendization could have started early, presumably only 
a few days or weeks after the incident, as Hanna transformed his and John Hogg’s 
experience into a sermon, dramatizing and adding the edifying elements to it.574 
As the eyewitness, Hanna had a vital role in turning the too-complex incident into 
a memorable story, preserving the tradition, though not its ‘historical accuracy’, in 
a form that was useful for the community. He would not have resisted this process 
backward toward the more complex ‘original version’.575 Consequently, Bailey’s 
theory is not disconfirmed simply because the two subsequent versions do not 
share unaltered what Weeden considers the fundamental components.576 In fact, 
570  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (52-53); cf. e.g. Mt. 8.5-13/Lk. 7.1-10. For example, Dunn 
points to the exchange between the risen Jesus and the centurion in Mt. 8.8-10/Lk. 7.6-9.
571  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (54).
572  Eve, Behind, pp. 72-73.
573  Bird, Gospel, pp. 93-94 n. 88.
574  Eve, Behind, pp. 73; cf. Hogg, Master Builder, p. 208.
575  Eve, Behind, pp. 73-74.
576  Eve, Behind, p. 81; also Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (50-54).
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Eve notes what may be the most important objection to Weeden, not mentioned 
by Dunn; in his comments on the Shann story,577 Weeden ‘generalizes from 
what Bailey says about one story (or at least, one type of story) into a claim for 
all informal controlled oral tradition’.578 Weeden’s critique regarding the different 
conclusions of the two versions is invalid, as Bailey’s main point holds up, namely, 
that ‘the central thrust of the story’ remained unchanged.579
 Aside from his critique of Bailey’s use of the two particular anecdotes, Weeden 
also thinks that Rena Hogg’s comments on the general nature of the Hogg stories 
in the preface of the biography are more than harmful for Bailey’s case.580 Rena 
Hogg pointed out that in many Egyptian towns and villages the tales about John 
Hogg had gained ‘in glamour with the years’. At the time she was writing, only 
twenty-eight years had passed from her father’s death, and yet, she recounts, 
there was ‘danger that the message of his life may be lost under a tangled mass 
of fact and fiction’.581 For Weeden, these words are a stunning revelation about 
the unreliability of the Hogg stories and ‘a death knell to Bailey’s theory’; in line 
with James C. Scott and Jan Vansina’s notions of the evolution of oral tradition in 
‘non-literate, non-elite cultures’, the Hogg stories have been significantly altered 
in less than three decades, and the central figure has been idealized and distorted 
to conform to the present ideals of the communities.582 Weeden refers to Werner 
Kelber’s notion of social control (and preventive censorship) over the oral tradition 
in oral societies; those historic elements of the communities’ oral tradition that 
conflicted with ‘the existential needs’ of the communities’ ‘present consciousness’, 
would have been ‘expunged from their oral tradition’.583
 Without addressing the critique of Bailey’s overall methodological purpose 
at this point, one critical consideration can be made with regard to Weeden’s 
577  Cf. Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (6), which lists the ‘fundamental components 
that must be preserved without alteration in every recitation of such stories.’ Emphasis original.
578  Eve, Behind, p. 81; cf. Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (50-54).
579  Eve, Behind, p. 82; Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (51).
580  One could challenge Weeden for supposing that Rena Hogg’s work is an ‘objective’ point of 
comparison, whereas Bailey’s material is merely based on ‘subjective’ experiences, as if Rena 
Hogg’s work was not influenced by the surrounding post-Victorian context. 
581  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (19); Hogg, Master Builder, pp. 13-14. Rena Hogg’s 
way of looking at the past?
582  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (19-20); James C. Scott, ‘Protest and Profanation: 
Agrarian Revolt and the Little Tradition’, Theory and Society 4 (1977), pp. 1-38; Vansina, Oral 
Tradition, pp. 105-8.
583  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (20); Kelber, Oral and Written.
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interpretation of Rena Hogg’s words: regardless of what form of social control was 
at play in the communities, this control did not result in the complete rewriting 
of John Hogg’s life, as the two Hogg-incidents demonstrate.584 Thus, Weeden’s 
criticism of Bailey’s use of the Hogg stories is too severe.
 (2) Bailey’s Use of ‘Non-Hogg’ Anecdotes. Weeden continues his critique of 
Bailey’s material by addressing his use of the other ‘eight non-Hogg anecdotes’.585 
First, Weeden acknowledges that Bailey’s experience of being present in a haflat 
samar in Kom al-Akhdar village supports Bailey’s notion of the informal character 
of the oral tradition; anyone ‘grown up hearing oral tradition stories recited in 
a haflat samar can be a haflat samar reciter’.586 Second, however, regarding the 
example of the seventeenth-century zajali Maronite monk, who composed a 
complete history of the Maronite church, Weeden asks whether one can trust 
that a zajali known for occasional ad-libbing did not deviate from the original, 
historically authentic oral tradition of the church; it is question able to use village 
poems as ‘the witness for accurate transmission of oral tradition’, consid ering that 
a zajali would be an entertainer.587 However, Dunn points out that, when speaking 
about the original, historically authentic oral tradition of the church, Weeden 
misses the point of variation again; he does not recognize the observation of Parry 
and Lord that, regardless of the ad libbing and variation in wording, the stories 
recited by the singer or saga teller would remain substantially the same. It is this 
kind of a situation to which Bailey compares the transmission of the Synoptic 
tradition.588 
 Third, Weeden recognizes that Bailey’s experience of being present in a haflat 
samar when the ‘Shann’ story was related to him by ‘the ranking patriarch’ is 
consistent with Bailey’s theory of haflat samar.589 Fourth, Weeden questions 
Bailey’s use of his classroom situations as examples of how controlling 
communities are formed; how does Bailey come to the conclusion that the 
students formed a controlling community, a haflat samar, and was this conscious 
584  Bird, Gospel, pp. 93-94 n. 88, also speculates that Rena Hogg’s statements about how fact and 
fiction were mixed seem like ‘a post-Victorian literary device to bring proper sensibility to 
popular rumors and to incline readers to adhere to her account’. This is possible, but difficult to 
verify.
585  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (21-32).
586  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (21-22); cf. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (6).
587  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (22-23); cf. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (7).
588  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (54). 
589  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (23); cf. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (7).
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or spontaneous on their part?590 While overly harsh in his critique of Bailey’s use of 
some non-Hogg anecdotes, this is a legitimate question; indeed, it is unclear how 
Bailey can conclude from such classroom situations that the students formed a 
controlling community that is comparable to a haflat samar. Fifth, Weeden argues 
that Bailey fails to give evidence for his authenticity claim about the story of the 
basket makers; it is Bailey, not Father Makhiel, who concludes that changing the 
‘basic story’ line about the monks is unthink able.591 It is not clear whether this 
anecdote supports Bailey’s theory; at least, the story is not directly related to the 
haflat samar.592
 Sixth, Weeden does not see how Bailey’s own experience of preaching to 
congregants in a village supports his case; according to Weeden, there is no 
guarantee that the traditions re peated by the elder and memorized by the 
congregants were retold accurately and in a con trolled fashion.593 As for this 
criticism, it needs to be noted that Bailey does not give concrete examples of what 
happened to stories after the church services.594 In light of this, Weeden is justified 
in asking whether the stories were retold accurately afterwards. However, if one 
as sumes, like Dunn, that the established formulation of a story formed the core 
of future retellings, which then took place in the haflat samar, there is no doubt 
that the members of the gatherings would have controlled the retelling of what 
had been preached in the church setting.595 It is, nevertheless, safe to conclude that 
instead of directly supporting Bailey’s the sis of informal controlled oral tradition, 
his experiences of preaching merely serve to illus trate the formation of tradition.596 
 Seventh, Weeden views the Dagher parable about the camel as undermining 
Bailey’s theory; the simple fact that Dagher revised the ending of the parable, 
which was not even transmitted in a haflat samar (but rather in a public lecture), 
contradicts the principal canon of Bailey’s theory, namely, the inviolability of the 
590  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (23-24); cf. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (7); idem, 
‘Middle Eastern’, pp. 363-67 (366).
591  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (24-25); cf. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (8).
592  See Eve, Behind, pp. 80-81, who sympathetically points out that perhaps the haflat samar is to be 
understood as the typical setting of the informal controlled oral tradition but it is not the only 
setting.
593  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (25-26); cf. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (10).
594  Eve, Behind, p. 79. Eve points out that the use of repetition to aid memorization in Bailey’s 
accounts of preaching are to some extent reminiscent of Gerhardsson’s view, except that the roles 
of teacher and student are not rigid.
595  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (55). 
596  Cf. Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (55). 
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punch line.597 This criticism is, however, flawed, because it focuses merely on the 
revised ending of the parable; Bailey’s point is not to illustrate that the tradition 
was controlled, but rather to depict how a familiar parable tradition could be 
modified into something more effective. This event of modification as such 
became important for the community, and was remembered within it.598
 Finally, Weeden criticizes Bailey’s use of the shooting incident as a support 
for his thesis; the incident does not support Bailey’s case, as ‘the inviolate punch 
line’ has been altered with the creation of two different versions. The police report 
contains the first variation, namely, the altered version of the cause of death of the 
groom; instead of being shot, a camel is said to have stepped on Burus. According 
to Weeden, this change at the beginning of the community’s oral tradition 
fictionalized Burus’ death by invoking the principles, which Werner Kelber 
labeled ‘the rule of preventive censorship’ and ‘the law of social identification’; 
the incident, which was deemed socially unacceptable by the audience, was 
not reported in a historically accurate manner but was altered to match the 
community’s social identity.599 In line with the principle of preventive censorship, 
the second variation of the punch line was coined by the community to ensure 
its own well-being; in order to avoid a cycle of blood revenge, it was decided that 
Burus’ death was caused by an act of God, not Hanna, his friend. Thus, due to the 
preventive censorship that functioned in the community, the wedding incident 
cannot be used to support Bailey’s version of informal controlled oral tradition.600
 Weeden’s description that the community reported what was important for its 
identity is not flawed as such. Nevertheless, in arguing that the multiple retellings 
of the wedding incident falsify Bailey’s use of the story, Weeden ignores that 
the core elements of the story remained consistently fixed. As stated by Dunn, 
it is futile to argue from a modern Western viewpoint that the Middle-Eastern 
community’s version of the story, which was agreed by all (including the police) 
597  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (26-27); cf. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (9).
598  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (55-57). Dunn, (p. 57), concludes: ‘So KB’s [Kenneth Bailey’s] 
account is relevant to his ‘informal control’ model in two ways. (1) The particular re-telling of 
the parable was so effective because it could assume the normal constraints of informal control 
– the audience’s knowledge of the traditional form of the parable. (2) ID’s [Ibrahim Dagher’s] 
redrafting of the familiar parable made such a powerful impact that the retelling of the story 
– that is, the retelling not of the parable, but of ID’s revision of it – became a fixed item in the 
history of the Lebanese Christians.’
599  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (30); cf. Kelber, Oral and Written, pp. 24, 28-29, 71.
600  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (29-32); cf. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (9-10).
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to have reflected the communal decision that Hanna was not to blame for Butrus’ 
death, is ‘historically inaccurate’ or ‘inauthentic’; the distortion of the historical 
facts as such was not the point of the community’s version.601 The community 
chose not to control the historical facts, but instead they paid attention to the 
significance placed on those facts.602 However, this does not undermine the fact 
that there was a process of informal control operating; what the community 
viewed as significant – that the incident truly was an accident not caused by any 
human being – was controlled.
 (3) The Haflat Samar. Beside Bailey’s use of the anecdotal material, the supposed 
context of transmission for his ‘informal controlled oral tradition’, namely, the 
haflat samar, is another central target of Weeden’s criticism.603 For Weeden, the 
questions of the definitive meaning and the cultural purpose of the haflat samar 
are the most fundamental and critical. Weeden refers to several Middle Eastern 
authorities on the Arabic language, giving two clear conclusions.604 First, as for the 
meaning of the words haflat samar, none of Weeden’s authorities recognize Bailey’s 
understanding as valid. Whereas hafalat can be translated ‘parties’, samar does not 
refer to ‘preservation’ or searching of true historical reality of the oral tradition; it 
is rather an unofficial evening gathering where people enjoy themselves, sharing 
proverbs, poems, old stories, and songs.605 Second, the cultural purpose of the 
gatherings is entertainment and amusement, not instruction. Regardless of the 
area of Middle East, hafalat samar nowhere refers to occasions where stories 
about historical events and people are recited with the emphasis on the historical 
601  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (57-61). 
602  Cf. Eve, Behind, pp. 77-78: ‘…the community is more concerned to preserve its version of the 
“truth,” insofar as that is serviceable to the community, than to preserve facts for their own sake, 
but this may or may not result in considerable distortion of the facts.’ In this case, I do not think 
that anyone involved in the communal decision making thought the version about the camel was 
the ‘historical’ truth in the modern sense of ‘what really happened’.
603  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (38-42).
604  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (38-42): 1) Salman Aziz, the Imam of the Muslim 
Community in Fox Valley, Wisconsin; 2) Nihal Shahbandar, a woman native of Lebanon; 3) Layla 
Yahyawi-Valenzuela, a native Syrian teacher of Arabic at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh; 
4) Daniel Beaumont, Associate Professor at the University of Rochester, who teaches Arabic; 
5) Devin Stewart, Winship Distinguished Research Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies, 
Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies at Emory University; 6) Mahmoud Al-
Batal, an Arabic scholar, Associate Professor, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, University 
of Texas at Austin.
605  So e.g. Nihal Shahbandar, a woman native of Lebanon, with whom Weeden was able to make 
contact through the Imam Salman Aziz; also, Daniel Beaumont, Associate Professor at University 
of Rochester, who teaches Arabic. See Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (38-40).
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accuracy and reliability of oral transmission. These conclusions are verified, for 
instance, by Professor Devin Stewart, who points out that the lexical meaning of 
the Arabic samar is not ‘preserve’ but to ‘hold a conversation, or discourse, by 
night’606; Stewart also points to the dictionary of modern Egyptian dialect, which 
translates ‘h.aflit samar’ as ‘an evening party or gathering in the open air’.607 While 
Stewart recognizes that ‘the content of what is samar may…vary in practice’ and it 
may be both ‘amusing and edifying’, it is generally anecdotal.608 Thus, accordingly, 
Bailey’s understanding of hafalat samar as ‘parties of preservation’ in Middle 
Eastern societies cannot be upheld.609
 While impressed by Weeden’s examination of the haflat samar, Dunn criticizes 
Weeden’s unwillingness to consider that Bailey had a distinctly Christian usage 
of the term in mind, something of which he had much personal experience; the 
churches with which Bailey was familiar could have understood their gatherings 
differently from the usual understanding in the Middle East.610 Dunn points 
out that Weeden’s consultants emphasize the party dimension of which Bailey 
is aware, but this dimension could have been less prominent in the Christian 
villages, ‘sensing a need to define themselves and their distinctive features within 
a predominantly non-Christian culture’, a situation somewhat comparable to 
that of earliest Christian communities in the middle of the first century.611 
However, regardless of how appealing the explanation is, Dunn is guilty of special 
pleading here, as Bailey nowhere indicates a nonstandard usage of the term; 
Bailey’s contested claim that samar in Arabic is cognate of the Hebrew shamar 
(‘to preserve’) implies that he did not argue for a special usage of the term.612 
Dunn’s argument for a distinctive meaning of the haflat samar is an argument ex 
silentio, and in this case not a strong one; thus, Bailey’s view of the haflat samar 
is undermined by Weeden’s research.613 This does not mean that the central point 
606  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (40); cf. E.W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon 
(Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1984), p. 1424.
607  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (41); cf. Martin Hinds and El-Said Badawi, A 
Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1986), p. 429.
608  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (41).
609  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (19-20), points out an additional factor which can be 
taken to speak against Bailey’s view of informal controlled oral transmission: there is no reference 
in Rena Hogg’s work to the existence of haflat samar in the Hogg-founded communities.
610  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (49); cf. Bailey, ‘Middle Eastern’, pp. 363-67 (364).
611  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (50).
612  Eve, Behind, p. 80.
613  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43.
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of Bailey’s view is negated, namely, that the informal controlled oral tradition 
preserves the core of the stories regarded as important for the community.
 (4) The Methodological Purpose of Bailey’s Case. After evaluating Bailey’s 
anecdotal evidence, Weeden concludes that Bailey’s material does not support his 
version of the informal controlled oral tradition. For Weeden, the question is not 
whether there can be any form of informal controlled oral tradition, rather what 
kind of control there is. As Jan Vansina and Werner Kelber have argued, in an oral 
society, oral tradition tends to become congruent with the community’s social 
identity. According to Weeden, Bailey’s material supports this kind of informal 
controlled oral tradition, but not Bailey’s conclusions, which require historical 
truth and integrity of a community’s oral tradition to be preserved uncorrupted.614
 As indicated by the references to Kelber’s work, this overall critique by 
Weeden has its basis in valid scholarship. Weeden employs a version of the 
social memory theory, which is basically approved by Dunn, who phrases the 
view in the following way: ‘that a community’s oral tradition is subservient to 
the community’s social identity, serving to give expression to that social identity 
rather than to retain accounts of the history of that community as it hap pened’.615 
For Dunn the application of the social memory theory to the Synoptic tradition 
is not the problem; instead, his sharp criticism of Weeden has to do with how 
Weeden, while employing the social memory theory, still assumes that ‘there was 
or could have been an “un corrupted,” “original” account of the “historical facts”’.616
 On the one hand, according to Dunn, in accusing Bailey for using the anecdotes 
to illustrate that accurate historical information is preserved without corruption in 
a community’s oral tradition, Weeden has misunderstood what Bailey’s case was 
meant for: to illustrate the process of transmission of the oral Synoptic tradition. 
On the other hand, according to Weeden (and contrarily to what Weeden thinks 
Bailey attempted to demonstrate, namely, the historical and factual accuracy of 
614  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (32-37). Weeden (p. 37), asserts: ‘[T]he primary 
concern of this particular version of informal controlled oral tradition, which most of Bailey’s 
anecdotal evidence supports, is to preserve a community’s social identification in its ‘present’ 
consciousness—even if that means the alteration of its oral tradition, including the possible loss 
of authentic historical information related to the community’s past history—in order to bring 
its oral tradition into congruency with the community’s current self-understanding of its social 
identity, as well as to make its oral tradition congruently relevant in addressing the demands of 
new existential realities when they arise.’
615  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (59).
616  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (60).
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the oral tradition, transmitted by a community), Bailey’s anecdotes illustrate that 
the essential core of a story, indispensable to a community’s identity, is preserved 
and faithfully transmitted.617 So the disagreement between Dunn and Weeden lies 
in how Bailey’s methodological purpose is to be viewed.
 In fact, Bailey did attempt to apply his theory to the Synoptic tradition, claiming 
that the informal controlled transmission of oral tradition ensures the authenticity 
of that tradition all the way down to the end of the first century.618 According to 
Eve, Weeden is then justified in challenging Bailey’s claim for the transmission 
of factually accurate historical information; actually, Dunn also acknowledges the 
validity of Weeden’s criticism in relation to the robber band incident.619 This is 
an important notion, because it underscores that Weeden and Dunn are not very 
far from each other in the final analysis: the former argues for the invalidity of 
Bailey’s historical accuracy claims, linking Bailey’s data with Kelber and Vansina’s 
model of social identity in oral societies, whereas the latter views Bailey’s model 
as useful for the Syn optic tradition, accepting Weeden’s notion of the social 
memory theory.620 Eve is justified in concluding that neither Weeden nor Dunn 
views the informal controlled oral tradition as pro viding ‘a direct window or an 
impenetrable barrier onto historical events’.621
 But does Bailey use the word ‘authenticity’ in its traditional meaning among 
historians of Jesus as referring to ‘actuality’? Rafael Rodríguez believes that Weeden 
has ‘fundamentally misread’ Bailey’s work in interpreting Bailey’s ‘authenticity’ as 
a reference to the uncorrupted preservation of the archaic, original historical facts, 
whereas Bailey used the term as a reference to the ‘stability’ of the oral tradition.622 
While this explanation may seem too sympathetic toward Bailey, admittedly, he 
may use the term in an unusual way.623 On the basis of Bailey’s two articles, one 
617  Eve, Behind, p. 82; cf. Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (33-34, n. 29).
618  See Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (10); also pointed out by Eve, Behind, p. 82.
619  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (53, 60).
620  Eve, Behind, pp. 82-83; Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (33, 36); Dunn, ‘Bailey’s 
Theory’, pp. 44-62 (53, 59).
621  Eve, Behind, p. 82.
622  Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 49; cf. Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (33, 35-37).
623  See e.g. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-11 (10): ‘Thus, at least through to the end of the first century, 
the authenticity of that tradition was assured to the community through specially designated 
authoritative witnesses…[w]hile affirming that freedom of movement [in the Synoptic tradition 
noted by Dodd and Davies], it has been our intent here to study the ‘braking system’ that keeps 
that movement within limits and assures continuity and authenticity to what is being transmitted.’ 
Italics are mine.
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cannot be absolutely sure of whether, by ‘authenticity’, Bailey meant ‘stability’ or 
historical ‘factuality’.624 If Bailey’s term is viewed as a reference to the ‘stability’ 
of the core of the tradition, on the one hand, the difference of opinion between 
Weeden and Dunn becomes more understandable: Weeden criticizes Bailey for 
something that Bailey never intended his data to speak for, while recognizing the 
kind of informal controlled tradition that Bailey’s data supports, whereas Dunn 
understands Bailey’s overall case in light of the idea of the preservation of the 
stable core of oral tradition as compared to the Synoptic tradition without getting 
occupied with the questions of historical ‘factuality’. On the other hand, if Weeden 
is viewed as correctly reading Bailey as referring to the preservation of historical 
factuality, he is right in indicating that Bailey did not note the flexibility and 
variation of the tradition to a sufficient degree.625 Either way, this does not change 
the fact that Weeden is right in contending that Bailey’s evidence is inconclusive in 
the sense that it is not based on sound socio-anthropological research.626
 Besides Weeden’s critique, other critical points on Bailey’s view has also been 
presented. Michael Bird and others have pointed out that there is no certainty that 
the early Jesus com munities functioned in a similar way to the modern Middle 
Eastern communities to which Bailey refers.627 Furthermore, even if one assumes 
that Bailey’s theory is valid in the Jesus traditions’ original environment, the 
Palestine of the first century, it does not explain the pro cesses of transmission of 
the Jesus traditions elsewhere, for instance, in Syria, Greece, and Rome; as some of 
the Gospels to which Bailey applies his model were actually written in these places, 
his model lacks the necessary explanatory power.628 These are valid criticisms, as 
624  However, Bailey’s other writings may suggest that, in addition to the stability of the core of the 
tradition, he also places considerable emphasis on the capacity of the oral tradition to retain 
historically authentic material. For instance, Bailey, Jesus Through, p. 18-20 (18), views ‘the 
Aramaic eyewitness testimony to that life [the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth] as an integral 
part of the process through which the canonical Gospels passed’. Bailey (p. 18 n. 13) supports 
the idea of eyewitness testimony by a reference to Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, who argues for the 
historical reliability of the Jesus traditions on the basis of eyewitness testimony. Bailey (p. 20), 
states that ‘the Gospels are history theologically interpreted’, yet says that, overall, he attempts to 
examine the Gospel texts ‘holistically’ as a combination of Jesus’ words and the Gospel authors’ 
editing, without aiming to separate the two from each other.
625  So also Bird, Gospel, pp. 93-94, n. 88.
626  Weeden, ‘Kenneth Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 3-43 (37).
627  Bird, Gospel, p. 94; also Gerhardsson, ‘Secret’, pp. 1-18 (5): ‘Bailey is convinced that this type of 
transmission of oral tradition follows an extremely old practice, but the performances that he has 
heard and seen for himself are, after all, from our own time, not from 2,000 years ago.’
628  Bird, Gospel, p. 94; also Byrskog, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition’, pp. 459-71 (465): 
‘In order to work as an ‘explanatory model’ for the Jesus tradition, it [Bailey’s model] needs to 
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Bailey’s model is based on nothing but the assumption of similarity of the contexts. 
Even though Dunn is probably right in stating that these criticisms are not fatal 
for the comparison of Bailey’s model to the Synoptic tradition,629 Bailey’s model 
can only assume the similarity between the modern Middle Eastern communities 
and the earliest communities of the Jesus movement, and is not comprehensive 
enough to explain the processes of the transmission of the Jesus traditions in 
different contexts of early Christianity.630
 Bailey’s model is simply too limited to function as an ‘explanatory model’ 
for the Jesus traditions.631 Although Dunn has been able to link Bailey’s idea of 
the preservation of the core of the traditions with the Jesus traditions found in 
the Gospels, it is debated whether these links are sufficient in portraying the 
practice of informal controlled oral tradition in the ancient setting; after all, in 
order to function as an explanatory or working model for the transmission of 
the Jesus traditions,632 Bailey’s model needs to account for the performance of 
those traditions not only in small village gatherings but also in the urban house 
meetings in early Christianity.633 This demand is clearly beyond the scope of what 
Bailey has demonstrated.
 In addition to these criticisms, it has been asked, since the other two models of 
transmission (informal uncontrolled and formal controlled) are assumed to have 
existed in modern Middle Eastern contexts by Bailey, why could not these models 
have existed in the first-century Palestine as well? In other words, would not the 
Jesus traditions have been preserved by different models and in different settings 
in the first century?634 This is, of course, a valid question to pose for a model as 
have some kind of comparative link to evident practices in the ancient socio-cultural setting and 
account not only for the contextualized performance of a village gathering, but also for the urban 
setting of early Christian house meetings. It does not.’
629  Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62 (46-47): ‘the social habits and modes of passing on tradition in 
Middle Eastern villages I suspect have differed very little over the centuries, just as pre-radio, pre-
TV and preinternet village communities the world over have tended to retain very conservative 
patterns of social life and values. Above all, I repeat, the most weighty factor for me was that the 
KB model helped explain the enduring character of the Synoptic Jesus tradition more effectively 
that any other I had hitherto encountered.’
630  Cf. Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-10 (10).
631  Pace Dunn, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62.
632  Cf. Dunn; Wright.
633  Byrskog, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition’, pp. 459-71 (465). The question of the 
differences between the early Christian communities (e.g. village gatherings/urban house 
meetings) is discussed in the next main chapter of the dissertation (ch. 3).
634  Bird, Gospel, p. 94.
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limited as that of Bailey, although he did indicate that the categories of models 
were not absolute.635
 Despite the severe criticisms, Bailey’s analogy between Middle Eastern village 
communities and early Jesus communities is stronger than other analogies 
that employ, for example, Homeric epics in ancient Greece, or folklore studies 
from the Balkans.636 Whatever one makes of Bailey’s anecdotal evidence, Bailey 
attempts to place his case in a Middle Eastern context; despite the lack of solid 
socio-anthropological evidence, which is pointed out in detail by Weeden, this 
brings Bailey’s case closer to Jesus’ day and his social context than the modern 
West.637 Whatever its flaws, Bailey’s anecdotal material illustrates how the core of 
a Jesus tradition could have been preserved by the communities. Even with his 
contested idea of the actual context of preservation, the haflat samar, and the 
limited textual evidence, it is not too far-fetched to conclude that Bailey’s model 
‘accounts for stability and flexibility in the Jesus tradition, whereas the form-
critical and Scandinavian models [Gerhardsson] tend to emphasize one over the 
other’.638 This is a point that creates a link between the views of Bailey and Kelber, 
and those who apply social memory theory to the study of the transmission of the 
Jesus traditions and the historical Jesus. It must be noted, nevertheless, that the 
attention that Bailey’s case has received is probably to a large extent due to the use 
of his view by Jesus-scholars like Dunn and Wright.
2.5 Conclusion
In order to form a meaningful framework for the discussion of the development of 
the memory approach to the historical Jesus and the Jesus traditions, four different 
views on the transmission of the Jesus traditions in early Christianity were 
presented and critically evaluated in this chapter. First, it was argued that, while 
some of form criticism’s insights are still useful starting points for discussion about 
635  Bailey, ‘Informal’, pp. 4-10 (10), indicated that ‘[t]he pedagogy of the rabbinic schools may well 
lie behind some of the material’, while ‘[t]he assumptions of radical kerygmatizing’ are unhelpful 
and the informal controlled oral tradition provides ‘a methodological framework’ for ‘the bulk 
of the materials’.
636  Bird, Gospel, pp. 94-95.
637  See Eve, Behind, p. 84.
638  Bird, Gospel, p. 95; also Eve, Behind, p. 83. Cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 252-63, who argues 
that Bailey’s explanation of the mechanism for the control of the tradition is too vague and that 
his notions of stability and flexibility could also be applied to a formally controlled tradition. 
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the nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions in early Christianity, the views 
of Martin Dibelius and Rudolf Bultmann have by and large become outdated; the 
relationship between oral tradition and the written Gospels cannot be plausibly 
explained through reference to anonymous collectives of early Christian tradents 
and by linking the ‘original form’ of a tradition with a Sitz im Leben. The form 
critics’ romantic notion about oral tradition displayed an overemphasis on the 
flexibility of the Jesus traditions, while undermining the role early Christian 
individuals who exercised, to a degree, control over the transmission process. 
Both Dibelius and Bultmann presented their views during the first centuries of 
the twentieth century, at the time of the decline of the so-called First Quest for 
the historical Jesus, which explains, at least in part, their skepticism toward the 
possibility of knowing much about the historical person of Jesus. 
 Second, it was acknowledged that the two Scandinavian scholars Harald 
Riesenfeld and, more importantly, Birger Gerhardsson, who stressed memorization 
and replication of teaching as the historical techniques of transmission, enabled 
later scholars to recognize that there were authoritative individuals exercising 
control over the transmission process, as opposed to the form-critical notions of 
anonymous community: the earliest Christians committed to memory what they 
believed were Jesus’ actual teachings and accounts of his life. While Gerhardsson’s 
view of the transmission of the Jesus traditions was deemed to be unrealistically 
rigid and inflexible, undermining the variability of the Jesus traditions, he needs 
to be viewed as an important predecessor of the memory approach due to his 
emphasis on memorization. Gerhardsson’s view results in a much more substantial 
(or ‘maximalist’) view of the historical Jesus than the (‘minimalist’) form-critical 
critical (or the so-called New Quest views with their heavy emphasis of the criteria 
of authenticity) would allow.
 Third, it was argued that the views of Erhardt Güttgemanns and, especially, 
Werner Kelber, which outlined a radical discontinuity between the pre-Gospel 
oral Jesus tradition and the written Gospel of Mark, cannot be excluded from 
the research-historical discussion on the transmission of the Jesus traditions and 
the study of the historical Jesus. While Kelber’s original split between orality and 
textuality was deemed to be a fallacy of method, the value of his contribution 
to the discussion on the oral transmission of the Jesus traditions, as well as the 
role of the historical Jesus as an oral performer, was recognized; Kelber’s view of 
the relatively low levels of literacy within the earliest Christian communities was 
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generally viewed as plausible. His rejection of the categories of ‘authentic’ and 
‘inauthentic’ with regard to the Jesus traditions, combined with his openness to 
the conceptual category of memory, questioned many of the presuppositions of 
what is often labelled Third Quest scholarship and has had a foundational impact 
on the development of the memory approach.
 Fourth, it was argued that, despite the anecdotal nature of evidence and the 
lack of socio-anthropological support, Kenneth Bailey’s analogy between Middle-
Eastern village communities and early Jesus communities is stronger than some 
of the previous analogies, such as Homeric epics and folklore studies, for the 
transmission of the Jesus traditions. The Middle-Eastern context probably brings 
his case closer to the first-century situation than the modern West. Even with the 
contested idea of the actual context of preservation of the tradition, the haflat 
samar, the model of informal controlled tradition creates a link between Bailey 
and Kelber, as well as the memory approach to the historical Jesus, by emphasizing 
both the stability and flexibility of the transmission of the Jesus traditions. 
Nevertheless, if it were not for James D. G. Dunn and N. T. Wright, Bailey’s case, 
which is largely based on anecdotal evidence, would probably have received much 
less scholarly attention.
 These four distinct views on the transmission of the Jesus traditions prepare 
the way for the discussion on the memory approach to the Jesus traditions and 
the historical Jesus in the next chapter. Understanding these four views, and their 
distinctive approaches to the Jesus traditions, is important for the discussion on 
the more recent scholarship which more heavily employs the conceptual categories 
of oral performance, individual memory, and social memory in the study of the 
historical Jesus.
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3 The Memory Approach – A Way Forward?
An informed view of historical Jesus research and the nature and transmission 
of the Jesus traditions in early Christianity cannot avoid the topic of memory 
after the rise and development of the memory approach.639 While memory as 
such has become less central for intellectual life since the Middle Ages640 (to the 
extent that some say ‘modern societies suffer from amnesia’641), the concepts of 
individual memory (the psychological understanding of memory) and social or 
collective memory (the sociological understanding of memory) have gained great 
traction within historical Jesus research. Psychological literature on these aspects 
of memory, as well as the study of the role of memory in the transmission of oral 
tradition and performance, have provided the discussion on the Jesus traditions 
with a perspective that cannot be ignored.642 
639  Cf. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 50: ‘the Jesus-Memory Approach’; ch. 3.5 below; also, Bird, Gospel, pp. 
95-111 (95): ‘Jesus in Social Memory’. Bird’s title for the chapter in question is telling: ‘II. A New 
Paradigm: Jesus in Social Memory’.
640  Eve, Behind, p. 86. On ‘memory’ in pre-modern era, see the references in Eve, Behind, p. 86, n. 
1: Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge 
Studies in Medieval Literature; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 2008); David 
M. Carr, Writing on the Tablets of the Heart: Origins of Scripture and Literature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Jocelyn Penny Small, Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive Studies of 
Memory and Literacy in Classical Antiquity (Abingdon: Routledge, 1997).
641  Barbara A. Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering (ed. L. Ray; Theorizing Society; Maidenhead 
and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2003), p. 12.
642  For memory studies in the NT and Gospels studies and historical Jesus research, see e.g. G. M. 
Keightley, ‘The Church’s Memory of Jesus: A Social Science Analysis of 1 Thessalonians’, BTB 
17 (1987), pp. 149-56; J. Schröter, ‘The Historical Jesus and the Sayings Tradition: Comments 
on Current Research’, Neot 30/1 (1996), pp. 151-68; idem, Erinnerung an Jesu Worte. Studier 
zur Rezeption der Logienüberlieferung in Markus, Q und Thomas (WMANT, 76; Neukirchen-
Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1997); Kelber, ‘The Case of the Gospels: Memory’s Desire and the Limits 
of Historical Criticism’, pp. 55-86; Dunn, Jesus Remembered; idem, The Oral Gospel Tradition; 
Kirk and Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition and Text: Uses of the Past in Early Christianity; 
Bauckham, Eyewitnesses; Tom Thatcher, Why John Wrote a Gospel: Jesus – Memory – History 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2006); Stephen C. Barton, Loren T. Stuckenbruck, and 
Benjamin G. Wold (eds.), Memory in the Bible and Antiquity: The Fifth Durham-Tübingen Research 
Symposium (WUNT, 212; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007); Scot McKnight and Terence Mournet 
(eds.), Jesus in Early Christian Memory (LNTS, 359; London: Clark, 2007); April D. DeConick, 
‘Human Memory and the Sayings of Jesus: Contemporary Exercises in the Transmission 
of Jesus Tradition’, in T. Thatcher (ed.), Jesus, the Voice and the Text: Beyond the Oral and the 
Written Gospel (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2008), pp. 135-79; Anthony Le Donne, 
Historiographical; idem, Historical Jesus; Allison, Constructing; J. Redman, ‘How Accurate Are 
Eyewitnesses? Bauckham and the Eyewitnesses in the Light of Psychological Research’, JBL 129/1 
(2010), pp. 177-97; Rodríguez, Structuring; idem, Oral Tradition; R. K. McIver, Memory, Jesus, 
and the Synoptic Tradition (SBLRBS, 59; Atlanta: SBL, 2011); Keith, Jesus’ Literacy; idem, Jesus 
against the Scribal Elite: The Origins of the Conflict (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014); P. J. 
J. Botha, Orality and Literacy in Early Christianity (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012); Keith 
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 Based on the previous chapter’s discussion on the form-critical understanding 
of the Jesus traditions and its alternatives, it will be explored in this chapter 
whether the memory approach to the study of the Jesus traditions can be 
conceived as a coherent methodological shift in historical Jesus research. Does the 
memory approach constitute a viable path forward for the study of the historical 
Jesus? Does the memory approach constitute a methodologically coherent school 
of thought in historical Jesus research?
 The individual and social aspects of memory are first introduced as far as they 
are relevant for the study of the nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions 
and the historical Jesus. Most of the chapter is devoted to an analysis and critique 
of the studies that apply the conceptual category of memory (3.2: James D. G. 
Dunn; 3.6: Dale C. Allison), social memory theory (3.3: Richard A. Horsley; 3.4: 
Rafael Rodríguez; 3.5: Chris Keith; 3.7: Anthony Le Donne), and various studies 
on orality and oral tradition (esp. Dunn, Horsley, Rodríguez) to the question 
of the transmission of the Jesus traditions. Also, the studies of the question of 
eyewitness testimony and the role of early Christian eyewitnesses by Samuel 
Byrskog and Richard Bauckham, as well as the specific category of individual 
memory, eyewitness memory (especially, in Bauckham’s work), are addressed in 
this chapter (3.8).
 While seeking to address the main research problem of the dissertation, namely, 
whether the memory approach constitutes a methodologically coherent approach 
to the historical Jesus, the different viewpoints are discussed in this chapter with 
regard to (1) how source-critical hypotheses, such as the Two-(or Four-)Source 
theory, are viewed within the memory approach, (2) what the role of the criteria 
of authenticity is, if they have any, within the memory approach to the Jesus 
traditions and historical Jesus scholarship, (3) whether the memory approach 
sheds new light on the question about the distinction between the historical 
Jesus and the Christ of faith, (4) and whether the memory approach should be 
construed as a new beginning or a dead end for historical Jesus research. At the 
and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity; Kelber and Byrskog (eds.), 
Jesus in Memory; Eve, Behind, pp. 86-107, 108-134; idem, Writing the Gospels: Composition and 
Memory (London: SPCK, 2016); R. A. Horsley, Text and Tradition; Bird, Gospel; Christine Jacobi, 
Jesusüberlieferung bei Paulus? Analogien zwischen den echten Paulusbriefen und den synoptischen 
Evangelien (BZNW, 123; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015); Ehrman, Jesus Before the Gospels; Byrskog, 
Hakola, and Jokiranta (eds), Social Memory and Social Identity in the Study of Early Judaism and 
Early Christianity.
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end of the chapter, some conclusions are derived concerning how the memory 
approach attempts to distinguish itself from earlier scholarship, namely, form 
criticism and its alternatives, with regard to the question of the transmission of 
the Jesus traditions and the task of reconstructing the historical Jesus.643 
3.1 Individual Memory and Social Memory
Individual Memory
As indicated above, memory can be thought of in terms of the mental capacity of 
an individu al.644 Individual memory concerns first the memory of events that an 
individual has personal ly experienced; this is labeled personal, or autobiographical 
memory, which refers to ‘the way we tell others and ourselves the story of our 
lives’; these memories are not always accu rate, although they usually do cohere 
with one’s self-knowledge, life themes, and sense of self.645 There is a difference 
between autobiographical knowledge about one’s personal life (for instance, the 
date of birth) and episodic memory, in other words, ‘remembering an expe rience 
643  Cf. Ch. 1.2.
644  Misztal, Theories, pp. 9-10; Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (ed. J. Dunn, J. Goody, E. 
A. Hammel and G. Hawthorn; Themes in the Social Sciences; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), pp. 21-23; also Geoffrey Cubitt, History and Memory (ed. G. Cubitt; Historical 
Approaches; Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 67-68; William 
F. Brewer, ‘What is Recollective Memory?’ in D. C. Rubin (ed.), Remembering Our Past: Studies 
in Autobiographical Memory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 19-66; Martin 
A. Conway, ‘Autobiographical Knowledge and Autobiographical Memories’, in Rubin (ed.), 
Remembering, pp. 67-93; cf. Eve, Behind, pp. 87-91 (88 n. 2, 3); also, on cognitive neuroscience 
of memory, see Daniel L. Schacter, Kenneth A. Norman and Wilma Koutstaal, ‘The Cognitive 
Neuroscience of Constructive Memory’, Annual Review of Psychology 49 (1998), pp. 289-318; 
Daniel L. Schacter and Donna Rose Addis, ‘The Cognitive Neuroscience of Constructive 
Memory: Remembering the Past and imagining the Future’, Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B 362 (2007), pp. 773-86; Daniel L. Schacter, ‘The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights 
from Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience’, American Psychologist 54.3 (1999), pp. 182-203; 
on false memory, J. Deese, ‘On the Prediction of Occurrence of Particular Verbal Intrusions in 
Immediate Recall’, Journal of Experimental Psychology 58 (1959), pp. 17-22; Henry L. Roediger 
and Kathleen B. McDermott, ‘Creating False Memories: Remembering Words Not Presented in 
Lists’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 21 (1995), pp. 803-
14; Hans F. M. Crombag, Willem A. Wagenaar and Peter J. Van Koppen, ‘Crashing Memories and 
the Problem of “Source Monitoring”’, Applied Cognitive Psychology 10 (1996), pp. 95-104; Tom 
Smeets et. al., ‘What’s Behind Crashing Memories? Plausibility, Belief and Memory in Reports 
of Having Seen Non-Existing Images’, Applied Cognitive Psychology 23 (2009), pp. 1333-41; cf. 
Kloppenborg, ‘Memory, Performance, and the Sayings of Jesus’, pp. 97-132 (99-101): also see 
DeConick, ‘Human Memory and the Sayings of Jesus’, pp. 135-79.
645  Misztal, Theories, p. 10.
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by partly reliving it in our imagination’.646 Individual memory also concerns the 
memory of facts gathered from different sources; this kind of memory has to do 
with remem bering, for example, the dates of historical events, such as significant 
battles, and facts like ‘a bicycle has two wheels’. This category is called cognitive, 
declarative or semantic memory.647 Further, individual memory has to do with the 
memory of how to do things; it concerns habit or procedural memory. Procedural 
memory has to do with remembering how to perform activities that demand 
attention, for example, operating a computer or riding a bicycle. Habit memory 
refers to one’s capacity to reproduce a certain performance, denoting the ability to 
habitually recall the signs and skills of everyday life.648
 The human mind has specific ways of storing and retrieving memories of 
events. In his classic 1932 book, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social 
Psychology, the British psychologist Frederick C. Bartlett (1886–1969) studied 
memory distortions and laid the foun dation for schema theory.649 On the basis 
of various perception and memory experiments, Bartlett named the general form 
that people used to make sense of their experiences a schema, which refers to 
the general organization of a story of a typical event. In order to make sense of 
memories, the human mind employs specific cognitive schemata, in other words, 
the typical narrative patterns to describe an event.650 A schema is, for instance, 
the typical script, which defines a situation like a visit to the dentist or a meal at 
a restaurant.651 While one’s cognitive schemata can help in the recollection and 
reconstruction of events, the human mind tends to reshape the memories of one’s 
experiences to better fit these frameworks. Bartlett’s phrase ‘effort after meaning’ 
referred to human attempts to convert elements that are difficult to perceive 
into understandable forms. His famous experiment with the Native American 
tale of the ‘War of the Ghosts’ illustrated, for example, that the English subjects 
unfamiliar with Native American culture used a schema of a fairy tale, a genre 
646  Eve, Behind, p. 88.
647  Eve, Behind, p. 88; Misztal, Theories, p. 9.
648  Eve, Behind, p. 88; Misztal, Theories, p. 9-10; Connerton, How Societies, pp. 22-23. 
649  Frederick C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995 [1932]).
650  Bartlett, Remembering, pp. 199-214; Eve, Behind, pp. 89-90; James L. Fentress and Chris 
Wickham, Social Memory (New Perspectives on the Past; Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil 
Blackwell, 1992), pp. 32-36; Cubitt, History and Memory, pp. 81-82, 96-106; Crossan, Birth, p. 82; 
Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 326-29, 335-38; Connerton, How Societies Remember, p. 27.
651  Eve, Behind, p. 90.
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to which they were accustomed; some even came up with a moral at the end of 
the story.652 For Bartlett, remembering was ‘not the re-excitation of innumerable 
fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces’, but rather ‘an imaginative reconstruction, or 
construction, built out of the relation of our attitude towards a mass of organized 
past reactions or experiences’.653
 A few further cautions regarding individual memory are necessary. First, 
despite the fact that schematization does not always and automatically equate to 
falsification, the human mind is capable of creating schemata that cause one to 
remember what one expected to see. Also, subsequent reflection and narrativizing 
of an event may distort the memory towards one’s expectations. This cannot be 
completely avoided, as one’s memories can only be understandable to oneself and 
others as parts of larger narratives.654
 On the one hand, successive acts of remembering can, besides fixing an event 
in memory in a memorable form, establish a distorted version or even introduce 
new distortions. The human mind tends to narrate an event in a self-justifying 
way, making one’s own actions appear either more praiseworthy or less culpable 
depending on the situation.655 On the other hand, an event which is less frequently 
rehearsed does not get as easily distorted, although it is more likely to be forgotten. 
While some distortions are deliberate fabrications, often the details of one incident 
are accidentally conflated with another.656
 Finally, even the most private remembering has a social dimension.657 
652  Bartlett, Remembering, pp. 63-64. See the discussion on narrativization in relation to social 
memory below, esp. in ch. 3.7 on Anthony Le Donne’s view.
653  Bartlett, Remembering, p. 213. Kloppenborg, ‘Memory, Performance, and the Sayings of Jesus’, 
pp. 97-132 (99-102) notes that these conclusions are largely confirmed by more recent studies 
of brain function. See e.g. Schacter, Norman, and Koutstaal, ‘The Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Constructive Memory’, pp. 289-318; also Schacter, ‘The Seven Sins of Memory’, pp. 182-203, 
which speaks of transience (memories fading), absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, 
suggestibility, bias, and persistence as ‘seven sins of memory’ that affect the cognitive processes 
of memory construction.
654  Eve, Behind, p. 90; Connerton, How Societies Remember, pp. 26-28.
655  Eve, Behind, pp. 90-91; Daniel Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past 
(New York: Basic Books, 1996), pp. 111-12; Cubitt, History and Memory, pp. 96-97.
656  Eve, Behind, p. 91; Schacter, Searching for Memory, pp. 114-18; Cubitt, History and Memory, pp. 
83-84.
657  Eve, Behind, p. 91; Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (tr. Lewis A. Coser; Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 53; Bartlett, Remembering, pp. 237-300; Fentress 
and Wickham, Social Memory, pp. 7, 25; Richard A. Horsley, ‘Prominent Patterns in the Social 
Memory of Jesus and Friends’, in Alan Kirk and Tom Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition and 
Text: Uses of the Past in Early Christianity (SBLSS, 52; Atlanta: SBL, 2005), pp. 57-78 (65).
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Remembering is a social activity, as it is influenced by the social forces operating in 
communities, movements, and societies.658 Although one’s personal idiosyncrasies 
are a factor in the process, the lan guage, concepts, world-view and schemata, 
which are employed to ‘encode, retrieve and in terpret’ one’s memories, stem from 
the social environment. Memories are often subject to ex ternal pressure from 
a group or groups with which one identifies closely; conforming to the socially 
acceptable way of remembering within a specific group is a significant factor, 
espe cially in remembering ‘matters of considerable group significance’.659
 Within historical Jesus scholarship that employs psychological studies on 
memory, there are two trends regarding the reliability of individual memory which 
may appear opposite at first glance. On the one side, Dale C. Allison begins his 
construction of the historical Jesus by accounting for the unreliability of certain 
aspects of individual memory.660 Allison reminds that ‘[p]ersonal reminiscence 
is neither innocent nor objective’661 and the memories of early Christian leaders, 
who were the originators of the Jesus tradition, ‘must have been subject to all the 
failures and biases that modern science has so helpfully if disturbingly exposed’.662 
Be fore Allison, citing psychological literature on memory, John Dominic Crossan 
argued that an individual’s memory can be very unreliable and should be viewed, 
more than anything else, as a selective reconstruction of the past: ‘Memory is as 
much or more creative reconstruction as accurate recollection, and, unfortunately, 
it is often impossible to tell where one ends and the other begins’.663 On the other 
side, Richard Bauckham argues for the reliability of a specific kind of individual 
memory, in particular, eyewitness memory.664 With the help of psychological 
studies on memory, Bauckham intends to demonstrate that eyewitness memory, 
in other words, the testimony of first-hand witnesses to a given event, cannot be 
deemed unreliable; this means, according to Bauckham, that the Jesus tradition, 
which he argues is based on the recollections and testimony of the eyewitnesses of 
658  Horsley, ‘Prominent Patterns’, in Kirk and Thatcher (eds.), Memory, pp. 57-78 (65); Fentress and 
Wickham, Social Memory, p. 25.
659  Eve, Behind, p. 91; see the discussion on social memory below.
660  Allison, Constructing, pp. 1-30. Allison’s work is discussed in more detail below in ch. 3.6.
661  Allison, Constructing, p. 1.
662  Allison, Constructing, p. 30.
663  John Dominic Crossan, The Birth of Christianity: Discovering What Happened in the Years 
Immediately after the Execution of Jesus (San Francisco, Harper, 1998), pp. 59-84 (59).
664  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 319-57. Bauckham’s theory of eyewitness memory, which diverges 
in many ways from the scholars discussed in this chapter, is addressed in detail in ch. 3.8.2.
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Jesus’ ministry, is historically reliable.
 Comparing Crossan and Bauckham, Eve points out that, while both sides 
find support for their viewpoints in psychological literature, the difference ‘is 
as much one of emphasis as one of substance’.665 Crossan admits that memory 
is hardly completely unreliable, whereas Bauckham acknowledges, at least, an 
element of reconstruction in the process of remember ing.666 These two emphases 
lead to important observations about individual memory. First, the reliability 
of individual memory is variable; while the human memory works well for 
many practical purposes (such as giving access to one’s individual past), it is 
nevertheless prone to many failures that warn against naïve trust (for instance, 
error, forgetting, distortion, unconscious invention, reinterpretation, self-interest, 
suggestibility and social pressure).667 Second, recollection involves an element of 
reconstruction, which means that one cannot sim ply reactivate a stored image 
from one’s memory; one’s general understanding of things and the world at large, 
as well as one’s present needs, inform the process of recollection and inter pretation 
of past events. Remembering is an attempt to make sense of what is recalled for 
the present.668 Thus, individual memory ‘is a combination of past recollection 
and present imposi tion’.669 Social memory is discussed next, as the process of the 
transmission of the Jesus tradi tions was essentially communal in nature.
Social Memory
‘Social memory’, ‘collective memory’ and ‘cultural memory’670 are all terms used to 
describe the social aspects of memory, in other words, the sociological reality that 
a group preserves, rehearses, shapes and transmits memories that are significant to 
that group’s identity.671 The French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945) is 
665  Eve, Behind, p. 89.
666  Eve, Behind, 89; cf. Crossan, Birth, p. 84; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 325-30.
667  Eve, Behind, p. 89.
668  Eve, Behind, p. 89, as well as the references in n. 9: Schacter, Searching for Memory, pp. 69-71, 
88-97; Todd Tremlin, Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundations of Religion (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 152; Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, p. 31.
669  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 47.
670  See Jan Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political 
Imagination (trans. David Henry Wilson; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
671  On the definitions of the three terms, see Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 42 n. 8: the pioneer of 
social memory theory Maurice Halbwachs used sociaux to describe how individual memories 
are informed by group ideologies; with collective memory, he referred to memories shared and 
passed down by groups. Currently, these terms are often used synonymously. More recently, 
‘cultural memory’ is often used to broaden the scope of collective memory into a long-term 
cultural tradition.
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widely considered the pioneer and father of social memory theory.672 Halbwachs’ 
classic work, Les Cadres sociaux de lá memoire,673 was inspired by the ideas of 
Henri Bergson (1859–1941), who discussed the relationship between memory 
and time, and Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), who studied the relationship 
between society and individual.674 Halbwachs argued, first, that the past is not 
preserved in the memories of individuals, but is reconstructed on the basis of the 
present in social interaction and, secondly, that the cognitive reconstruction of 
the past is essentially spurred by ‘social frameworks’.675 Halbwachs emphasized 
that all remembering is necessarily social in nature, regardless of the fact that 
individuals do the remembering.676 Social groups provide the frameworks – and 
the very language – used to frame one’s thoughts and perceptions; all recollections 
are placed within these frameworks. Acts of remembering are social in nature, as 
memories are shared in social interaction.677
 For Halbwachs, ‘collective memory’ functioned to maintain group identity, 
values and cohesion.678 Bearing a resemblance to the concept of homeostasis in 
oral tradition, Halbwachs’ notion of collective memory refers to the idea that 
society reshapes its memories to meet present needs, forgetting anything that 
would threaten group cohesion.679 Memories do not usually outlast the group to 
which they are significant, except maybe the memories of some former members 
of a defunct group.680 While admitting that one’s ‘impressions [or ‘individual 
memories’] perdure for some time’, Halbwachs stressed that ‘this “resonance” of 
672  See e.g. Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 41; Eve, Behind, p. 93.
673  Maurice Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux de lá memoire (Paris: F. Alcan, 1925); all references in 
my study are to the 1992 English translation, Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (trans. 
Lewis A. Coser; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
674  Lewis A. Coser, ‘Introduction’, in M. Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (trans. L. A. Coser; 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 3-7.; in Le Donne, Historiographical, 
p. 41 n. 3.
675  Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, pp. 38-40, 46-51; Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 42. Cubitt, 
History and Memory, pp. 158-59, points out that, like Bartlett, Halbwachs argued that memory 
was reconstructive rather than reproductive in nature; instead of focusing on the implications 
on the individual, Halbwachs was interested in the group. Specifically, Halbwachs studied the 
cohesion and interdependence of individual memory and social frameworks of memory in the 
context of dreams, family, religion, and social class.
676  Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p. 53, in Eve, Behind, p. 93.
677  Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, pp. 172-73; Cubitt, History and Memory, p. 159; Misztal, 
Theories, p. 54; Eve, Behind, p. 93.
678  See Misztal, Theories, pp. 50-52; Eve, Behind, p. 93.
679  Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, pp. 182-83; cf. Vansina, Oral Tradition as History, pp. 114-23; 
Eve, Behind, p. 93; cf. also ch. 2.3 of this study above.
680  Cubitt, History and Memory, p. 162; Eve, Behind, p. 93.
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impressions is not to be confused with the preservation of memories’.681
 The process of ‘localization’ was important for Halbwachs.682 It refers to the 
anchoring of mental images associated with the past to mental frames of reference; 
as such these frames are incomplete, until they are set in a context of meaning. 
Complete and cohesive memories are the result of fragmentary ideas being 
formed by these frames. Le Donne summarizes that the purpose of this process ‘is 
to reinforce images associated with the past by localizing them within imaginative 
contexts wherein these ideas are meaningful and intelligible to the present state of 
mind’; images associated with the past can only make sense in the present state of 
mind, when memories are reinforced with plausibility and integrity.683
 According to Halbwachs, there was no way of reaching ‘the actual past’ in 
order to verify that which was reinforced. The social group, with its established 
collective memories, corrects and rejects particular individual memories in social 
interaction, unless they are properly rendered. The group sets the standards for 
the formation of individual memories. Collective memory is a complex entity 
of norms, interpretations, and attitudes ‘that spur and constrain’ the imaginative 
process.684
 Halbwachs gave some examples of how collective memory creates social 
networks in which individual memories are localized. For example, an adult who 
reads a book familiar from her childhood completes the incomplete recollection 
of the book by the present perception of it.685 Also, family memories are social 
in nature, which often makes it impossible to distinguish them from individual 
recollections; according to Halbwachs, this is evidence of memory being, not 
only reinforced, but socially reinforced to become entirely social in nature.686 
Furthermore, Halbwachs did not restrict social dialogue to the external, but 
argued that the individual’s relationship to society is so deep that it affects 
individual memories even before social dialogue. The notion of ‘an internal 
social dialogue’ has subsequently resulted in the argument that every private and 
681  Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p. 40 n. 3.
682  Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, pp. 52-54.
683  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 47.
684  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 47-48.
685  Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p. 46; Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 48.
686  Halbwachs, Historiographical, p. 38; on this example, also see Jacques Le Goff, History and 
Memory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992 [1977], p. 4; Fentress and Wickham, Social 
Memory, p. 22; Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 48-49.
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communal memory is social in nature.687
 Halbwachs’ views have received many criticisms. His view is said to downplay 
the significance of the distinctive memories of individual human beings. While 
Halbwachs himself did not represent an extreme ‘presentist’ view, where the 
past is viewed as a complete fabrication designed to serve present interests,688 
his view is nevertheless in danger of lapsing into sociological reductionism.689 
An overemphasis on the influence of the present interests of the group easily 
leads to ignoring how much the actual past is immanent in the present; the 
resilience of individual memory should not be undermined.690 This kind of 
‘social determinism’ can be avoided when social memory is not viewed as a free 
invention of history, but as a process of negotiation that allows for fluidity and 
unpredictability; suppression of alternative interpretations and coercion do not 
ensure the acceptance of particular interpretations within the group.691
 Halbwachs is also criticized for neglecting how individuals’ consciousness of 
memory relates to the collective memory of the groups to which they belong. 
His view is said to create ‘a concept of collective consciousness’ not appropriately 
connected to any particular person’s thought processes.692 Further, Halbwachs’ 
view is said to fail to explain the handing on of col lective memories from 
generation to generation; he did not account for the role of individu als, as well 
as rituals, in this regard.693 In defense of Halbwachs, Rodríguez underscores that 
group memory was not ‘a mystical group mind’ for Halbwachs; collective memory 
is rather a sociological process that ‘goes on within the minds of individual group 
687  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 49; Michael Schudson, ‘Dynamics of Distortion in Collective 
Memory’, in Daniel Schacter (ed.), Memory Distortion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1995), pp. 346-64 (347).
688  Such a ‘presentist’ or ‘invention of traditions’ approach is argued for by others. See Misztal, 
Theories, pp. 56-61; Eve, Behind, p. 94: cf. Alan Kirk, ‘Social and Cultural Memory’, in Kirk 
and Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, and Text, pp. 1-24 (11-14); Barry Schwartz, ‘Christian 
Origins: Historical Truth and Social Memory’ in Kirk and Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, 
and Text, pp. 43-56 (44-46).
689  Misztal, Theories, p. 53; Cubitt, History and Memory, p. 162; Eve, Behind, p. 94.
690  Kirk, ‘Social and Cultural’, pp. 1-24 (14-17); Eve, Behind, p. 94.
691  Misztal, Theories, p. 71, refers to a ‘dynamics of memory’ view; see Eve, Behind, pp. 94-95. Eve, 
Behind, p. 95, points out that although even in Misztal’s own estimation this view lacks ‘a clear 
focus’, it nevertheless reminds that ‘the social memory of a particular group is not necessarily 
some monolithic set of ideas about the past that all members of the group share without question, 
but that the contents of collective memory may be debated and contested’.
692  Misztal, Theories, pp. 54-55; Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, p. ix; Eve, Behind, p. 95.
693  Connerton, How Societies Remember, pp. 37-38; Misztal, Theories, p. 55; Eve, Behind, p. 95.
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members’.694 There is space for the individual in Halbwachs’ viewpoint, as society 
does not completely take over the individual.695 Rodríguez stresses the capacity of 
the individual to process her memories in interaction with the group she belongs 
to; in Halbwachsian terms, the framework of social memory confines and binds 
together one’s remembrances, the group exerting ‘social force’ upon individual 
perceptions and interpretations.696
 Other criticism against Halbwachs can be listed as follows. Halbwachs’ 
conception of the past has been deemed inconsistent: he gives the impression that 
the past can be presented by present states of mind, while also indicating at times 
that the past is mostly unknowable.697 Halbwachs is also said to have presented 
a vague concept of ‘collective memory’.698 His ap proach too readily assumes the 
stability of the image of the past in group memory, not ac counting for change.699 
Finally, as a child of post-WWI disillusionment and suspicion, Halb wachs leaned 
too heavily towards dogmatic distrust; his view can be seen to take extreme 
constructivism normatively.700 His constructivist view is said to be guilty of 
circular reason ing.701
 Without assessing each criticism individually, it can be argued that Halbwachs 
held a conventional positivist approach to historiography. He believed that the 
objective writing of history was possible only after the vanishing of collective 
memory, which he deemed an unreliable source for history.702 Le Donne aptly 
summarizes: ‘Halbwachs considered memory to be a fluid and active process 
while history was a more rigid discipline that required the historian to maintain 
an objective distance from his or her subject matter’.703 Halbwachs’ method of 
writing history became prototypical for later historians of tradition, showing 
694  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 45.
695  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 45-46; Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p. 52.
696  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 46; Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p. 53.
697  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 47.
698  Cubitt, History and Memory, pp. 13-14, 165; see Eve, Behind, p. 95.
699  Misztal, Theories, p. 55; Eve, Behind, p. 95.
700  Schwartz, ‘Christian Origins’, pp. 43-56 (45-51); Eve, Behind, p. 95.
701  Kirk, ‘Social and Cultural Memory’, p. 13; Eve, Behind, p. 95.
702  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 43-45. Halbwachs came to this conclusion through his study in 
the field of topographical commemoration. See ‘The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in 
the Holy Land’, in Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, pp. 193-235, trans. of M. Halbwachs, La 
Topographie des Evangiles en Terre Sainte. Etude de mémoire collective (Paris: Presses universitaires 
de France, 1941). Some problems in Halbwachs’ study, such as his dating of the Gospels to the 
second century, are pointed out by Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 43-44.
703  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 43, 44-45.
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how to write a history of the politics of memory.704 His model recognized that 
the analysis of commemoration helps in understanding the thought world of the 
commemorators themselves. Halbwachs acknowledged that the way in which a 
society remembers her origins betrays a significant amount of information about 
her current stage.705
 It became clear later on, however, that Halbwachs and the followers of his 
historiographical method had upheld a false dichotomy between history and 
memory706; specifically, this was shown to be the case by Pierre Nora, who argued 
that collective memory is the essence of historical inquiry, not a mere building 
block that precedes the historian’s work, and that historiography is about the 
intentional reconstruction of memory, which is reliable because of its constant 
evolution and completion of the present.707 Most historians who apply social 
memory theory are said to fall between viewing social memory as the essence of 
historical inquiry (cf. Nora) and upholding a split between collective memory and 
history (cf. Le Goff).708
 The most important conclusions of Halbwachs’ work can be summarized 
as follows: (1) memory is the past reconstructed in light of present needs; (2) 
‘collective memory’ refers to that which is articulated into social communication; 
(3) no memory is conceived outside so cial frameworks.709 Several Halbwachsian 
ideas are broadly accepted at least in a modified sense. First, the social dimension 
of memory is always there no matter what kind of a role the individual dimension 
plays; memory has to make use of shared language and ideas, as remembering 
generally takes place in a social context.710 Second, social memory is important 
for maintaining social identity and a world of shared meanings; the past is often 
704  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 44. Le Donne, p. 44, states that ‘it was not until the posthumous 
publication of La Mémoire collective that Halbwachs’ historiographical conclusions became 
known’.
705  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 44. 
706  See e.g. Jacques Le Goff, History and Memory, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992 
[1977], whose work benefited from the posthumous publication of Halbwachs’ work. So Le 
Donne, Historiographical, pp. 44-45.
707  Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’, Representations 26 (1989), 
pp. 7-25; Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 45-46. Nora, ‘Between’, pp. 7-25 (8), argued that ‘real 
memory’ remains ‘unviolated’ in the realm of the subconscious.
708  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 46-47; cf. Nora, ‘Between’, pp. 7-25; Le Goff, History and Memory.
709  So Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 42.
710  Eve, Behind, p. 96; Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, p. 7; Cubitt, History and Memory, pp. 
118-20, 125-26; Misztal, Theories, pp. 11-12; Kirk, ‘Social and Cultural Memory’, pp. 1-24 (3-5).
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used in the legitimization of a present social order.711 Third, social memory has 
an element of construction, because it adapts to present needs and conceptions.712 
Fourth, this may lead to the distortion of facts and high selectivity about what is 
remembered, although this is not necessarily the case.713 Finally, as a modification 
of Halbwachs’ viewpoint, it is worth noting that, while present concerns do shape 
our understanding of the past, both the actual and remembered past also shape 
our understanding of the present.714
 Social memory theory is relevant for the study of the transmission of the Jesus 
traditions in early Christianity because most early Christians did not receive 
their knowledge about Jesus from their autobiographical memory; the Jesus 
traditions were ‘embedded in the social memory of the early church’, small house 
churches, forming a network scattered around the Roman Empire. Regardless 
of the differences between the collective memories of communi ties in different 
locations, one may speak of the early church’s collective memory of Jesus; how 
Jesus was remembered was paramount to their group identity.715 In the following 
sec tions, the studies by eight significant scholars on memory and the transmission 
of the Jesus traditions are presented and evaluated. James D. G. Dunn, Richard 
A. Horsley, Rafael Ro dríguez, Chris Keith, Dale C. Allison, and Anthony Le 
Donne apply, in their distinct ways, memory studies and social memory theory to 
questions related to the study of the Jesus traditions and the historical Jesus, while 
Samuel Byrskog and Richard Bauckham focus more on the question of eyewitness 
testimony.716
 Space permitting, other scholars and works could be included; for example, 
711  Eve, Behind, p. 96; Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, p. 25; Connerton, How Societies 
Remember, p. 3; Misztal, Theories, pp. 13-14; Kirk, ‘Social and Cultural Memory’, pp. 10-12.
712  Eve, Behind, p. 96; Misztal, Theories, pp. 13; Kirk, ‘Social and Cultural Memory’, pp. 10-11.
713  Eve, Behind, p. 96; Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, pp. xii-xiii.
714  Eve, Behind, p. 96; Connerton, How Societies Remember, pp. 2-4; Misztal, Theories, p. 13; Kirk, 
‘Social and Cultural Memory’, pp. 14-17.
715  Eve, Behind, p. 98. Eve argues that some form of a collective memory of Israelite traditions was 
also important for all or most of both Jewish and Gentile Christian communities, since Jesus was 
called the Messiah of Israel and the Son of God of Israel.
716  The focus of some of the views (e.g. Keith, Allison, Le Donne) discussed here is more on 
the study of the historical Jesus than on specific questions regarding the transmission of the 
Jesus traditions in early Christianity. Yet all the views that are discussed are based on a certain 
understanding of the dynamics of the Jesus traditions; for example, it can be roughly stated that 
the views that apply social memory theory to the historical Jesus have in common a notion that 
‘tradition’ can or should be thought of in light of the category of memory (i.e., the Jesus traditions 
can be thought of as the early Christian social memory about Jesus).
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Jens Schröter (b.1961) is a seminal figure when it comes to the application 
of the concept of memory, specifically, cultural memory, to the study of the 
Jesus traditions. After outlining some of his basic methodological points in 
his 1996 article, Schröter’s 1997 monograph, Erinnerung an Jesu Worte, applies 
Jan Assmann’s notion of cultural memory to the sayings traditions in Mark, Q, 
and Thomas, arguing for a presentist view which problematizes the notions of 
historicity and authenticity.717 While Schröter’s application of the concept of 
memory comes close to many other scholars discussed below, he emphasizes, 
717  See Jens Schröter, ‘The Historical Jesus and the Sayings Tradition: Comments on Current 
Research’, Neot 30/1 (1996), pp. 151-68; idem, Erinnerung, pp. 1-12, 462-66; also see, idem, 
‘Markus, Q und der historische Jesus: Methodische und exegetische Erwägungen zu den 
Anfängen der Rezeption der Verkündigung Jesu’, ZNW 89 (1998), pp. 173-200; idem, ‘Jerusalem 
und Galiläa. Überlegungen zur Verhaltnisbestimmung von Pluralität und Kohärenz für die 
Konstruktion einer Geschichte des frühen Christentums’, NovT 42/2 (2000), pp. 127-59; idem, 
‘Der historische Jesus in seinem jüdischen Umfeld: Eine Bestandsaufnahme angesichts der 
neueren Diskussion’, Bib 83/4 (2002), pp. 563-73; idem, ‘Von der Historizität der Evangelien: 
Ein Beitrag zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion über den historischen Jesus’, in J. Schröter and 
R. Brucker (eds.), Der Historische Jesus: Tendenzen und Perspektiven der gegenwärtigen 
Forschung (BZNW, 114; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), pp. 163-212; idem, ‘Die Bedeutung der 
Q-Überlieferungen für die Interpretation der frühen Jesustradition’, ZNW 94 (2003), pp. 38-67; 
idem, ‘The Criteria of Authenticity in Jesus Research and Historiographical method’, in Keith 
and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, pp. 49-70; most recently, 
J. Schröter and C. Jacobi (eds.), Jesus Handbuch (HdTh; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017). 
  On Schröter’s views, see e.g. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, passim; Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 
75-76; Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 119-20; Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 51, 63, 66; idem, ‘The Narratives 
of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 (442-44); Eve, Behind, pp. 131-32; Bird, Gospel, 
pp. 105-6; Hübenthal, Das Markusevangelium, pp. 19, 24, 30, 35, 42-44, 53-55, 59-60, 62-63, 67; 
Ernest van Eck, ‘Memory and Historical Jesus Studies: Formgeschichte in a New Dress?’, HTS 
Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 71/1 (2015), pp. 1-10; Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, 
pp. 43-65; Zimmermann, Puzzling the Parables, pp. 76-79; Kirk, Q in Matthew, pp. 153, 177, 301. 
  Also see Jacobi, Jesusüberlieferung bei Paulus?, which is a recent study on the relationship 
between Paul and the Synoptic Jesus tradition from a memory approach point of view. Jacobi, 
a student of Jens Schröter, argues for a ‘minimalist’ view on Paul’s use of the Jesus traditions, 
focusing on Rom. 12.14-21, 1 Thess. 5.1-11, 1 Cor. 7, 1 Cor. 11.23a, and Rom. 14.14. She questions 
a ‘maximalist’ interpretation that would view too many of the early Christian traditions as ‘Jesus 
traditions’ and is critical of positing too fixed a chain of transmission (contra e.g. Gerhardsson). 
This view, as noted by Kari Syreeni, review of Christine Jacobi’s Jesusüberlieferung bei Paulus? 
Analogien zwischen echten Paulusbriefen und den synoptischen Evangelien, RBL 12 (2016), pp. 
1-5, can be taken, on the one hand, as the Bultmannian (‘minimalist’) line of reasoning from 
a social memory perspective or, on the other hand, as an articulation of the way Paul ‘receives’ 
Jesus and the Jesus traditions as a hermeneutical sphere and an orientation toward the past, 
which is not interested in merely studying the repetition of Jesus’ words in Paul. On the latter 
view, which is open to the interpretation as a different kind of ‘maximalist’ view, see the 
description of Jacobi’s study on the Jesus Blog to which she is a contributor along with three other 
scholars discussed in this dissertation (Chris Keith, Rafael Rodríguez, Anthony Le Donne). See 
http://historicaljesusresearch.blogspot.fi/2015/09/christine-jacobi-joins-jesus-blog.html. 
Accessed February 22, 2017.
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more than some others, ‘a free and living’ Jesus tradition ‘in which there was not 
interest in distinguishing the authentic words of Jesus from material drawn from 
elsewhere’.718 The current discussion on social memory and the historical Jesus 
emerges by and large from the background of ancient media studies, which can be 
well demonstrated with the current selection of scholars and studies.
3.2 James D. G. Dunn
James D. G. Dunn’s (b.1939) vast contribution to the discussion on the Jesus 
traditions needs to be addressed in relation to the application of social memory 
theory, although Dunn’s major work on the historical Jesus, Jesus Remembered, 
does not pay close attention to the concept of memory despite its title.719 His work 
718  Eve, Behind, pp. 131-32 (132). Eve discusses Schröter only briefly under the title ‘Other 
contributions’.
719  Dunn, Jesus Remembered; see also his articles from the past decades republished in J. D. G. 
Dunn, The Oral Gospel Tradition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013): Chapter 1, pp. 13-40: Dunn, 
‘Prophetic “I”-Sayings and the Jesus-Tradition: The Importance of Testing Prophetic Utterances 
within Early Christianity’, NTS 24 (1977–78), pp. 175-98; Chapter 2, pp. 41-79: idem, ‘Altering 
the Default Setting: Re-envisaging the Early Transmission of the Jesus Tradition’, NTS 49 (2003), 
pp. 139-75 (the reprinted version from J. D. G. Dunn, A New Perspective on Jesus [Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2005], pp. 79-125); Chapter 3, pp. 80-108: idem, ‘Q¹ as Oral Tradition’, in M. 
Bockmuehl and D. A. Hagner (eds.), The Written Gospel (Festschrift G. N. Stanton; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2005), pp. 45-69; Chapter 4, pp. 109-19: idem, ‘Matthew’s Awareness of 
Markan Redaction’, in F. Van Segbroeck (ed.), The Four Gospels: Festschrift for Frans Neirynck 
(Festschrift F. Neirynck; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), pp. 1349-59; Chapter 5, pp. 120-
37: idem, ‘Matthew as Wirkungsgeschichte’, in P. Lampe et al. (eds.), Neutestamentliche Exegese 
im Dialog: Hermeneutik – Wirkungsgeschichte – Matthäusevangelium. Festschrift für Ulrich Luz 
(Festschrift U. Luz; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2008), pp. 149-66; Chapter 6, pp. 138-63: 
idem, ‘John and the Oral Gospel Tradition’, in H. Wansbrough (ed.), Jesus and the Oral Gospel 
Tradition (JSNTSup 64; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), pp. 351-79; Chapter 7, pp. 
164-95: idem, ‘John’s Gospel and the Oral Gospel Tradition’, in A. Le Donne and T. Thatcher 
(eds.), The Fourth Gospel in First-Century Media Culture (LNTS 426; London: T&T Clark, 2011), 
pp. 157-85; Chapter 8, pp. 199-212: idem, ‘On History, Memory and Eyewitnesses: In Response 
to Bengt Holmberg and Samuel Byrskog’, JSNT 26 (2004), pp. 473-87; Chapter 9, pp. 213-29: 
idem, ‘Eyewitnesses and the Oral Jesus Tradition’, JSHJ 6 (2008), pp. 85-105; Chapter 10, pp. 
230-47: idem, ‘Social Memory and the Oral Jesus Tradition’, in Barton, Stuckenbruck and Wold 
(eds.), Memory in the Bible and Antiquity: The Fifth Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium, pp. 
179-94; Chapter 11, pp. 248-64: idem, ‘Bailey’s Theory’, pp. 44-62; Chapter 12, pp. 267-89: idem, 
‘Two Versions of Remembering Jesus: How the Quest of the Historical Jesus Lost Its Way’, in P. 
R. Eddy and J. K. Beilby (eds.), The Historical Jesus: Five Views (Downers Grove: IVP, 2009), pp. 
199-225; also in T. Holmén and S. E. Porter (eds.), Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus 
(4 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 1:183-205; Chapter 13, pp. 290-312: idem, ‘Between Jesus and 
the Gospels’, in Jesus, Paul and the Gospels (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), pp. 22-44; Chapter 
14, pp. 313-60: idem, ‘The History of the Tradition: New Testament’, in J. D. G. Dunn and J. W. 
Rogerson (eds.), Eerdmans Commentary on the Bible (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans: 2003), pp. 950-
71; idem, ‘Living Tradition’, in P. McCosker (ed.), What Is It That the Scripture Says? Essays in 
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employs oral hermeneutics and sociological view points which foreground the 
discussion on social memory and the historical Jesus. The basic tenet of Dunn’s 
view is that one cannot objectively access the actual historical Jesus through the 
Jesus traditions contained in the Gospels, but rather the Gospel material shows 
how Jesus’ impact was remembered by his first followers; it is not possible to 
separate Jesus from his first followers’ faith and interpretation in a neutral way. 
Dunn is interested in how the impact, or impacts, of Jesus became textualized in 
the tradition, especially the Synoptic tradition, which he believes contains most 
of what can be known about Jesus. This approach can be viewed as reasserting 
the central idea of Martin Kähler’s Die sogenannte historische Jesus und der 
geschichtliche, biblische Jesus, that there is no ‘historical Jesus’ apart from the 
Christ of faith provided by the Gospels.720 
 Dunn argues that Jesus’ collective impact, which began to be made on his first 
followers at the beginning of his ministry, played a major role in the formation 
of their group identity already before Easter. According to Dunn’s sociological 
logic, the oral Jesus tradition formed a foundation story that helped to explain 
the distinct identity of Jesus’ followers; alongside a Christian interpretation of 
the Scriptures, early Christian teachers, of whom Paul is a prime example, would 
teach the oral traditions that would distinguish their communities from other 
communities, religious or other kind. Dunn remarks that Jesus was regarded and 
remembered as a ‘teacher’ and his closest followers as ‘disciples’ or ‘those taught, 
learners’, who under stood it to be their task to remember their teacher’s teaching. 
Witnessing and remembering are New Testament motifs, important for identity 
formation.721
 Dunn’s views are said to be largely consistent with social memory theory, 
although he lacks broader discussion on and explicit reference to the theory.722 
Biblical Interpretation, Translation and Reception in Honor of Henry Wansbrough OSB (LNTS 
316; London: T&T Clark, 2006), pp. 275-89.
720  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 125-27, 128-33, 242, 335-36; also see Eve, Behind, pp. 108-9; 
Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 5 n. 5. See Martin Kähler, Die sogenannte historische Jesus und der 
geschichtliche, biblische Jesus; Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 126-27 (126 n. 99); cf. Syreeni, ‘The 
Identity’, p. 1-16 (12).
721  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 174-80.
722  Eve, Behind, p. 109. It is fair to point out, nevertheless, that Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 178 n. 
32 refers to A. Assmann, Das Kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität 
in frühen Hochkulturen (Munich: Beck, 1992), via Schröter, Erinnerung, pp. 462-63, and speaks 
of ‘teachers reinforcing their church’s corporate memory of Jesus tradition’ in Dunn, Jesus 
Remembered, p. 186.
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Holding that ‘the church-founding apostles’ passed on Jesus traditions, teachers 
reinforced the ‘corporate memory of Jesus tradition’, and that early authors of 
letters alluded to that tradition, Dunn rejects the theory that early Christian 
prophecy was often added to the Jesus tradition, resulting in the prophets’ words 
being mixed up with Jesus’ words.723
 Turning to the dynamics of oral tradition, Dunn reviews and critiques the 
views of J. G. Herder, Rudolf Bultmann, C. F. D. Moule, Helmut Koester, Birger 
Gerhardsson, Werner Kel ber, Richard Horsley and Jonathan Draper, and 
Kenneth Bailey.724 Dunn is appreciative of Kelber’s notions of oral epic and oral 
characteristics in Mark, but criticizes his idea of a rup ture with the oral tradition 
caused by the writing of the Gospel. Dunn also deems some of Horsley’s and 
Draper’s views useful, as they employ John Miley Foley’s work on oral perfor-
mance. Dunn finds Foley’s idea of ‘metonymic referentiality’ especially helpful.725
 As discussed above in Chapter 2.4, Dunn is, nevertheless, most impressed with 
Bailey’s view of the ‘informal controlled oral tradition’, which he interprets at 
least partly through Jan Vansina’s theory on oral tradition726 and couples with the 
following notions about oral perfor mance: 
[I]n oral tradition one telling of a story is in no sense an editing of a 
previous telling; rather, each telling starts with the same subject and 
theme, but the retellings are differ ent; each telling is a performance of 
the tradition itself, not of the first, or third, or twenty-third ‘edition’ of 
the tradition.727
723  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 186-92; contra e.g. Bultmann, History, pp. 127-28.
724  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 192-210.
725  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 204-5; R. A. Horsley and J. A. Draper, Whoever Hears You Hears 
Me: Prophets, Performance, and Tradition in Q (Harrisburg: Trinity, 1999); J. M. Foley, Immanent 
Art: From Structure to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic (Bloomington: Indiana University, 
1991), chs 1, 2; idem, The Singer of Tales in Performance (Bloomington: Indiana University, 
1995), chs 1-3. With regard to the performance of oral traditional texts, ‘metonymic reference’ 
denotes ‘a mode of signification wherein the part stands for the whole’ (Foley, Immanent, p. 7; 
in Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 205), and a text ‘is enriched by an unspoken context that dwarfs 
the textual artifact’ (Foley, Immanent, pp. 40-41; in Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 205). Dunn, 
Jesus Remembered, p. 205, sums Foley’s point: ‘Oral traditional texts imply an audience with 
the background to respond faithfully to the signals encoded in the text, to bridge the gaps of 
indeterminacy and thus to “build” the implied consistency.’ 
726  Vansina, Oral Tradition; esp. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 207. 
727  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 209; contra e.g. Bultmann. Eve, Behind, p. 110, notes that this insight 
could just as well be from Lord, Foley, Kelber, or Horsley.
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Dunn gives Bailey credit specifically for recognizing that (1) a community would 
exercise some control over its traditions, and (2) the degree of control would vary 
both in regard to form and in regard to the relative importance of the tradition 
for its own identity. These quite non-controversial points, which are actually not 
original to Bailey,728 are followed by the third claim derived from Bailey, namely, 
that (3) the element regarded as the core of the story or key to its meaning would be 
its most fixed element.729 Dunn aims to illustrate this from the Synoptic tradition, 
discussing examples from the double tradition and Mark; he rejects the theory of 
direct literary copying on the grounds that the differences between accounts betray 
evidence of oral retellings of an oral tradition common to the different authors, or 
one au thor’s recollection of another’s account, rather than literary redactions of 
one another. Dunn argues that Matthew, Luke and their communities would have 
been familiar with the material of Mark and Q even before they received it in a 
written form; this means that the authors of the later Gospels would have known 
both the oral traditions and the parallel written materi al.730
 Dunn emphasizes the communal nature of the transmission of the Jesus 
tradition, while attempting to acknowledge the role of eyewitnesses as important 
authoritative figures.731 The Jesus tradition had its beginnings in Jesus’ ministry, 
words and actions, but the remembered impact was based on a synthesis of the 
impacts made on several occasions, precise recollec tions of individual occasions 
being beyond one’s reach. The material was used and molded constantly in early 
communities, a point made by early form criticism; also, the Easter event, as well 
as the transitions from Aramaic to Greek and from Galilean village to Hellenistic 
city, shaped the tradition for the changing circumstances.732
728  So Eve, Behind, p. 110.
729  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 209.
730  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 210-38; idem, ‘Altering the Default Setting’, pp. 139-75. Dunn’s 
examples include Mt. 8.5-13/Lk. 7.1-10; Mt. 8.23-27/Mk 4.35-41/Lk. 8.22-25; Mt. 15.21-28/Mk 
7.24-30; Mt. 17.14-18/Mk 9.14-27/Lk. 9.37-43; Mt. 18.1-5/Mk 9.33-37/Lk. 9.46-48; Mk 12.41-44/
Lk. 21.1-4; Mt. 6.7-15/Lk. 11.1-4; Mt. 5.13/Lk. 14.34-35; Mt. 5.25-26/Lk. 12.57-59; Mt. 5.39b-42/
Lk. 6.29-30; Mt. 6.19-21/Lk. 12.33-34; Mt. 7.13-14/Lk. 13.24; Mt. 7.24-27/Lk. 6.47-49; Mt. 10.34-
38/Lk. 12.51-53, 14.26-27; Mt. 18.15, 21-22/Lk. 17.3-4; Mt. 22.1-14/Lk. 14.15-24.
731  E.g. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 178 n. 28 cites the importance of the concept of autopsy in 
Byrskog, Story as History; also, see Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 180-81, 242-43: ‘Nor should we 
forget the continuing role of eyewitness tradents, of those recognized from the first as apostles or 
otherwise authoritative bearers of the Jesus tradition.’
732  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 239-45. Eve, Behind, p. 113, notes that these viewpoints are largely 
in accordance with social memory theory. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 313-14; idem, The Oral 
Gospel Tradition, pp. 41-79 (51 n. 34) basically accepts the low estimates of literacy (as low as 
146
 While learning ‘from postmodernism’s emphasis on the reception rather than 
composition of the text’ and arguing for an active living oral tradition that did not 
cease to exist when the Gospels were written, it is clearly the continuity provided 
by the oral Jesus tradition itself and its stability from its inception that Dunn 
wishes to emphasize.733 In accordance with his use of Bailey, Dunn posits that, 
despite the reality that the oral retellings of the traditions resulted in variations 
in details and emphases, the core of the tradition remained stable.734 Dunn’s view 
challenges three assumptions or conceptions of oral tradition: first, that the oral 
Jesus tradition initially circulated in isolated individual units, an assumption of 
the early form critics; second, that oral tradition can be viewed as a series of layers 
rather than a sequence of performances; and third, that there was a sharp shift 
from orality to writing with the composition of the Gospels.735
 In sum, paying attention to oral hermeneutics, Dunn proposes that the 
characteristics of the Jesus tradition are by and large explainable through the 
impact of Jesus on his first followers.736 Dunn approaches the Jesus traditions with 
no interest in the ‘authenticity’ of individual sayings and deeds, while holding a 
rather optimistic view of the continuity and stability of the Jesus traditions.
Critique & Evaluation
Dunn’s view has been warmly welcomed by some and fiercely criticized by 
others.737 The first main criticism of Dunn’s position has to do with his inattention 
3 percent) for Roman Palestine in Second Temple times, referring to e.g. William V. Harris, 
Ancient Literacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Heszer, Jewish Literacy, 
and others. 
733  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 245: ‘But the oral Jesus tradition itself provided the continuity, the 
living link back to the ministry of Jesus, and it was no doubt treasured for that very reason.’
734  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 249.
735  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 245-53; also Eve, Behind, pp. 113-14, for context and evaluation 
of Dunn’s notions.
736  The importance of the impact of the historical Jesus on his first followers has been addressed 
by other scholars. See e.g. Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest 
Christianity (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 53-55 (53): ‘The only 
reasonable factor that accounts for the central place of the figure of Jesus in early Christianity is 
the impact of Jesus’ ministry and its consequences, especially for his followers’. Cited in Keith, 
Jesus’ Literacy, p. 49.
737  See e.g. B. Holmberg, ‘Questions of Method in James Dunn’s Jesus Remembered’, JSNT 26.4 (2004), 
pp. 445-57; Gerhardsson, ‘Secret’, pp. 1-18; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 252-63; Rodríguez, 
Structuring, passim; Allison, Constructing, passim; R. Stewart, ‘From Reimarus to Dunn: Situating 
James D. G. Dunn in the History of Jesus Research’, in R. Stewart and G. Habermas (eds.), 
Memories of Jesus: A Critical Appraisal of James D. G. Dunn’s Jesus Remembered (Nashville: B&H, 
2010), pp. 1-30; M. Bockmuehl, ‘Whose Memory? Whose Orality? A Conversation with James D. 
G. Dunn on Jesus and the Gospels’, in Stewart and Habermas (eds.), Memories of Jesus, pp. 31-44; 
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to the concept of memory. Markus Bockmuehl puts it quite mildly in his 
assessment: ‘Dunn has left his welcome stress on remembrance somewhat starved 
of theoretical definition’. Dunn’s theoretical focus on the workings of memory, 
and its relation to orality and oral history, is not clear in Jesus Remem bered, as 
he does not address the most important theorists in these fields, such as Maurice 
Halbwachs, Pierre Nora, Jan Assmann, and others.738 While in Dunn’s defense 
it can be point ed out that he occasionally refers to the concept of memory in 
Jesus Remembered,739 and has subsequently engaged the theory, recognizing for 
instance the importance of Halbwachs,740 the lack of a theoretical framework on 
S. McKnight, ‘Telling the Truth of History: A Response to James D. G. Dunn’s Jesus Remembered’, 
in Stewart and Habermas (eds.), Memories of Jesus, pp. 45-57; Byrskog. ‘A New Perspective on 
the Jesus Tradition’, pp. 459-71; idem, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition: Reflections 
on James D. G. Dunn’s Jesus Remembered’, in R. Stewart and G. Habermas (eds.), Memories of 
Jesus, pp. 59-78; C. L. Blomberg, ‘Orality and the Parables: With Special Reference to James D. 
G. Dunn’s Jesus Remembered’, in Stewart and Habermas (eds.), Memories of Jesus, pp. 79-127; J. 
Schröter, ‘Remarks on James D. G. Dunn’s Approach to Jesus Research’, in Stewart and Habermas 
(eds.), Memories of Jesus, pp. 129-43; C. A. Evans, ‘Jesus’ Dissimilarity from Second Temple 
Judaism and the Early Church’, in Stewart and Habermas (eds.), Memories of Jesus, pp. 145-58; B. 
Warren, ‘The Transmission of the Remembered Jesus: Insights from Textual Criticism’, in Stewart 
and Habermas (eds.), Memories of Jesus, pp. 159-72; C. L. Quarles, ‘Why Not “Beginning from 
Bethlehem”? A Critique of James D. G. Dunn’s Treatment of the Synoptic Birth Narratives’, in 
Stewart and Habermas (eds.), Memories of Jesus, pp. 173-96; B. Witherington III, ‘“Christianity 
in the Making”: Oral Mystery or Eyewitness History?’, in Stewart and Habermas (eds.), Memories 
of Jesus, pp. 197-226; P. R. Eddy, ‘Remembering Jesus’ Self-Understanding: James D. G. Dunn on 
Jesus’ Sense of Role and Identity’, in Stewart and Habermas (eds.), Memories of Jesus, pp. 227-53; 
S. T. Davis, ‘James D. G. Dunn on the Resurrection of Jesus’, in Stewart and Habermas (eds.), 
Memories of Jesus, pp. 255-66; G. R. Habermas, ‘Remembering Jesus’ Resurrection: Responding 
to James D. G. Dunn’, in Stewart and Habermas (eds.), Memories of Jesus, pp. 267-85; for Dunn’s 
response, J. D. G. Dunn, ‘In Grateful Dialogue: A Response to My Interlocutors’, in Stewart and 
Habermas (eds.), Memories of Jesus, pp. 287-323; Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, passim; idem, Scribal; 
passim; McIver, Memory, Jesus, and the Synoptic Tradition, pp. 117-20; J. S. Kloppenborg, 
‘Variation and Reproduction of the Double Tradition and an Oral Q?’, ETL 83 (2007), pp. 53-80; 
idem, ‘Memory, Performance, and the Sayings of Jesus’, pp. 97-132 (104, 112-17); Eve, Behind, pp. 
108-15; Bird, Gospel, pp. 97-99; Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 48-49, 64-66, passim.
738  Bockmuehl, ‘Whose Memory?’, pp. 31-44 (38-39).
739  See e.g. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 173 n. 1: ‘Expressed in very general terms, “tradition” denotes 
both content and mode of transmission: the content is typically beliefs and customs which are 
regarded as stemming from the past and which have become authoritative; the mode is informal, 
typically word of mouth. At one end of its spectrum of usage “tradition” has to be distinguished 
from individual memory, though it could be described as corporate memory giving identity to the 
group which thus remembers.’ Also, Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 178 n. 32, references Assmann, 
Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, and Schröter, Erinnerung; Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 186 talks about 
‘[early Christian] teachers reinforcing their church’s corporate memory of Jesus tradition’; and 
Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 241, mentions ‘the tradition as shared memory’. All italics are mine. 
Despite the few mentions, references to memory are scarce.
740  Dunn, ‘On History, Memory and Eyewitnesses’, pp. 473-87 (481-82); idem, ‘Social Memory and 
the Oral Jesus Tradition’, pp. 179-94.
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memory, and sufficient treatment of important con cepts like reconstruction and 
distortion, easily conveys the impression that Dunn treats memory as a rather 
simple ‘guarantor of continuity’ from the time of Jesus to the Gospel au thors.741 
 Dunn’s initial inattention to memory studies has broader implications for his 
position, which leads to another major criticism. Dunn’s notion that the variations 
between the Synoptic Jesus traditions cannot be explained through the idea of 
direct literary copying (or as literary redactions), as one must account for oral 
retellings, is in need of some revision. First, Dunn himself accepts that Matthew 
and Luke could have freely edited and reworked the traditions found in Mark; if 
the two authors knew Mark from memory, they would have had no need to attend 
Mark’s text closely.742 Secondly, the examples of the Synoptic parallels that Dunn 
gives in support of his theory do not deviate from how ancient authors would 
have used literary sources; thus, to refer to ‘oral retellings’ in such cases may not 
be necessary.743
 Unlike indicated by Dunn (and subsequently his student Terence Mournet), it 
cannot simply be assumed that Matthew and Luke, or any given author, would 
adopt and follow a consistent way of verbatim repetition or paraphrase; this 
undermines, for example, the notion that Matthew and Luke are relying on ‘oral 
tradition’ when the degree of verbatim agreement is low in their reproductions 
of the Q material.744 John S. Kloppenborg points to April D. DeConick’s study on 
human memory and Jesus’ sayings, which not only suggests caution against too 
optimistic claims about the infallibility of memory but also indicates that even 
when a person has visual contact with a given source material, he or she easily 
departs from the exact wording of the sources.745
 It is no wonder that Bockmuehl, who is in many ways sympathetic towards 
Dunn’s approach, indicates that Dunn’s emphasis on orality (as derived from 
741  Eve, Behind, p. 114. Allison, Constructing, pp. 1-30, who derives conclusions similar to Dunn’s 
approach about ‘a synthesis of impact made by Jesus on several occasions’, is much more nuanced 
in his treatment of memory and its fallibility.
742  Eve, Behind, p. 111.
743  Kloppenborg, ‘Variation and Reproduction of the Double Tradition and an Oral Q?’, pp. 53-80; 
Eve, Behind, p. 111.
744  Kloppenborg, ‘Memory, Performance, and the Sayings of Jesus’, pp. 97-132 (104); cf. Dunn, ‘Q¹ as 
Oral Tradition’, pp. 45-69; idem, The Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 80-108; Mournet, Oral Tradition 
and Literary Dependency.
745  Kloppenborg, ‘Memory, Performance, and the Sayings of Jesus’, pp. 97-132 (102-4); DeConick, 
‘Human Memory and the Sayings of Jesus’, in Thatcher (ed.), Jesus, the Voice and the Text, pp. 
135-79.
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the notion of ‘oral retellings’) makes the work of traditional Synoptic critics, 
concerned with sources and redaction, difficult if not impossible.746 While Dunn 
may not, of course, be concerned about this, as he argues for a paradigm shift from 
an illusion of literary precision and quest for ‘authentic’ material, his view makes 
one wonder how exactly is any certainty to be had about, say, the hypothetical Q 
source and the whole two-source theory, which Dunn seems to accept as given. 
One may legitimately ask whether Dunn’s method is negligent of and does cohere 
with the literary remains – the actual memory – that is available to all.747 One 
may explain any variation between the Jesus traditions through oral retellings, but 
such explanations easily appear arbitrary.
 Dunn’s explanation of variation is further challenged by a notion of stability 
in oral tradition. According to David C. Rubin’s multiple-constraint theory of 
stability, some forms of oral tradition can be treated with more flexibility than 
some written sources. This means that the degree of verbatim agreement between 
the Synoptic Jesus traditions may not indicate whether the relationship between 
the variants is textual or oral.748
 As a result of the lack of theoretical nuance, Dunn seems to have placed too 
much emphasis on the stability of the Jesus tradition during the early years of the 
Jesus movement. Eve states that even if ‘the tradition was relatively stable’ when 
the Synoptic Gospels were written (according to Eve, 70–100 CE), it is neither sure 
that the tradition remained equally stable during the 40 years before the writing 
of Mark’s Gospel, nor is it guaranteed that there was only one ‘stable’ version of 
the Jesus traditions. Dunn’s notion of stability and variation, based on Bailey’s 
idea of ‘stable core or key in a story’, does not take into account the fact that the 
changing circumstances and needs of the community may result in a reshaping of 
the tradition quite quickly, even if the tradition later becomes stable.749
746  Bockmuehl, ‘Whose Memory?’, pp. 31-44 (41-42).
747  See Kari Syreeni, ‘Eyewitness Testimony, First-Person Narration and Authorial Presence as 
Means of Legitimation in Early Gospel Literature’, in S. Byrskog, R. Hakola, and J. Jokiranta 
(eds), Social Memory and Social Identity in the Study of Early Judaism and Early Christianity, 
pp. 89-110 (89): ‘…our principal evidence from the early Jesus tradition is written texts. Any 
hypothesis concerning pre-Gospel developments, no matter on how advanced sociological, 
cognitive or other models they are based, must cohere with the literary remains – the memory 
that we actually have.’
748  Eve, Behind, pp. 100-1, 111; D. C. Rubin, Memory in Oral Traditions: The Cognitive Psychology of 
Epic, Ballads, and Counting-out Rhymes (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
749  Eve, Behind, p. 111-12. While criticizing Dunn for his neglect of the ‘oral history’ approach, 
Witherington, ‘Oral Mystery’, pp. 197-226 (206-7), further criticizes Dunn’s use of Bailey: how is 
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 Dunn’s notions of stability of the tradition have a close relationship with his 
understanding of the early Christian controllers of the tradition. Especially those 
who emphasize ‘oral history’ and the role of eyewitnesses have deemed Dunn’s 
picture of the early Christian movement problematic; his notion of the ‘apostolic 
custodians’ and references to Peter, James, and John as these ‘principal witnesses’, 
is not considered to be enough, or in fact in accordance with Dunn’s idea of 
anonymous communal traditioning process.750 Dunn’s attempt to adhere to both 
an idea of anonymous community and a notion of individual controllers of the 
tradition creates a tension that may not be easily reconciled with his notion of 
‘living tradition’.751
 In light of the criticisms of his view, Dunn does not seem to present sufficient 
argumentation for his confidence in the continuity of the Jesus traditions. It is 
noteworthy, however, that he seems to constantly argue against what he considers 
faulty assumptions and misconceptions of oral tradition in more skeptical earlier 
scholarship. Regarding the Synoptic Jesus traditions’ relationship to historical fact, 
Dunn’s rhetoric hardly leads to naïve conclusions; his treatment of Jesus’ trial and 
death are examples of this.752 Read along with his explicit criticism of classic form 
criticism’s tendency to emphasize the creativity of early Christian communities in 
Jesus Remembered, Dunn’s later comments, made after engaging social memory 
theory, indicate that he envisages his own view as a corrective of more skeptical 
positions; in his criticism, Dunn sees an overemphasis on ‘creative, rather than 
it that Dunn, who does not believe that clear guidelines for oral traditioning in the ancient world 
can be drawn (Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 210), nevertheless refers to Bailey’s ‘anachronistic’ 
and ‘anecdotal’ model as reliable? Cf. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 209-10. On Dunn’s use of 
Bailey, also see Kloppenborg, ‘Memory, Performance, and the Sayings of Jesus’, pp. 97-132 (112-
17).
750  Bockmuehl, ‘Whose Memory?’, pp. 31-44 (40-41); Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 257-63 (262-63); 
Byrskog, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition’, pp. 459-71; also Gerhardsson, ‘Secret’, pp. 
1-18 (17), is very critical of Dunn’s viewpoint, concluding, for example, that it is neither ‘easy 
to find evidence for the thesis that celebrations and other performances following Bailey’s rural 
model were in fact customary in the Jewish and Hellenistic world to which Jesus and his early 
adherents belonged’, nor ‘to produce any evidence showing that Jesus or his disciples and other 
leading adherents were tellers of the orality type’. Cf. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 180-81.
751  Also, see the perspective of Schröter, ‘Remarks on James D. G. Dunn’s Approach to Jesus Research’, 
pp. 129-43 (137-141), who argues that Dunn posits a naïve view of early Christian uniformity. 
According to Schröter, Dunn is not clear about how the Jesus tradition was transmitted during 
the early decades and how it is possible to refer to a uniform ‘faith’ of early Christians or the 
‘impact’ of Jesus on early Christians, given the traces of diversity and conflict about Jesus within 
the Jesus traditions themselves.
752  Cf. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 774-81; Eve, Behind, pp. 114-15.
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retentive function of memory’ and ‘interpretative reinforcement’ (or distortion) 
in social memory studies as somewhat reminiscent of classic form criticism.753
 Dunn’s reassertion, through his notion of the impact of Jesus, of Kähler’s idea 
that there is no ‘historical Jesus’ apart from the Christ of faith is also subject 
to criticism.754 Syreeni argues that Dunn’s hermeneutic ‘excludes in principle 
the possibility of reconstructing any “historical” Jesus other than one seen 
through faith’.755 Dunn’s position, if taken as an attempt to tie history and faith 
together in general, is thus at risk of fideism. Does Dunn mean to indicate that 
all interpretations of the Jesus traditions are equal when it comes to knowing 
anything about the historical figure of Jesus? Surely, this would raise the question 
as to whether anything can be known of him in the first place. Or does he simply 
mean to argue that the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith are merged at the 
level of the Jesus tradition? While the notion of Dunn and others is quite plausible, 
that the historical actuality of Jesus is beyond one’s reach – all we have is the 
historical data to be interpreted – and that the faith of Jesus’ first followers needs to 
be accounted for, the usefulness of Kähler’s notion for contemporary scholarship 
needs to be questioned.756 Historical research is always in need of some commonly 
shared historical criteria if it is to remain meaningful for scholars with different 
perspectives and faith persuasions; while Dunn would hardly disagree, it may not 
be helpful to reassert a statement that can easily lead to the charge of fideism.
 No matter how one views Dunn’s overall argument that the Synoptic Jesus 
traditions preserve the original memory of Jesus, his work moved the discussion 
further toward a different paradigm which is not concerned about the historical 
authenticity of individual sayings or deeds of Jesus. Consequently, it has been 
suggested that in light of memory studies it is plausible to take Dunn’s idea that 
whatever is characteristic (or relatively distinctive) of the Synoptic Jesus traditions 
originates from the impact Jesus made on his first followers as a starting point.757 
Despite its shortcomings and neglect of subtle discussion on the functions of 
753  Dunn, ‘Social Memory and the Oral Jesus Tradition’, pp. 179-94 (180); idem, The Oral Gospel 
Tradition, pp. 246; cf. Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 64. Bird, Gospel, p. 97, also points out 
that Dunn argues against any notion of the objective writing of history and against historical 
skepticism.
754  Cf. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 126-27 (126 n. 99).
755  Syreeni, ‘The Identity’, p. 1-16 (12).
756  Admittedly, Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 126-27 (126 n. 99), asserts that this is the only point 
he adopts from Kähler.
757  So Eve, Behind, p. 114; cf. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 327-36; Allison, Constructing, pp. 10-26.
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memory, Dunn’s view is important for understanding the larger discussion on 
social memory and the Jesus traditions.
3.3 Richard A. Horsley
Richard A. Horsley (b.1939) is one of the first scholars to comprehensively apply 
social memory theory to the Jesus traditions. He has written extensively on the 
subjects of oral tra dition and performance, social memory, and the socio-political 
circumstances of first-century Palestine.758 Combining John Miles Foley’s work on 
oral performance with social memory theory, Horsley studies the Jesus traditions 
particularly in the Gospel of Mark and the hypothetical written source Q.759 While 
starting with standard source-critical presupposition, Horsley’s work is intended 
to challenge what he frequently calls ‘the assumptions of print-culture’.760 
758  R. A. Horsley, ‘Innovation in Search of Reorientation: New Testament Studies Rediscovering Its 
Subject Matter’, JAAR 62/4 (1994), pp. 1127-66; Horsley & Draper, Whoever Hears; R. A. Horsley, 
Hearing the Whole Story: The Politics of Plot in Mark’s Gospel (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2001); idem, ‘Oral Tradition in New Testament Studies’, Oral Tradition 18/1 (2003), 
pp. 34-36; R. A. Horsley, J. A. Draper, and J. M. Foley (eds.) Performing the Gospel: Orality, Memory, 
and Mark. Essays Dedicated to Werner Kelber (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006); R. A. Horsley, Jesus 
in Context: Power, People, & Performance (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008), from which Chapter 6 
(pp. 126-45) was previously published as Horsley, ‘Prominent Patterns in the Social Memory of 
Jesus and Friends’, in Kirk and Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, and Text, pp. 57-78; idem, 
Text and Tradition, from which Chapter 1 (pp. 1-30) was originally published as Horsley, ‘Oral 
Communication, Oral Performance, and New Testament Interpretation’, in A. B. McGowan and 
K. H. Richards (eds.), Method and Meaning: Essays on New Testament Interpretation in Honor of 
Harold W. Attridge (Resources for Biblical Study 67; Atlanta: SBL, 2011), pp. 125-56; Chapter 9 
(pp. 198-219) as Horsley, ‘The Languages of the Kingdom: From Aramaic to Greek, Galilee to 
Syria’, in Z. Rodgers et al. (eds.), A Wandering Galilean: Essays in Honour of Sean Freyne (JSJSup 
132; Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 401-25; Chapter 10 (pp. 220-45) as Horsley, ‘Oral Performance and 
Mark: Some Implications of The Oral and Written Gospel, Twenty-Five Years Later’, in T. Thatcher 
(ed.), Jesus, the Voice, and the Text: Beyond “The Oral and Written Gospel” (Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2008), pp. 45-70; and Chapter 12 (pp. 279-301) as Horsley, ‘Oral and Written 
Aspects of the Emergence of the Gospel of Mark as Scripture’, Oral Tradition 25 (2010), pp. 93-
114; also, for Horsley’s overall view of the historical Jesus, see e.g. Horsley, Jesus and Empire: 
The Kingdom of God and the New World Disorder (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003); idem, ‘Jesus 
and Empire’, in R. A. Horsley (ed.), In the Shadow of Empire: Reclaiming the Bible as a History of 
Faithful Resistance (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2008), pp. 75-96; idem, ‘Jesus and 
the Politics of Palestine under Roman Rule’, in Charlesworth (ed.), Jesus Research, pp. 335-60. 
For helpful recent accounts of Horsley’s contribution to the discussion on the transmission of 
the Jesus traditions, see Eve, Behind, pp. 115-23, and more briefly Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 
50-51.
759  On Q, initially esp. Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears; on Mark, esp. Horsley, Hearing the 
Whole Story. Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 50, points out that, instead of the questions of the 
composition of texts, Horsley is more focused on their function ‘in their specific sociocultural 
environments’.
760  E.g. Horsley, Text and Tradition, p. 208, and pp. 221-24, where he recognizes the importance of 
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 Reminiscent of Werner Kelber’s view, Horsley maintains that the Jesus 
traditions had their beginnings in an oral culture where the upper classes of 
society were literate, including some servants and educated slaves, the peasantry 
being non-literate, including Jesus and the early Galilean Jesus movement.761 In 
this culture, most communication was oral, even within the literate elite circles; 
among peasants written texts were often viewed with suspicion (for instance, as 
instruments of domination). Generally, written texts’ function was to aid memory; 
they were performed orally.762 Horsley argues, based on the work of William V. 
Harris and Catherine Hezser, for a low level of literacy not only in ancient Greece 
and Rome (5 to 10 percent), but also in Roman Palestine (only around 3 percent), 
the birthplace of the earliest Jesus movement and the Jesus traditions.763 
 Horsley recognizes that knowledge of Israel’s sacred traditions was quite 
widespread among the Jews. This was not, however, due to them possessing sacred 
scrolls, namely, the written artifacts of which the Hebrew Bible would later be 
comprised. The scrolls would have been so expensive, complex and difficult to 
handle that even the Israelite elite would recite and cultivate sacred traditions 
mainly orally. Horsley argues that not only did many Judean and Galilean village 
assemblies (synagogues) in second-temple times not own Torah scrolls,764 but 
there was also ‘a general lack of scribes in towns and villages’765. Horsley finds no 
unambiguous evidence for the presence of the Pharisees in Galilee (or Galilean 
synagogues) before or during the time of Jesus.766 Since writing was not common 
in everyday life, most people would become familiar with the contents of Israel’s 
traditions through hearing them recited orally.767
Kelber, Oral and Written, for challenging ‘the dominant orientation toward print culture in the 
field of biblical studies’ by utilizing methods that study the relation between orality and writing, 
oral tradition, and oral performance.
761  It is central to Horsley that Jesus was outside the Jewish scribal elite. Cf. e.g. Gerhardsson’s view.
762  See e.g. Horsley, Jesus in Context, pp. 89-95; idem, Text and Tradition, pp. 208-9, 210-12.
763  Horlsey, Jesus in Context, p. 5; cf. Harris, Ancient Literacy; Heszer, Jewish Literacy. Especially in 
his later work, Horsley refers to Hezser, Jewish Literacy. See Horsley, Text and Tradition, pp. 208: 
‘the extensive recent survey by Catherine Hezser documents beyond the possibility of continuing 
denial that in late second-temple and early rabbinic times literacy was limited mainly to scribal 
circles, and limited in use to documents used by the wealthy and powerful’. 
764  Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 136-37; cited also in Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 50.
765  Horsley, Text and Tradition, p. 214, refers to Hezser, Jewish Literacy, pp. 118-26, who argues that 
scribes were rare in rural areas until the third century. On the ‘village scribes’ with ‘little or no 
education’, also Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, p. 126. 
766  Horsley, Text and Tradition, pp. 163-64, 210; for similar points and the historical context of Mark, 
pp. 257-64 (260).
767  Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 125-44; Horsley, Hearing the Whole Story, pp. 53-61; 
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 According to Horsley, it was customary to cite tradition from memory in an oral 
culture. Israelite social memory is displayed in the Gospel allusions and quotations 
of ‘Scripture’. To illustrate that writing had a symbolic meaning in Israelite oral 
culture, he considers it likely that, instead of being indications of direct scribal 
copying, ‘the references to “it is written” or “Scripture” in Judean texts and early 
“Christian” texts [esp. Mk and Q] are to the authority and not to the wording of 
such a written text’.768 Arguing against ‘print-culture’ misconcep tions of memory 
(such as ‘the textual model of memory’, ‘the copy-and-save concept of memory’, 
and ‘memory as individual’) and the use of the criteria of authenticity,769 Horsley 
applies the sociology of conflict and the anthropology of marginal and oppressed 
cultures to Galilean village life; he borrows the distinction between the ‘great 
tradition’ of the official educated dominant elite and the ‘little tradition’ of the 
oppressed uneducated masses from James C. Scott (b.1936), who has studied the 
social distribution of power specifically in colonialist contexts of Southeast Asia.770 
Horsley suggests that the distinction is applicable in ‘traditional agrarian societies 
[like ancient Galilee] in which urban-based elites rule over and expropriate the 
produce of peasants who live in semi-self-governing village communities’.771 
 Regarding the two strands of tradition, Horsley maintains that, whereas the 
diverse, complex, and not fixed, ‘great tradition’ of the Israeli elite was at least 
in part written tradition, the competing ‘little tradition’ was only cultivated 
orally and existed in the social memory of the illiterate village communities. In 
ancient Palestine, on the one hand, the ‘great tradition’ would have been used 
to support the interests of the dominant elite, for example, the power structures 
idem, Jesus in Context, pp. 57-62, 89-95; idem, Text and Tradition, pp. 101-2, 109, 125-26, 208-9, 
210-12, 214.
768  Horsley, Jesus in Context, p. 93-95 (95). Italics original. Also, Horsley and Draper, Whoever 
Hears, pp. 140-44.
769  See Horsley, Jesus in Context, pp. 132-34; idem, ‘Prominent Patterns’, in Kirk and Thatcher 
(eds.), Memory, Tradition, and Text, pp. 57-78. Horsley takes these flawed models of memory 
as representative of much of form-critical Jesus scholarship, including the Jesus Seminar (e.g. 
Crossan), and counters them for instance with Halbwachs’ notion that memory is social in 
nature; therefore, ‘the memory involved in oral tradition was not a text-like container but a social 
process’ (Horsley, Jesus in Context, p. 132).
770  Horsley frequently refers to the following works: J. C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: 
Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); idem, 
‘Protest and Profanation: Agrarian Revolt and the Little Tradition’, Theory and Society 4 (1977), 
pp. 1-38, idem, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985); idem, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
771  Horsley, Text and Tradition, p. 100.
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of the Temple system; on the other hand, the ‘little tradition’ would express the 
values and concerns of the oppressed peasant community, for instance, through 
the recitation of relevant parts of Israel’s covenant (such as the prophet Elijah’s 
opposition to the oppressive rule of King Ahab). Horsley contends that the ‘great 
tradition’ corresponds with the official social memory and transcripts, while the 
‘little tradition’ reflects the anti-hegemonic social memory and hidden transcripts. 
Nevertheless, the two traditions are parallel in certain ways and in interaction, 
as, for example, illiterate peasants could become familiar with parts of the ‘great 
tradition’ through hearing and recitation.772
 Albeit complex and not unitary due to the social diversity of Jewish groups, 
Horsley asserts that the ‘great tradition’ can be accessed through the Hebrew Bible 
and other written texts from the second-temple period, such as some of the Dead 
Sea Scrolls, and Judean texts like Psalms of Solomon. However, these texts offer 
only a limited access to the ‘little tradition’, as the elite would not have paid much 
attention to it; in addition to these writings, Horsley posits that the Gospels (esp. 
Mk and Q) refer to the ‘little tradition’, and Josephus’ accounts of contemporary 
uprisings in Jewish War and Antiquities of the Jews indicate what kind of cultural 
scripts were influential. By way of deduction, Horsley locates the messianic 
and prophetic cultural scripts (or patterns of expectation and interpretation)773 
among peasants; for example, the stories of Moses’ deliverance of Israel from 
Egyptian slavery and Joshua’s conquest of the land provided ‘a popular prophetic 
script’, while David’s resistance to Philistine oppression functioned as ‘a popular 
messianic script’.774
 Not dissimilarly to Kelber, Horsley uses Foley’s work on oral performance 
772  Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, p. 98-103, 128-32; Horsley, Hearing the Whole Story, pp. 
156-61 (157-59); idem, ‘Prominent Patterns’, in Kirk and Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, 
and Text, pp. 57-78 (60-61); idem, Jesus in Context, pp. 28-30, 146-56, 169-223; idem, Text and 
Tradition, pp. 99-122, 125-26, 135, 145, 147-48, 154-55, 163, 211-12, 217-19, 231-32, 265-73, 
286-87, 288; also, Eve, Behind, p. 116.
773  Horsley understands these cultural scripts in correlation with framing and keying in social 
memory theory. E.g. Horsley, Jesus in Context, pp. 119-23; also, Eve, Behind, p. 117; ch. 3.1 above.
774  Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 95-98, 104-22; Horsley, Hearing the Whole Story, 
pp. 231-53; idem, Jesus in Context, pp. 36-42, 67-71, 119-25, 139-45, 156-61; idem, Text and 
Tradition, pp. 99-122.
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regarding ‘text’ (or message)775, performance arena (or context)776, register777, 
and especially metonymic referencing778 which refers to ‘a mode of signification 
wherein the part stands for the whole’ in an oral performance779. A central 
question to Horsley is how the Israelite ‘little tradition’ is metonymically 
referenced by the Jesus tradition, particularly in Q (for which Horsley suggests 
a prophetic register) and Mark, both of which originated among the Galilean 
village peasantry and portray Jesus as the prophetic leader of a covenant renewal 
movement and a certain type of popular messianic figure. Horsley maintains that 
the prophetic script of the entire tradition (as it relates to resistance to oppressive 
rule in particular) is metonymically referenced in those parts of the Q tradition 
(for him, a sequence of ‘Q speeches’, rather than a series of sayings compiled by 
a literary redactor)780 which present Jesus as ‘accomplishing the prophetically 
articulated longings of Israel’, for example, by performing healings and exorcisms, 
and preaching good news to the poor. Also, the allusions to parts of the covenant, 
for instance, covenantal traditions in Luke 6.20-49, metonymically reference the 
covenantal renewal.781
775  Horsley, Text and Tradition, p. 159: ‘The first step is to figure out what the shape and content 
of the [orally-derived] “text” or message communicated [orally] was…in antiquity texts were 
“inscribed” on the heart (memory) even of the literate (e.g., scribes, Pharisees, rabbis) as much 
or more than on scrolls.’ 
776  Horsley, Text and Tradition, p. 159: ‘in order to understand a message or communication properly 
it is necessary to hear it in the appropriate context. Context determines the expectation and the 
appropriate hearing of the message.’
777  Horsley, Text and Tradition, p. 160, 161: ‘In order not to be “taken out of context” the message/
text must then fit the context, that is, must be in the appropriate register…The appropriate 
register depends on three factors: the subject matter being communicated, who is participating 
in the communication, and the mode of communication…A certain set of language…is often 
“dedicated” to a certain context of communication…A particular register of speech is often 
activated by certain cues, sounds or phrases that set up expectations in the listeners.’
778  Horsley, Text and Tradition, pp. 161-64 (162): ‘The traditional oral performer…thoroughly 
grounded in standard strategies long familiar to his or her collective audience, summons 
conventional connotations of conventional structures evoking a meaning that is inherent…A 
performance of Jesus’ speeches or of the Gospel of Mark, therefore, would have depended much 
more heavily on extra-textual factors as meaning was evoked metonymically from the tradition 
with which the listeners were familiar.’
779  ‘Metonymic reference’ denotes ‘a mode of signification wherein the part stands for the whole’ 
(Foley, Immanent, p. 7), and a text ‘is enriched by an unspoken context that dwarfs the textual 
artifact’ (Foley, Immanent, pp. 40-41). See also Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 205, who sums 
Foley’s point: ‘Oral traditional texts imply an audience with the background to respond faithfully 
to the signals encoded in the text, to bridge the gaps of indeterminacy and thus to “build” the 
implied consistency.’ 
780  See Horsley, ‘Appendix: Q speeches’, in Jesus in Context, pp. 229-45. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 
204-5, embraces this notion of Q espoused by Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears.
781  Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 160-74, pp. 195-227; Horsley, Hearing the Whole Story, 
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 Horsley avoids any religious or theological readings of Q and Mark, especially 
such that would view them as foundational documents for the new religion of 
‘Christianity’ against ‘Judaism’; he believes, viewed in their proper social context, 
they address the socio-economic concerns of Galilean village peasants, who were 
oppressed, for instance, through heavy taxa tion by Roman and Jewish rule and 
threatened by the urbanization of Galilee. In this context, Q and Mark emphasize 
a covenantal renewal through the coming of the ‘kingdom of God’, which Jesus 
was preaching to the Galilean villagers.782 Against this background, Horsley bol-
sters an image of Jesus the prophetic leader, conveyed by the Jesus tradition in 
Mark and Q, whose message was inherently political; referring to Scott’s work 
on the popular politics of resistance, he speaks of ‘Jesus’ bold declaration of the 
hidden transcript in the face of power’, his confrontation with the Temple and 
high priesthood in particular, which resulted in his cru cifixion and led to the 
expansion of the earliest Jesus movement from Galilee. Horsley posits that neither 
would the Jesus traditions have been remembered, nor would Jesus have had 
any significant historical impact without his program of societal renewal being 
cultivated by his earliest followers.783
 Both Q and Mark are viewed as transcripts of performance, or oral-derived 
texts, by Horsley.784 The speeches in Q record in written form the ‘prophetic’ 
speeches delivered orally within the earliest Jesus movement in and around Galilee; 
according to Horsley, the original ly Aramaic speeches were put into writing in 
Greek either through the expansion of the Jesus movement to the Galilean cities 
of Sepphoris or Tiberias, where Greek was a more prevalent language, or through 
pp. 177-210; idem, Jesus in Context, pp. 65-71, 156-61; idem, Text and Tradition, pp. 78-79, 123-
155 (137-41), 156, 157-64, 249-51; also Eve, Behind, pp. 117-18.
782  Horsley contends Galileans to be descendants of the northern kingdom of Israel, brought 
back under Jerusalem rule and ‘the laws of the Judeans’ as a result of the ‘re-socialization’ by 
the Hasmonean high priestly regime during the first century BCE. See e.g. Horsley, Text and 
Tradition, pp. 126-27, 163, 209-10.
783  Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 46-60; Horsley, Hearing the Whole Story, pp. 27-52, 99-
148; idem, Jesus in Context, pp. 1-3, 20-28, 45-47, 54-55, 190-222; idem, Text and Tradition, pp. 
126-27, 163, 209-10.
784  Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 6, 166-68. Foley, Singer, p. 63, has warned about direct 
equation of ‘oral derived’ texts with ‘transcripts of oral performance’. Horsley, Hearing the 
Whole Story, pp. 61-62, is more careful. J. M. Foley, ‘The Riddle of Q: Oral Ancestor, Textual 
Precedent, or Ideological Creation?’, in R. A. Horsley (ed.), Oral Performance, Popular Tradition, 
and Hidden Transcript in Q (Atlanta: SBL, 2006), pp. 123-40 (138), repeats the warning against 
‘committing to the gospels as transcribed oral performances [which] we cannot responsibly do’. 
Cited in Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 111 n. 74.
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the movement’s expansion into villages and towns of the surrounding countries 
(e.g. in Tyre, Sidon, Caesarea Philippi), where Greek was spoken more.785
 Horsley and Draper analyze parts of Q with the help of Dell Hymes’ and 
Richard Bauman’s notions on ethnopoetics, as well as with Foley’s views on oral-
derived texts.786 According to Horsley and Draper, the oral Jesus tradition can be 
partly accessed through Q; for instance, Draper’s analysis of Q 12.49-59787 and 
Horsley’s analyses of Q 6.20-49 and Q 12.2-12788 illustrate this.789 With regard 
to the contexts of oral Jesus traditions preserved in Q, Horsley indicates that the 
individual Q speeches, which were delivered on various occasions, can be placed 
in specific contexts (or performance arenas), for example, covenant renewal 
(Q 6.20-49), mission and sending of envoys (Q 10.2-16), the arrest and trial of 
community members (Q 12.2-12), and prophesying against rulers (Q 13.28-29, 
34-35). The context of oral performance for the whole Q would have been ‘the 
periodic community and movement meetings’.790
 Aligning himself with a recent emphasis on performance in the scholarship of 
the Gospel of Mark, Horsley attempts to strengthen the case made by, for instance, 
Antoinette Wire that Mark’s Gospel was composed in oral performance.791 
785  Horsley, Jesus in Context, pp. 68-69; idem, Text and Tradition, pp. 213-15, as well as pp. 215-19, 
where Horsley attempts to present evidence for ‘Aramaic features Discernible in the Greek text 
of Q 7:18-35’.
786  Foley, Singer, pp. 60-98. Horsley refers to D. Hymes, “In Vain I Tried to Tell You”: Essays in 
Native American Ethnopoetics (Studies in Native American Literature 1; Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1981); idem, ‘Ways of Speaking’, in R. Bauman and J. Sherzer (eds.), 
Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking (Studies in the Social and Cultural Foundations 
of Language 8; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1989), pp. 433-74; Richard 
Bauman, Verbal Art as Performance (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland, 1977). See e.g. Horsley, 
Jesus in Context, pp. 72-73; idem, Text and Tradition, p. 167.
787  Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 175-94. For instance, alliteration, assonance, rhyme, 
tonal repetition, parallelism, rhythm and metonymic referentiality are viewed as markers of oral 
performance.
788  Horsley, Jesus in Context, pp. 71-88; idem, Text and Tradition, pp. 156-74.
789  On the discernment of patterns of oral performance in the ‘Q speeches’, i.e. the arranging in lines 
and stanzas (as largely derived from Dell Hymes), see Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, chs 
7–8; Horsley, Jesus in Context, pp. 229-45.
790  Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, p. 169; Eve, Behind, p. 119. On Q 12.2-12, also see Horsley, 
Text and Tradition, pp. 169-70.
791  Horsley, Text and Tradition, pp. 246-78; cf. Antoinette Clark Wire, The Case for Mark Composed 
in Performance (BPCS 3; Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011). A similar conclusion was presented 
by Whitney Shiner, ‘Memory Technology and the Composition of Mark’, in Horsley, Draper and 
Foley (eds.), Performing the Gospel: Orality, Memory, and Mark, pp. 147-65. Eve, Behind, p. 120, is 
not aware of Horsley’s later work in Text and Tradition, as he states that ‘Horsley himself does not 
actually claim this [that Mark was composed in oral performance] (so far as I know)…’
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Already in his earlier work, Horsley had held that Mark was performed orally 
from memory by members of early Jesus movements who knew the whole of the 
Jesus tradition.792 In his 2013 text, he goes a step further to argue for the oral-
composition and development of Mark on the basis of three basic steps, which can 
be viewed as a logical result from his earlier work. First, Horsley asserts that what 
he considers the ‘main plot’ of the Gospel, namely, the dominant conflict between 
Jesus and the ruling elite, indicates the oral development of the Gospel within 
the early Jesus movement, despite the complexity of the full Gospel. Secondly, he 
posits that the story of Jesus’ mission (including the characters, settings, sequence 
of events) depicted in Mark fits ‘the history of Galilean and Judean people under 
Roman rule’. Thirdly, Horsley points to how Mark’s story of Jesus mission of 
covenantal renewal was rooted in Israelite cultural tradition, particularly Israelite 
popular tradition ‘as carried in the people’s social memory’, which was sometimes 
in opposition to ‘the official Judean tradition’ (cf. the notion of metonymic 
referencing). Mark’s Gospel would have resulted from oral performances by 
multiple performer-composers in the Markan Jesus movement, which itself was a 
result of the interaction between Jesus and his followers and opponents.793 By his 
account of Mark’s oral composition, Horsley attempts to underline the ongoing 
nature of the oral Jesus tradition; neither Q nor Mark are the end result of oral 
tradition.
Critique & Evaluation
Horsley’s view has attracted both critical and appreciative reactions from other 
scholars.794 To begin with the critical points, Horsley has been taken to task for 
downplaying the presence of written texts in rural contexts of first-century Judea 
and Galilee. Rodríguez remarks that, de spite Horsley’s acknowledgement that 
biblical scrolls were available to some Jewish assem blies, he ‘ought to take greater 
account of the potential for the social function and cultural currency not just of 
792  Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 157-60; Horsley, Hearing the Whole Story, pp. 61-62; 
idem, Jesus in Context, pp. 96-102; cf. Eve, Behind, p. 120.
793  Horsley, Text and Tradition, pp. 246-78 (249-50, 256-73)
794  See e.g. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 56-57, 204-5, passim; idem, The Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 
41-79 (59 n. 65); J. Dewey, ‘The Survival of Mark’s Gospel: A Good Story?’, JBL 123/3 (2004), pp. 
495-507 (498); Mournet, ‘The Jesus Tradition as Oral Tradition’, in Kelber and Byrskog (eds.), 
Jesus in Memory, pp. 39-61 (51 n. 45, 49, 58 n. 81); Allison, Constructing, passim; Rodríguez, 
Structuring, pp. 21-23, 33-34 n. 85, 54 n. 28, 111, 129, 188 n. 48; idem, Oral Tradition, pp. 50-51; 
Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 62, 65, 72-73, 74, 79, 189; idem, Scribal, p. 138; idem, ‘Early Christian 
Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (34 n. 56); Eve, Behind, pp. 120-23.
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written tradition but of actual written texts “to render the actual presence of a text 
superfluous”’.795 Horsley’s notion of the symbolic meaning of writing within the 
Is raelite oral culture seems not to do full justice to the picture that emerges from 
the Jesus tra ditions, where on occasion the presence, reading, and study of texts 
is presupposed.796 For ex ample, in John 7.15 on Jesus teaching in the Temple, ‘the 
Jews’ are depicted as amazed at the fact that Jesus ‘knows letters’, indicating that he 
was thought to have read and studied the biblical texts.797
 This criticism has to do with Horsley’s view of the early texts of the Jesus 
movement, particularly Mark and Q, raising the question whether he minimizes 
the difference between written and oral texts too much. While Horsley’s notion 
of the symbolic meaning carried by written documents, especially biblical scrolls, 
is plausible enough, given the oral nature of the culture and low-literacy rates,798 
he follows Kelber in underestimating the influence of texts and textuality within 
early Christianity. Early Christian manuscripts of the Gospels, unlike the scrolls 
of the sacred Scriptures with great symbolic significance, were circulated in the 
convenient form of codices; this suggests a more significant role for the use of 
actual written texts within the early communities than Horsley allows.799 The 
manuscripts were important for maintaining and articulating the early Christian 
group identity, which questions Horsley’s notion of treating Mark and Q as mere 
transcripts of oral performance.800
 Regarding the ‘oral composition’ of the Gospel of Mark, Horsley’s conclusions 
are far-fetched.801 It is one thing to recognize the continuity between Mark’s 
795  Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, p. 50-51 (51). Rodríguez’s quotation is from Brian Stock, The 
Implication of Literacy, p. 7. Italics original.
796  Cf. Horsley, Jesus in Context, p. 93-95 (95); also, Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 140-44.
797  So, despite evidence pointing toward Jesus’ lack of formal education. See Rodríguez, Oral 
Tradition, p. 51, referring to C. Keith, ‘The Claim of John 7.15 and the Memory of Jesus’ Literacy’, 
NTS 56/1 (2010), pp. 44-63.
798  Here Horsley is on firm ground. See e.g. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 71-123; idem, ‘Early Christian 
Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (35-36); Hezser, Jewish Literacy; also, Eve, Behind, pp. 10-11.
799  Eve, Behind, p. 120: ‘Given that Horsley minimizes the difference between oral and written texts 
to the extent he does, it becomes hard to see why anyone would have bothered to write down 
Mark or Q in the first place…’ See also Hurtado, ‘Oral Fixation’, pp. 321-40.
800  Keith, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (34-35, 37); cf. ch. 2.3.3 above.
801  See e.g. Myllykoski, ‘Mark’s Oral Practice’, pp. 97-113 (102-7, 106, 107), who, while sympathetic 
to many aspects of Horsley’s ideological reading of Mark, argues that ‘[t]he plot of Mark reveals 
tensions and discrepancies, which speak for the presence of different traditions that originally 
made sense in different contexts. These signs of discontinuity in the gospel hint at the literary 
character of its making, since there is no seamless orality behind the text.’ Albeit presupposing 
‘a strong output of orality’, the production of Mark’s main plot was probably a literary process. 
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textuality and oral narrative, namely, the profound influence of orality on the 
Gospel of Mark,802 and another thing to argue for the oral composition of the 
entire text within an anonymous community of multiple performer-composers, as 
Horsley does.803 That the narrative of the Gospel of Mark exhibits an ‘oral register’ 
and was composed with an audience of oral performance in mind does not mean 
that the text itself originated in ‘performance’.804
 Horsley’s view of Q raises further critical questions. His explanation for the 
inclusion of what he argues was an Aramaic oral tradition, which employed 
Israel’s popular or ‘little tradition’ in the Greek text of Q, is found wanting. It is far 
from clear why the ‘Q speeches’ would have been performed in settings, such as 
Sepphoris or Tiberias, which differed greatly from rural Galilee, or how well the 
‘metonymic referencing’, upon which Horsley places significant emphasis, would 
have functioned in non-Israelite regions unfamiliar with ‘the Israelite popular 
tradition’. Horsley produces no sufficient evidence for the suggestion that the 
Greek-speaking non-Israelite regions in question did adopt Israelite traditions.805 
To be sure, arguing for a non-fixed composition of Q, namely, that the Q speeches’ 
development in oral performance happened first ‘in Aramaic in Galilee before 
continuing in Greek in Syrian villages’, Horsley does point to Aramaic features 
in the Greek text of Q/Luke 7.18-35 (such as words and phrases with Aramaic 
background and ‘local color’), but this is hardly enough to confirm the accuracy 
of his specific reconstruction.806
 Horsley’s view of Q is further weakened by the vagueness of the settings 
or contexts that he proposes for the different ‘speeches’. It may be possible to 
place, for example, Q 6.20-49 in the performance arena of ‘a covenantal renewal 
ceremony’ and Q 10.2-16 in a context of ‘the commissioning of missionaries’. 
802  See Dewey, ‘Oral Methods’, pp. 32-44; Hurtado, ‘Greco-Roman Textuality’, pp. 91-106 (98-99); 
idem, ‘Oral Fixation’, pp. 321-40; cf. ch. 2.3.3 above.
803  Cf. Horsley, Text and Tradition, pp. 246-78. Hurtado, ‘Oral Fixation’, pp. 321-40 (322 n. 2) points 
out that, in addition to Wire, The Case for Mark Composed in Performance, this view has been 
embraced e.g. by J. Dewey, ‘The Survival of Mark’s Gospel’, pp. 495-507 (500); P. J. J. Botha, 
‘Mark’s Story as Oral Traditional Literature: Rethinking the Transmission of Some Traditions 
about Jesus’, HvTSt 47 (1991), pp. 304-31, republished in Botha, Orality and Literacy in Early 
Christianity, pp. 163-90 (166).
804  Hurtado, ‘Oral Fixation’, pp. 321-40 (335). Also, Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 111, who notes ‘that our 
gospels are not transcriptions of actual performances, written records of an oral presentation…
neither were the gospels intended to function as scripts to facilitate subsequent performances.’ 
Rodríguez’s specific viewpoint is discussed below in ch. 3.4.
805  Eve, Behind, pp. 120-21; cf. Horsley, Jesus in Context, pp. 68-69.
806  Cf. Horsley, Text and Tradition, pp. 215-19 (215).
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However, Horsley’s other suggestions seem to simply describe the contents of the 
speeches, not shedding much light on their possible contexts of performance. The 
notion of ‘periodic community or movement meetings’ as the social context of the 
oral performance of all the speeches one after another is also very vague; it is not 
supported by any evidence.807
 Furthermore, it may well be that in his confidence in the hypothetical written 
Q document, Horsley (and Draper) undermines his very own paradigm which 
builds so much on orality. Eve is helpful here:
One may also question the propriety of reconstructing an oral 
performance from a hy pothetical reconstructed text such as Q, 
particularly where a putative tradition of Ara maic-language oral 
performance in Galilean villages is being proposed on the basis of 
linguistic features (such as ‘alliteration, assonance, rhyme, tonal 
repetition, parallelism and rhythm’) of a reconstructed Greek text.808
Unlike Dunn, who at least attempts to recognize the consequences of ‘an oral 
paradigm’ for the nature of Q, Horsley’s use of a hypothetical Q may undermine 
his own interest in questioning assumptions of print-culture. It needs to be asked 
whether it is logically possible, given an orality mindset which argues for primarily 
oral use of texts in the first-century context, to simply hold on to Q as a written 
source and to the standard Two-Source-Hypothesis.809
 Horsley’s reconstruction of social context surely has its merits, but his view 
of Mark and Q as fundamentally ‘non-theological’ texts has been viewed as 
problematic. While Horsley legitimately pays attention to the presence of the 
socio-political and economic circumstances of the first-century context, Eve 
challenges him for reducing the religious element almost completely to politics 
and economics.810 As an example of such reductionism, Rodríguez also points to 
Horsley and Draper’s interpretation of Q, which assumes that Q addresses concrete 
807  Eve, Behind, p. 121.
808  Eve, Behind, p. 121.
809  Eve, Behind, pp. 121-22; Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 21-23, 33-34 (21): ‘Horsley and Draper, too, 
feel no obligation to even discuss the Two-Source-Hypothesis and, instead, immediately proceed 
to critique standard approaches to Q (both as a document and as a collection of traditions).’ Cf. 
Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 147-49; idem, ‘Q¹ as Oral Tradition’, in The Oral Gospel Tradition, 
pp. 80-108.
810  Eve, Behind, p. 122.
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socio-economic life, as opposed to Matthew’s ‘more spiritual and metaphorical 
perspective’; this view is more asserted than based on argumentation.811 The 
different perspectives to the traditions may not be mutually exclusive.
 Moreover, Horsley’s account of ‘a Galilean renewal movement’ fails to offer any 
plausible explanation for the transition from the earliest rural Jesus movement(s) 
to the subsequent early Christianity of Paul and later periods.812 Horsley seems 
to alienate Jesus the Jewish prophet of covenantal renewal movement, as 
portrayed in Mark and Q, from other early Christian beliefs to the extent that 
the methodological validity of his approach can be questioned.813 Horsley asserts 
rather than argues persuasively that Mark and Q only had ‘minimal continuity 
with later developments’ through being absorbed and transformed into Matthew 
and Luke’s gospels.814
 An overemphasis on discontinuity may at least in part result from Horsley’s 
notion of ‘great tradition’ and ‘little tradition’, where the Israelite ‘old’ traditions 
are heavily stressed. Dunn has argued that Scott’s distinction, utilized by Horsley, 
which is based on Southeast Asian contexts, is not relevant for a Jewish Galilee 
ruled by a client Jewish king.815 The possible implausibility or anachronism of 
Horsley’s application of Scott’s work has not been addressed by other scholars like 
Eve, and one cannot help but notice a certain irony in the fact that this criticism 
comes from Dunn, who himself bases his own view of the transmission of the 
Jesus traditions on Bailey’s ‘anecdotal model’ which has been fiercely criticized 
for anachronism.816 Nevertheless, Dunn’s criticism is not entirely without basis, 
considering the sharp discontinuity in Horsley’s model. Is Horsley’s use of Scott’s 
model, while certainly consonant with the elite/peasant situation in Roman 
Palestine,817 enough to account for both the persistence of old Israelite tradition 
811  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 33-34 n. 85; cf. Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 195-227 
(216-220). Horsley and Draper take, for example, the ‘blessings and curses’ in Q 6.20-49 as 
references to concern for ‘economic viability’ and judgment ‘against the rich’.
812  As pointed out by Eve, Behind, p. 122, this is admitted by Horsley himself. See Horsley, Jesus in 
Context, pp. 53-54 (53): ‘There is no obvious reason to imagine much continuity between any of 
the early Jesus movements or Christ-believers and what later became established Christianity…’ 
813  In this sense, Horsley’s position does not differ from the approach in Theissen and Winter, The 
Plausible Jesus.
814  Cf. Horsley, Jesus in Context, p. 53.
815  Dunn, The Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 41-79 (59 n. 65).
816  Of course, one may wonder if the charge of anachronism can be avoided by anyone attempting 
to find more recent points of comparison for the first-century situation and transmission of the 
Jesus traditions. Cf. Gerhardsson’s rabbinic model in ch. 2.2.
817  I do not find Horsley’s basic application of Scott’s notions of ‘hidden transcript’ and ‘discourse of 
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and the emergence of new Jesus tradition, even if much of the latter should be 
viewed as reconfiguration of older tradition?818
 Turning to the positive contributions of Horsley’s view, despite the overly 
minimized role Horsley gives to written texts, his reconstruction of the literacy 
situation of first-century Palestine is generally plausible. This allows him to pay 
proper attention to the oral nature of the first-century culture. A paradigm shift 
from a literary mindset which considers the Gospels as literary texts, ‘composed 
at a desk in a scholar’s study lined with texts and open to discourse with other 
intellectuals’,819 in a limited sense, is needed.820 Whether Horsley’s em phasis on the 
rejection of the criteria of authenticity as a way of discussing what parts of the 
Jesus traditions go back to the historical Jesus is reasonable, is discussed in more 
detail in connection with other scholars who make similar points.821
 Horsley’s application of social memory to Israel’s traditions and the Jesus 
traditions is also plausible, as it points to a reality where ‘the broader social 
memory of first-century Jews provided categories for their initial reception/
remembering of Jesus’.822 Horsley’s careful attention to the social, economic, and 
cultural conditions also allows him to emphasize the importance of Israel’s cultural 
traditions, as far as his use of Scott’s work is tenable, as the metonymic referent 
of much of the Jesus traditions; his notions of cultural (‘messianic’, ‘prophetic, 
‘covenantal’) scripts are also useful for the interpretation of the cultural tradi-
tions.823 Horsley’s emphasis on Israelite traditions does not exclude the possibility 
that parts of Jesus traditions (for instance, a miracle story) may metonymically 
dignity’ to the Gospels (esp. Mark and Q) to be implausible. See e.g. Horsley, Jesus in Context, 
pp. 187-90; cf. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 
818  Cf. Dunn, The Oral Gospel Tradition, p. 59 n. 65.
819  As phrased by B. Mack, A Myth of Innocence: Mark and Christian Origins (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1988), pp. 322-323; cited in Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 23 n. 54, and R. A. Horsley, ‘A Prophet Like 
Moses and Elijah: Popular Memory and Cultural Patterns in Mark’, in R. A. Horsley, J. A. Draper, 
and J. M. Foley (eds.), Performing the Gospel: Orality, Memory, and Mark: Essays Dedicated to 
Werner Kelber (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), p. 234 n. 5. 
820  Eve, Behind, p. 122.
821  Cf. the views of Rafael Rodríguez, Chris Keith, Dale Allison and Anthony Le Donne below.
822  Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 62; cf. Horsley, Jesus in Context, pp. 140-44; Kirk, ‘Memory’, in Kelber 
and Byrskog (eds.), Jesus in Memory, pp. 155-72 (168-69); regarding Jesus as ‘Son of David’, see 
Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 65-189.
823  Eve, Behind, pp. 122-23; the primary reservation for applying Foley’s idea of metonymic 
referencing to the relationship between the Israelite traditions and Jesus traditions is the fact that 
Foley’s performance traditions were different in nature. Horsley and Draper, Whoever Hears, pp. 
173-74, recognize this.
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reference the Jesus tra dition as a whole.824
3.4 Rafael Rodríguez
In his 2010 work, Structuring Early Christian Memory: Jesus in Tradition, 
Performance and Text, which is based on his earlier PhD dissertation at the 
University of Sheffield, Rafael Ro dríguez outlines a theoretical framework for 
studying the New Testament and the Jesus tradi tions, especially Jesus’ healings 
and exorcisms in the sayings traditions.825 Rodríguez’s view, like Horsley’s, is 
informed by both social memory theory and research on oral tradition, the ideas 
of John Miles Foley in particular. Rodríguez distances himself from the views 
of Shin er, Horsley and Draper in arguing that the Gospels were not dictated in 
oral performance, and focuses on how ‘[o]ral performances installed the Jesus 
tradition in early Christian collective memory and became vital parts of the 
traditional milieux in which Jesus’ earliest followers lived’.826 Rejecting Kelber’s 
notion of contradiction between written Gospel and oral perfor mance, Rodríguez 
maintains that the oral Jesus tradition was not silenced by writing, but it continued 
in memory.827 He speaks of ‘the installation of Jesus’ in early Christian memory, 
which is close to Dunn’s concept of the impact of Jesus on his earliest followers, 
only more nuanced, and provides a continuity between oral performances and 
the written gospels. Further, Rodríguez refers to Samuel Byrskog’s notion of 
oral history, namely, that the oral transmission of the Jesus traditions was not a 
dispassionate and distanced exercise, but rather one where the actual past and the 
824  Eve, Behind, p. 123. Eve expresses slight skepticism toward ‘how much the apparatus of 
metonymic referencing really adds to what could be said from the perspective of social memory’. 
He speculates that it may help to recognize aspects of the traditions (such as the phrase ‘scribes 
and Pharisees’ or the way miracle stories are narrated) that are metonymically referencing similar 
phrases or narrative patterns of a performance tradition that is now lost. Albeit speculative, 
Eve’s notion that, instead of a direct allusion to 2 Kings 1.8, the description of John the Baptist’s 
clothing in Mark 1.6 may be a metonymic reference to a typical way of describing prophetic attire 
in a performance tradition, is possible.
825  Rodríguez, Structuring; more recently and strongly from the viewpoint of oral tradition, 
Rodríguez, Oral Tradition; see also R. Rodríguez, ‘The Embarrassing Truth About Jesus’, in Keith 
& Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, pp. 132-51; on orality and 
literacy, idem, ‘Reading and Hearing in Ancient Contexts’, JSNT 32.2 (2009), pp. 151-78. Also, 
see the account by Eve, Behind, pp. 123-31.
826  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 3-9 (4); cf. Whitney Shiner, Proclaiming the Gospel: First Century 
Performance of Mark (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003); Horsley and Draper, 
Whoever Hears; Horsley, Text and Tradition.
827  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 4-5; pace Kelber, Oral and Written.
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present experience of the tradents were weaved together, as they spoke of Jesus.828
 Rodríguez builds his view of the Jesus traditions upon the historical hypotheses 
that the traditional milieux of development for the earliest Christian movements 
was oral in nature, with low literacy rates, that the Jesus tradition was robust ‘despite 
the inaccessibility of its written texts to the majority of the people’, and that the 
tradition had the potency ‘to foster and sustain social critique among non-/semi-
literate groups’.829 Deeming Gerhardsson’s historical model of ‘memorization’ too 
rigid, Rodríguez refers to Dunn’s view of oral tradition, based on Bailey’s model of 
‘informal controlled oral tradition’, as a viable starting point for the discussion on 
what kind of oral tradition is preserved in the extant texts.830 He does not attempt 
to study the pre-Gospel oral traditions, or individual oral performances, based 
on linguistic features (such as formulae, repetitions, rhythmic patterns etc.) but is 
interested in how the written Gospels, being embedded in and surrounded by the 
Jesus tradition, as ‘oral-derived texts’, function as instances of the Jesus tradition, 
not as editions or versions of one another.831 Rodríguez views the tendency in 
Gospel scholarship to utilize textual methods such as redaction criticism, despite 
the fact that the oral nature of the first-century culture is widely recognized, as 
problematic.832
 Rodríguez begins his discussion on social memory and the Jesus tradition by 
noting that the criticisms by Gerhardsson and Byrskog against the ‘collective’ 
nature of memory (especially, as a reaction to Dunn’s work), while not entirely 
without warrant, ‘evince an unfamiliarity with sociological discussions of 
memory’; memory is often wrongly considered in individual terms.833 Based 
828  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 5-6; cf. Byrskog, Story as History.
829  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 23-26 (26); cf. Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 2-10 (3, 4, 5): ‘Scholars 
estimate that literacy rates in the ancient world were shockingly low…Inhabitants of Roman Judea 
and Herodian Galilee lived in the shadow of written texts…Even in the shadow of written texts, 
the earliest Christians continued to place a high value on orally expressed tradition…The earliest 
Christians nevertheless exhibited a keen interest in written texts from the very beginning…These 
four points – (1) the low literacy in antiquity, (2) the robust textuality of Hellenistic and Roman 
Judaisms, (3) the preference for direct (oral) authority, and (4) the broad range of early Christian 
text-production – demonstrate the complexity of the question of communications media (oral, 
written, and others) among the early Christians.’
830  Cf. the sympathetic discussion of Bailey’s view in Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, pp. 47-50. 
831  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 25-26, 35-37.
832  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 26-35.
833  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 41-42; cf. Gerhardsson, ‘Secret’, pp. 1-18 (8-9); Byrskog, Story as 
History, p. 255; idem, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition’, pp. 459-71, which react to 
Dunn, Jesus Remembered.
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on the work of Maurice Halbwachs, Jeffrey Olick and Richard Jenkins on social 
memory and social identity, Rodríguez argues that all remembering is social in 
nature, individual and collective memory being two sides of the same coin, not 
different phenomena. Individual and social identity and memory are in a constant 
process of negotiation, being established and shaped in social interaction; neither 
individual and social memory, nor individual and social identity can be neatly 
separated from each other and analyzed on their own terms.834
 Regarding the relationship between individual and social memory, the social 
nature of human beings is a fundamental starting point. Even when doing the 
remembering alone, people do it with reference to their social identities.835 
Contrary to the claim that individual and social memory are separate entities to 
be analyzed apart from each other, Rodríguez reminds that ‘both individual and 
social identity – and memory – are established, shaped and perpetuated in the 
dynamics of social interaction’; both are being constantly negotiated, resulting 
from ‘a dialectic between the individual and the collective’.836 This means that the 
memorial narratives the individual tells herself are under constant construction; 
they interact with feedback and narratives that are received from other people.837 
While the synthesis between individual and collective memory and identity 
must be maintained, the distinction between the two must not be done away 
with altogether: neither is what goes on in one person’s mind obvious to others, 
nor does the way one person sees herself necessarily match how she is seen by 
others.838 One must bear in mind Halbwachs’ notion of memory as a sociological 
process, where there is space for the individual.839 Rodríguez summarizes, 
834  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 42-50 (42-43); cf. Halbwachs, On Collective Memory; Jeffrey K. Olick, 
‘Products, Processes, and Practices: A Non-Reificatory Approach to Collective Memory’, BTB 
36.1 (2006), pp. 5-14; idem, ‘Collective Memory: The Two Cultures’, Sociological Theory 17/3 
(1999), pp. 333-48; Richard Jenkins, Social Identity (New York and London: Routledge, 1996). 
While viewing Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, as in some ways useful in mapping the discussions 
on memory, Rodríguez distances himself from Bauckham’s way of separating individual and 
collective memory from each other. See e.g. Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 42-43, 58 n. 41; pace 
Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 312.
835  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 42; Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p. 38: ‘It is in society that 
people acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their 
memories’. Cf. Olick, ‘Products, Processes, and Practices’, pp. 5-14 (11).
836  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 43, referring to Jenkins, Social Identity, p. 20.
837  The references in Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 44 n. 8, to the objectivization of knowledge and one of 
its subsets, memory, through language, discussed by Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, 
pp. 26, 66, 67-68, are specifically helpful for understanding this process. 
838  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 44-45; Jenkins, Social Identity, p. 30.
839  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 45-46.
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‘memory – like identity, religion, economics and politics and so on – is a social 
phenomenon; collective memory cannot be analyzed as a ‘thing’ over against 
‘personal memory’…Social memory is not just a new field within memory studies; 
it is an approach to memory itself.’840
 Rodríguez outlines two ways in which memory distortion has been understood 
in Jesus research. First, there is the view which suggests that the past is derivative 
of the present and reflects and serves present interests and ideological conflicts; 
this view is heavily influenced by form-critical perspectives. Second, there is 
the view which emphasizes the stability and continuity of the past with the 
present, underestimating the influence of the social realities of the present on the 
tradition.841 Rodríguez views the relationship between the past and the present 
as more complicated, rejecting both a radically constructivist view and any naïve 
notion about the actual past being preserved; the past is always expressed – and 
all remembering is rooted – in the present, which means that there is no access 
to an uninterpreted actual past. Sometimes fabrication and deception in the 
present, for example, as part of an ideological struggle, even lead to a complete 
divorce of the present from the actual past. Nevertheless, Rodríguez argues that 
the past ‘in its pastness’ retains connections to the present to a degree that one 
should understand distortion ‘in a weak sense’ as ‘transformation’, having more to 
do with ‘actualizing the past’s potential than with exerting power over competing 
images of the past’.842
 Rodríguez utilizes Barry Schwartz’s double model of framing and keying to 
explain how both the past and the present are ‘transformed’ in the process of 
remembering. The past provides frames in which present experiences can be 
located and explained as meaningful. Keying links together the present events 
with the group’s ‘sacred narrative’, matching the public (or symbolic) models of 
the past to the present experiences. In collective memory, the past and present are 
dialectic, as memory distortion works both ways; in other words, a transformation 
of the meaning of both the past and the present results from processes of framing 
840  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 46.
841  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 50-51; cf. A. Kirk and T. Thatcher, ‘Jesus Tradition as Social Memory’, 
in Kirk and Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, and Text, pp. 25-42 (30, 35). Rodríguez cites Kirk 
and Thatcher’s treatment of Bultmann as an example of the first view, and Gerhardsson’s view as 
an example of the second view. As noted above in this study, both views suffer from a shallow 
treatment of the sociological dynamics of memory.
842  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 51-56 (55-56).
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and keying.843
 According to Rodríguez, the study of the historical Jesus has often 
underestimated the stability of social memory in the face of social change. While 
the past is not preserved in memory in a way that would allow for the separation 
of historical fact from subsequent interpretation (or investigation of ‘objective 
history’), Schwartz’s model indicates that collective memory holds a stable core (a 
persistent historical reputation or image) which peripheral historical elements are 
added to or subtracted from. In other words, ‘the past persists’, even if not always 
and never perfectly, ‘across fluctuations in the present’.844 
 Rodríguez illustrates the point with the three respects, outlined by Schudson, in 
which the past is resistant to being rewritten by the present interests. First, there 
are convenient or inconvenient features of the available pasts that become installed 
in social memory and, de spite the passing of time, attract power to themselves; 
these features resist ‘efforts to displace the memory’ of an event, even against ‘the 
interests of official power centres’. Second, the past has a psychological impact on 
individuals and groups, restricting how much present in terests can reconstitute 
the past. Rodríguez appeals to Schudson’s dynamics of ‘trauma’845, ‘channel’846, 
and ‘commitment’847. Third, the existence of rival definitions of the past sets limits 
to the rewriting of the past; people and groups with alternate and competing 
definitions of reality and the past constrain each other’s efforts to portray the past 
in self-interested ways.848
 Rodríguez discusses the social and historical reputation of a person as an 
example of the interpenetration of the past and the present, implying that a 
persistent historical reputation may constitute a stable historical image or core 
843  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 56-57; cf. B. Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National 
Memory (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 18-19, 225-226 etc.
844  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 59, 62-64. Rodríguez, p. 63, also refers to Fentress and Wickham, 
Social Memory, p. 59: ‘…Social memory is not stable as information; it is stable, rather, at the level 
of shared meanings and remembered images’. This statement is balanced by Rodríguez, p. 63 n. 
54, with the notion that social memory can be very exact, when it is found socially relevant by 
people to remember an event in the way it was originally experienced (so Fentress and Wickham, 
Social Memory, p. xi).
845  That is, personally and vicariously experienced, not always negative, consequential events that 
cannot be ignored without causing anxiety, fear, pain.
846  Or the ‘inertial pull’ of historical precedent, namely, how earlier, even rare, events are summoned 
to inform our response to the present issues.
847  Namely, the attachment of an individual or group to identity, character or social reputation.
848  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 59-61; Michael Schudson, ‘The Present in the Past Versus the Past in 
the Present’, Communication 11 (1989), pp. 105-13 (107-12). 
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in social memory. Rodríguez laments the shallow treatment of ‘Jesus’ reputation’ 
by Jesus scholars (especially, in relation to Jesus’ healings and exorcisms),849 and 
proceeds to discuss reputation sociologically in light of the works of Schwartz, 
Fine, and others.850 Reputations are socially constructed and shared personas 
which are embedded within social relations, dependent on social contexts, and 
‘arise in relation to established images of the past’, shaping and constraining ‘future 
images of the past’.851
 Rodríguez observes that the dynamics of reputational entrepreneurship are at 
work when a reputation is being established. ‘Reputational entrepreneurs’ need 
to have (1) self-interest to construct, propose and defend a historical reputation, 
(2) the ability to construct a resonant narrative to a wider audience, and (3) an 
institutional placement, that is, they ‘must occupy an authoritative social position 
to have their proposal taken seriously by their audience’.852
 According to Rodríguez, ‘strict constructionism’ is not a fruitful approach 
to social construction and its constraints, as this view, while addressing how a 
reputation can be manipulated for present purposes, most importantly for the 
study of the historical Jesus, does not explain why a person becomes a model for 
the present to begin with.853 Rodríguez emphasizes a contextual constructivist 
approach, observing that reputation ‘develops in the nexus of “historical facts” 
and discursive manoeuvring’; the influence of ‘objective factors’ should not be 
downplayed. Rodríguez writes: ‘Images of the past are always selective, always 
interested, but the mediation, selection, and interest of historical events is, usually, 
rooted in actual history’.854
 While Rodríguez recognizes that the historical reputations of heroic and 
villainous people are not problematic, he points out that there are difficult pasts 
and difficult reputations of ambiguous or incompetent people and failures. 
In such cases, the reasons of failure are remembered and installed in collective 
849  Cf. e.g. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 670-94.
850  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 64-80; esp. Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln; Gary Alan Fine, ‘Reputational 
Entrepreneurs and the Memory of Incompetence: Melting Supporters, Partisan Warriors, and 
Images of President Harding’, American Journal of Sociology 101/5 (1996), pp. 1159-93; idem, 
Difficult Reputations: Collective Memories of the Evil, Inept, and Controversial (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2001). Fine, ‘Reputational Entrepreneurs’, was republished 
in Fine, Difficult Reputations’, pp. 60-94.
851  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 64.
852  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 65-67.
853  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 68-69; cf. Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 253-55.
854  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 69-70. Italics are original.
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memory, while the individuals themselves may be forgotten; here the dynamics 
of social forgetting come into play. Rodríguez only indicates what this might mean 
for the study of the historical Jesus in his footnote discussions: Jesus, a Galilean 
τέκτων, who was executed as a political subversive, had first become the object 
of collective forgetting due to his presumably difficult reputation, but was later 
installed as a central feature of collective remembering.855
 Rodríguez argues that sometimes people with reputations of failure manage to 
shake off the anonymity and are remembered. Changes in social circumstances 
and cultural logic can lead to a broad acceptance of what previously seemed a 
difficult past. Abraham Lincoln and the events of Masada serve as examples. 
According to Rodríguez, historical reputations are symbolic in nature and 
often function like rites; they do not forge consensus on what the object of 
commemoration means, while still promoting social solidarity. There must always 
be some link between historical reputations and ultimate social values and beliefs 
that are widely accepted.856
 Rodríguez turns to the study of oral tradition, arguing that the focus on 
‘orality’, and not so much on social memory theory, in NT studies has caused 
some confusion. Rodríguez rejects the interpretation of Kelber’s work that would 
take his emphasis on the convergence of transmission and composition in oral 
performance to mean that oral performance creates tradition de novo or ex nihilo. 
The stabilizing role of memory in oral performance must not be downplayed. 
Yet the Jesus tradition lacked a fixed textual form, as the verbal forms and words 
necessary for the actualization of the tradition in performance were of secondary 
importance. Written versions of the Jesus tradition (including the written gospels) 
were initially received in performance as actualizations of the tradition among 
other such actualizations.857
 According to Rodríguez, the variability and stability of the tradition is rooted 
in early Christian memory, in both the memory of Jesus’ teaching and healing 
activity and the memory of various performances, that is, retellings of that activity. 
Rodríguez portrays the tradition as the story and memory, which is able to transmit 
the same thing over and over again despite verbal and structural variability due to 
the tradition not being confined to the shape of any particular performance. The 
855  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 71-76 (74 n. 85, 76 n. 89).
856  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 77-79.
857  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 81-84.
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multiplicity of performances, namely, the experience and memory of previous 
performances, functions as a constraint of future performances; the tradition 
‘becomes institutionalized over time’ through an interplay of stability and fluidity. 
While certain words and phrases may become important over time, this does not 
downplay the tradition’s multiformity.858
 Rodríguez applies Foley’s work on oral performance, word-power and 
metonymic referencing to his discussion of the Jesus tradition. He approaches 
the similarities and differences between the Synoptic Gospels, not as a way of 
understanding ‘the evangelists’ editorial practices’, but as expressions of the 
tradition with multiform and variegated instantiation. Foley’s notion that in oral 
performance one part stands for the whole tradition (‘pars pro toto’) is applicable to 
the Gospels, which are ‘actualizations of the abstract corpus of the Jesus tradition’. 
Rodríguez argues that the evangelists were not merely authors but tradents and 
performers of the Jesus tradition, speaking and living within a traditional idiom, 
before authoring the Gospels.859
 Rodríguez pays close attention to the engagement of the audience with the 
tradition in oral performance. In line with Foley, he recognizes that context 
and words together generate meaning, which means that the audience cannot 
apprehend the metonymic meaning of the ‘words’ performed, and the text as 
a whole, if it is not conversant in the traditional idiom. Ro dríguez recognizes 
Foley’s use of Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser’s receptionist theory, which 
emphasizes the multiformity and instability of oral-derived texts in performance 
when meaning is sought through interpretation, and balances this with Foley’s 
notion that interpre tation is constrained by the unifying role of performance and 
the tradition itself (namely, ‘the body of immanent meaning’).
 This is all theory that works for actual oral performances of a living oral 
tradition; what about the Gospels, which are written texts? Rodríguez employs 
Foley’s ‘typological spectrum’, which spans from the transcribed performance to 
‘literary’ texts still rooted in oral tradition, arguing that the dynamics of verbal art 
are at play in all categories along the spectrum. A process of consistency-building 
is important for understanding verbal art, namely, the audience must be capable 
858  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 85-88. An individual healing story, such as the straightening of the 
‘bent’ woman in Luke 13.11-13, would evoke both the contextualizing of Israelite tradition and 
the whole tradition  of Jesus as healer and exorcist. Cf. Horsley’s view above.
859  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 89-92.
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of both attending to the text’s metonymic references and to fill out the lacunae 
in the text-in-performance through its knowledge of the tradition. Rodríguez 
emphasizes that research must not only focus on the composition of the Gospels 
but also on their reception, as ‘the evangelists and their audiences would have been 
familiar with and participants in oral performances of the Jesus tradition’.860
 In accordance with Foley’s ideas of performance arena and register, Rodríguez 
argues that the Gospels preserve traces of the traditional register of oral 
performance. Based on this hypothesis, he attempts to inquire, first, ‘how that 
register incorporates traditional metonymic signification’, and second, ‘how the 
texts relate to the oral performative practices of the early communities of Jesus’ 
followers’, who performed the Jesus tradition regularly.861
 Rodríguez holds that, while the reception of, for example, Mark’s Gospel was 
not monolithic in nature, there was a continuity between the images of Jesus 
presented in the written Gospel traditions and the images already established 
through multiple oral performances.862 The early wide-spread acceptance of the 
written Gospels begs a reasonable explanation, if the texts broke from how Jesus 
was represented in the earliest Christian communities. Based on this notion 
of continuity, Rodríguez hypothesizes that the rhetoric of the written Gospel 
text must signal its context of performance in order to preserve anything of its 
performance arena; it is, then, the task of the scholar to study how the texts’s 
register ‘invokes the performance arena’ in a way that its phraseology maintains 
its metonymic character.863
 Rodríguez places the Gospels into the third category of ‘Voices from the Past’ 
in Foley’s fourfold typology of oral-derived texts, the first two categories being 
‘Oral Performance’ and ‘Voiced Texts’, and the last one being ‘Written Oral 
Poems’. First, regarding the first catego ry, analyzing the Gospel texts differs from 
analyzing oral performances; second, the Gospels cannot be ‘voiced texts’ because 
the Jesus tradition could be orally performed without the presence of the texts; 
860  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 93-96 (96); cf. Foley, The Singer of Tales in Performance, pp. 45-46: 
‘The single performance of a traditional oral work is both something unique, a thing in itself, 
and the realization of patterns, characters, and situations that are known to the audience through 
prior acquaintance with other performances.’
861  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 97-102 (101).
862  Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 107, notes ‘the gospel texts, in their original contexts, would have 
been read aloud or reperformed in the same or similar contexts in which oral traditions were 
performed…’
863  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 102-4 (103); cf. Foley, The Singer of Tales in Performance.
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third, with regard to the last category, ‘written oral poems’ were ‘writ ten by an 
author and read by readers’; their word-power is not dependent on oral perfor-
mance. Rodríguez follows Foley, who also viewed the Gospels as ‘voices from 
the past’ by which he refers to the Gospels dependence upon oral tradition and 
their interaction with the written word. According to Rodríguez, this category 
does justice to the diversity of Gospel composition, performance and reception: 
these texts were composed for the actualization of the Jesus tradition in oral 
performance. While, negatively, the category of ‘voices from the past’ does not 
guarantee much certainty regarding the texts’ composition, performance and re-
ception, it does, positively, enable one to appreciate their complexity and diversity 
and con texts of origin.864
 Before moving on to his concrete analysis of the Synoptic materials, Rodríguez 
draws certain conclusions regarding the continuity between the oral Jesus tradition 
and the written Gospels. He rejects the notion of the written Gospels subverting 
the oral Jesus tradition, as the written texts needed to be accepted by the audience; 
the oral-performative tradition sets limits to the flexibility, while allowing for the 
presentation of ‘differing, even conflicting, images of Jesus’ by the tradents. The 
canonical Gospels present traditional performances that were widely accepted; 
they should be approached as expressions of a living tradition which was formed 
in multiple contexts through the interaction between performers and audiences, 
not as literary redactions of one another, although some literary relationship 
between them is possible.865
 In light of his detailed discussion on social memory theory, reputation, oral 
tradition, and the Gospels, Rodríguez analyses three instances from the Synoptic 
Gospels: the account of Jesus’ response to John the Baptist’s inquiry (Mt. 11.2-
6/Lk. 7.18-23), Jesus’ appearance and sermon in Nazareth (Lk. 4.16-20), and 
the Beelzebul controversy (Mk. 3.20-26/Mt. 12.22-28/Lk. 11.14-20). He is not 
interested in studying the ‘authenticity’ of these Jesus traditions, namely, whether 
864  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 104-6; cf. J. M. Foley, How to Read an Oral Poem (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), pp. 38-53; idem, ‘The Riddle of Q: Oral Ancestor, 
Textual Precedent, or Ideological Creation?’, in R. A. Horsley (ed.), Oral Performance, Popular 
Tradition, and Hidden Transcript in Q (Atlanta: SBL, 2006), pp. 123-40 (137-38).
865  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 107-13 (112-13). Rather than attempting to make the evangelists’ 
editorial practices more accessible, Rodríguez aims to ‘suggest something of the tradition of 
which the individual accounts are singular instances’ (p. 112). An example of this posture is 
found in Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 32-35, where the parallel accounts in Mt. 5.3/Lk. 6.20 and 
Mt. 7.11/Lk. 11.13 are compared.
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or to which extent they correspond to historical fact; he rather attempts to find 
out how images of Jesus were utilized by the tradents, and how Israel’s traditions 
functioned for Jesus and his ‘reputational entrepreneurs’; how were the events 
of Jesus’ life and his teachings used in contexts where ‘Israel’s traditions had to 
make sense’? This model is not concerned about the ‘distortion’ of Jesus in terms 
of Israelite traditions or vice versa; emphasis is placed upon the continuity of the 
presentation of Jesus’ reputation.866
 Rodríguez conducts his analysis on the basis of the notion, also presented 
by Horsley, that the Gospels are ‘little tradition’ that metonymically reference 
Israelite traditions (especially, the Exodus, Isaianic, Elijah/Elisha traditions). 
First, regarding Jesus’ response to John the Baptist’s inquiry (Mt. 11.2-6/Lk. 7.18-
23), Rodríguez argues that the text portrays Jesus’ followers’ need to emphasize 
Jesus’ reputation as John’s ὁ ἐρχόμενος; their memory of Jesus was in a dialectic 
interplay with their present concerns, for example, a concern to subordinate John’s 
ministry to that of Jesus.867 Second, Rodríguez does not view Jesus’ appearance 
in the synagogue in Nazareth (Lk. 4.16-20) as an actual event in history; rather, 
the instance is an example of Luke’s creative use and reworking of the traditional 
material found in Luke 7.18-23, a process in which Luke has, for example, paired 
the image of Jesus reading in the synagogue with the Israelite traditions of 
restoration in Isaiah 61.868 Third, Rodríguez takes the Beelzebul controversy (Mk. 
3.20-26/Mt. 12.22-28/Lk. 11.14-20) as an indication about the reality that Jesus’ 
exorcisms were an integral part of the early Christian memory of Jesus; oral-
performative dynamics are at play in all three different accounts of the controversy 
that evince the development of Jesus’ reputation as a healer and exorcist in light of 
Isaianic, Mosaic, and Elijah/Elisha traditions.869
 In sum, Rodríguez suggests that historical Jesus research has to give up attempts 
to study the ‘authenticity’ or ‘inauthenticity’ of the Jesus traditions found in the 
Gospels; the criteria of authenticity do justice to neither the Gospel texts in their 
contexts nor to the nature of the Gospels as oral-derived texts. Social memory 
theory and study of oral tradition imply that it is illegitimate to view the oral Jesus 
tradition as a source to be studied as any other (literary) source; the oral dynamics 
866  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 117-20.
867  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 120-37.
868  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 138-73. Cf. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 142-45, for another treatment of 
Luke 4.16-20 from a social memory perspective.
869  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 174-210.
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have a bearing on how – or whether – source criticism can be con ducted. For 
example, Rodríguez indicates that Matthew could have used Mark without access 
to a written copy of Mark’s text. Finally, Rodríguez does not find it culturally and 
historically appropriate to atomize, decontextualize, and then re-contextualize 
little pieces of the Gospel tradition, an exercise that constitutes an entire scholarly 
program in the field of the study of the ‘historical Jesus’.870
Critique & Evaluation
In addition to the sympathetic references and evaluations by some,871 there 
have been other rather strong general reactions against Rodríguez and others’ 
application of social memory theory to the study of the Jesus traditions and the 
historical Jesus.872 To start with the criticisms, first, some of the same points that 
were leveled against Dunn’s view of the variants of the Synoptic Jesus tradition 
as ‘oral retellings’ apply to Rodríguez’s view of ‘variant instantiations’ of the oral 
Jesus tradition. While Rodríguez’s view of the Jesus traditions in the Gospels is 
more nuanced than Dunn’s due to his theoretical emphasis on oral tradition, it 
can be asked whether Rodríguez also downplays the role of the Gospel authors as 
writers of texts; for example, it is one thing to reject the old notion of oral tradition 
as one source among many, and another to suggest that the degree of verbatim 
870  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 213-25. For Rodríguez’s critique of the criteria of authenticity, see 
Rodríguez, ‘Authenticating Criteria: The Use and Misuse of a Critical Method’, pp. 152-67; idem, 
‘The Embarrassing Truth About Jesus’, in Keith & Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise 
of Authenticity, pp. 132-51.
871  See e.g. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, passim; idem, Scribal, passim; McIver, Memory, Jesus, and the 
Synoptic Gospels, pp. 108, 157, 182; Eve, Behind, pp. 123-131; idem, Writing, pp. 114-19 (esp. on 
the concept of ‘reputation’); Bird, Gospel, passim; Kirk, Q in Matthew, pp. 18, 19, who is both 
sympathetic and somewhat critical of Rodríguez’s view.
872  See e.g. Paul Foster, ‘Memory, Orality, and the Fourth Gospel: Three Dead-Ends in Historical 
Jesus Research’, JSHJ 10 (2012), pp. 191-227; Tobias Hägerland, ‘The Future of Criteria in 
Historical Jesus Research’, pp. 43-65; van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10; Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, 
pp. 17-18, 27-28 (n. 28), 50, 77-78 (n. 57, 58). Since these evaluations mainly concern the 
views of the other scholars presented and analyzed in this chapter (in particular, Chris Keith, 
Dale C. Allison, and Anthony Le Donne), the bulk of their critique is discussed in Chapters 
3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 respectively. Here it is sufficient to limit the discussion to only a few specific 
points with regard to Rodríguez’s view as presented in Structuring Early Christian Memory. 
 To be sure, Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (56-57, 60-61), discusses and 
criticizes Rodríguez’s critique of the criterion of embarrassment in Rodríguez, ‘The Embarrassing 
Truth About Jesus’, pp. 132-51; this critique is discussed briefly below in conjunction with the 
discussion on Dale Allison’s view (ch. 3.6). Van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10, also places Rodríguez in 
the category of the memory approach to the historical Jesus and occasionally refers to his work, 
but his critique is mainly focused on the views of Chris Keith, Anthony Le Donne, and Jens 
Schröter. 
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agreement and agreement in order between Mark and Matthew can be explained 
without allowing Matthew to access a written copy of Mark. Matthew may have 
known Mark’s text by heart, but this would have required access to the written text 
at some point.873 This is not to be taken as a dismissal of Rodríguez’s application 
of the study of oral tradition to the Jesus traditions (and the possible need for 
addressing source critical questions anew),874 but rather as a factor which balances 
one’s historical view of the Gospel authors as authors who used literary sources 
despite being embedded in the oral Jesus tradition.875 Despite the relevance of the 
question, Rodríguez chooses not to pursue whether the standard Two Document 
Hypothesis should be reformulated or abandoned altogether on the basis of 
his views, which leaves his view vulnerable to the criticism. Worth mentioning 
here is Sandra Hübenthal, who argues that one cannot approach the historical 
Jesus simply with sociological approaches to memory, but rather traditional 
methods of exegesis are to be employed beside a hermeneutical framework of 
social memory theory in order to study the biblical text as an artifact of social 
remembering.876 Also, there are other scholars who apply theories of orality, oral 
tradition, and social memory theory extensively to the Jesus traditions but do not 
share Rodríguez’s deemphasis on the source-critical discussions, as is at length 
demonstrated, for example, by Alan Kirk in his monograph Q in Matthew: Ancient 
873  So also Eve, Behind, pp. 111, 130-31; pace Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 223; cf. Eve, Writing, pp. 39-
42, 81-102. However, Eve, Writing, p. 39, concludes: ‘Given what is known of the ancients’ use of 
texts and their reliance on memory, compositional dependence on memory may well be a better 
default assumption than visual dependence on a written text constantly consulted during the 
process of composition.’ On the use of sources by ancient authors, also see the critique of Dunn 
above; Kloppenborg, ‘Variation and Reproduction of the Double Tradition and an Oral Q?’, pp. 
53-80; idem, ‘Memory, Performance, and the Sayings of Jesus’, pp. 97-132 (102-4); DeConick, 
‘Human Memory and the Sayings of Jesus’, in Thatcher (ed.), Jesus, the Voice and the Text, pp. 
135-79.
874  Cf. Eve, Behind, p. 131: ‘So perhaps what needs questioning is not so much the fact of literary 
dependence between the Gospels as what literary dependence might actually mean in this 
context’. The question is discussed in more detail in Eve, Writing, pp. 39-42; cf. Andrew Gregory, 
‘What Is Literary Dependence?’, in Paul Foster, Andrew Gregory, John S. Kloppenborg and J. 
Verheyden (eds.), New Studies in the Synoptic Problem (BETL, 139; Leuven: Leuven University 
Press, 2011), pp. 87-114. 
875  Also see Hurtado, ‘Oral Fixation’, pp. 321-40 (339), who argues that texts were read from 
manuscripts in early Christian circles; while passages could be recited from memory, actual 
manuscripts played an important role when entire works were performed.
876  Hübenthal, Das Markusevangelium; also, idem, ‘Reading the Gospel of Mark as Collective 
Memory’, in S. Byrskog, R. Hakola & J. M. Jokiranta (eds.), Social Memory and Social Identity 
in the Study of Early Judaism and Early Christianity (NTOA, 116; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2016), pp. 69-87.
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Media, Memory, and Early Scribal Transmission of the Jesus Tradition, which 
looks ‘for the setting for Synoptic writing among ancient media and memory 
practices’.877 Kirk does, nevertheless, share Rodríguez’s and others’ criticism of the 
criteria of authenticity.878
 Second, while Rodríguez’s rejection of the categories of ‘authentic’ and 
‘inauthentic’ as well as of the program of ‘atomizing’ the Jesus tradition, which 
is similar to the views of Kelber, Dunn, Horsley and others that emphasize an 
‘orality mind-set’, is in many ways consonant with studies on memory and oral 
tradition, it suffers from vagueness when it comes to studying the historical 
Jesus. It is understandable that Rodríguez attacks, for instance, the atomistic use 
of the criteria of authenticity to access ‘actual history’, but in Structuring Early 
Christian Memory he does not attempt to offer a comprehensive alternative and 
concrete means for reconstructing the Gospels’ function ‘within their originative 
contexts’,879 or assessing their ‘testimony to the historical Jesus’880, both of which he 
deems important tasks of Gospel and historical Jesus scholarship. It is more than 
reasonable to bring the contribution of social memory theory and oral tradition 
to the table. Yet a disinterest in older ways of conducting research does not shed 
much light on how the questions of historical authenticity or actuality should be 
addressed in Rodríguez’s estimation; it may be that he considers these questions to 
be of secondary or almost no importance at all for historical Jesus research. These 
questions require a more clearly focused and theoretically nuanced discussion.881
 Despite these critical points, Rodríguez’s picture of the historical situation 
in first-century Palestine with relatively low literacy rates, and of Jesus and his 
877  Kirk, Q in Matthew, p. 1. On Rodríguez, Kirk, Q in Matthew, p. 19, states: ‘The problem is that 
Rodríguez’s pronounced oral/written binary prevents him from finding a place for written 
tradition in the traditional memorial register. Accordingly, while he is able to deliver a robust 
account of variation in the synoptic tradition, he struggles to explain, and therefore is forced 
to marginalize, its patterns of agreement, and his case studies are mostly of low-agreement 
parallels…This criticisms [sic] ought not to overshadow how much Rodríguez gets right.’ Kirk, 
Q in Matthew, p. 19 n. 92 gives more credit to Rodríguez, Oral Tradition, for his ‘more interactive 
media approach’.
878  See e.g. Kirk and Thatcher, ‘Jesus Tradition as Social Memory’, in Kirk and Thatcher (eds.), 
Memory, Tradition, and Text, pp. 25-42 (33): ‘“[t]radition” and “memory” are not elements of the 
Gospels that can be pried apart through the application of particular criteria.’
879  Cf. Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 221.
880  Cf. Rodríguez, Structuring, p. 224.
881  See the discussion below; cf. e.g. Hägerland, ‘The Future of Criteria’, pp. 43-65, who evaluates 
the recent attempts by e.g. Rodríguez, Keith and Allison to move the discussion on ‘historical 
actuality’ beyond the criteria of authenticity. Also, see the critical response to Hägerland, in 
Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 (430-33).
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followers as steeped in an oral culture, is plausible.882 Rodríguez is able to avoid the 
pitfalls of some who overemphasize the oral nature of the culture: unlike Horsley, 
Shiner and others, Rodríguez does not underestimate the cultural role of written 
texts for the formation of early Christian identity; he does not argue for the ‘oral 
composition’ of the Gospels, but rather employs a conception of ‘performance’ 
that is not limited to ‘oral performance’, but can, as Hurtado notes, ‘encompass 
practically any conveyance of Jesus tradition in any form’.883 Furthermore, 
Rodríguez’s focus on oral dynamics, specifically on metonymic referencing, can 
shed light on how the Jesus traditions relate to Israel’s wider tradition and in 
what kind of a context the Je sus traditions were performed; in light of his own 
theoretical framework, Rodríguez’s analy ses of the three instances are plausible.884
 Finally, Rodríguez’s discussion of social memory theory and historical 
reputation provides a useful framework for addressing the questions of the 
continuity and discontinuity of the Jesus traditions. While Rodríguez could be 
more specific about how he relates the discussion on historical reputation to the 
historical Jesus, the idea of competing historical images (or reputations) of Jesus is 
a useful category for discussing Jesus of Nazareth.885 Rodríguez’s discussion does 
not underestimate the past’s influence on the present, but recognizes that the past 
is always an interpreted past. Whatever one’s take is on matters such as the criteria 
of authenticity, Rodríguez attempts to lay out a conception which overcomes, 
on the one hand, strict constructivism and presentism, and on the other hand, 
naïve trust in ‘historical reliability’ or preservation of ‘actual history’ in the Jesus 
traditions of the Gospels.
3.5 Chris Keith
In his article (2011) and two books on the historical Jesus (2011, 2014), based 
882  Again, e.g. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 71-123; idem, ‘Early Christian Book Culture’, pp. 22-39 (35-
36); Hezser, Jewish Literacy; also, Eve, Behind, pp. 10-11.
883  Hurtado, ‘Oral Fixation’, pp. 321-340 (322 n. 1); cf. Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 81-113. Such 
conception may, of course, raise the question whether Rodríguez’s view is too vague in this 
regard.
884  Here one needs to remain cautious, bearing in mind that the performance tradition which Foley 
had in mind differed from the Jesus traditions; also, it is reasonable to ask whether the notion 
of metonymic referencing is necessary from the viewpoint of social memory theory. Cf. Eve, 
Behind, p. 123.
885  Eric Eve adopts the notion of the construction of reputation in his more recent work on the 
writing of the Gospels, referring to both Rodríguez and the theorists of historical reputation such 
as Fine, Ducharme, and Schwartz. See Eve, Writing, pp. 114-19.
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on social memory theory, Chris Keith outlines an approach to the study of the 
nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions and the historical Jesus, with a 
special focus on the question of his toricity.886 Keith states unequivocally that 
he joins the ‘Jesus-memory approach’ to the historical Jesus, as opposed to the 
dominant ‘criteria approach’ which attempts to authenti cate individual traditions 
before reconstructing the historical Jesus. It is central to Keith’s ar gument that the 
latter approach is questionable in its indebtedness to form criticism: the crite-
ria approach, which has been the dominant approach in Jesus studies for over a 
hundred years, has employed a misguided notion of the nature and development 
of the Jesus tradition, which results in an inadequate view of the historicity of the 
tradition. Keith proceeds to show both the indebtedness of this traditional way of 
doing Jesus scholarship to form criticism and the superiority of the Jesus-memory 
approach due to its different conception of the Jesus tra dition and the task of the 
historian.887
 Starting with a rebuttal of what he considers a flawed approach to the Jesus 
tradition since at least the beginning of the Third Quest, Keith chooses not to 
treat the criteria of authenticity in detail; he rather focuses on (1) the criteria 
approach’s conception of the composition of the Jesus tradition, (2) the alleged 
form-critical influence on that conception, and (3) how the historian’s task is 
erroneously defined by such a conception as a method of getting ‘behind’ the text. 
Martin Dibelius and Rudolf Bultmann serve to demonstrate the form-critical 
influence on this method. Keith notes, for example, that a central tenet of classical 
form criticism was that the pre-textual oral tradition ought to be identified 
in the written Gospel tradition; this notion was based on a sharp distinction 
between the assumed pre-literary history of the Gospel tradition among early 
886  Chris Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity: Jesus Tradition and What Really Happened’, ZNW 102 
(2011), pp. 155-77, which was modified and expanded in Chapter 2 of Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 
27-70; also see idem, Scribal, pp. 67-84; further, idem, ‘The Claim of John 7.15 and the Memory 
of Jesus’ Literacy’, NTS 56 (2010), pp. 44-63 (55-63); idem, ‘The Indebtedness of the Criteria 
Approach to Form Criticism and recent Attempts to Rehabilitate the Search for an Authentic 
Jesus’, in Keith & Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, pp. 25-48; idem, 
‘The Fall of the Quest for an Authentic Jesus: Concluding Remarks’, in Keith & Le Donne (eds.), 
Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, pp. 200-5; idem, ‘Social Memory Theory and 
Gospel Research: The First Decade (Part One)’, EC 6 (2015), pp. 354-76; idem, ‘Early Christian 
Book Culture’, pp. 22-39; idem, ‘The Competitive Textualization of the Jesus Tradition in John 
20:30-31 and 21:24-25’, CBQ 78 (2016), pp. 321-37; also importantly, idem, ‘The Narratives of the 
Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55.
887  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (155-56); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 27-29; also, 
idem, Scribal, pp. 73-74.
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Palestinian Christians and later textualization of the tradition among Hellenistic 
Christians.888 Keith outlines the primary assumptions of Dibelius’ and Bultmann’s 
form criticism that attempted to extract the ‘pre-literary Jesus traditions from 
the written Gospels’, concluding that, for the form critics, it was central to the 
identification of the pre-literary Jesus tradition of the early Palestinian Church to 
remove ‘individual traditions from their narrative contexts in written texts’ and 
reorganize ‘them under categories of forms’, thereby attempting to get ‘through’ 
or ‘behind’ the text. According to Keith, this methodological assumption has 
influenced generations of Jesus scholars who have been searching for an entity of 
tradition that existed prior to the written Gospels, as the assumption was inherited 
by the criteria approach to the written Jesus tradition.889
 Regarding the criteria approach, Keith notes that the categories of ‘inauthentic’ 
and ‘authentic’ Jesus tradition correspond ‘roughly’ to the notions of the historical 
Jesus and the Christ of faith. These categories are used to indicate whether the 
sayings and deeds attributed to Jesus in the Gospels originated from the historical 
Jesus or the theology of the early Christians. The criterion of dissimilarity, for 
888  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (156-58); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 29-32. Keith, 
Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 41-50, discusses three ‘trends’ in Jesus scholarship, which in their own ways 
reflect ‘a return to the written tradition’, and have attempted to address the problems related to 
the criteria of authenticity: (1) those who modify the traditional criteria: for example, instead of 
using the criterion of dissimilarity which is guilty of the severance of Jesus from both Second 
Temple Judaism and early Christianity, some would rather positively apply ‘the criterion of 
double similarity/dissimilarity’ (e.g. Wright, Victory of God, pp. 132-33), and others propose 
a criterion of plausibility in place of the criterion of dissimilarity (Theissen and Winter, The 
Plausible Jesus, p. 212; Theissen and Merz, The Historical Jesus, pp. 116-17); (2) those who reject 
the criteria altogether because they ‘simply do not work’, propose a return to the Gospel narratives 
as they stand, and apply memory studies to the question of the historical Jesus (e.g. D. C. Allison, 
Jesus of Nazareth; idem, Constructing). Keith views Allison as aligning with the Jesus-memory 
approach; (3) those who employ memory as an important analytical category and emphasize 
the impact of Jesus and thus shift critical discussion from Jesus’ self-understanding onto others’ 
reception of him (e.g. E. Schüssler Fiorenza, Jesus and the Politics of Interpretation [London: 
Continuum, 2000]; Dunn, Jesus Remembered; idem, A New Perspective; Hurtado, Lord Jesus, pp. 
53-54; Bauckham, Eyewitnesses). On what Keith considers ‘the demise of authenticity’, see Keith, 
Scribal, pp. 78-81; Keith and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Crtieria, and the Demise of Authenticity.
889  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (158-60); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 32-35; also, 
idem, Scribal, pp. 74-77. These assumptions include the following: first, the Synoptic Gospels are 
a mix of earlier oral traditions and later early Christian traditions; second, the Gospel tradition 
developed evolutionarily; third, the interpretations of Jesus in the written tradition originated 
from later Christians, not from the earliest stages of oral tradition; fourth, the form critic is able 
to connect Jesus traditions (pericopae, sayings, etc.) in the written Gospels to forms that reflect 
various Sitze im Leben via a circular process; fifth, the present theological convictions of early 
Christian communities shaped the Jesus tradition; finally, the pre-literary oral Jesus tradition 
can be separated from the later interpretive work of the Evangelists and their communities. Cf. 
Dibelius, From Tradition; Bultmann, History.
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example, ‘passes as authentic any tradition that does not comport with the 
early Church (or Second Temple Judaism)’. Keith acknowledges that the criteria 
approach does not exclude the possibility that some traditions reflect both the 
historical Jesus and early Christian identity; the approach is, nevertheless, invalid, 
as it does not deliver what it promises, namely, authenticity.890
 Keith argues that it is the task of the criteria to get ‘behind’ the written 
Gospel texts in order to access the historical Jesus who existed before the later 
interpretation of him; the material of the Gospels can be connected to the 
historical Jesus only as far as it passes the criteria of authenticity. This primary 
task of the criteria approach is based on certain assumptions about the Gospel 
tradition. First, the Gospel tradition is viewed as a mix of authentic and inauthentic 
tradition. Second, the earlier authentic traditions absorbed later early Christian 
interpretive inauthentic traditions. Third, the interpretations of Jesus in the 
written tradition originate from early Christian communities and elsewhere, not 
from the historical Jesus; albeit not always stated, the criteria approach (especially, 
the criterion of dissimilarity) deems authentic only the traditions that are distinct 
from both early Christian and first-century Jewish identity. Fourth, it is possible 
to distinguish authentic tradition from inauthentic tradition.891
 According to Keith, there is a striking similarity between how form criticism 
(especially as represented by Bultmann) and the criteria approach view the 
historian’s task. Whereas the former attempted to separate ‘the original historical 
tradition’ from the work of the author, for example, Mark, the latter has simply 
replaced that original tradition with ‘the historical Je sus’. The substitution of the 
historical Jesus for the pre-literary traditions, argues Keith, is specifically evident 
in the development of the criterion of dissimilarity. Bultmann used the criterion 
to access the original traditional material, such as the state of similitudes during 
Jesus’ life, but subsequently scholars like Käsemann and Perrin have used the 
criterion to attain the historical figure of Jesus. This is part of Keith’s argument 
that the criteria approach grows ‘directly from form-critical soil’.892
890  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (161-62, n. 22, 23); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 35-
36. As an example of the standard criteria approach, Keith points to, for example, T. Holmén, 
‘Authenticity Criteria’, in C. A. Evans (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Historical Jesus (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), pp. 43-54.
891  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (162-63); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 36-37.
892  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (163-64); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 37-39; idem, 
Scribal, pp. 76-77; idem, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 
(437-40); cf. e.g. E. Käsemann, ‘The Problem of the Historical Jesus’, in Käsemann, Essays on 
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 Keith lists further assumptions about the nature of the Gospel tradition 
which are shared by the criteria approach and form criticism despite the former 
seeking the historical Jesus and the latter seeking the pre-literary Jesus tradition. 
First, the criteria approach categorizes the written Jesus tradition as authentic 
and inauthentic in a similar way as form criticism assumes the tradition to be 
a mix of earlier oral traditions and later interpretive categories. Second, the 
criteria approach assumes the absorbing of inauthentic traditions in the process 
of transmis sion by authentic Jesus traditions much like form criticism assumes 
that the later early Chris tian interpretive categories were absorbed by the early 
Jesus tradition. Third, while the crite ria approach assumes that ‘inauthentic 
Jesus tradition represents the theology of the early Church’, not the historical 
Jesus, form criticism assumes that ‘the written tradition represents the Sitze im 
Leben in which the tradition was transmitted’, not the earliest stages of the oral 
tradition. Finally, the criteria approach attempts to separate authentic tradition 
from inauthen tic tradition like form criticism attempted to separate earlier oral 
tradition from later written tradition. Thus, Keith concludes that ‘the criteria 
approach borrows its conception of the Gospel tradition from a methodology that 
New Testament scholarship largely abandoned decades ago’.893 Keith regards as one 
of form criticism’s strongest influences on the study of the historical Jesus the way 
scholars connect the Jesus traditions in the written Gospels to the historical Jesus 
only after the traditions have been removed from their interpretative frameworks 
in the Gospel narratives via the application of the criteria of authenticity.894
 Keith rejects the so-called presentist view of commemoration (that is, ‘the 
New Testament Themes (trans. W. J. Montague; SBT, 41; London: SCM, 1964), pp. 15-47 (36); 
N. Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 39; also, F. 
Hahn, ‘The Quest of the Historical Jesus and the Special Character of the Sources Available to 
Us’, in F. Hahn, W. Lohff, and G. Bornkamm, What Can we Know about Jesus? (trans. G. Foley; 
Edinburgh: Saint Andrew, 1969), pp. 69-86; idem, ‘Methodological Reflections on the Historical 
Investigation of Jesus’, in E. Krentz (ed.), Historical Investigation and New Testament Faith: Two 
Essays (trans. R. Maddox; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), pp. 35-105.
893  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (164-65); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 39-40. Italics 
are original. Keith refers to Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20 (19): ‘Today form criticism is being 
challenged on several – if not all – of its basic tenets…’ Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 39, also expands 
the discussion to the Jesus Seminar’s project of ‘dismantling the Gospels’ in a search for the 
historical Jesus via authentic tradition, which he believes bears resemblance to Bultmann’s work. 
See R. W. Funk and the Jesus Seminar, The Acts of Jesus: The Search for the Authentic Deeds of 
Jesus (New York: Harper Collins, 1998). Keith, Scribal, p. 78, recognizes John P. Meier as one of 
the most prominent proponents of the criteria approach.
894  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (165); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 40-41.
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present in the past’), which is known as revisionism or constructionism and is 
derived from ‘Halbwachs’ prioritization of the present in acts of remembrance’. 
Keith aligns himself with the continuity perspective (or ‘the past in the present’), 
which criticizes the presentist view for undermining historical continuity 
altogether. This does not mean a rejection of Halbwachs’ idea that memory is 
conditioned by the present; however, the presentist perspective’s dismissal of 
the role of the past in shaping the memory in the present is questioned, and the 
social nature of memory and its capability to preserve the past beyond individual 
existence is emphasized. In line with Zelizer, Schwartz, Schudson, Kirk and others, 
Keith argues for a continuity perspec tive which views memory as a more complex 
social process of mutual influence of the past and the present; ‘the past…provides 
the framework for cognition, organization, and interpre tation of the experiences 
of the present’.895 Thus, Keith’s view attempts to avoid the extremes of both trying 
to determine the reliability of the Gospels on the basis of social memory theory 
and dealing only with the tradition, not addressing the historical Jesus at all.
 According to Keith, the written Gospels are ‘receptions of Jesus-memory’. 
Adopting the continuity perspective, he studies the preservation, commemoration, 
and interpretation of the past of Jesus by early Christians in light of that past and 
their present. Keith stresses that he is not retreating to ‘a literalist approach to 
the Gospels as pure images’ of actual history; in his appropriation of collective 
memory, he rather attempts to take both the role of the present shaping the 
past and the role of the past shaping the present seriously. This view results in 
the rejection of the central tenets of the criteria approach: as all tradition and all 
memory is a mix of the past and the present, memory is selective, and memories 
are produced and organized by language and thought categories deriving from 
the individual’s present context, the attempt to search ‘authentic’ Jesus traditions 
and separate them from ‘inauthentic’ traditions is doomed to failure; there simply 
is no memory, preserved past, or access to it, without inter pretation, as all of the 
Jesus traditions belong to the categories of both ‘authentic’ and ‘inau thentic’.896
895  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (169); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 58-61. The direct 
quotation is from A. Kirk, ‘Social and Cultural Memory’, in Kirk and Thatcher (eds.), Memory, 
Tradition, and Text, pp. 1-24 (15). Cf. B. Zelizer, ‘Reading the Past against the Grain: The Shape of 
Memory Studies’, Studies in Mass Media 12 (1995), pp. 214-39; Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln; idem, 
Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era: History and Memory in Late Twentieth-Century America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); E. Shils, Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981); Schudson, ‘The Present’, pp. 105-13; Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory.
896  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (169-70); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 61.
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 Albeit skeptical about the usefulness of authenticity/inauthenticity language, 
Keith does not deny the basic thrust of two of the other assumptions of the criteria 
approach,897 but he does question their simplicity. It goes without saying for Keith 
that the transmitters had an impact on the Jesus tradition, as the criteria approach 
also recognizes based on the form-critical emphasis on the Sitz im Leben. Jesus 
would simply not have been remembered at all, if it were not for the categories in 
the present contexts of early Christians. Keith thinks, however, that the criteria 
approach and form criticism with their presentist perspective do not properly 
account for the origins of those categories; in their vague appeals to the Sitz im 
Leben, both fail to answer from where the social reality and the structures that 
form it, derive.898
 According to Keith, it is crucial to consider what the criteria approach and form 
criticism do not address. First, the social memory of first-century Jews would 
have provided the initial categories for the reception and remembering of Jesus; 
the original interpretations of Jesus by his audience were already impacted by 
the commemorated past.899 Second, the interpretative categories that shaped the 
Gospel narratives were informed by initial and subsequent recep tions of Jesus’ life. 
This means that the process of the development of the tradition cannot be viewed 
as one where ‘inauthentic interpretations’ were later attached to an authentic core 
of earlier tradition, the two being still easily separable and identifiable. Instead, in 
the process of transmission, there were ever only interpretations and memories of 
the past to which subse quent interpretations, even contradictory ones, were added 
through a constant dialogue. Keith argues that the supposedly later inauthentic 
traditions cannot be simplistically and entirely de tached from the earlier stages 
of the traditioning process. Such attempts lead to unjustified re moval of later 
Christologies from their historical trajectories of progression. The presence of the 
past should not be undermined by confirming the presence of the present.900
897  Namely, that ‘authentic traditions absorbed inauthentic traditions in the process of transmission’ 
and that ‘the interpretations of Jesus in the Gospels are due primarily to those inauthentic 
traditions and context(s) that produced them’.
898  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (170-71); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 61-62.
899  As examples of treatments of first-century Jews’ social memory, Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 61 n. 151, 
refers to Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 65-189, (regarding Jesus as ‘Son of David’); Horsley, 
Jesus in Context, pp. 145-45; Kirk, ‘Memory’, pp. 168-69.
900  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (171-72); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 62-63; cf. e.g. 
the critique of the presentist perspective by Halbwachs and Bultmann in Schwartz, ‘Christian 
Origins’, pp. 43-56 (49).
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 As portrayed by Keith, the Jesus-memory approach connects earlier stages of the 
traditioning process to later stages and the actual past to how it was remembered. 
There is a connection between the historical Jesus and later Christologies. In other 
words, the real events of Jesus’ life and death, which cannot be directly accessed, 
triggered interpretations and memories of him by the people who encountered 
him. The present contexts of those people, including the Jewish typologies and 
categories, did shape the initial impressions of Jesus; this was the case even for 
eyewitnesses. Keith draws some general limitations that the actual past imposed 
upon the initial interpretations and memories: Jesus was not remembered as 
a sailor, Caesar, or an astronaut, but rather as ‘a first-century Jew who lived in 
Palestine, taught, healed, and got into trouble with Jewish and Roman authorities’. 
The actual life of the historical Jesus did permit these memories to be set into 
motion. By insisting that the historical Jesus was capable of triggering such 
memories, Keith attempts by no means to downplay the existence of competing 
and contradictory memories and interpretations of Jesus’ life; all of the memories 
contained in the Gospels simply cannot be historically accurate, which means that 
‘[e]arly Christians undoubtedly did remember him incorrectly at times’.901
 Furthermore, Keith distances himself from what he views as ‘the criteria 
approach’s fragmentation of the written tradition’. He does not attempt to 
‘neutralize the interpretations of Jesus’ in the written tradition, because he believes 
that ‘the interpretations of the past themselves are what preserve any connection to 
the actual past’. A removal of these interpretations results in a removal of ‘any 
bridge to the actual past’. Keith emphasizes in line with Schröter that the actual 
past can be discussed by scholars, but one cannot get closer to it by dismissing the 
interpretations of Jesus in the written tradition.902 In his article, Keith also points 
out that this approach shares some common ground with redaction criticism, 
which is interested in the theological interpretations of the Gospel authors.903
 The task of the Jesus historian is, according to Keith, ‘to explain the existence 
of the Jesus-memories in the Gospels’, namely, to account for the interpretations 
in the Gospels without dismissing them or fragmenting them. Again, this task 
is described in terms of a departure from the criteria approach. First, due to the 
901  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (172); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 63-64.
902  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (172-73); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 65. Italics are 
original. 
903  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (173); cf. Schröter, ‘Von der Historizität der 
Evangelien’, pp. 163-212 (205); Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 83. 
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reality that memory is shaped in the present of the remembering community, the 
contextual factors shaping the Jesus-memory are to be studied; Jesus-memories 
must be placed within the contexts of first-century Judaism and the early Church, 
not distanced from these contexts as does the criterion of dissimilarity. Second, 
Jesus-memories must be interpreted in their narrative contexts; this is another 
reason to emphasize understanding the Jesus-memories in their historical 
contexts. Third, one must admit that the actual past of the historical Jesus cannot 
be accessed in full; however, this does not mean a complete lack of access to the 
past because the actual past did happen and some of it was preserved in social 
memory. By this Keith probably refers to the idea that there is no access to an 
uninterpreted past. These parameters leave the Jesus historian with the task of 
positing ‘an actual past that best explains the existence of the Jesus-memories in 
light of the contexts of remembrance in early Christianity’.904
 Keith compares the way the Jesus-memory approach relates to the actual past 
to the text critics’ approach to variant readings. The reading that best explains 
others is viewed as original. This suggestion had not, according to Keith, drawn 
much attention from scholars, although the Jesus-memory approach ‘provides a 
fuller methodological basis’ for such an approach to the historical Jesus.905
 While recognizing that neither rejecting the criteria approach nor referring 
to mnemonic evidence is anything new in the study of the historical Jesus, Keith 
outlines several advantages of the Jesus-memory approach. First, based upon a 
solid conceptual framework for the nature and development of the Jesus tradition, 
it offers a plausible historiographical method for approaching how ancient people 
904  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (173-74); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 66-67. Keith 
adopts Le Donne’s notion of ‘triangulation’ which refers to the process of establishing different 
interpretive trajectories of an event in Jesus’ life and claims. It is the historian’s responsibility 
to account for the relationship between those trajectories, but the process does not identify an 
exact historical reality; rather the purpose is, in Le Donne’s words, to ‘establish the most plausible 
intersection between the established trajectories’. While accepting Le Donne’s way of describing 
the historical task as ‘considering what could have happened in the past to produce the different 
interpretative trajectories’, Keith disagrees with Le Donne’s appeals to and use of the criteria of 
authenticity. See Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 85-86, on the criteria of authenticity, pp. 87-88, 
176, 252 n. 107, 265, 267.
905  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (175); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 67-68. Keith notes 
that his own Doktorvater, Larry Hurtado, has proposed a similar approach. See L. W. Hurtado, 
‘A Taxonomy of Recent Historical-Jesus Work’, in W. E. Arnal and M. Desjardins (eds.), Whose 
Historical Jesus? (Études sur le christianisme et le judaisme, 7; Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1997), pp. 272-95 (295). Keith also recognizes the similarity of Werner Kelber’s 
approach to the Jesus tradition in Kelber, ‘Conclusion: The Work of Birger Gerhardsson in 
Perspective’, pp. 173-206 (204).
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appropriated and preserved the past. Second, instead of discussing hypothetical 
tradition-histories, it ‘locates scholarly discussion on the written texts that scholars 
have’, thus marking a ‘return to the text’.906 Third, this leads to the advantage of 
avoiding the extremes of both Modernity and Postmodernity, as the Jesus-memory 
approach takes seriously the notion that historical portrayals are representations 
of the past, not the actual past itself. For Keith this does not mean that scholars are 
unwarranted to ‘theorize about the actual past based on the commemorations it 
produced’.907 Keith concludes that his approach affirms form criticism and criteria 
approach’s ‘best aspect’, namely, their recognition of early Christian interpretative 
activity, while addressing ‘their worsts aspect’, which is their exclusion of the 
impact of Jesus upon the interpretations of him. Keith believes that the overall 
implications of his approach challenge the clean distinction between the historical 
Jesus and the Christ of faith.908 In sum, Keith’s view indicates that there is no Jesus 
tradition devoid of theological interpretation.
 In his book-length study on Jesus’ literacy and the scribal-literate status, Keith 
argues for low levels of literacy in first-century Greco-Roman world, including first-
century Palestine.909 In light of his reconstruction of the first-century Palestinian 
906  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (176-77); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 68-69; see also, 
idem, Scribal, pp. 81-84. This notion is made repeatedly by Dale Allison; see e.g. Allison, Jesus 
of Nazareth, pp. 27-31. In terms of Paul Ricoeur, Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 44 n. 67, labels this 
return to the text ‘a second naiveté in critical Jesus research’: ‘Ricoeur’s concept of the second 
naiveté is concerned with philosophical, theological, and hermeneutical approaches to meaning 
and language as myth (Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil [trans. Emerson Buchanan; Boston: 
Beacon, 1967], pp. 347-57; esp. p. 351). He uses it to propose where readers (can) go once the 
introduction of criticism destroys the ‘primitive naiveté’ of pre-critical textual encounters. Its 
relevance in the current discussion is not so much due to its theological/philosophical import as 
its description of the critical enterprise. Jesus studies have paralleled the path Ricoeur describes. 
After form criticism and the criteria approach disrupted the narratives of the Gospels and their 
interpretations of Jesus in search of “history”, scholarship returned to the surface level of the 
text. This return, however, is not to the original pre-critical position vis-à-vis the text, but to 
a new understanding in light of what the criteria approach has taught scholars.’ Keith takes 
the quotation from C. Keith and L. Hurtado, ‘Conclusion: Seeking the Historical Jesus among 
Friends and Enemies’, in Keith and Hurtado (eds.), Jesus among Friends and Enemies: A Historical 
and Literary Introduction to Jesus in the Gospels (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), pp. 269-
88 (281-88).
907  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (177); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 69; cf. Schröter, ‘Von 
der Historizität’, pp. 163-212 (205); P. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (trans. K. Blamey and 
D. Pellauer; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 235-38.
908  Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (177); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 69-70.
909  Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 71-123. Keith views his work in continuum with Harris, Ancient 
Literacy; Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth; Hezser, Jewish Literacy; H. Gregory Snyder, Teachers and 
Texts in the Ancient World: Philosophers, Jews and Christians (New York: Routledge, 2000); David 
M. Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart: Origins of Scripture and Literature (New York: Oxford 
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scribal culture and context and social memory theory, Keith attempts to explain 
the different portrayals of the historical Jesus as to his scribal-literate status. He 
argues that the question of Jesus’ scribal-literate status can not be answered with 
a simple affirmation or denial of scribal literacy for Jesus. Keith favors the view 
that Jesus was not a scribal literate teacher, but nevertheless complicates the ques-
tion by proposing that the answer Jesus’ contemporaries would have given would 
depend upon whom one asked. The different Jesus-memories in the Gospels and 
other sources are to be explained by various groups and individuals perceiving 
different literate skills differently in the first-century Palestinian scribal culture.910
 Keith analyses the accounts of Jesus’ return to the synagogue in his hometown 
Nazareth as a central example of his view that the Synoptic Gospels and John 
witness to explicit first-century Christian disagreement or confusion over Jesus’ 
scribal-literate status. On the one hand, Mark is at one end of the spectrum in 
claiming that Jesus was ‘not like scribes’ (Mark 1.22), but rather identified 
as a τέκτων, a member of the artisan class, and rejected in his hometown as a 
synagogue teacher due to this identification (Mark 6.3). On the other hand, Luke 
removes the charge that Jesus is a τέκτων and portrays him as a scribal-literate 
teacher who is familiar with Hebrew manuscripts and capable of public reading of 
Scripture in a synagogue (Luke 4.16-20), suggesting that the rejection of Jesus was 
not due to his teaching in the synagogue but for his refusal to heal in Nazareth (Lk. 
4.23-29). Instead of attempting to establish the more ‘authentic’ or ‘true‘ portrayal 
of Jesus and his scribal-literate status, Keith argues that the historical Jesus was 
capable of producing these contradictory portrayals, that the Markan portrayal 
was closer to historical reality, and that Luke was not merely inventing his image 
since different perceptions of Jesus would have existed among eyewitnesses.911 In 
contrast to the Synoptics that evince for ‘a debate over Jesus’ scribal-literate status 
between sources’, Keith posits that in John the debate takes place within Jesus’ life: 
John 7.15 indi cates that Jesus could inspire both the view that he was uneducated 
like most Galileans and a reassessment of this view by teaching ‘as if he had been 
University Press, 2005); R. A. Horsley, Scribes, Visionaries, and the Poitics of Second Temple Judea 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007); and Karel van der Toorn, Scribal Culture and the 
Making of the Hebrew Bible (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).
910  Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 124-64, 189-90.
911  Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 124-64, 190; also, idem, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (175-
76).
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educated’.912
 Keith builds his more recent assessment of the conflict narratives between Jesus 
and the scribal elite upon this work on Jesus’ literacy and social memory theory.913 
According to Kei th, the conflict must be viewed in light of the different perceptions 
of Jesus, a scribal-illiterate carpenter who occasionally took the position of a 
scribal-literate teacher, by various groups within Second Temple Judaism.914 
Keith argues that this view of the origins of the conflict is not incompatible 
with other contributing factors, such as Jesus’ identity as a miracle worker, a 
healer, an exorcist, the Messiah, or a prophet. He does, however, emphasize the 
importance of Jesus’ early career, which led to the conflict, more than previous 
scholarship. While no di rect line can be drawn from the origins of the controversy 
in Galilean synagogues to the reso lution of the controversy on a Roman cross in 
Jerusalem, historians of Jesus must account for how Jesus became worthy of the 
attention of the scribal elite in the first place. The early con flicts with the scribal 
elite, taking place publicly in an honor/shame culture, elicited confusion about 
Jesus’ scribal-literate status and launched hostility against him on the part of the 
elite. In tracing the roots of the conflict to Jesus and his ministry, Keith distances 
himself from scholarship that argues for fabrication of the controversy narratives 
by early Christians against non-Christian Jews. He draws attention to what he 
calls ‘the beginning of the end’, namely, ‘the escalation of the conflict from initial 
questioning to outright hostility’, and per ceives irony in the fact that, in engaging 
Jesus in public debates over Scripture and authority in order to expose him as not 
truly a scribal-literate teacher, the scribal elite enabled some au diences to perceive 
Jesus as exactly that. These conclusions are based on Keith’s view of so cial memory 
and the hermeneutical process of transmitting the Jesus tradition which allegedly 
does not disconnect the Gospel narrative entirely from the past; the past and the 
present are connected in complex ways.915
912  Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 155-56.
913  Keith, Scribal, pp. 109-26, addresses, for example, the following instances of conflict: (1) regarding 
Scripture: Torah (Mk. 10.2/Mt. 19.3-10; Mk 12.18-27/Mt. 22.23-33/Lk. 20.27-40), The Prophets 
(Mk. 7.1-13/Mt. 15.1-9), The Writings (Mk 12.35-37/Mt. 22.41/Lk. 20.27, 39); (2) regarding 
authority: e.g. Jesus’ demonstration in the temple: Mk 11:15-17/Mt. 21.12-13/Lk. 19.45-46, Mk 
11.27-28 cf. Mt. 21.23/Lk. 20.1-2, Mk 11.29-30/Mt. 21.24-25/Lk. 20.3-4 etc.; in John’s Gospel, 
Jesus’ conflict against ‘the Jews’ (e.g. Jn 5, 10).
914  Keith, Scribal, pp. 15-37, 39-65, 155.
915  Keith, Scribal, pp. 85-108, 109-26, 127-51, 155-57 (157).
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Critique & Evaluation
As for scholarly reactions to Keith’s view of the Jesus traditions and the study of 
the historical Jesus, there are those who concur with his reconstruction of the 
first-century literacy situation and view his application of social memory theory 
to the study of the Jesus traditions as a positive development,916 and others who 
do not find his version of the memory approach to the Jesus traditions entirely 
convincing or helpful.917 In this critique and evaluation section, the latter critical 
responses to Keith are first presented and discussed; then, the contribution of 
Keith’s view to the field of historical Jesus research is addressed.
 A significant criticism directed against Keith’s proposal has to do with how he 
links the criteria approach to the Jesus traditions with form criticism, proposing 
as a result – so the critics say – an inadequate view of the history of Jesus research. 
Tobias Hägerland recognizes that Keith’s view reflects a broader tendency to 
problematize the criteria of authenticity and re-evaluate the notion of authenticity, 
although few have taken their criticism as far as Keith, who places the criteria in 
opposition to the concept of memory.918 After complaining that the criticisms of 
the criteria tend to attack the whole idea of the criteria approach, regardless of how 
the criteria are defined, Hägerland explicates why he finds Keith’s argument about 
the indebtedness of the criteria approach to form criticism problematic (as the 
former is associated with scholars like Bultmann, Käsemann, Perrin, Meier, and 
Holmén, and consists of the ‘stable core’ of the criteria of dissimilarity, multiple 
attestation, and coherence).919
 Hägerland charges Keith’s logic for calling for the abandonment of the criteria 
approach on the basis of a supposed scholarly consensus that form criticism 
is thoroughly flawed. Keith is taken to task for quoting only parts of Samuel 
916  See e.g. Eve, Behind, pp. 10-11, 28-29, 129; idem, Writing, pp. 1-4 (3), 106; Rodríguez, Oral 
Tradition, pp. 3, 22, 120 n. 5, 10, 121 n. 16, 123 n. 26, 128 n. 34, 134-35 n. 45. The views of 
Allison, Constructing, and Le Donne, Historiographical; idem, Historical Jesus, are in many ways 
consonant with Keith’s basic notions regarding social memory theory. Also, Kelber, Horsley, 
Dunn, Rodríguez, Allison, and several others share Keith’s interest in social memory theory 
and his skepticism toward the criteria of authenticity. See also Keith and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, 
Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity. 
917  Esp. Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (45-47, 49-53); more critically, van Eck, 
‘Memory’, pp. 1-10.
918  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (46-47). Keith and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, 
Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, is a prime example of this tendency.
919  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (48-49), argues that, for example, the criticisms 
by Allison and Schöter are insensitive to the different ways that criteria are used by scholars like 
Ernst Käsemann, John Dominic Crossan, and the Jesus Seminar.
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Byrskog’s and Christopher Tuckett’s assessments of form criticism in order to 
give the impression that the two are completely dismissive of form criticism; 
however, both Byrskog and Tuckett leave open at least the possibility that there are 
‘insights of lasting validity’ even in early form criticism, although the paradigm in 
its entirety needs to be modified.920 Keith’s rejection of form criticism runs deep 
and is at least partially unfounded: the criteria of authenticity seem to be deemed 
invalid simply due to their association with form criticism.921
 Hägerland’s objection to Keith’s proposal has to do with the notion that the 
criteria approach stems ‘directly from form-critical soil’.922 While Keith is right 
in noting that some of the criteria of authenticity were defined and approved 
by Bultmann, and that form criticism and the criteria approach mirror each 
other at several points, Hägerland argues that the conclusion does not stand 
critical scrutiny: Keith does not consider the possibility that the similarities are 
derived from earlier historical Jesus research. The notion of the Gospels as a mix 
of authentic and inauthentic traditions was prevalent already in the nineteenth 
century, for example, in the work of David Strauss.923 In fact, the form critics did 
not formulate the criteria, while the development of some of them can be linked 
to form criticism; for instance, the criteria of dissimilarity, multiple attestation, 
and coherence have a longer history of use.924
920  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (50-51). Keith, ‘The Indebtedness’, pp. 25-48 
(37), quotes Tuckett, ‘Form Criticism’, pp. 21-38 (37): ‘The various challenges and criticism which 
have been directed against the model of form criticism as developed by Dibelius and Bultmann 
are serious. That model, in precisely that form, is probably no longer sustainable.’, leaving out 
‘it is doubtful if we can simply turn the clock back nearly one hundred years and pretend that 
form criticism has contributed nothing’; and Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20 (19): ‘Today form 
criticism is being challenged on several – if not all – of its basic tenets. Scholars have abandoned 
or modified it.’ Keith leaves out what Byrskog (p. 19) means by this modification which ‘looks 
at forms and literary types from the perspective of mnemonic signs or textual effect rather than 
their one-dimensional correlation with the Sitz im Leben of the early church’.
921  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (50-51); cf. ch. 2.1 above. It has to be recognized, 
however, that Keith, ‘The Indebtedness’ pp. 25-48 (37-40), does discuss the most common 
criticisms of form criticism.
922  Cf. Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (163-64); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 37-39; idem, 
Scribal, pp. 76-77.
923  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (51-52); see David Friedrich Strauss, Das Leben 
Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet (2. vols.; Tübingen: Ossiander, 4th edn [reprint of 1st edn], 1840), pp. 
100-5. Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 (437), admits 
this. See the discussion below.
924  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (51-52); on the criterion of dissimilarity, e.g. 
G. Theissen and D. Winter, Die Kriterienfrage in der Jesusforschung: Vom Differenzkriterium 
zum Plausibiltätskriterium (NTOA, 34; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997), pp. 28-174; 
Strauss, Das Leben Jesu, p. 103; on the criterion of multiple attestation, e.g. F. C. Burkitt, The 
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 As a confirmation of this, Hägerland points to the fact that one of the basic 
tenets of form criticism stands in an irreconcilable conflict with the criterion of 
dissimilarity. He challenges Keith’s claim that the criteria approach follows form 
criticism in taking a ‘presentist’ approach to the relationship between the past 
and the present, based on the form-critical notions of unfailing correspondence 
between the literary form of the tradition and the Sitz im Leben and the bounding 
of the contents of the tradition to the interests of the transmitters. Hägerland 
argues that the criterion of dissimilarity ‘operates precisely on the principle that 
some traditions do not reflect the transmitters’ interests’.925 The form-critical 
idea of Sitz im Leben stands, therefore, in contradiction to the criterion of 
dissimilarity,926 which has been recognized by neither those who use the criteria 
nor those who reject them.927 Hägerland contends that the fact that ‘the probably 
most important authenticity criterion’ cannot be reconciled with the early 
form-critical understanding of memory and tradition indicates that ‘the alleged 
indebtedness of the criteria to form criticism has been severely exaggerated’.928
 Interestingly, despite his criticism of the rejection of the criteria approach 
by Keith and others, Hägerland is nevertheless willing to recognize the value 
of the memory approach’s general emphasis on the nature of the past as always 
remembered and interpreted. Memory studies have shown that ‘authenticity’ 
Gospel History and Its Transmission (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1906), pp. 147-68; Heinrich Weinel, 
Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments: Die Religion Jesu und des Urchristentums (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2nd edn, 1913), p. 45; on the criterion of coherence, e.g. Johannes Weiss, Die 
Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1892). See Anthony Le 
Donne, ‘The Criterion of Coherence: Its Development, Inevitability, and Historical Limitations’, 
in Keith and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, pp. 95-114 (97-99).
925  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (52); cf. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 62-63.
926  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (52-53); T. Holmén, ‘Knowing about Q and 
Knowing about Jesus: Mutually Exclusive Undertakings?’, in A. Lindemann (ed.), The Sayings 
Source Q and the Historical Jesus (BETL, 158; Leuven: Peeters, 2001), pp. 497-514 (500): ‘…if 
the preserved traditions… are bound to exhibit the theological and social dispositions of their 
bearers… there simply cannot be traditions that are “dissimilar to Christianity”’. 
927  Hägerland argues that both sides are guilty of adopting the early form-critical notion of memory 
and tradition, namely, that ‘commemoration always takes place in order to serve the interests of 
those who remember’. On one side, Meier, A Marginal Jew, IV, p. 174 n. 125, thinks, for example, 
that ‘in Jesus’ prohibition of divorce, discontinuity [=dissimilarity] does not apply to the early 
church’s teaching or actions. We know of Jesus’ prohibition of divorce only because the early 
Christians handed on this teaching’. On the other side, Mark Goodacre, ‘Criticizing the Criterion 
of Multiple Attestation: The Historical Jesus and the Qurestion of Sources’, in Keith and Le Donne 
(eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise Authenticity, pp. 152-69 (165-67), argues that the criteria 
of embarrassment and multiple attestation are in contradiction with each other, since multiple 
attestation does not indicate that a tradition was found embarrassing by the transmitters.
928  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (53).
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cannot mean ‘a state of non-remembered, non-interpreted hard facts of the past’.929 
One may even take this as a reframing of the authenticity/inauthenticity language, 
albeit not to the degree Keith has in mind.930
 Ernest van Eck expresses, in turn, a much more severe criticism of Keith’s 
position, as well as of the whole enterprise of employing ‘memory studies’ in the 
study of the historical Jesus, which he views as ‘nothing else than Formgeschichte 
in a new dress’.931 While acknowledging that Keith’s basic understanding of form 
criticism is correct,932 van Eck argues that form criticism cannot be linked with 
the criteria approach, as Keith does. Rather, the criteria approach, which should 
be seen in conjunction with the so-called New Quest or the Third Quest, has 
Redaktionsgeschichte as its point of departure; thus, instead of trying to identify 
the oral traditions within and ‘behind’ the text, the criteria approach focuses on 
the literary text, the contribution of its final author, and ‘identifying the most 
probable earliest tradition in the written tradition’ via Redaktionsgeschichte and 
the use of criteria.933 Van Eck attempts to demonstrate this by an example: based 
on the Two- (or Four-) source theory as a solution to the Synoptic Problem, the 
criteria approach would argue in a study of Matthew that ‘the majority of the 
sources used by the narrator were not oral traditions behind the text, but written 
sources such as Mark and Q’, although M (Matthean Sondergut) could have 
929  See Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (62).
930  See below; Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 (432-33): 
‘Such softening claims [including those of Hägerland] for the criteria approach do not align with 
the logic by which the criteria work...’
931  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (2). Van Eck associates the views of Zeba Crook, Paul Foster, Chris 
Keith, Rafael Rodríguez, Anthony Le Donne, and Jens Schröter with the rise of ‘memory studies’ 
in historical Jesus research. For a blunt rebuttal of van Eck’s criticism of the memory approach 
and Keith’s own view, see Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-
55 (430, 432, 442, 449).
932  Namely, that form criticism is a method which studies how the pre-literary oral Jesus tradition 
was shaped in the earliest communities due to various Sitze im Leben and attempts to separate 
that tradition from the later interpretations by the Gospel authors and their communities. Cf. 
Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (160).
933  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (4-5). On the one hand, van Eck notes that Rafael Rodríguez, ‘An 
Uneasy Concord: Memory and history in contemporary Jesus research’, paper presented at the 
SBL Annual meeting, Memory studies in historical Jesus research; Baltimore, 22–26 November 
(2013), pp. 1-18 (6), has also confirmed that Redaktionsgeschichte is the point of departure for the 
criteria approach. On the other hand, I find the argument of Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, 
pp. 155-77 (173), that his Jesus-memory approach shares some common ground with redaction 
criticism, convincing: it is the purpose of the Jesus-memory approach to study the different 
theological interpretations of Jesus in the final texts of the Gospels.
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partially consisted of oral traditions.934
 Van Eck detects a further problem in Keith’s notion that the written texts are 
not the only sources of the past, but additionally one needs to account for the ‘past 
interpretations of the past’ in order to study the historical Jesus.935 Ironically, van 
Eck views these ‘interpretations’ as exactly the oral traditions that form criticism 
sought to identify ‘behind’ the written texts. The memory approach is, according 
to him, guilty of historical positivism, as it supports the evolutionary development 
of the Gospel tradition wherein the oral tradition (or memory re fraction) 
‘absorbed elements of the early Church’s faith on an inevitable path toward the 
tra dition’s textualization’.936 Consequently, the memory approach, rather than the 
criteria ap proach, believes that earlier oral traditions (or memories) are present 
in the Gospels; as van Eck contends that these earlier oral traditions, and the 
earliest phase of oral transmission as a whole, are not accessible by any means, the 
memory approach is left with no defined sources to work with, unlike the criteria 
approach, which can use the written texts as sources that can take one ‘closer to 
the earliest layer of the Jesus tradition’.937
 In line with Zeba Crook’s view,938 van Eck contends, therefore, that the memory 
approach to the study of the Jesus traditions and the historical Jesus is reminiscent 
of the Old Quest that employed form criticism, and results in ‘a new No Quest’; 
as memory is prone to distortion and it is not possible ‘to distinguish between 
real and distorted memories’, the historical reliability of the Gospels is completely 
questioned.939 Van Eck argues that scholars would be better off if they completely 
ignored memory studies: memory studies are not needed to reach the conclusion 
934  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (5), quoting Kloppenborg, ‘Memory, Performance, and the Sayings 
of Jesus’, pp. 97-132 (103-5) to argue for the Synoptics’ use of written rather than oral sources.
935  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (5); cf. Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (169): ‘…the 
appropriation of collective memory must account not only for the role of the present in shaping 
the past, but also the role of the past, and past interpretations of the past, in shaping the present’.
936  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (5) quotes the description of form criticism in Keith, ‘Memory and 
Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (159). Italics are original.
937  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (5-6); therefore, ‘[m]emory studies, when applied to the study of the 
historical Jesus, are nothing else than Formgeschichte in a new dress’.
938  Zeba Crook, ‘Memory theory and the evolution to a New Quest’, paper presented at the SBL 
Annual meeting, Memory studies in historical Jesus research, Baltimore. 22–26 November 
(2013), pp. 1-22 (3, 12, 13).
939  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (6); cf. Crook, ‘Memory theory and the evolution to a New Quest’, 
pp. 1-22 (3, 12, 13); also see Zeba Crook, ‘Collective Memory Distortion and the Quest for the 
historical Jesus’, JSHJ (2013), pp. 53-76, who argues against the view that would grant optimism 
concerning the historicity of the Gospels (pace Dunn, Bauckham, Le Donne, McIver).
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which he believes ‘has been the point of view of the criteria approach since its 
use of Redaktionsgeschichte in the New Quest and Renewed or Third Quest’: ‘[t]o 
address the problems, experiences and needs of [the specific Gospel] audiences, 
the Gospel writers told (remembered) or constructed the past in light of the 
needs of the present in the form of narratives (memories) intended for social 
formation in the present’.940 Thus, van Eck rejects Keith’s criticism that the criteria 
approach does not begin the quest for the historical Jesus from the portrayals of 
Jesus available in the sources, but rather in spite of them: taking into account the 
textual world of the Gospels,941 the criteria approach rather deems it necessary to 
get behind the text through the text.942
 There is a lot to unpack in these criticisms of Keith’s view. First, with regard 
to Hägerland’s criticism, some clarification and nuance regarding the relationship 
between the criteria of authenticity and form criticism is required, as the criteria 
of authenticity do not stem from form criticism as directly as Keith’s original 
argument about the criteria approach’s origins can be taken to suggest.943 To 
be fair, Keith’s 2016 response to Hägerland’s criticisms sheds more light on 
the issue.944 Keith admits that the post-Bultmannian scholars, in particular 
Käsemann, Bornkamm, and Hahn, who were demonstrably responsible for the 
emergence of the criteria approach as a coherent methodology, ‘were not the first 
to use the terms “authentic” or “inauthentic” for the Jesus tradition, just as they 
were not the first to formulate criteria for determining either category’.945 More to 
the point, Keith argues that his view is concerned with a macro-level criticism of 
the criteria approach to the historical Jesus more than with addressing individual 
940  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (7); cf. Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (168). Van 
Eck (p. 7) also rejects the criticism of the criteria approach by Hooker, ‘On Using the Wrong 
Tool’, pp. 570-81 (570), namely, that the criteria approach wrongly uses a literary tool, instead of 
a historical tool, to study the historical Jesus; in contrast, van Eck argues that ‘a literary tool is 
needed to postulate something about the historical Jesus’, contending that the memory approach 
is confused in its use of a historical tool to study literary texts.
941  By which he refers to the Gospel narratives as ‘a mix of received traditions, interpreted from a 
post-Paschal perspective for a specific audience, at a specific time in a specific location and social 
situation, for a specific reason’. See the discussion in van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (6-7).
942  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (7 n. 26); cf. Keith, ‘The Fall of the Quest’, pp. 200-5 (202).
943  However, see Keith, Scribal, pp. 73 n. 12, 82 n. 49, where Keith admits that ‘aspects of the criteria of 
authenticity stretch back even further than one hundred years’, and ‘…[not] all scholars applying 
social memory theory to the Gospels agree with my particular argument that the criteria are an 
outgrowth of form criticism’.
944  Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 (430-33, 436-37).
945  Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 (437). Instead, Strauss 
and other earlier scholars already employed these terms.
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criteria.946 This leads the discussion to the epistemological difference that Keith 
detects between his view and that of his critics who are not willing to discard the 
criteria of authenticity: due to the criteria approach’s alleged roots in the form-
critical assumptions about the nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions 
(specifically, their existence as individual units), Keith does not believe it to be 
epistemologically possible to combine the use of the criteria and the memory 
approach; for him it is not enough to state that the meaning of ‘authenticity’ must 
be redefined in a more cautious way.947
 Regardless of this, Keith seems to leave some room for the possibility of 
combining the criteria approach or at least some elements of it with the memory 
approach. He admits to be open to the possibility that various aspects of the 
criteria approach, such as the concept of early Christian embarrassment, may be 
useful for discussing past plausibility as long as one does not imagine to access 
the actual past, suggesting that further attention be given to this matter.948 This at 
least makes it possible to entertain the question as to whether more of the criteria 
are useful than Keith allows. After all, Hägerland and (as will be demonstrated 
below in the discussion on Allison and Le Donne) those who take seriously the 
contribution of memory studies, but still adhere to the criteria of authenticity in 
a modified form, do not believe the actual past can be accessed. Surely, as Keith 
suggests, further attention must be paid to methodological and epistemological 
matters by those who aim to integrate the criteria approach with the memory 
approach; this suggestion as such does not invalidate such efforts of integration.
 Second, concerning van Eck’s attempt at refuting Keith’s view, the assumption 
that Keith’s Jesus-memory approach is merely form criticism ‘in a new dress’ is 
problematic because it ignores that, rather than building upon a form-critical 
presentist view of the transmission of the Jesus traditions, Keith argues for a 
continuity perspective which is based on Halbwachs’ notion that memory is 
946  Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 (430-32).
947  Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 (432-33): ‘Such 
softening claims [including those of Hägerland] for the criteria approach do not align with the 
logic by which the criteria work to recover the historical Jesus and thus pass too easily over a 
fundamental theoretical and epistemological difference over how Jesus scholars can approach 
the historical Jesus and how they use the gospels to do so.’ Cf. Hägerland, ‘The Future of the 
Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (62, 65). Also, Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, 
pp. 426-55 (448-49): ‘When one removes “authenticity” as a goal for the historical endeavor but 
continues the means of attaining that goal, it raises the question of where the criteria then lead.’
948  Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 (448-49).
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conditioned by the present, but nevertheless does not dismiss the role of the past 
in shaping the memory in the present. This perspective, which is ignored in van 
Eck’s pessimistic evaluation of the memory approach, is well argued for by social 
memory theorists like Zelizer, Schwartz, Schudson, Kirk, and others.949 It does not 
do justice to Keith’s view to link it with a constructivist and presentist view of 
social memory and label it as form criticism. Contrary to van Eck’s suggestion, I 
find it more plausible to consider the overlap between Redaktionsgeschichte and 
Keith’s memory approach, which both aim to study the different interpretations of 
Jesus in the final texts of the Gospels.
 Van Eck’s ignorance of the continuity perspective results in his claim that 
the memory approach, including Keith’s view, leads to a new No Quest and 
questioning the reliability of the Gospels as historical sources. The fact that van 
Eck, following Crook,950 laments the impossibility of distinguishing between real 
and distorted memories in the memory approach evinces a misunderstanding 
of what Keith means by the ‘return to the text’. Keith is neither interested in 
using the authenticity/inauthenticity language nor is he trying to prove the his-
torical reliability of the Gospels; the Jesus-memory approach questions the use 
of such language, attempts to prove ‘historical reliability’, and rather proposes a 
way of doing his toriography without the search for ‘authentic Jesus traditions’ by 
accounting for the mnemon ic evidence, namely, the contradictory portrayals of 
Jesus in the Gospels, as there is no access to uninterpreted history or ‘the non-
remembered past’. It is on these terms that Keith’s work should be evaluated.
 Even if Keith’s characterization and rejection of the criteria approach could 
in some ways be questioned, his overall approach to the Jesus traditions and the 
reconstruction of the historical Jesus cannot be dismissed. Whatever one makes of 
Keith’s narrative of the history of Jesus scholarship, and specifically, his views about 
the origin and uselessness of the criteria approach, his Jesus-memory approach 
manages to place emphasis on the impact of Jesus on the later interpretations of 
him, namely, on the fact that there is no such thing available as an uninterpreted 
history of Jesus. In this sense, to borrow Hägerland’s statement, ‘business as usual 
949  See Keith, ‘Memory and Authenticity’, pp. 155-77 (169); idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 58-61; cf. Kirk, 
‘Social and Cultural Memory’, pp. 1-24; B. Zelizer, ‘Reading the Past’, pp. 214-39; Schwartz, 
Abraham Lincoln; Shils, Tradition; Schudson, ‘The Present’, pp. 105-13; Fentress and Wickham, 
Social Memory.
950  Crook, ‘Memory theory and the evolution to a New Quest’, pp. 1-22.
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in Jesus research is over’.951
 Keith’s proposal of the nature and development of the Jesus tradition is capable 
of producing scholarship that takes the different, even contradictory, portrayals of 
the level of Jesus’ scribal literacy/illiteracy – as well as the depictions of conflict in 
the Gospel narratives – seriously, offering historical explanations, and does this 
by incorporating insights from social memory theory in the field of the historical 
Jesus.952 Whether the criteria of authenticity can have any place in conducting the 
job of a Jesus scholar after the rise of the memory approach is further addressed 
below in conjunction with the works of Dale Allison, who thinks the traditional 
criteria are beyond any repair, and Anthony Le Donne, who still finds use for the 
criteria when studying the nature and transmission of the Jesus traditions in early 
Christianity.953
3.6 Dale C. Allison
Dale C. Allison (b.1955) has formulated another significant application of social 
memory theory to the study of the Jesus traditions in what promises to be his 
final book-length treatment of the historical Jesus, Constructing Jesus: Memory, 
Imagination, and History (2010).954 Allison begins by addressing the frailty of 
human memory: misperception and misremembering are unavoidable, and even 
951  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (62).
952  A recent example of applying a memory approach similar to that of Keith to the Gospels and, 
more specifically, to the parables of Jesus is Zimmermann, Puzzling the Parables. See esp. 
Zimmermann, Puzzling the Parables, pp. 57-103, on what he labels a paradigm shift from the 
‘historical’ to a ‘remembered’ Jesus. This way of studying the parables differs radically from Meier, 
Marginal Jew, V, who adheres to the traditional methods, applying the criteria of authenticity to 
the parables of Jesus rigorously.
953  One may ask whether those critical of the criteria approach, like Keith, also refer to the 
principles behind the criteria when making judgments about the historical scenarios related to 
the mnemonic evidence. In other words, besides his careful reconstruction of the first-century 
literary contexts, to what extent is Keith’s contribution to the scholarly discussion on Jesus’ literacy 
due to the originality of his ‘Jesus-‘memory approach’, and is it, at least partially, based on his 
use of the entities of Jesus traditions without invoking the authenticity/inauthenticity language 
while still applying the principles behind the criteria, say, for example, multiple attestation, 
dissimilarity and coherence? Cf. the discussion below on Allison’s view (ch. 3.6).
954  Allison, Constructing, p. ix. Allison had previously presented some of his ideas in Allison, Jesus of 
Nazareth; idem, The Historical Christ and the Theological Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009). 
Also see Allison, ‘How to Marginalize the Traditional Criteria of Authenticity’, in T. Holmén & 
S. E. Porter (eds.), Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus (4 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 
1:3-30, which had been prepared several years prior to the publication; idem, ‘It Don’t Come 
Easy: A History of Disillusionment’, in Keith and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise 
of Authenticity, pp. 186-99. Eve, Behind, does not discuss Allison’s view at length.
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eyewitnesses give different accounts of events.955 Allison employs memory studies 
extensively to demonstrate the ‘many sins’ of human memory. (1) Memory is 
reconstructive, reproductive, and involves imagination; (2) a person’s recall can 
be altered by incorporation of post-event information, retroactive inference, 
and social pressure; (3) present circumstances and biases are projected onto past 
experiences, and former selves are assimilated to present selves; (4) memories 
become less distinct with time’s passage; (5) memories are displaced as temporal 
judgments are reconstructive; (6) memories are organized into patterns that 
advance their agendas by both individuals and collectives as remembering is a 
way of maintaining meaningful self-identity; (7) competing memories are not 
rehearsed by communities, and approved remembrance lives on; (8) narrative 
conventions, such as ‘a neat beginning, a coherent middle, and a resolution that 
satisfies’, as well as fitting characters, impact memory; (9) subjectively compelling 
memories, which people are inclined to trust, are ‘decidedly inaccurate’.956 
 Allison’s emphasis on the malleability of memory does not lead him to 
dismiss the hope of accessing anything about the past, including the historical 
Jesus. While the deficiencies of recall should ‘profoundly unsettle us would-be-
historians of Jesus’, he believes ‘a middle way’ between naïve apologetic trust in 
the Gospels and hyper-skepticism toward the Jesus traditions can be argued; the 
955  Allison, Constructing, p. 1, immediately rejects the view that ‘eyewitnesses or companions 
of eyewitnesses composed the canonical Gospels’, held most prominently by Bauckham, 
Eyewitnesses.
956  Allison, Constructing, pp. 2-8. Allison cites respectively e.g. Henry L. Roediger and Kathleen 
B. McDermott, ‘Creating False Memories: Remembering Words Not Presented in Lists’, 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 21 (1995), pp. 803-14; 
Bartlett, Remembering; William F. Brewer, ‘What is Recollective Memory?’, in David C. Rubin 
(ed.), Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 19-66; Elizabeth F. Loftus, James A. Coan, and Jacqueline E. Pickrell, 
‘Manufacturing False Memories Using Bits of Reality’, in Lynne M. Reder (ed.), Implicit Memory 
and Metacognition (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), pp. 195-220; Deborah 
Davis and Elizabeth F. Loftus, ‘Internal and External Sources of Misinformation in Adult 
Witness Memory’, in Michael P. Toglia et al. (eds.), Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology: Memory 
for Events, Volume 1 (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007), pp. 195-238; Norman 
R. Brown, Lance J. Rips, and Steven K. Shevell, ‘Subjective Dates of Natural Events in Very Long-
Term Memory’, Cognitive Psychology 17 (1985), pp. 139-77; Steven Rose, The Making of Memory: 
From Molecules to Mind (New York: Doubleday, 1992), p. 307; M. Halbwachs, The Collective 
Memory (trans. Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yadzi Ditter; 1950; repr.; New York: Harper & Row, 
1980); Kirk and Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, and Text; Le Donne, Historiographical; 
Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory; Helen L. Williams, Martin A. Conway, and Gillian 
Cohen, ‘Autobiographical Memory’, in Gillian Cohen and Martin Conway (eds.), Memory in the 
Real World (New York: Psychology Press, 3rd edn, 2008), pp. 63-70.
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Gospels do indeed preserve memories of Jesus, although there must be much else 
mixed in their recollections.957 Having articulated his strong misgivings about 
the traditional criteria of authenticity and scholarly attempts to proceed on the 
basis of pre-authenticated traditions,958 Allison argues that, instead of details, 
scholars should focus on the big picture, the general impressions of the Jesus 
traditions; since ‘[t]he first-century traditions about Jesus are not an amorphous 
mess’, scholars should expect to ‘find memory’ of Jesus in the themes, motifs, 
and rhetorical strategies which ‘recur again and again’ and together ‘leave some 
distinct impressions’.959
 Allison labels this method which looks for ‘macrosamples’ in the Jesus traditions 
the principle of recurrent attestation. For example, the numerous traditions that 
exhibit Jesus as an exorcist and in a successful combat with Satan create a large 
pattern which is based on generalities rather than the authenticity of individual 
units and can lead to the conclusion that ‘Jesus was an exorcist who thought of 
himself as successfully combating the devil’. Another example of this principle is 
the notion that Jesus regularly spoke about ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ, which cannot be 
accounted for through the criteria of double dissimilarity or multiple attesta tion, 
but rather is a topic that ‘reappears again and again throughout the tradition’.960
 In response to Tom Holmén’s critique about the general nature of information 
that recurrent attestation can yield, Allison argues that the method can give more 
than nonspecific or cursory results; it offers more than a minimalist foundation 
for reconstructing the historical Jesus.961 Allison admits that some additional 
957  Allison, Constructing, pp. 8-10 (9). Allison (p. 9 n. 47) does ‘not contend that the evangelists 
were…amnesiacs’. Regarding the role of the evangelists in molding the Jesus tradition, Allison, 
Constructing, p. 160, argues that ‘the Jesus tradition was not, at least for Matthew and Luke, a 
mere peg upon which to hang their own ideas. They did not just look into the well of tradition 
and narcissistically see only their own reflections. Instead, they were primarily…exegetes, and 
they typically contributed to the sayings of Jesus and stories about him by way of “abbreviation 
and omission, clarification and explanation, elaboration and extension of motif.” [The quotation 
is from Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 224] In other words, their business was largely that of 
contextualizing the tradition.’ Allison assumes the existence of Q source and the Markan priority.
958  For Allison’s initial reservations about the standard criteria, see Allison, Jesus of Nazareth; later he 
has abandoned any ambition to redeem the criteria: see Allison, Constructing, p. 10 n. 51; idem, 
‘How to Marginalize the Traditional Criteria’, pp. 3-30; idem, ‘It Don’t Come Easy’, pp. 186-99.
959  Allison, Constructing, p. 10-17 (15).
960  Allison, Constructing, pp. 17-20 (19). Allison (pp. 17-18) lists several passages in the Synoptic 
tradition where Jesus is depicted as an exorcist and combating the forces of Satan.
961  Allison, Constructing, p. 20; cf. Holmén, ‘Authenticity Criteria’, pp. 43-54 (47), which originally 
responded to Allison, ‘How to Marginalize the Traditional Criteria’, pp. 3-30. Interestingly, 
Allison, Constructing, p. 20 n. 85, states: ‘Nothing prohibits those less skeptical of the criteria of 
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considerations about the tradition are necessary; he is, for instance, willing 
to argue for the historicity of the twelve disciples and Jesus as the originator of 
most of the sayings in Luke’s Sermon on the Plain and elsewhere, and accepts the 
formulation of certain tradition histories as aids, his belief in the Q source being 
an exam ple of this. Furthermore, Allison aligns his method with E. P. Sanders’ 
argument in Jesus and Judaism, namely, that one ought not to start by the sayings 
supposedly authenticated by the criteria: it is more fruitful, via abduction, to look 
for a Jesus who makes sense of what is oth erwise known of Judaism and early 
Christianity.962
 Besides Sanders’ chief facts about Jesus’ life (Jesus was a Galilean preacher and 
healer who submitted to John’s baptism and limited his activity to Israel, etc.),963 
Allison suggests with slightly varying confidence that (1) some items (esp. sayings) 
in the Jesus traditions seem to have been designed to be remembered (such as ‘Love 
your enemies’), (2) Jesus was an itinerant teacher whose committed supporters 
must have become familiar with his standard teachings, and (3) some of Jesus’ 
sympathizers extended Jesus’ ministry through their own missional activities.964 
Allison suggests throughout his work that, according to the early tradi tions, Jesus 
displayed apocalyptic expectations, viewed himself at the centre of God’s activity 
in the world, and anticipated and accepted his coming execution.965
 Allison also addresses the objection that modern studies on memory cannot be 
used to draw historical conclusions about the Jesus traditions in ancient contexts. 
He argues that the ‘sins of memory’ are not limited to modern times, and ‘the 
distinction between detailed memories and more generalized recall’ is applicable 
to early Christian texts. While admitting that early Christians whose identity was 
largely dependent upon their view of the Jesus tradition would not have accepted 
authenticity from employing them in connection with what I have called “recurrent attestation”.’
962  Allison, Constructing, pp. 21-22; cf. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, pp. 4-5, 15-16, 18-22. Allison (p. 
22 n. 93) notes that this final point partially corresponds to ‘historical plausibility’ in Theissen 
and Winter, The Plausible Jesus.
963  Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, pp. 4-5, 15-16, 18-22.
964  Allison, Constructing, pp. 23-25. Allison (p. 23) is in agreement with C. H. Dodd, The Founder of 
Christianity (London: Fontana, 1973), p. 33, who argued that when allowing for the distortions 
of the tradition, ‘it remains that the first three gospels offer a body of sayings on the whole so 
consistent, so coherent, and withal so distinctive in manner, style, and content, that no reasonable 
critics should doubt, whatever reservations he may have about individual sayings, that we find 
reflected here the thought of a single, unique teacher’.
965  Allison, Constructing, passim; as noted also by Rafael Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as his Friends Remembered 
Him A Review of Dale Allison’s Constructing Jesus’, JSHJ 12 (2014), pp. 224-44 (230).
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‘major divergencies’,966 Allison emphasizes the variability of the tradition. Tradents 
would introduce changes to the tradition in an oral culture; the differences 
between the Gospels, the lack of verbatim repetition, or the existence of the Fourth 
Gospel cannot be accounted for without a notion that each oral performance was 
to some degree new. Selective recall and distortion would have played a key role 
even among eyewitnesses, as any retelling of the past would be influenced by (1) 
the prospect of there being an audience, (2) the aims of a speaker, (3) expectations 
of the interests and attitudes of the listeners, and (4) the reactions of the audience. 
It was not the intention of early Christians, concludes Allison, to memorize the 
Jesus tradition verbatim; and while the tradition had its origins in the acts of 
recall by early Christian leaders, their memories ‘must have been subject to all the 
failures and biases that modern science has so helpfully if disturbingly exposed’.967
 Despite the emphasis on the unreliability of memory, Allison attempts to offer 
a positive contribution to the study of the Jesus traditions and the historical Jesus 
on the basis of the principle of recurrent attestation.968 Allison spends nearly 
200 pages arguing for a historical Jesus who had an ‘apocalyptic eschatology’; he 
lists thirty-two traditions in support of his argument.969 In the two excursuses 
that follow, Allison argues for the recurrent attestation of some aspects of Jesus’ 
eschatology. He first rejects the standard lexicographical interpretation of ἡ 
βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ presented, for instance, in BDAG as ‘God’s dynamic activity 
as ruler’; Allison argues that in the Jesus tradition the phrase stands for both rule 
and realm and ‘refers principally to the future time when and to the future place 
where the petition “Your kingdom come” will no longer need to be uttered’.970 In 
the latter excursus, Allison argues on the basis of the recurrently attested material 
966  Allison, Constructing, p. 29; cf. Dunn, ‘Social Memory’, in Barton, Stuckenbruck and Wold (eds.), 
Memory in the Bible and Antiquity, pp. 179-94 (180, 189).
967  Allison, Constructing, pp. 27-30.
968  Cf. the summary of Allison’s basic argument in Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered 
Him’, pp. 224-44 (228-35).
969  Allison, Constructing, pp. 31-220, for the thirty-two traditions, pp. 33-43. For Allison, 
Constructing, p. 32, ‘apocalyptic eschatology’ stands for themes that were prominent within 
post-exilic Jewish literature: ‘Although God created a good world, evil spirits have filled it with 
wickedness, so that it is in disarray and full of injustice. A day is coming, however, when God 
will repair the broken creation and restore scattered Israel. Before that time, the struggle between 
good and evil will come to a climax, and a period of great tribulation and unmatched woe will 
descend upon the world. After that period, God will, perhaps through one or more messianic 
figures, reward the just and requite the unjust, both living and dead, and then establish divine 
rule forever.’
970  Allison, Constructing, pp. 164-204 (168-69).
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that one should not underestimate the points of continuity between Jesus and the 
John the Baptist; however, one needs to keep in mind at the same time that ‘the 
forerunner is the darker figure’ of whom little is known due to there being few 
sources.971
 Allison then turns to discuss the genesis of Christology, namely, ‘what 
Jesus of Nazareth encouraged others to think about him’, in light of his earlier 
methodological considerations. Allison attempts to demonstrate that, regarding 
Jesus’ status, the notion of recurrent attestation yields results that are significantly 
different from the common scholarly conclusion that Jesus proclaimed the 
kingdom, not himself, a conclusion that he believes not to be supported by the 
general impression of the Jesus tradition. Allison presents as proof a list of twenty-
six closely related sayings from the Synoptic Jesus tradition.972 Based on the 
general impressions of the Jesus traditions about how Jesus was remembered by 
his followers, Allison concludes that, unlike Paul, who was not called divine by 
any follower of Jesus, ‘Christians did…say astounding things about Jesus, and that 
from the very beginning’.973 Allison does not arrive at this conclusion through first 
arguing for the authenticity of a body of material; his way of studying the historical 
Jesus, and Jesus’ self-awareness, differs from much of previous scholarship that 
does not address the general impression that Jesus’ followers did proclaim him 
rather than his message of God’s kingdom.974
 Allison’s method of studying the Jesus traditions is not solely based on 
the principle of recurrent attestation. Although Allison begins chapter 4 of 
Constructing Jesus by recognizing a pattern of Jesus giving whole speeches 
instead of one-liners in the Synoptic Gospels and John,975 the focus of his lengthy 
discussion on the Sermon on the Plain (Q 6.27-42) is to argue that the discourse is 
largely the work of a single individual and can be viewed as a recollec tion of what 
Jesus spoke on more than one occasion.976 Allison bases this view of the speech 
971  Allison, Constructing, pp. 204-20 (205).
972  Allison, Constructing, pp. 221-304 (225, 226-27, 231). Allison (p. 231) comments on these 
traditions: ‘whether they use a formal title or not, are united in one particular: when they look 
into the future, they see Jesus, and indeed Jesus front and center’.
973  Allison, Constructing, p. 304.
974  Cf. Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (232-33)
975  Cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 306-9. Mk 4.1-34; 13.1-37; Mt. 5.1-7.28; 10.1-42; 11.7-19; 18.1-35; 
23.1-39; 24.1–25.46; Lk. 6.17-49; 7.24-35; 8.4-18; 10.1-16; 11.37-54; 15.3-32; 16.1-31; 17.22-37.
976  Allison, Constructing, pp. 305-86 (312-13): ‘Several considerations suggest, notwithstanding the 
judgment of so many to the contrary, that most of this material circulated together from the 
start. In other words, the central part of the Sermon on the Plain is not an anthology made up of 
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on both the notion of the historical Jesus as an aphorist and rhetorically gifted 
teacher and an analysis of the thematic coherence of Q 6.27-42 and its interaction 
with Lev. 19.977 Allison’s main discussion does not use the principle of recurrent 
attestation, but it does employ the lan guage of oral performance and memory.978
 The principle of recurrent attestation is again the focus in Allison’s discussion 
on the passion of Jesus. Allison contrasts his view of the Jesus traditions about 
Jesus’ death with those of Crossan979, Bultmann980, and Strauss981, who were all 
skeptical about the historicity of those narratives.982 Allison argues, contrary to 
the minimalist accounts, that there is much to be known about Jesus’ death on 
the basis of Paul and the Gospel traditions of Jesus’ passion. After attempting first 
to demonstrate what can be known about Jesus’ death based on Paul’s genuine 
epistles alone,983 Allison secondly studies Mark and John alongside Paul.984 
Allison’s brief discussion on death and memory returns to the ‘sins of memory’, 
and proceeds to remind, for instance, that ‘people in all cultures typically respond 
to death by seeking out and telling stories about a deceased friend or relative’, 
and ‘memories and imaginations, shortly after a death, often converge upon a 
life’s end, upon “the events leading up to the loss.”’985 In support of his argument, 
smaller anthologies, nor was its history as protracted and complex as often imagined; rather, it 
represents, by and large, the work of a single individual.’
977  Allison, Constructing, p. 380, concludes the argument of the preceding pages: (1) Matthew and 
Luke attribute Q 6.27-42 to Jesus; (2) Clement and Polycarp attribute ‘closely related logia’ to 
Jesus; (3) Pauline parallels demonstrate that at least some sayings in Q 6.27-42 ‘were already 
tradition’ for the earliest Christian author; (4) Paul’s characterization of Jesus (Rom. 15.1-3; 
2 Cor. 10.1; Phil. 2.7-8) is in line with Jesus’ words in Q 6.27-42; (5) the pre-Markan passion 
narrative, which ‘is not bereft of memory’, portrays Jesus as behaving in the fashion of Q 6.27-42; 
(6) Mark 12.28-34 shows, ‘if it remembers rightly’, that Jesus ‘paid heed to Lev 19’, as Jesus refers 
to Lev. 19.18 as the second commandment; (7) there is ‘no explanatory advantage’ in assigning Q 
6.27-42 to a contemporary author other than Jesus. 
978  Allison, Constructing, pp. 380-81: ‘Luke 6 would incorporate the memory of multiple oral 
performances in which Jesus, in dialogue with Lev 19 and its history of interpretation, encouraged 
unrestricted benefaction and reciprocity and discouraged revenge and judging others…the 
text does not record anybody’s personal memory of a single occasion; rather, it descends from 
somebody’s generic memory, which was the product of multiple episodes.’
979  Cf. John Dominic Crossan, Who Killed Jesus? Exposing the Roots of Anti-Semitism in the Gospel 
Story of the Death of Jesus (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), the notion of ‘prophecy 
historicized’.
980  Cf. Bultmann, History, pp. 261-84.
981  Cf. D. F. Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (trans. George Eliot; ed. Peter C. Hodgson; 
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972 [German original, 1836]), pp. 563-690.
982  Allison, Constructing, pp. 387-433.
983  Allison, Constructing, pp. 392-403.
984  Allison, Constructing, pp. 403-23.
985  Allison, Constructing, pp. 423-27 (423).
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Allison lists thirty-two traditions from Q, Mark, M, L, Thomas, the authentic 
Pauline letters, 1 Timothy, Hebrews, and 1 Peter, which ‘reflect [in other words, 
recurrently attest] a very wide-spread belief ’ that ‘Jesus did not run from his death 
or otherwise resist it’. The final conclusion is that Paul, the tradents of the Jesus 
traditions, and other early Christians remembered that Jesus did not shun but 
rather accepted his execution because that is what happened.986
 Allison’s final discussion on memory and invention addresses the question as to 
how much history is contained in the Gospels.987 Allison discusses the possibility 
of there being entirely metaphorical narratives in the Synoptic Gospels, but after 
addressing issues related to the genre of the Synoptics, ancient reading methods, 
the possibility of the evangelists communicating fiction through humor and 
absurdity, other possible textual clues about authorial intentions, and redaction 
criticism, he reaches a two-fold conclusion: first, it remains unclear that those 
Jesus traditions which are now generally regarded as ‘purely metaphorical’ or 
theological fiction (e.g. the earthquake, opening of the tombs in Mt. 27.51-53) 
were intended as such by the evangelists; they were probably reporting what they 
thought had really happened, namely, ‘a true story’; second, the first conclusion 
is not absolutely certain; due to what is known about oral performance of Gospel 
texts in ancient communities, Allison does not want to rule out the possibility that 
the social settings would have ‘offered clues as to how texts or episodes within 
them should be understood’.988 Despite all the ‘sins of memory’ and hesitations 
about historians’ ability to access the past, Allison remains quite confident that 
‘Synoptic writers thought that they were reconfiguring memories of Jesus, not 
inventing theological tales’.989 In sum, Allison’s view of the Jesus traditions and 
Jesus scholarship represents an articulated attempt to find the larger patterns 
within the traditions and the best explanations for those patterns; such a view 
differs considerably from previous scholarship that attempts to authenticate 
individual items of tradition and posit hypothetical tradition-histories for them.
986  Allison, Constructing, pp. 427-33 (432, 433); cf. Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered 
Him’, pp. 224-44 (233-34).
987  Allison, Constructing, pp. 435-62 (435). 
988  Allison, Constructing, pp. 437-59 (459). Allison (p. 459) theorizes: ‘Maybe the prefatory or 
interpretive comments that accompanied a reading of Matthew’s infancy narrative would have 
made it plain enough to an audience that “not everything that is remembered happened.” And 
maybe the ecclesiastical setting for a reading of Mark’s passion narrative would have made it 
evident that the darkness at noon was true only theologically. We can never know otherwise.’ 
989  Allison, Constructing, p. 459.
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Critique & Evaluation
Reactions to Allison’s proposal for studying the Jesus traditions can be roughly 
categorized as follows: (1) those who largely agree with it,990 (2) those who 
strongly disagree with it,991 and (3) those who view Allison’s overall argument 
positively but criticize some aspects of it.992 First, some who hold that memory 
studies have a positive contribution to the study of the Jesus traditions approve 
of Allison’s basic approach; they accept the principle of recurrent attestation,993 
view the historical Jesus as a teacher on the basis of this principle,994 and agree 
with the rejection of authenticity language and the criteria of authenticity that go 
with it.995 For example, Chris Keith is so close to Allison’s position that he states 
‘Constructing Jesus aligns with the Jesus-memory approach’ he has proposed.996 
 Second and in contrast, there are negative reactions to Allison’s view from 
others who are critical of the contribution of memory studies to the study of 
the Jesus traditions.997 In the fifth volume of his major project on the historical 
990  Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 44-47; idem, Scribal, pp. 17, 78, 80, 83; idem, ‘Indebtedness’, pp. 25-48 
(26-28, 43); Bird, Gospel, pp. 110, 111; Schröter, ‘The Criteria of Authenticity in Jesus Research 
and Historiographical method’, pp. 49-70 (51, 52, 57, 58, 65). Allison’s view is not discussed by 
Eve, Behind, except for a few approving references. See Eve, Behind, pp. 102, 114-15. Eve, Behind, 
pp. 114, labels Allison’s view of memory ‘fuzzy memory’ and argues that it ‘plays the same role 
as Dunn’s notion of the synthesis of the impact [of Jesus] made on a number of occasions’ and 
that ‘Allison…shows how the gaps in Dunn’s treatment of memory could be filled in without 
fundamentally undermining Dunn’s position’.
991  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, pp. 17-18, 27-28 (n. 28).
992  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (234-43); Hägerland, ‘The Future 
of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (53-62).
993  Keith, Scribal, pp. 83; Schröter, ‘The Criteria of Authenticity’, pp. 49-70 (65): ‘The general outline 
might be more characteristic for how Jesus was perceived by his contemporaries than the 
particular unit isolated by form-critical investigation and put to the test for its authenticity’. Also, 
Bird, Gospel, p. 111: ‘[w]here we find these repetitive patterns in the Gospels, we are on fairly 
solid ground to conclude that we are encountering the literary deposit of an oral tradition based 
on solid memory.’ Cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 15-24.
994  Keith, Scribal, p. 17: ‘Didaskalos appears in all four Gospels in reference to Jesus. The Gospels…
collectively affirm that those around Jesus recognized him as a rabbi and teacher, and there is 
no reason to doubt this portrayal. “It is more than a safe bet that Jesus was a teacher.”’ Keith’s 
quotation is from Allison, Constructing, p. 24. Also, Bird, Gospel, p. 110: ‘Jesus probably taught 
and said the same things in multiple instances, in various locations, over the course of three 
years. His itinerant ministry would require that much the same thing be said from place to place 
as he urgently broadcast the message of the kingdom to the string of villages he entered.’
995  Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 44-46; idem, Scribal, pp. 78, 80; idem, ‘Indebtedness’, pp. 25-48 (26-28, 
43); Schröter, ‘The Criteria of Authenticity’, pp. 49-70 (52, 65). Cf. e.g. Allison, Constructing, pp. 
x, 460-61; idem, The Historical Christ and the Theological Jesus, p. 55; idem, ‘How to Marginalize 
the Traditional Criteria’, pp. 3-30 (5, 7); idem, ‘It Don’t Come Easy’, pp. 186-99 (195-97).
996  Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 46.
997  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, pp. 17-18, 27-28 n. 28.
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Jesus, which deals with the authenticity of Jesus’ parables, John P. Meier considers 
Allison’s ‘whole approach problematic’.998 Meier’s main problem seems not to be 
with the possible contribution of studies on memory, eyewitnesses, oral tradition, 
and oral performance to NT research per se,999 but rather with Allison’s principle 
of recurrent attestation and his rejection of the criteria of authenticity applied 
specifically to the Jesus traditions and the historical Jesus. Meier argues that 
the criteria of multiple attestation and coherence ‘sneak back into’ his quest for 
repeating patterns, the former criterion becoming ‘the pivotal criterion’ in the 
project. Instead of individual sayings and deeds of Jesus, Meier argues, Allison’s 
use of multiple attestation is focused on general themes and motifs. This results 
in a dead end as for the historical Jesus, as it is not possible to leave open the 
question of the authenticity of individual traditions and maintain the view that, 
taken together, these traditions somehow create more than a highly dubious 
pattern. Recurring patterns simply are not enough if no decision is made about 
the probable historicity of the individual sayings and deeds.1000 Meier concludes 
that Allison’s skepticism about the criteria of authenticity and the authenticity of 
individual Jesus traditions should lead to equal skepticism about ‘constructing 
any probable portrait of the historical Jesus’.1001 In general, Meier is skeptical 
about efforts to undermine both the role of textuality in the transmission of the 
Jesus traditions1002 and the traditional textual methods of inquiry1003 in favor of 
studies on memory and oral tradition; while for instance any parable of Jesus 
998  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, p. 27 n. 28; cf. e.g. Allison, Constructing, p. 10; idem, ‘How to 
Marginalize’, pp. 3-30.
999  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, p. 50: ‘Such studies are welcome additions to NT research, but one may 
wonder what exactly they contribute to the question of the authenticity of a given parable.’ This 
statement demonstrates a fundamental difference between Meier and scholars like Keith and 
Zimmermann who do not view the ‘authenticity’ or ‘inauthenticity’ of a given Jesus tradition as 
something that can be meaningfully discussed. 
1000  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, p. 27 n. 28: ‘In reconstructing the historical Jesus, the whole is the 
sum of the parts selected for analysis.’ Italics are original.
1001  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, p. 27 n. 28; cf. van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (5-6), who argues that the 
rejection of the criteria approach would lead to a No Quest due to the lack of sources to work 
with.
1002  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, pp. 50, 78 n. 58, refers to Hurtado, ‘Oral Fixation’, pp. 321-40, who 
emphasizes that an emphasis on oral tradition does not justify undermining the role of texts in 
early Christianity.
1003  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, p. 50: ‘…the proper understanding of the complexity of oral tradition 
and the influence of memory on both oral and written material enriches but does not invalidate 
the basic model created by form, source, tradition, and redaction criticism, including the two-
source theory of Synoptic relationships.’
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would ‘undergo many oral performances and be remembered in different ways’, 
the scholarly treatment of the issue of authenticity in the case of each individual 
tradition cannot be replaced with notions of ‘oral variants’ or ‘[v]ague, general 
appeals to folk memory and oral performances in ancient or nonliterate 
cultures’.1004
 Meier’s criticism of Allison’s method is not entirely without merit; apart from 
his discussion of the fallibility of memory, Allison’s proposal lacks a detailed 
discussion on method, which makes his view vulnerable to the charge of simply 
‘muddling through’ the tradition with his ‘scholarly instinct’.1005 While Allison has 
argued for the rejection of the criteria of authenticity at length,1006 his recurrent 
attestation may not be a satisfactory methodological replacement for the criteria. 
Its methodological basis is rather vague, and in some cases, it even seems that the 
old criteria are presupposed but not cited explicitly.1007 It is also worth considering 
that Allison’s and others’ total rejection of the criteria of authenticity may, at least 
in part, result from unrealistic expectations for the results and level of certitude 
that the criteria are to yield; even a hard-core proponent of the use of the criteria 
like Meier does not believe absolute certainty is within reach in historical 
studies.1008 Meier is at least right in insisting that the variety of results and lack of 
worldwide scholarly agreement on the historical Jesus is hardly surprising and is 
not the right reason to abandon the criteria.1009
 On the other hand, regarding Meier’s criticism, one may legitimately ask what 
1004  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, pp. 50-51, 78-79 n. 59. In contrast, obviously, to e.g. Dunn, Jesus 
Remembered.
1005  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, p. 17: ‘…some of these skeptics [like Allison] prefer to “muddle 
through” as best they can with their scholarly instinct…’
1006  Allison, ‘How to Marginalize’, pp. 3-30; idem, ‘It Don’t Come Easy’, pp. 186-99.
1007  Cf. Allison, ‘How to Marginalize’, pp. 3-30 (7), which accuses Theissen and Winter, The Plausible 
Jesus, of only revising the old criteria, with Allison, Constructing, p. 22 n. 93, which recognizes 
that his own effort of trying to find a Jesus who makes sense of what is otherwise known of 
Judaism and early Christianity is reminiscent of the criterion of plausibility in Theissen and 
Winter, The Plausible Jesus. Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, pp. 18, 28 n. 30 (18), argues that both 
Theissen and Winter, The Plausible Jesus, and Theissen and Merz, The Historical Jesus, are guilty 
of reformulating and streamlining the traditional criteria into one or two criteria (esp. ‘criterion 
of plausibility’), while ‘other [traditional] criteria may quietly and surreptitiously function 
when they are useful in individual cases’. See also the discussion on the criticisms of Allison by 
Rodríguez and Hägerland below. 
1008  On historical probabilities, see Meier, A Marginal Jew, I, pp. 167-68. Also, see the discussion on 
Anthony Le Donne’s view below (ch. 3.7).
1009  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, p. 17. Meier points out that ‘more than a century of minute study of 
the Synoptic Gospels has not led all scholars to adopt a single solution to the Synoptic Problem’.
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contribution, if any, does he think memory studies have to the study of the Jesus 
traditions and the historical Jesus. Meier’s sympathetic yet questioning rhetoric 
about memory studies is hardly enough to account for what so many scholars 
today see as a major development and paradigm shift in the study of the historical 
Jesus.1010 Also, given the widely-shared understanding that historical inquiry never 
reaches absolute certainty regardless of method, it is far from clear why the results 
of Meier’s study of Jesus’ parables – in particular, the basic conclusion regarding 
the historicity of the parables that the historical Jesus probably only spoke the four 
parables that can be authenticated through the criteria of authenticity1011 – should 
elicit more confidence than, say, Allison’s method of recurrent attestation, which 
avoids the authenticity language and focuses instead on memories of Jesus.1012
 Third, there are positive yet critical reactions to Allison’s view from some who 
explicitly approve of the use of memory studies,1013 and others who, while open 
to memory’s significance as a conceptual category, are not willing to endorse 
memory studies at the expense of rejecting the criteria of authenticity.1014 On the 
one hand, Rafael Rodríguez views Allison’s general approach to the historical 
Jesus, including its rejection of the criteria of authenticity, as commendable, yet 
criticizes some aspects of Allison’s view of memory and the principle of recurrent 
attestation.1015 Rodríguez is ‘largely persuaded’ by Allison’s overall approach, 
namely, that the ‘sources have the broad strokes of Jesus right’ and that Allison’s 
discussion is ‘an even-handed, cautious treatment of the issues facing anyone…
1010  E.g. Zimmermann, Puzzling the Parables, p. 57: ‘Within Jesus scholarship, a paradigm shift 
from the “historical” to the “remembered” Jesus is emerging.’ Of course, it is understandable 
that Meier does not make a greater attempt to integrate memory studies into his work at this 
point, as his book on the authenticity of Jesus’ parables is the fifth volume in his major series 
on the historical Jesus, which otherwise leans heavily on the use of the criteria of authenticity 
in a traditional sense.
1011  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, p. 370 concludes: ‘We identified four parables that, upon further 
testing, proved to be credible candidates for the critical judgment of “coming from the historical 
Jesus.” In the case of the Mustard Seed (Mark–Q overlap), the Great Supper (Matthew and 
Luke), and the Talents/Minas (again, Matthew and Luke) the basic argument for historicity…
was the multiple attestation of independent sources. The odd man out was the Evil Tenants of 
Vineyard, where a form and redaction-critical analysis provided us with a primitive version of 
the parable that met the criteria of embarrassment and/or discontinuity.’
1012  Though Jesus’ parables are a recurring theme that Allison, Constructing, does not discuss; cf. 
Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (241). It takes, of course, more 
than these remarks to abandon any use of the criteria of authenticity altogether, as is indicated 
below.
1013  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (234-43).
1014  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (53-62).
1015  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (234-43).
211
wanting to know about the historical Jesus’; Rodríguez does not see a new No 
Quest as the result, but rather asserts ‘[t]he quest of the historical Jesus…has 
turned a corner and is heading in new directions’.1016 These positive statements 
can be seen, at least in part, in contradiction with what follows.
 Rodríguez’s first critical question has to do with Allison’s skeptical view of 
human memory, which he thinks is one-sided and in need of refinement.1017 
Allison can be read to indicate that memory is almost useless for preserving 
specific details, but this goes against the reality that human beings rely on the 
successful general performance of their memories in everyday life (despite the fact 
that the failings of memory are reflected in laboratory experiments). Studies also 
suggest that malleability and stability are simultaneous and complex functions of 
memory.1018 Furthermore, Rodríguez contends that human beings do not usually 
think they are free to ‘remember whatever past they wish’. While Allison rightly 
argues that people often ‘confuse what…ought to have occurred with what did 
occur’, one must not forget that people are often ‘confronted with a past that they 
wish they could forget’.1019 Rodríguez also reminds that the presence of other 
people establishes social constraints which make mucking with the past harder.1020 
Finally, the interplay between memory and identity provides a constraint: figures 
or events that are less significant for an individual’s or group’s sense of self tend 
to have less inertial weight; however, important events and figures that ‘provide 
orientation to the present and enable meaningful interpretation of reality’ 
experience more inertia.1021
 Allison responds to Rodríguez’s criticism by recognizing that, despite agreeing 
1016  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (234-35). Also Rodríguez (p. 
244): ‘This is the point of recurrent attestation: if the tradition ever got anything about Jesus 
right, we can be most confident about its “rightness” in the broad strokes and general ideas of 
its representations…This is the new shape of Jesus scholarship…the days of questing after the 
historical Jesus, free from interpretations and memories of those who considered themselves 
his followers, are behind us.’
1017  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (235-38). 
1018  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (236), argues that this is not 
clear in ‘Allison’s emphasis on general ideas over against particulars’.
1019  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (236-37); Schudson, ‘The 
Present’, pp. 105-13 (107-12); cf. Allison, Constructing, p. 4. Rodríguez points out that Allison 
recognizes this in his discussion on the aftermath of Jesus’ execution and his followers’ likely 
response to it. Cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 423-24.
1020  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (237); Schudson, ‘The Present’, 
pp. 105-13 (112): ‘People’s ability to reconstruct the past just as they wish is limited by the 
crucial social fact that other people within their awareness are trying to do the same thing’.
1021  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (237-38).
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on several points, he is ‘less sanguine than Rodríguez’ about human memory; 
this is, Allison says, a direct result of studying the cognitive literature on memory 
extensively and reflecting on the ability of one’s mind to create memories and 
misremember things of everyday life.1022 As presented above in my presentation 
of Allison’s view, it is not just the malleability of memory that Allison wishes 
to emphasize; he has also argued for a ‘middle way’. While Allison admits that 
discussing this merely in a footnote may have given the wrong impression, it is 
evident in his following conclusions about the historical Jesus that he does not 
promote skepticism.1023 Allison argues that his focus on the fallibility of memory 
was to warn historians of Jesus about the difficulty of their job; the discussion was 
also meant to justify both the marginalization of the criteria of authenticity which 
promised ‘much more than they have delivered’ and the search for the general 
impressions of the tradition. In light of this consideration, Allison also admits 
that his work may not have given sufficient thought to his focus on generalities 
over details; yet he notes in agreement with Rodríguez to have ‘long assumed’ that 
details can be fixed by repetition and emotional states like surprise and trauma, 
and a lack of individual or communal significance is likely to result in fluctuations 
of memory.1024
 Rodríguez’s other points of criticism have to do with recognizing recurrently 
attested themes. Much like Meier, who accused Allison of ‘muddling through’ 
the tradition with ‘scholarly instinct’, Rodríguez laments the methodological 
imprecision of Allison’s work: commonsense plays a great role in Allison’s proposal. 
Rodríguez asks the obvious question: how does Allison choose, for instance, the 
seventeen traditions that relate to the question of Jesus’ confrontation with the 
devil? Allison admits that not all of the traditions are historical, but his argument 
depends not upon individual traditions but on all of them together. He does not, 
however, discuss how many traditions are enough for a theme to be recurrently 
attested.1025 Despite his own advocacy of memory studies and the rejection of 
the criteria of authenticity, Rodríguez states that Allison’s method requires more 
discussion ‘if we are to avoid the impression that the flight from the traditional 
1022  D. C. Allison, ‘Response to Rafael Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as his Friends Remembered Him’, JSHJ 12 
(2014), pp. 245-54 (246-48).
1023  Allison, ‘Response’, pp. 245-54 (248); Allison, Constructing, p. 9 n. 47.
1024  Allison, ‘Response’, pp. 245-54 (248-50).
1025  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (238-40); cf. Allison, 
Constructing, pp. 17-20.
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criteria of authenticity results almost automatically in a flight towards unbridled 
historical intuition (or ‘commonsense’)’.1026
 Moreover, Rodríguez points out the imbalance in Allison’s discussion of 
different recurrently attested themes: while as such Allison is allowed to focus on 
certain themes more than on others in one work on the historical Jesus, giving 
much more space to two of the five themes (180 pages on apocalyptic eschatology, 
over 80 pages on Jesus’ self-conception) leaves the impression that Allison’s 
choice and way of organizing the Jesus traditions did not have as much to do with 
recurrent attestation as he indicates.1027 Also, Rodríguez finds Allison’s discussion 
on the thematic, structural and intertextual continuities in the Sermon on the 
Plain (Q 6.27-42) as well as his treatment of Jesus’ passion somewhat deficient 
with respect to recurrent attestation. While the former discussion is based on a 
different method, one that Allison never comments upon, and ‘raises the question 
of other routes of inquiry from the Gospels to Jesus’,1028 the latter is primarily 
focused on knowledge about Jesus’ passion attainable from Paul’s letters, both in 
isolation and in relation to Mark and John.1029 Rodríguez finds Allison’s discussion 
on the special function of memory in helping people cope with the death of a 
loved one helpful.1030 He also sympathetically acknowledges that Allison never 
claims recurrent attestation to be ‘sufficient unto itself ’ and believes that recurrent 
attestation could do more than Allison’s work indicates, but nevertheless laments 
how little the book has to do with the principle.1031
 Again, Allison readily admits that he could have been clearer about the 
intentions of his method. However, regarding the choice of the seventeen 
traditions about Jesus’ confrontation with the devil, he argues the pattern in these 
traditions is only presented as an example and ‘the beginning of discussion, not 
the end’; simply to note the pattern is not the end of the discussion either here 
1026  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (240).
1027  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (240-41). Rodríguez (p. 241) 
lists several themes that appear throughout the tradition but are not discussed by Allison (e.g. 
Jesus’ open table fellowship, the presence and function of women, children and other socially 
marginal persons in and for Jesus’ ministry, Jesus’ parables, Jesus’ religious piety and experience 
with God, his conflicts with Jewish figures, his interpretation of Hebrew biblical tradition, 
appeal to the gentiles, his relation to the temple-cult, etc.)
1028  Cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 305-86. See the discussion on Hägerland’s criticism and the 
criteria of authenticity below.
1029  Cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 387-433 (392-421).
1030  Cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 423-27.
1031  Rodríguez, ‘Jesus as His Friends Remembered Him’, pp. 224-44 (242-43).
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or in any of the other chapters.1032 Allison disagrees with Rodríguez’s notion that 
the discussion on the Sermon on the Plain (Q 6.27-42) does not utilize recurrent 
attestation; he refers to the beginning of the chapter in Constructing Jesus, where 
he argued for a pattern of Jesus delivering speeches, not just one-liners, which 
runs across the sources1033; the subsequent discussion is focused on Jesus as a 
speaker of discourses and what Allison believes to be ‘the most likely speech to 
go back, in some form, to Jesus himself ’. Therefore, recurrent attestation is more 
of a starting point than the conclusion.1034 Regarding the overall imbalance of his 
chosen material, Allison concludes that it was never the intention to address all 
important subjects; he merely attempted to explicate that one can know some 
important things about the historical Jesus without the criteria of authenticity.1035
 There is no question that Allison’s notions about human memory are sober and 
well-documented; while overly skeptical views may not be grounded in evidence, 
there is no reason to exaggerate the reliability of either individual or communal 
memory. Allison’s discussion and subsequent reactions to it well demonstrate 
that memory studies, or memory as a conceptual category, does little to prove it; 
two basic kinds of conclusions have been drawn from his discussion: the kind 
that places emphasis on skepticism about the reliability of memory and argues 
for a variable rather than stable Jesus tradition,1036 and the kind that emphasizes 
the general reliability of early Christian memory and the stability of the Jesus 
tradition.1037 While this difference of outlook on Allison’s work (or what kind of 
1032  Allison, ‘Response’, pp. 245-54 (251-52). Allison (p. 252) notes that in Constructing, p. 19, he 
said ‘I would argue, if demonology were our subject (which it is not), that in this particular our 
texts remember rightly’.
1033  Cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 306-9.
1034  Allison, ‘Response’, pp. 245-54 (250-51).
1035  Allison, ‘Response’, pp. 245-54 (253-54).
1036  See e.g. Schröter, ‘The Criteria of Authenticity’, pp. 49-70 (51), who shares Allison’s criticism 
of the criteria of authenticity and seems to adopt a similarly skeptical view of human memory: 
‘…“memory” is by itself a problematic historical category. It does not lead automatically to 
a more adequate picture of the past, but, to the contrary, can be affected by misperception, 
wrong information, oblivion, and projection. Therefore, memory itself begs the question for 
critical scrutiny.’ Also see Foster, ‘Memory, Orality, and the Fourth Gospel’, pp. 191-227 (201-
2), who views Allison as an example of a nuanced understanding of the role of memory in 
reconstructing the historical Jesus, which properly emphasizes memory’s fallibility (contra 
Bauckham). Foster’s whole argument is that ‘memory studies’, while not without value, should 
not be applied over-confidently to the quest for the historical Jesus and cannot be used to 
validate ‘the historical authenticity of Gospel traditions’. 
1037  See e.g. Bird, Gospel, p. 111, who rejects the notion that ‘the earliest followers of Jesus suffered 
from some kind of “radical amnesia”’ in favor of the reliability of the Jesus traditions. Cf. Allison, 
Constructing, p. 9 n. 47: ‘I do not contend that the evangelists were, in effect, amnesiacs’. For a 
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views his work is taken to support) may be in part due to the fact that Allison’s 
comments against ‘hyperskepticism’ are only found in a footnote, it nevertheless 
demonstrates that it is the scholar’s responsibility to do the historiographical work 
on the Jesus traditions; any discussion on memory, no matter how sophisticated, 
is in vain if not accompanied by an articulated method that can make sense of 
both memory studies and the Jesus traditions.
 Because of this, the question of Allison’s method is pertinent. At least in 
relation to the exemplary seventeen traditions on Jesus’ confrontation with the 
devil, it may be acceptable for Allison to say that recurrent attestation is only the 
beginning. Nevertheless, in practice, devoting so much space to questions other 
than this principle in relation to both the Sermon on the Plain (Q 6.27-42) and 
Jesus’ passion without discussing the chosen ‘other’ methods undermines Allison’s 
overall argument.1038 Allison hardly manages to escape the charge against the 
vagueness of his method. In fact, he does not even make much of an attempt, as 
he admits that ‘the logic of recurrent attestation cannot be quantified’,1039 nor can 
the procedure of his work be formalized, and further states that his ‘work involves 
the hazy principle of abduction, or inference to the best explanation’.1040 If one’s 
method is so imprecise that it cannot be formalized and, therefore, suggested to 
others, are not further considerations required?
 Tobias Hägerland, on the other hand, offers some such considerations regarding 
the question of the historicity of the Jesus traditions, focusing mainly on Allison’s 
rejection of the criteria of authenticity.1041 Hägerland recognizes that on the 
basis of Allison’s attention to the Gospels’ recurring patterns ‘a picture of Jesus 
can be painted that is not sketchy or blurred but remarkably colourful and rich 
in detail’, but remains unconvinced that recurrent attestation can entirely replace 
the criteria of authenticity.1042 According to Hägerland, the main problem with 
Allison’s method lies in the fact that through the principle of recurrent attestation 
criticism of Bird’s view, see A. Kirk, ‘Ehrman, Bauckham and Bird on Memory and the Jesus 
Tradition’, JSHJ 15.1 (2017), pp. 88-114.
1038  Cf. the discussion below on Tobias Hägerland’s criticism of Allison’s view of Jesus’ crucifixion.
1039  Allison, ‘Response’, pp. 245-54 (252).
1040  Allison, ‘Response’, pp. 245-54 (252).
1041  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (53-62). For a critical response to Hägerland, 
see Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55 (430-33).
1042  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (53-54). Hägerland is not as dissatisfied with 
the principle of recurrent attestation as Meier, but like Meier he considers Allison’s avoidance 
of the criteria problematic.
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Jesus’ past can be represented only partially: there are unrepeatable crucial events 
in Jesus’ life, which cannot be recurrently attested.1043
 Hägerland allows Allison’s condition that recurrent attestation is only the first 
step of the method and its use needs to be paired with other assured circumstances 
about Jesus’ life such as the rough dates of his life (ca. 7–5 BCE–30/33 CE), his 
baptism by John the Baptist, his (last or only) journey from Galilee to Jerusalem, 
his arrest and condemnation by the Romans, and his crucifixion.1044 However, it 
is not clear, Hägerland argues, how Allison can recover these other circumstances 
and events that clearly cannot be established through recurrent at testation; neither 
Allison nor any other scholar who rejects the criteria of authenticity has pro posed 
a viable alternative method for establishing the historicity of these events, which 
re sults in an inexplicit or partial acceptance of the traditional criteria.1045
 Regarding such events, Hägerland first asks how Allison and others would 
explain within the confines of historiography that Jesus was baptized by John.1046 
Allison mentions the recurrent endorsements of John by Jesus, but does relate 
the question of historicity to them; he offers no historical explanation for Jesus’ 
baptism by John.1047 Second, Hägerland points out that neither Allison nor any 
1043  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (54). A satisfactory representation of the 
historical Jesus must account not only for those events that ‘occurred repeatedly at Jesus’ own 
instigation’ but also for ‘those decisive events which were to a large extent beyond his control’.
1044  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (54); cf. Allison, ‘How to Marginalize’, pp. 
3-30 (26), where these circumstances are listed as examples of such circumstances in Jesus’ life.
1045  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (54-55). Of course, it can be argued that it is 
not the intention of these scholars to attempt to establish the historicity of any events.
1046  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (55-57). Hägerland (p. 55) points out that 
the historicity of this event is rarely doubted in traditional scholarship, as the three major 
criteria of authenticity are used to authenticate the Gospel narratives about the event. First, 
Jesus’ baptism by John is coherent with Jesus’ sayings about the pre-eminence of John that 
are considered authentic by other criteria (Mk 11.27-33; Q 7.24-35; 16.16); secondly, multiple 
attestation applies to the story (Mk 1.9-11; Q 3.21-22; cf. Jn 1.29-34; Gos. Heb. 2); third, the 
episode evidently caused embarrassment by portraying Jesus as subordinate to John and by 
expressing doubt about Jesus’ sinlessness (cf. Mt. 3.14-15). Cf. e.g. Meier, A Marginal Jew, II, 
pp. 101-3, 103-5.
1047  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (55-56); cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 53-54. 
Hägerland (p. 56) also finds fault with Mark Goodacre, ‘Criticizing the Criterion of Multiple 
Attestation’, pp. 152-69 (159-62, 166), who criticizes and gives up the criteria of multiple 
attestation and embarrassment as for the historicity of Jesus’ baptism by John; how does he 
then know that Jesus was baptized by John? Hägerland (pp. 56-57) also argues that Rodríguez, 
‘The Embarrassing Truth About Jesus’, pp. 132-51 (141-43, 145-46), in abandoning the criterion 
of embarrassment in relation to Jesus’ baptism, grants the scholar a ‘freedom to choose any 
“historical” narrative (whether prompted by the sources or not, it seems) as the framework 
within which to interpret an individual item of the tradition’, while offering no explanation for 
the event or why none of the previously presented reconstructions are convincing.
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other scholar who rejects the criteria of authenticity offers an explanation for how 
Jesus’ action in the temple can be viewed as part of a viable representation of the 
historical Jesus.1048 This is, according to Hägerland, a major shift from traditional 
views like that of Sanders, who held the Jesus’ temple action as ‘one of the most 
fundamental facts about Jesus, indeed the very foundation for his reconstruction 
of Jesus as an apocalyptic prophet’.1049 Allison only treats the episode as an instance 
of recurrent attestation, another narration that demonstrates Jesus’ royal and 
prophetic identity, but remains uncertain about whether a specific event in history 
is commemorated; Hägerland indicates that, while Allison’s agnostic position on 
the matter is consistent with his method, it is ‘explicitly motivated by the failure of 
earlier, criteria-based scholarship to attain consensus’.1050
 Third and finally, Hägerland argues that Allison’s lengthy treatment of Jesus’ 
passion and crucifixion indicates both that Allison believes ‘that it really occurred’ 
and that Allison employs, at least indirectly, the criteria of authenticity.1051 
Hägerland notes that Allison’s discussion on Paul’s knowledge of a pre-Markan 
passion narrative attempts to show that Paul was probably aware of many of 
the Gospels’ details of Jesus’ death; Allison’s discussion of the common themes 
1048  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (57-59). Hägerland (p. 58) points out that 
‘[n]one of the essays in Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of the Authenticity makes even a single 
reference to the temple action, which is therefore left out completely of the general picture of 
Jesus established by the “memory approach”’.
1049  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (58-59). Hägerland (pp. 57-58) explains that, 
while ‘[m]ost scholars appear to acknowledge a basis in history for this episode’, there is a 
minority that expresses doubt. All three main criteria are used to argue for the authenticity: 
first, the temple action is viewed as coherent with Jesus’ identity as a prophet. Cf. John P. Meier, 
‘From Elijah-like Prophet to Royal Davidic Messiah’, in D. Donnelly (ed.), Jesus: A Colloquium in 
the Holy Land (New York and London: Continuum, 2001), pp. 45-83 (68). Second, it is attested 
doubly (Mk 11.15-17; Jn 2.14-17). Cf. Kyle R. Snodgrass, ‘The Temple Incident’, in D. L. Bock 
and R. L. Webb (eds.), Key Events in the Life of the Historical Jesus: A Collaborative Exploration 
of Context and Coherence (WUNT, 247; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), pp. 429-80 (430-31, 
439-44). Third, taken together with the multiply attested saying about destroying the temple 
and building a new one, the temple action is dissimilar to (namely, does not derive from) early 
Christianity and appears to have been embarrassing. Cf. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, pp. 71-75. 
Hägerland (p. 58) presents the criticism of each of these points by David Seeley, ‘Jesus’ Temple 
Act’, CBQ 55 (1993), pp. 263-83; idem, ‘Jesus’ Temple Act Revisited: A Response to P. M. Casey’, 
CBQ 62 (2000), pp. 55-63: first, Jesus’ temple action would be incoherent with Jesus’ non-violent 
behavior and his relative indifference towards the external matters of religion; second, John is 
dependent on Mark’s narration of the episode, which, thirdly, fits within Mark’s plot and is 
derivable from his purposes. Furthermore, according to the negative criterion of implausibility, 
for example, such action would have made no sense to Jesus’ contemporary audience and would 
have caused a forceful reaction from the Roman authorities. 
1050  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (59); cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 237-38. 264.
1051  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (59-62).
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between Paul and the Gospels relates the question of how early the traditions are 
to be dated to the question of whether they represent historical events, though 
Allison does distinguish between the two questions. Thus, it seems that ‘[e]ven 
for Allison the early date of a tradition, being entailed by its attestation in two or 
more independent sources, increases the likelihood that it is rooted in a historical 
event’, that is, Allison seems to accept the criterion of multiple attestation in some 
cases.1052
 Similarly, Allison seems to employ the criterion of dissimilarity in order to 
establish the historicity of some details of Jesus’ death. Allison writes: ‘at least a 
few of the stories are likely to mirror real events because they cannot be derived 
from the Jewish Bible and the because there is no obvious motivation for Christian 
invention…’1053 This is in contrast with Rodríguez’s complete rebuttal of the use of 
the criterion of embarrassment (or any other criteria) to authenticate the event of 
crucifixion, without offering any other explanation for how one can know that Jesus 
was crucified.1054 In light of his discussion of Allison’s view, Hägerland concludes 
that the criteria of authenticity are still useful and necessary ‘for authenticating 
traditions which cannot be corroborated by appeal to recurrent attestation’ and 
suggests, as a methodological consideration, that ‘the traditional criteria’ be used 
‘preferably in conjunction with the principle of recurrent attestation’.1055
 From this discussion and presentation of critique of Allison’s view, it can be 
concluded that Allison’s method of recurrent attestation is not enough for the 
study of the Jesus traditions if one wants to make even cautious claims about their 
historicity.1056 If nothing else, Meier’s criticism points towards the continuing 
1052  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (60); cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 404, 423.
1053  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (60); cf. Allison, Constructing, p. 425. Among 
the events that are authenticated by this logic are ‘conscription of a passerby, Simon of Cyrene, 
to carry Jesus’ cross; crucifixion by order of Pontius Pilate; execution at a place called Golgotha; 
the presence of female followers at the cross; burial by a Jewish official, Joseph of Arimathea’. 
Cf. Allison, Constructing, pp. 426-27, where Allison expresses hesitations about the validity of 
the criterion of embarrassment.
1054  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (60-61); cf. Rodríguez, ‘The Embarrassing 
Truth About Jesus’, pp. 132-51 (146-47). Rodríguez (p. 147) argues, for example, that the use 
of the criterion of embarrassment to authenticate Jesus’ crucifixion is doomed to fail because 
already Paul used Jesus’ execution as a criminal as part of his proclamation; albeit a difficult fate 
for Israel’s Messiah from the viewpoint of early Christian theology, it became the centre of Paul’s 
theology, far from an embarrassing event.
1055  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (62). It is remarkable that Allison, Constructing, 
p. 20 n. 85, does not think others less skeptical cannot use the criteria with his recurrent 
attestation.
1056  I do recognize that it is exactly against these kinds of claims that some within the memory 
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usefulness of some of the criteria of authenticity; while his notions need to be 
balanced with a nuanced view of the role of memory in the study of the Jesus 
traditions, he points out that, despite seemingly rejecting the criteria, Allison 
refers to them without explicitly referring to them. Also, Rodríguez recognizes 
that recurrent attestation will need other methods to accompany it; as a 
proponent of memory studies in conjunction with the rejection of the criteria of 
authenticity, he is, however, not willing to suggest the use of the criteria in any 
form. Rodríguez’s discussion on Allison’s view of memory serves to demonstrate 
the need of a more formulated method for discussing the historicity of the Jesus 
traditions. Finally, Hägerland promotes a balanced contribution to the question of 
method as for the historicity Jesus traditions; albeit not one of the scholars who 
have strongly advocated memory studies, he is willing to adopt language that 
is largely consonant with memory studies and combine their insights with the 
more traditional methods, the criteria of authenticity.1057 By pointing out some 
blindspots in Allison’s work regarding the criteria of authenticity, Hägerland 
offers methodological considerations that can contribute to the study the Jesus 
traditions after the rise of the memory approach. As will be discussed below in 
relation to Anthony Le Donne’s view, these methodological considerations are 
not unanimously viewed as contradictory to the use of memory as a conceptual 
category within the memory approach.
3.7 Anthony Le Donne
Anthony Le Donne’s (b.1975) initial work, The Historiographical Jesus: Memory, 
Typology, and the Son of David (2009), which is based on his earlier PhD 
dissertation at Durham University, is among the first systematic applications of 
social memory theory to the questions of the Jesus traditions and the historical 
Jesus.1058 The purpose of Le Donne’s work is to develop a hermeneutical 
approach react. 
1057  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65. Hägerland (p. 62), concludes, for example, that 
‘if we go on to speak of “authenticity” we must acknowledge that this does not mean anything 
like a state of non-remembered, non-interpreted hard facts of the past’. This is, of course, a view 
with which Chris Keith strongly disagrees. Again, Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the 
Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55.
1058  See Le Donne, Historiographical; on a more popular level Le Donne, Historical Jesus; also, idem, 
‘The Problem of Selectivity in Memory Research: A Response to Zeba Crook’, JSHJ 11 (2013), pp. 
77-97; idem, ‘Theological Memory Distortion in the Jesus Tradition: A Study in Social Memory 
Theory’, in Barton, Stuckenbruck and Wold (eds.), Memory in the Bible and Antiquity, pp. 163-
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methodology for applying social memory theory to the Jesus traditions in a way 
that benefits the study of the historical Jesus. Le Donne begins by a critique of 
historical positivism, which he argues has plagued historical Jesus research with its 
dichotomy between history (that is, historical fact) and interpretation. Le Donne 
wishes to rebut rationalist historiography, which attempted to reach historical 
certainty and objectivity, deriving its impetus from the desire for objectivity in the 
empirical sciences; he argues for a moderate form of postmodern historiography, 
which he imagines as ‘a welcome middle ground between critical realism and 
postfoundationalism’.1059
 Le Donne refers to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1789), a disciple of 
Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza (1632–1677), as a representative of an era when a 
notion of historical consciousness arose that historical truth and objectivity 
are beyond reach due to the gap between historical truth and experiential 
certainty.1060 Le Donne further recognizes specifically the significance of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher’s (1768–1834) notion of ‘pre-understanding’ (from the German 
Vorverständnis) and Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) ‘fore-conception’ (cf. the 
German terms Vorhabe, Vorsicht, and Vorgriff), for the development of the idea 
of the hermeneutical circle;1061 there is a strong constructive factor in any attempt 
78; idem, ‘Memory, Commemoration and History in John 2.19-22: A Critique and Application 
of Social Memory’, in A. Le Donne and T. Thatcher (eds.), The Fourth Gospel in First-Century 
Media Culture (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2011), pp. 186-204; idem, ‘The Rise of the 
Quest for an Authentic Jesus: An Introduction to the Crumbling Foundations of Jesus Research’, 
in Keith and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, pp. 3-21; idem, 
‘The Criterion of Coherence: Its Development, Inevitability, and Historiographical Limitations’, 
in Keith and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, pp. 95-114; also 
idem, ‘The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Revisionist History through the Lens of Jewish-
Christian Relations’, pp. 63-86.
1059  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 1-15. On Le Donne’s view of postmodern historiography, see 
further Le Donne, Historical Jesus, pp. 3-10 (5-7), 134: ‘[Within a postmodern paradigm] [t]
he historian’s job is to tell the stories of memory in a way that most plausibly accounts for the 
available mnemonic evidence…the historical Jesus is not veiled by the interpretations of him. 
He is most available for analysis when these interpretations are most pronounced. Therefore, 
the historical Jesus is clearly seen through lenses of editorial agenda, theological reflection, and 
intentional counter-memory.’
1060  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 17-26; cf. e.g. G. E. Lessing, ‘On the Proof of the Spirit and 
of Power’, in H. Chadwick (ed.), Lessing’s Theological Writings (London: William Clowes and 
Sons, 1956), pp. 51-56; idem, Gesammelte Werke (ed. P. Rilla; 10 vols.; Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 
1954–1958).
1061  The hermeneutical circle, as envisioned by Schleiermacher and Heidegger, has some affinity 
with the mnemonic cycle Le Donne utilizes later in his work. See Le Donne, Historiographical, 
p. 67; the discussion below.
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to acquire real knowledge.1062 He also discusses Bultmann’s hermeneutical view, 
which, he argues, employs Heidegger’s idea of the hermeneutical circle but 
nevertheless results in a positivistic understanding of historiography: it is not 
enough to encourage ‘the subjectivity of the modern historian’ when the workings 
of the hermeneutical circle are not recognized ‘in perceptions of the ancient 
historians’.1063 Based on his survey of the history of hermeneutics, Le Donne 
summarizes his initial premises: (1) ‘If perceptions are to be remembered, then they 
will inevitably be interpreted – subconsciously, consciously, or both’; (2) ‘Perceptions 
that contribute to historical memory are thus always interpreted along each stage of 
the tradition that they inhabit’.1064
 Albeit critical of Halbwachs’ historical positivism, Le Donne starts his discussion 
of the relationship between history and memory from Halbwachs’ understanding 
of social memory.1065 The concepts of memory distortion and refraction are central 
to Le Donne’s approach. Memory is not simply the cognitive preservation of past 
events.1066 It is rather ‘a process of encoding information, storing information, 
and strategically retrieving information, and there are social, psychological, 
and historical influences at each point’.1067 Distortion is used to distinguish the 
1062  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 28-32 (32): ‘In sum, Schleiermacher’s circle (and Heidegger’s 
adaptation of it) demonstrates how a new perception can attract a significance that has been 
prefigured (or “fore-conceived”) in a similar type of category.’ Cf. e.g. F. D. E. Schleiermacher, 
Hermeneutik, Nach den Handschriften neu herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Hinz Kimmerle 
(Heidelberg: Karl Winter Universitätverlag, 1959); H. G. Gadamer, ‘The Problem of Language 
in Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutic’, JTC 7 (1970), pp. 68-95; idem, Truth and Method (New York: 
Continuum, 2004 [1960]), pp. 190-92, 267, 295; M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer, 1961 [1927]), pp. 150-51; idem, Being in Time (London: SCM, 1962 [1927]), pp. 194: 
‘Any interpretation which is to contribute to understanding must already have understood what 
is to be interpreted’. Also see Le Donne, Historical Jesus, pp. 56-64.
1063  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 32-39 (39); cf. e.g. R. Bultmann, ‘Is Exegesis without 
Presuppositions Possible?’, in K. Mueller-Vollmer (ed.), The Hermeneutics Reader (repr. from 
TZ 13 [1957], Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 242-48.
1064  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 38. Italics are original. On Le Donne’s view on history and 
certainty, see also Le Donne, Historical Jesus, pp. 72-80 (77): ‘The unremembered and 
uninterpreted past is not history’. Italics are original.
1065  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 41-50. Le Donne (p. 42) summarizes the contribution of 
Halbwachs’ work as follows: ‘(1) Memory is the reconstruction of the past based on the needs 
of the present; (2) Collective memory is that which to that which is articulated into social 
communication; (3) All memories are conceived within social frameworks.’ Cf. the discussion 
on Halbwachs in the introduction of chapter 2.5.
1066  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 50; D. Schacter, ‘Memory Distortion: History and Current 
Status’, in D. Schacter (ed.), Memory Distortion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1995), pp. 1-46.
1067  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 50, quoting Schudson, ‘Dynamics’, pp. 346-64 (348).
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memory of the past from the past actuality. While memory distortion commonly 
carries negative connotations, not least due to the extreme forms it sometimes 
takes (such as revisionist history for political purposes), Le Donne argues that it 
is neither malevolent nor always consciously strategic.1068 Memory is always by 
nature distortion, whatever claims to its veracity are made, because it is always 
perspectival and interpreted; some things are emphasized, other things selectively 
ignored. Due to the inevitability of selectivity and distortion, no such thing as 
‘undistorted memory’ exists. Le Donne’s view of distortion resists any passive, 
objective or simplistic notions of memory.1069
 Memory distortion is not a reference to the unreliability of memory. Due to the 
negative associations the term carries, Le Donne prefers the concept of refraction. 
He utilizes Michael Schudson’s four categories of distortion (refraction) in memory 
and history: (1) distanciation (the tendency for memories to become vague); (2) 
instrumentalization (the tendency for memories to be reinterpreted to serve the 
present better); (3) conventionalization (the tenden cy for memories to conform to 
socio-typical experiences); (4) narrativization (the tendency for memories to be 
conventionalized through the constraints of storytelling).1070 To these cate gories, 
Le Donne adds articulation (the tendency for memories to conform to language 
con ventions). He contends that narrativization and articulation are the two most 
significant types or roles of memory refraction.1071
 Le Donne notes that social memory can be transmitted because it is always 
articulated. Articulation of social memory can take place through ritual (for 
instance, a religious obser vance, commemorative calendar), art (for instance, 
monuments commemorating particular events or people), and verbal or written 
language, which is usually required by all forms of articulation.1072 When memories 
1068  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 50; see M. Kammen, ‘Some Patterns and Meanings of Memory 
Distortion in American History’, in D. Schacter (ed.), Memory Distortion (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 329-45 (329); Schudson, ‘Dynamics’, pp. 346-64 (351).
1069  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 51; Schudson, ‘Dynamics’, pp. 246-64 (348).
1070  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 52; idem, Historical Jesus, pp. 106-10 (109); Schudson, 
‘Dynamics’, pp. 246-64 (348).
1071  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 52.
1072  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 52-53; Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, p. 47. Le Donne 
(p. 53 n. 65), notes that ritual and art rarely emerge without being accompanied by language 
in some way. Cf. Eve, Behind, pp. 92-93, who points to the celebration of the Lord’s Supper 
in the Pauline churches (1 Cor. 11:23-26) as an early Christian example of a commemorative 
ceremony, which made use of both language and ritualistic practices to rehearse ‘collective 
memories’. Hymns, prophecy, preaching, teaching and reading Scripture in worship meetings 
would be other examples of rehearsal of traditions.
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take the form of language through articulation, they must fit into the accepted 
semantic frameworks of the context; vocabulary, syntax, grammar, metaphor, and 
genre are some examples of these social frameworks. Le Donne views ‘seman-
tic frames’ as the most significant of Halbwachs’ ‘social frameworks’ because 
language con ventions are important for the localization of memories. Memory 
always needs to be rendered intelligibly within its context; articulation of tradition 
cannot render meanings inappropriate to the context or genre of articulation. This 
means that the transition from memory to lan guage involves both translation and 
interpretation.1073 Memory tends to conform to patterns familiar to the present 
group.1074
 Le Donne pays close attention to narrativization, namely, telling one story in 
terms of another: articulation of social memory is subject to narrativization.1075 
The past is remembered in the form of stories because stories provide societies 
and individuals with natural ways to order, connect and meaningfully explain 
events.1076 While providing stability, storytelling in volves a distortion of what is 
1073  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 52-53; Fentress and Wickham, p. 85. According to Halbwachs, 
On Collective Memory, p. 45, ‘verbal conventions constitute what is at the same time the most 
elementary and the most stable framework of collective memory’. Reference in Le Donne, 
Historiographical, p. 54 n. 70.
1074  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 54.
1075  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 54. In social memory theory, narrativization is related to framing 
and keying. Framing, or the application of schemata, is important for social remembering, as 
the conceptual frameworks used to interpret past and present experiences determine to an 
extent how the present and the past are understood. What is remembered not only individually 
but also collectively is dependent on how the information was encoded to be remembered at 
the first encounter and how the information is later interpreted on occasions of recollection 
and explanation. One tends to remember what best fits existing frameworks, reshaping the 
unfamiliar to fit the customary schemata. Eve, Behind, p. 96, points to the capacity of social 
memory ‘to conform to the predominant conceptual frameworks of the group to which it 
belongs, although the fit can often be imperfect’. The mismatch between social memory and 
conceptual frameworks can bring about a re-evaluation of the present. Nevertheless, framing 
helps the group to focus on what it deems significant in the midst of data and impressions. See 
also, Connerton, How Societies Remember, p. 27; Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, pp. 
32-36; Misztal, Theories, pp. 15-16, 82-83, 95. 
 Keying, namely, ‘understanding one set of events in light of another’, has to do with using an 
understanding of a significant event (for instance, in the distant past) to make sense of another, 
more recent or present episode. For instance, some aspects of the story of Jesus may be keyed to 
the history of Israel. See Eve, Behind, p. 97; Misztal, Theories, pp. 96-97; Barry Schwartz, ‘Jesus 
in First Century Memory – A Response’, in Kirk and Thatcher (eds.), Memory, Tradition, and 
Text, pp. 249-61 (50-51). Cubitt, History and Memory, p. 208, states: ‘Knowledge of the earlier 
Hebrew prophets shaped perceptions of the life of Jesus of Nazareth, both during that life and 
afterwards[.]’ The full quotation from Cubitt in Eve, Behind, p. 97; cf. e.g. the views of Horsley 
and Rodríguez.
1076  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 54; D. Lowenthal, The Past Is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: 
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recalled; stories will conform to the socially recognizable forms and plots familiar 
to the culture. This often requires the simplification and adaptation of the material 
being emplotted; a successful narrative requires a beginning and an end, with an 
in teresting storyline and heroic characters.1077
 Both the storyteller and the audience are forced into stereotypical patterns 
by narrativization. Le Donne refers to Gedi and Elam who underline the 
importance of stereotypes, which ‘are an indispensable part of our cognitive 
mechanism, rational patterns according to which our impressions are modeled’.1078 
Narrativization is not only a process that shapes memories in storytelling, but it 
also provides the individual with a framework for interpreting her environment 
and role in it; this grid provided by narrativization is powerful on a subconscious 
level.1079 Metanarratives are important for the process of narrativization, as they are 
stories of such a great cultural significance that all similar stories are interpreted 
by them. Metanarratives have significant mnemonic and distortive capabilities; 
individuals and societies tend to measure the climactic moments of their lives 
against the climactic moments in great metanarratives. Certain characters of 
significance in the great stories are elevated to the status of archetypes by the 
interpretative process.1080 For example, in early modern Europe, the Bible was so 
often read by the people that its stories and characters began to organize their 
perceptions and memories.1081
 Typology is also an important feature of narrativization, namely, the articulation 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 223: ‘stories appear to us as just a natural way of thinking 
about things, a way of ordering our knowledge […] and representing them in our minds…
Stories provided us with a set of stock explanations which underlie our predispositions to 
interpret reality in the ways that we do’. The full quotation in Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 54. 
Cf. Eve, Behind, p. 97; Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, pp. 50, 51, 72, the idea that stories 
with plots are easier to remember at subsequent occasions of recollection than unrelated facts.
1077  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 55, writes ‘pasts worth remembering are so because they bear 
resemblance to interesting plots, characters, and settings in our mind’s eye. These resemblances 
function as “mnemotechniques,” or “vehicles for memory”.’ Cf. Eve, Behind, p. 97; Misztal, 
Theories, p. 10. 
1078  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 54, quoting N. Gedi and Y. Elam, ‘Collective Memory–What Is 
It?’, History and Memory 8 (1996), pp. 30-50 (46).
1079  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 54.
1080  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 55-56.
1081  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 56 quotes Peter Burke, ‘History as Social Memory’, in T. Butler 
(ed.), Memory: History, Culture, and the Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 97-114 (103), who 
notes that, for example, the autobiography of John Bunyan ‘made use of schemata; Bunyan’s 
account of his conversion is clearly modeled, consciously or unconsciously…on the conversion 
of St. Paul as described in the Acts of the Apostles’.
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of social memory, as it refers to the interpretation of the roles of more recent or 
new characters in the narratives by the great characters of metanarratives. While 
narrativization usually takes place unnoticed, the localization of the individual 
memories of climactic moments into social frameworks requires what Le Donne 
labels ‘“grand localizations” in order to give appropriate meaning to these 
memories’ for the present state of mind. These moments of reinforcement make 
the metanarratives of collective memory more recognizable. Typology functions 
as a recognizable appeal to the foundational metanarratives and archetypes 
that have shaped the collective memory of the society or group.1082 Typological 
narrativization is not, however, a literary device employed in far-removed 
contexts, but rather a means of conflation between personal narratives and social 
narratives within a short time period, often the life of personal memory.1083
 Le Donne gives two basic applications of social memory theory.1084 The first 
one has to do with ‘the social constraints upon personal memories’; it is focused 
on Halbwachs’ original conception of the theory, namely, on exploring how 
present cognitive states influence an in dividual’s perception of her personal past. 
Le Donne calls this application of the theory ‘memory’. The other application has 
more to do with ‘the commemorative activity of com munities’; it aims to explore 
the influence of the present social contexts on the collective memories of groups. 
This is called ‘commemoration’. This latter form of analysis is more common in 
historiography, as social memory is most often applied to the examination of 
the commemoration of history in contexts removed by generations; personal 
memory is not a constraining factor of commemoration in such cases. The role of 
contemporary interpreters is viewed as more significant than that of the original 
perceivers or witnesses of the events.1085
1082  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 56. Typological manifestation can also happen in times of 
political or national crisis, as a society will choose to commemorate a tradition from the past: 
by reaching back into the society’s history all the way to the ‘golden age’, a more noble identity 
can be promoted. See Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 56-57; Y. Zerubavel, ‘The Historical, 
the Legendary and the Incredible: Invented Tradition and Collective Memory in Israel’, in J. R. 
Gillis (ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), pp. 105-25; Lowenthal, The Past Is a Foreign Country, pp. 21-25.
1083  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 59. Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 54-59, gives several 
examples of cases where the conflation of personal narratives and social narratives were 
imagined by the individual rememberers, ‘not by mythmakers generations later’.
1084  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 60, pointing to Kirk, ‘Social and Cultural Memory’, pp. 1-24, for 
the subsets of the application of the theory.
1085  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 60.
226
 Le Donne remarks that the latter method can be applied to the commemoration 
that takes place within the same generation of the event, but then discussion on 
the personal memories of those contemporary to the event cannot be avoided.1086 
In this method, the commemorative aims of the group are measured against 
personal memories, which echoes Halbwachs’ origi nal aim, although the interests 
of contemporary theorists are historiographical. Le Donne em phasizes that the 
people contemporary to the historical events shape the interpretation of the 
memory and its distortion; thus, it is not feasible to focus on the commemoration, 
while avoiding analyzing ‘the initial perceptions, memories, and interpretations 
of that event’.1087 The exploration of both ‘memory’ and ‘commemoration’ is 
important for the study of the Gospels and the historical Jesus; in the Gospels, 
‘memory’ (how Jesus was initially remem bered) and ‘commemoration’ (how these 
memories contributed to his commemoration in ear ly Christianity) meet each 
other. If one is to apply social memory to the study of the Jesus tra ditions, neither 
approach can be independently applied.1088
 As a cautious working model which combines social memory theory with 
historical methodology and confronts the flawed ‘passive model of recall’, Le 
Donne presents the synchronic model of the mnemonic cycle which refers to 
the circular and ongoing mnemonic process; in this process, a notable symbolic 
category (that is, a mnemonic or mental frame) (A) drawn from social memory 
mnemonically localizes (D) new perceptions (C), rendering them intelligible and 
communicable through the necessary process of refraction that involves any of 
the distortions of memory (B).1089 
1086  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 61. Le Donne (p. 61 n. 96) refers to Assmann, Das kulturelle 
Gedächtnis, pp. 11, 50-56, who suggests forty years for ‘kommunikative Gedächtnis’, or when 
the first generation begins to die, and to M. Bockmuehl, ‘New Testament Wirkungsgeschichte 
and the Early Christian Appeal to Living Memory’, in S. Barton, L. Stuckenbruck, and B. Wold 
(eds.), Memory in the Bible and Antiquity: The Fifth Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium 
(WUNT, 212; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), who argues for a ‘living memory’ that extends to 
the second generation (approx. 70–150 years).
1087  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 61.
1088  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 60-64 (64): ‘I contend that social memory’s historiographical 
interest in commemoration should only be applied independently when there are no personal 
memories to be measured. To avoid discussion of personal memory when the commemoration 
has been shaped by living memories of the historical event is irresponsible’. 
1089  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 65-68. Le Donne assigns four letters (A–D) to the mnemonic 
cycle to represent the different phases of synchronic analysis of the mnemonic process, which 
cannot be reduced to a linear progression: (A) mnemonic category of significance; (B) trajectory 
of refraction; (C) contemporary perception; (D) localization of the perception (C) within the 
previous category (A). Cf. Le Donne’s (p. 66) Figure 4.2.
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 John the Baptist serves to illustrate the model.1090 First, the mental associations 
regarding John’s appearance in the wilderness, his attire, and socioeconomic status 
with the category ‘prophet’ known to Jesus’ audience stand for ‘movement A’, 
that is, a mnemonic category of significance. Second, the prophetic expectations 
that the perceivers of John had before perceiving him would have refracted their 
actual perceptions of him, for instance, in the way of conventionalization and 
narrativization: not only did ‘[g]oing out to see a prophet’ presuppose ‘a certain 
sociotypical experience within that historical context’, but the significance of 
John was also associated with a specific Scripture (Mal. 3.1) by Q, and perhaps 
by Jesus; hence, movement B. Thirdly, and since movement C, namely that Jesus 
presupposed that John was perceived by his audience, can be taken for granted, 
Jesus’ words ‘more than a prophet’ indicate that ‘John’s significance has the capacity 
to reinterpret the previous parameters of prophethood’; the previous category 
(‘prophet’) is refracted to heed the new perception of John. Thus, Malachi 3.1 is 
reinterpreted in light of John’s significance, taken as a category of significance 
wherein John’s significance is ‘localized’; also, ‘the significance of Malachi has been 
“reinforced” within the new perception of John the Baptist’; hence, movement 
D.1091
 However, synchronic analysis of the mnemonic process requires a validation 
of mnemonic continuity through a diachronic analysis. Le Donne argues that 
by a diachronic analysis of memory refraction, memory trajectories can be 
identified, measured and triangulated; the ultimate purpose of such an analysis 
‘is to postulate what an early refracted memory probably looked like’. As 
movement A (‘the previous category of significance’) in the mnemonic cycle 
does not remain static but is always refracted ‘in order to accommodate for the 
novum (C)’, the mnemonic process ‘presupposes previous mnemonic cycles and 
propels subsequent mnemonic cycles’. This is illustrated by the mnemonic spiral 
of the diachronic continuity of memory where new perceptions refract previously 
established categories; hence, the reinterpretation of movement A along each 
memory cycle (A2, A3, etc.) and the evolution of memory refraction within 
each new memory cycle (B2, B3, etc.). Le Donne links movement D, namely, 
1090  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 68, refers to ‘the Jesus of Q’ who ‘appeals to’ the memory of 
John the Baptist (Lk. 7:24–26; cf. Mt. 11:7-9). Thus, Le Donne accepts a standard solution to 
the Synoptic Problem.
1091  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 69-70. On the consequences of Le Donne’s view for the 
variation and stability of the Jesus traditions, see Le Donne, Historical Jesus, pp. 65-71
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‘localization of a new event within a previous mnemonic category’, with the 
‘impact’ of the new perception (C). If the new perception does not entail anything 
unique or peculiar, it is not memorable. The consequences of the perception of a 
new event are dependent upon the extent of its impact, while the mnemonic spiral 
generally stabilizes new perceptions.1092
 Le Donne is able to grant ‘mnemonic continuity’ and speak of successive 
memory refractions as analyzable ‘trajectories’ due to his notion of memory 
refraction (distortion) which is not equated with ‘false memory’; human memory 
demands a considerable degree of continuity ‘in order to tie all of our shifting 
frames of meaning together’. He notes, however, that when moving from personal 
memories to commemoration, the multiplicity of trajectories that ‘branch off 
in separate directions’ needs to be recognized; instead of a simple mnemonic 
spiral, a matrix of refractive spirals connected to (and to some degree in tension 
with) each other needs to imagined. Nevertheless, Le Donne stresses the concept 
of mnemonic continuity, as the different trajectories allow the historian ‘to 
comparatively analyze the development of thought and patterns of refraction’; 
understanding the origin of a mnemonic trajectory requires comparison and 
contrasting interpretive spheres (namely, mnemonic cycles) that cause the 
opposite refractions. It is paramount to Le Donne’s approach to emphasize 
navigating ‘through interpretations’ as opposed to trying to set them aside; this 
requires a qualified sense of ‘real’, whereby ‘that which is perceived and interpreted 
and thus refracted’ is meant. Le Donne, like Dunn, rejects the distinction between 
the real Jesus and the remembered Jesus: even for the first-generation followers of 
Jesus, the real Jesus was essentially the Jesus of their memory. It is the historian’s 
task to render a history of effects that accounts for the contrary accounts and 
interpretations.1093
 In order to illustrate that typological narrativization can function as a means of 
1092  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 70-72; cf. Figure 4.3 (p. 71). Le Donne’s notion of the impact 
of the new perception is close to Dunn’s notion of impact.
1093  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 72-77; cf. Dunn, Jesus Remembered. Le Donne (pp. 75-77) 
discusses and qualifies Jens Schröter’s view of the relationship between historical event and 
historical story (‘history of effects’), which neither sets aside stories about Jesus in order to 
search for the ‘real’ Jesus nor ignores the historical Jesus in favor of the stories, and Theissen 
and Winter’s notion of historical plausibility, which posits that, while the data cannot be taken 
at face value, human beings are not capable of falsifying historical truth comprehensively; the 
accidental nature of the historical data increases the ‘intuitive certainty’ about the data. See 
Schröter, ‘Von der Historizität der Evangelien’, pp. 163-212 (205-6); Theissen and Winter, The 
Plausible Jesus, p. 234.
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remembering, Le Donne further discusses the case of John the Baptist, placing the 
saying of the Matthean Jesus (Mt. 11.12-15) first on a typological cycle and then 
on a typological spiral. As for the typological cycle and synchronic analysis, the 
text appeals to Elijah, which functions as a category from the Hebrew Bible; Jesus’ 
saying would evoke specific narratives from 1 and 2 Kings (for instance, the taking 
up of Elijah to heaven in 2 Kings 2); here ‘the category seems to be eschatological 
and evokes memories from Malachi’s appendix’ (Mal. 4.5-6); hence, movement 
A. Jesus’ claim that John ‘is Elijah, who was to come’ indicates that John the 
Baptist could be the fulfillment of Malachi’s prophecy. Like in the case of Q, which 
identified John with Malachi 3.1, here John is taken as the new perception (C), 
and conflated with a narrative category, that is, refracted via narrativization (B). 
The eschatological interpretation of Elijah by Malachi points to the existence of a 
refraction trajectory of Elijah tradition. Elijah is then interpreted in light of John’s 
significance by Jesus (D, ‘synthesis [localization] of tradition’), which results in a 
re-reading of Malachi 4.5-6 by Jesus’ audience if they accept his interpretation. 
Thus, ‘Matthew’s commemoration of Elijah was localized within perceptions of 
John, and John’s significance was refracted by the previous category of Malachi 
4:5-6’.1094
 Le Donne, further, presents the refraction trajectory of Elijah typology as a 
typological spiral and continuum, highlighting four shifts of refraction (or B1–
B4): Elisha as a type of Elijah (2 Kgs 2), Elisha as baptizer (2 Kgs 5.10), Malachi’s 
Elijah as eschatological expectation, and John the Baptist as Elijah redivivus. Jesus’ 
typological interpretation of John the Baptist indicates ‘how a refraction trajectory 
can take on typological significance’.1095
 On the basis of this discussion on the mnemonic cycle, continuity, and 
typology, Le Donne outlines his historical method for studying the Jesus 
traditions which, while in part based on traditional historical-critical methods, 
introduces ‘the mnemonic value of typology and the process of triangulation’ to 
the field of historical Jesus research.1096 Albeit not followed in a rigid order in his 
later analysis, Le Donne proposes a method which consists of five basic steps. 
(1) He surveys cultural traditions related to the given passage, charting their 
1094  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 77-79; cf. Figure 4.4 (p. 78).
1095  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 79-80; cf. Figure 4.5 (p. 79). Le Donne (p. 80): ‘…in Matthew, 
we see that Jesus’ appeal to Elijah’s significance was eschatologically filtered through Malachi’.
1096  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 81-86, 87-91.
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interpretive trajectories previous to, parallel to, and following the text or subject; 
this step is regularly used in historical Jesus research and involves the study of 
Jesus’ first-century context,1097 Hellenistic Judaism, the scriptural frameworks 
of the Hebrew Bible and Septuagint (e.g. metanarratives, archetypes, etc.).1098 
(2) He analyzes two or more manifestations of the same story or saying in the Jesus 
tradition, focusing specifically on ‘how this tradition functions mnemonically in 
its respective synchronic contexts’ and on manifestations of memory refraction; 
this step involves the study of mnemonic refraction, namely how the ‘evangelist’s 
authorial tendencies’ have distorted an episode of the Jesus tradition, in a fashion 
similar to redaction criticism.1099 (3) He analyzes the diachronic movement of the 
Jesus episode, the relations between its versions to one another, and the refraction 
trajectories of the given Jesus tradition; this step involves the comparison of 
‘different synchronic stages of the Jesus tradition (i.e., the Gospels)’ and attempts 
to chart ‘commemorative development from Q to Mark, Mark to Matthew, Mark 
to Luke, and so on’; the different theories that attempt to solve the Synoptic 
Problem originate in this kind of discussion.1100 (4) He considers ‘the possibility 
that the trajectory emerged prior to the tradition’s literary form’, if the synchronic 
1097  Le Donne does not discuss the first-century context at length in The Historiographical Jesus, 
but in The Historical Jesus his view is consonant with those who take seriously the oral nature 
of the transmission of the Jesus traditions. Consider Le Donne, Historical Jesus, pp. 65-71 (69-
70): ‘Understanding the difference between literate culture and oral culture is important for 
us because Jesus was first remembered by a largely oral culture. His words and deeds were not 
initially recorded, nor were they archived. Jesus’ words were remembered by an oral community. 
Every time Jesus told a parable worth remembering it was remembered by several witnesses 
with degrees of variance and stability.’ Italics are original.
1098  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 81, 82. Le Donne (p. 82) notes that the purpose of this step is 
‘to establish a tradition trajectory whereby a particular fountainhead (a text, or group of texts) 
has taken a special cultural significance…it is the movement from [A] to B that is available for 
analysis.’
1099  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 82, 83-84. Le Donne (p. 83) writes ‘[w]hen…the evangelist’s 
tendencies involve the application of scriptural categories to the Jesus tradition, one can 
expect the episode to be localized within such mnemonic frameworks. This corresponds to 
the movement from B to C in [the mnemonic cycle]. One can also expect that the NT category 
reinterprets the significance…of the scriptural category. This corresponds to the movement 
from C to D [in the mnemonic cycle]. The synthesis (or mnemonic reinforcement/localization) 
of old and new categories promote the contemporary relevance of the scriptural category and 
thus propel the distortion trajectory of the fountainhead. This corresponds to the movement 
from D to A in [the mnemonic cycle] and anticipates the movement from D to [A2 in the 
typological cycle].’
1100  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 82, 84 (84). Le Donne (p. 84) notes that this step is entirely 
dependent on one’s ‘ability to establish two or more refractive tendencies that are suggestive of 
a particular interpretative trajectory’.
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context of the traditions can be viewed as representing ‘a particular sphere along a 
diachronic refraction trajectory’; this step involves – and distinguishes Le Donne’s 
whole method of applying memory studies to the Jesus traditions from the views 
previously discussed in this chapter – consideration of whether the tradition has 
its origins ‘in memory or invention’ with the help of the criteria of authenticity.1101 
(5) He attempts to triangulate toward ‘the most plausible historical scenario’ 
according to the trajectories, if diverging redaction trajectories can be established 
and the tradition can be viewed as an early and widespread memory of Jesus; the 
notion of triangulation ‘describes the mnemonic sphere that best accounts for 
the trajectories of memory’. To illustrate the final step of triangulation, Le Donne 
returns to John the Baptist; as a historical person, John is to account for both the 
trajectory from Jewish prophetic typologies to Q and Matthew and the trajectory 
to John 1.19-21 (‘“What then? Are you Elijah?” And he said, “I am not.”’), which 
directly contradicts Jesus’ saying and the Elijah typology in Matthew 11.12-15.1102
 In the course of his exegetical chapters, Le Donne applies his method to the 
title Son of David, which he views as a category of the early Christian social 
memory of Jesus.1103 He follows the mnemonic trajectories of the Son of David 
typology, starting from a narrative schema in the Hebrew Bible and working his 
way through ancient Jewish texts to its early Christian refractions in the Jesus 
1101  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 82, 84, 87-91, 176, 195, 252 n. 107, 265, 267. Le Donne (pp. 87-
91) qualifies the notions of ‘authenticity’ and ‘historicity’ in accordance with his methodology, 
which maintains that all memory is refracted, and there is no access to the past actuality or 
‘objective history’ in order to verify ‘what actually happened’. Nevertheless, Le Donne does not 
avoid the question of the origin of the Jesus traditions, but attempts to establish ‘whether a story 
originated in the perceptions contemporary to the historical event’. He employs the criteria 
of multiple attestation, embarrassment, contrary tendency, multiple forms, coherence, and 
Semitisms and Semitic influence to address the question of origin. He stresses that the use of 
the criteria is only one stage of his historical method; the question of ‘historicity’ is not all that 
there is to the historian’s task. Cf. the views of Kelber, Dunn, Horsley, Rodríguez, Keith, Allison.
1102  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 82, 84-86 (86); cf. Figure 4.6 (p. 86). Le Donne (p. 84) describes 
‘triangulation’ as charting toward a historical portrait. On triangulation, also see Le Donne, 
Historical Jesus, pp. 120-32 (126-132). Le Donne, Historical Jesus, p. 130, writes ‘It is when the 
editors of [the Gospel stories/Jesus traditions] disagree the most that we can most confidently 
postulate historical memory! The fact that the memories of Jesus were refracted (bent in different 
directions) is the very fact that allows the historian to postulate the historical event.’ Italics are 
original.
1103  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 93-257. Le Donne (p. 93) ‘examines the title “Son of David” 
with an aim to (1) ascertain the title’s entry point into the Jesus tradition, (2) analyze the ways 
that it was mnemonically refracted in the interpretation of Jesus’ ministry (and vice versa), 
and (3) discuss how this refracted the more developed (i.e., formalized) Jesus tradition in early 
Christianity.’ 
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traditions. Le Donne first provides a general historical back drop for measuring 
Jesus’ actions and words. He discusses the uses of ‘Son of David’ in the Hebrew 
Bible (for instance, 2 Samuel 7, Isaiah 11) and in Psalm of Solomon 17, the first-
cen tury document which develops Hebrew concepts such as messianism in a 
Hellenistic context. In the Hebrew Bible, ‘Son of David’ is conflated with Solomon 
imagery and motifs, and in Psalm of Solomon 17, the ‘Son of David’ references 
of Isaiah 11 are placed within an escha tological and messianic framework as a 
reaction against historical events related to the inner disputes of Hasmonean 
dynasty (67–62 CE) and the conquest of Pompey; these historical events were 
typologically represented, that is, refracted and localized, by contemporary peo-
ple.1104
 Le Donne next turns to the question as to how the Solomonic exorcism 
paradigm influenced Jesus and the early Christians. He analyzes ‘the mnemonic 
lens’ utilized by Matthew, who has developed the title Son of David in the NT 
the most, and notes that Matthew frames Jesus’ therapeutic ministry (that is, 
refracts the Jesus traditions about his healings and exorcisms) with ‘Son of David’, 
localizing Jesus’ activity in this significant category of Solomon’s reputation in 
order to show, against the negative connotation of foreign exorcistic practice, 
that Jesus’ activity was in line with both royal messianism and Jewish exorcism; a 
conflicting mnemonic trajectory is found in the writings of Celsus and the much 
later Talmudic literature (b.Sanh. 107b), which view Jesus’ healings and exorcisms 
in light of foreign magical practices and sorcery. The originating refractive sphere 
for these trajectories, Le Donne argues, is the historical Jesus who was remembered 
as an exorcist and healer. Matthew attempts to make Jesus’ therapeutic ministry 
intelligible in a Jewish mnemonic sphere.1105
 Le Donne argues in the next chapter that Jesus’ temple procession (namely, 
his entry into Jerusalem and procession toward the temple) bears resemblance 
to a typological kingly en trance into a city, but this does not render the event 
unhistorical as such. Assessing Mark’s version (Mk 11.1-11) of Jesus’ procession, 
Le Donne argues that its core has its basis in memory rather than invention. He 
discusses the conceptual categories, for example, scriptural precedents, that are 
at work in the tradition. First, Mark localizes his procession narrative within a 
framework of Psalm 118. Second, although Mark may not have been aware of 
1104  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 93-136.
1105  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 137-89.
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the connection, the mnemonic trajectory from Mark’s symbolic depiction can be 
traced to Solomon’s entrance into Jerusalem on David’s mule in the Succession 
Narrative (esp. 1 Kings 1.32-40), a category further applied to Zerubbabel by 
Zechariah (Zech. 9.9). This indicates that Jesus’ entry into Jerusalem was localized 
in Zechariah 9.9 before Mark’s Gospel. On the other hand, Matthew’s version 
with Jesus riding into the city on two animals, also localizing Jesus’ act within 
Zechariah 9.9, represents a trajectory that symbolically explains Zechariach’s 
motif of dual messianism of king and priest present in the first century Dead Sea 
Scrolls; Matthew’s version is ‘a textbook example of refraction by narrativization’, 
as it culminates in Jesus’ rejection by the high priest at the temple.1106
 In his final exegetical chapter, Le Donne detects a similar priestly and royal 
motif in the Son of David question in Mark 12.35-37 where Psalm 110 is quoted. 
He contends that ‘early and widespread memories of Jesus considered him to have 
claimed divinely endorsed authority to destroy the present temple to make way 
for the temple of heaven’, but does not think the Son of David question can be 
established as having originated in early memory. Nevertheless, Le Donne argues 
that the tradition had a pre-Markan origin on the basis of the fact that ‘Son of 
David’ is not a central christological category for Mark, and that the question 
confirms that ‘Jesus’ perceived rank and mission’ were in opposition to the temple 
institution and entirely dependent upon his authority over the temple. Le Donne 
entertains the possibility that there was a messianic refraction of the perceptions 
of Jesus which localized Jesus’ significance in the exegesis of Psalm 110; these 
perceptions would have christologically combined the priestly and royal offices, 
posing a direct threat to the temple priesthood. Thus, while the quotation of 
Psalm 110 cannot be established as ‘historical’, its use as an early mnemonic 
refraction reveals aspects of contemporary perception and the interpretation of 
Jesus’ relation to the temple institution. Finally, Le Donne concludes that ‘”Son of 
David” provided the necessary mnemonic continuity between the historical Jesus 
and the Christology of early Christianity’.1107
 Le Donne concludes his work by presenting the major results of his exegetical 
analyses of the title Son of David in light of the mnemonic cycle, the typological 
cycle, the mnemonic/typological spiral to demonstrate diachronic continuity.1108 
1106  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 191-220 (215).
1107  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 221-57 (257).
1108  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 259-68; cf. Figures 9.1-9.6.
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His ultimate conclusion regarding the historical Jesus indicates a cautious posture 
toward the Jesus traditions: 
The historical Jesus is the memorable Jesus; he is the one who set 
refraction trajectories in motion and who set the initial parameters for 
how his memories were to be interpreted by his contemporaries…the 
historian does not ‘find’ Jesus in spite of the refractions of the evangelists. 
Rather the historian discerns his historical presence and impact on the 
basis of these refractions. It is because these refractions exist that we can 
confidently postulate the mnemonic sphere in which the memories of 
Jesus were located.1109
Critique & Evaluation
Le Donne’s view is not engaged in many other studies on social memory theory 
and the Jesus traditions, although it was one of the first lengthy treatments of 
these issues in the field of his torical Jesus research.1110 On a general level, some 
scholars have welcomed Le Donne’s way of combining social memory theory 
and the notions of the historian’s subjectivity and memo ry refraction with the 
study of the Jesus traditions.1111 More specifically, for instance, Tobias Hägerland 
views Le Donne’s combination of social memory theory with the use of tradition 
criteria of authenticity in order to address the historicity of the Jesus traditions as 
plausible.1112 However, some have expressed strong criticisms about Le Donne’s 
1109  Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 268.
1110  Albeit not a study of the historical Jesus, I find it surprising that Eve, Behind, pp. 86-134, fails 
to mention, let alone discuss, Le Donne’s view or methodology in relation to social memory 
theory and the oral Jesus tradition.
1111  See e.g. Bird, Gospel, pp. 82 n. 27, 97 n. 94: ‘All memory is filtered through the structures of 
pre-existing patterns, types, and categories’; ‘…the real Jesus was the Jesus of their memory’; 
cf. Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 52-64, 76. Allison, Constructing, p. 389: ‘To biblicize is 
not necessarily to invent…A memory can be told in many languages, including the language 
of Scripture’; cf. Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 52-59, 115-36; idem, ‘Theological Memory 
Distortion’, pp. 163-78. Thomas Kazen, ‘Revelation, Interpretation, Tradition: Jesus, Authority 
and Halakic Development’, in Byrskog, Holmén, and Kankaanniemi (eds.), The Identity of 
Jesus, pp. 127-160 (130): ‘in Anthony Le Donne’s words “[i]t is the effects of the past that are 
available for analysis and not the past itself ”’; cf. Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 76. Redman, 
‘How Accurate Are Eyewitnesses’, pp. 177-97 (194): ‘memory is distortion’; cf. Le Donne, 
Historiographical, pp. 52-64, 76; idem, ‘Theological Memory Distortion’, pp. 163-78 (168).
1112  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (62), notes that ‘using Le Donne’s recent 
terminology, we should recognize that an ‘authentic’ tradition is one that has ‘a basis in 
perception’ more than ‘a basis in invention’; cf. Le Donne, ‘The Criterion of Coherence’, pp. 
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overall method. For example, while recognizing that Le Donne uses the criteria of 
authenticity in his discussion on the historicity of the Jesus traditions,1113 Ernest 
van Eck claims that Le Donne’s approach is guilty of for what Le Donne criticizes 
‘the criteria approach’, namely of ‘historical positivism’; this criticism is, however, 
based on a misrepresentation of Le Donne’s view.1114 Also, Zeba Crook has raised 
concerns about Le Donne and others’ use of ‘memory theory’ in too an optimistic 
way as a guarantor of the historicity of the Gospels; Crooks’ criticism is, however, 
weakened by the fact that it is mainly targeted against Le Donne’s more popular-
level book, The Historical Jesus, and does not discuss (1) the nuances of Le Donne’s 
view of memory, which by no means undermine, for instance, memory distortion, 
and (2) Le Donne’s key method of triangulation.1115 Furthermore, there are others, 
who are much more approving of Le Donne’s overall approach and memory 
studies than van Eck and Crook, but have nevertheless raised concerns about the 
specifics of his view, especially as for Le Donne’s understanding of the historian’s 
task regarding the historicity of the Jesus traditions. Holly Hearon, Alan Kirk, and 
Chris Keith, who were all among the initial reviewers of The Historiographical 
96-114 (96), which Hägerland considers better than the dichotomy between ‘memory’ and 
‘invention’ in Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 86. See the discussion below.
1113  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (8 n. 31); cf. Le Donne, Historical Jesus, pp. 48-52, 85-92, 123-29, 
on Le Donne’s application of the criteria of authenticity on the question of Jesus’ relationship 
with his family.
1114  van Eck, ‘Memory’, pp. 1-10 (5 n. 14, 17). I fail to see the logic in van Eck’s (p. 5 n. 17) criticism: 
how does the quotation from Le Donne, Historical Jesus, p. 26 (‘memory does not preserve the 
past’) evince for historical positivism? Van Eck (p. 5 n. 17) asks ‘[w]hy, for example, is it not 
possible that some of Jesus’ sayings (e.g., the aphorisms in Mk 10:25; 12:17) could have been 
remembered as Jesus uttered them?’ I do not think that Le Donne would deny that these kinds 
of sayings could theoretically have been remembered as Jesus uttered them. The point of Le 
Donne is, however, that we cannot achieve objective certainty about such things. (I would add 
to this that these aphorisms in their present Greek form cannot possibly maintain ipsissima 
verba Jesu for the simple reason that Jesus probably taught them in Aramaic, which was his first 
language. On this see e.g. Meier, A Marginal Jew, I, pp. 255-68). I do not understand how Le 
Donne’s view can be viewed as compatible with the ‘historical positivism’ critiqued at length, 
for example, in Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 1-39, which is the introductory section of 
his major contribution to the subject and is, for reasons unknown, completely ignored by van 
Eck. Le Donne has certainly attempted to redefine what ‘authenticity’ means, and is not guilty 
of plain historical positivism. See the discussion below. Cf. also my discussions on van Eck’s 
criticisms of the memory approach above in ch. 3.5.
1115  Crook, ‘Collective Memory Distortion and the Quest for the Historical Jesus’, pp. 53-76; cf. Le 
Donne’s response in Le Donne, ‘The Problem of Selectivity in Memory Research’, pp. 77-97, and 
Crook’s response to Le Donne’s response in Z. Crook, ‘Gratitude and Comments to Le Donne’, 
JSHJ 11 (2013), pp. 98-115, where Crook (p. 99 n. 2) admits: ‘…Le Donne’s Historiographical 
Jesus is a fine, nuanced piece of scholarship. Though this work raises some of the same concerns 
for me as his Historical Jesus, those concerns are much more muted in his scholarly work.’
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Jesus, have indicated that Le Donne’s continuing use of the criteria of authenticity 
may not be compatible with his application of social memory theory to the Jesus 
traditions.1116 
 Hearon, who believes, for example, that Le Donne’s view of history as memory 
refraction is compelling, states that by attempting to locate memory refractions in 
history and using ‘the well-worn criteria’ in the process, Le Donne fails to distance 
himself from those he critiques.1117 Also, Kirk believes that while Le Donne 
has significantly advanced the historiographical discussion in Jesus research, 
combining the standard criteria with his proposed method is vulnerable to 
criticism.1118 Furthermore, Keith acknowledges that postmodern historiography, 
espoused by Le Donne, has proved the error of historical positivism, namely, 
the assumption that one can attain objective reconstruction of the past,1119 that 
Le Donne’s description of the general historical task of postulating the different 
interpretive trajectories (‘what could have happened in the past’) as helpful,1120 
and that Le Donne’s project of triangulation of memory refractions provides a 
way forward for scholars of the historical Jesus; however, this is only so ‘…if/once 
they dispense with the criteria of authenticity’.1121 Keith admits that Le Donne’s 
refinement of the authenticity language in his use of the criteria is significant, 
but still argues that Le Donne ignores the methodological basis of the criteria 
1116  See H. E. Hearon, review of Anthony Le Donne’s The Historiographical Jesus: Memory, Typology, 
and the Sone of David, CBQ 74 (2012), pp. 163-65 (165); A. Kirk, review of Anthony Le Donne’s 
The Historiographical Jesus: Memory, Typology, and the Sone of David, RBL 4 (2011), pp. 1-5 
(4); C. Keith, review of Anthony Le Donne’s The Historiographical Jesus: Memory, Typology, 
and the Sone of David, RQ 53 (2011), pp. 117-18; idem, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 64-65, 67; idem, ‘The 
Indebtedness’, pp. 25-48 (44-46).
1117  Hearon, review, pp. 163-165.
1118  Kirk, review, pp. 1-5 Kirk (p. 4) wonders ‘whether the methodologies can be productively 
conjoined’ and he remarks that many of the standard criteria ‘are calibrated toward making 
the positivistic distinction between fact and interpretation in the tradition to which Le Donne’s 
methodology is so averse, and the origins of the criteria approach lie in the form-critical 
construal of the tradition as a history of often radical discontinuities’.
1119  Keith, Scribal, p. 71; cf. Le Donne, Historical Jesus. See also Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 175-76 n. 
31, where Keith distinguishes his own view of historiography, which he says ‘coheres with that 
of Schröter and Allison’, from that of Le Donne: ‘Whereas Le Donne…proceeds…to qualify 
Schröter by claiming that scholars cannot speak intelligently about an actual past that existed 
apart from perception…, I affirm with Schröter that scholars can at least offer theories “about 
how things could have been.” No doubt, Le Donne would consider my appropriation of social 
memory theory to these ends to be closer to critical realism than his appropriation of social 
memory theory.’ Cf. Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 8-10. I consider this more a matter of 
emphasis than considerable difference.
1120  Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 67, also see pp. 64-65.
1121  Keith, ‘The Indebtedness’, pp. 25-48 (45).
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approach (namely, separating history from interpretation) and is open to the 
criticism that his method invalidates his validation of the authenticity criteria.1122
 Regarding these critiques, it has to be noted first that Le Donne does not end 
up among those he critiques uncritically. He is very well aware of the roots of 
the criteria of authenticity and that those roots go further than the early form 
criticism of Bultmann and others.1123 More to the point, in order to determine 
whether Le Donne’s use of both social memory theory/his notion of memory 
refraction and the criteria of authenticity to discuss the question of the his toricity 
of the Jesus traditions can be viewed as contradictory, one must understand 
how Le Donne defines ‘historicity’ and ‘authenticity’; surely, Le Donne borrows 
methodological con siderations regarding the criteria of authenticity, for example, 
from Meier,1124 who would probably fall into the category of ‘positivism’ in the 
estimations of those advocating for a memory approach,1125 but Le Donne does 
not do so uncritically: he redefines the authenticity language in light of memory 
studies, while benefitting from the long tradition of method ological discussion 
on the historicity of the Jesus traditions; it is not the Jesus historian’s task to 
attempt to find the ‘certain’ and ‘objective facts’ about Jesus.1126 Le Donne has no 
unrealis tic expectations about the results of the criteria due to his hermeneutical 
considerations. Thus, it is not accurate to define Le Donne as adopting the 
methodological basis of the criteria ap proach as such.
 One could, of course, keep pressing the point and argue that the criteria are 
not necessary: let the memory refractions stand as they are.1127 However, whatever 
1122  Keith, ‘The Indebtedness’, pp. 25-48 (46); idem, review, pp. 117-18. Further, Keith, ‘The 
Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55.
1123  See Le Donne, ‘The Rise of the Quest for an Authentic Jesus: An Introduction to the Crumbling 
Foundations of Jesus Research’, in Keith and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise 
of Authenticity, pp. 3-21; also Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 87-91; cf. Keith’s view, which 
greatly emphasizes the form-critical roots of the criteria approach.
1124  See the definitions of the criteria in Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 87-91; cf. Meier, A Marginal 
Jew, I, pp. 167-95.
1125  See e.g. the criticism of Meier’s view in Rodríguez, ‘The Embarrassing Truth About Jesus’, 
pp. 132-51 (148-49): ‘Meier set out to distinguish historically authentic data apart from any 
predetermined/ -ing interpretation of data. But the quest for data can only ever proceed with 
interpretation as its guide!’, citing Wright, Victory of God, p. 33 on interpretation from the 
viewpoint of critical realism.
1126  Cf. e.g. Le Donne, Historiographical, p. 76: ‘It is the effects of the past that are available for 
analysis and not the past itself.’
1127  Cf. Hearon, review, pp. 163-65 (165); also, Keith, ‘The Narratives of the Gospels and the 
Historical Jesus’, pp. 426-55, who argues that the use of the criteria of authenticity cannot be 
reconciled with a memory approach for epistemological reasons.
238
method one chooses for the study of the Jesus traditions, if one wishes to discuss 
the historical Jesus, one has to make judgments about ‘historicity’, no matter how 
strong or weak these judgments are.1128 As has been pointed out by Hägerland, 
who labels Le Donne’s view ‘a moderate variety of postmodern historiography’ and 
recognizes that Le Donne avoids speaking of a non-remembered, non-interpreted, 
or non-perceived past, one needs to have some principles; as Le Donne attempts 
to do, the criteria can be used for ‘the task of judging whether a tradition has its 
basis in perception or invention’.1129 In order to do this, it seems only legitimate to 
utilize a methodology that is as nuanced as possible; Le Donne’s hermeneutical 
framework, which rejects historical positivism, his understanding of memory 
studies and memory refraction, combined with the refined understanding of the 
task of the criteria, is an articulated one and is capable of yielding concrete results. 
This is not a naïve claim for the historicity of the Jesus traditions. It is also explicit 
that Le Donne does not imagine the discussion on ‘historicity’ to be the only task 
of the historian of Jesus, but rather only one step among other steps.1130 Le Donne 
shows in practice that, while the criticism of atomistic usage of the criteria is in 
many ways to the point,1131 there is still room for methodological discussion on 
the question of ‘historicity’ which involves the criteria of authenticity.1132
1128  Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 87-91 (87) argues for a weak sense of authenticity: ‘The aim 
is not to dig for an unrefracted memory…the historical goal is not to verify what “actually 
happened”.’ Cf. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, p. 65, who argues for a total rejection of the criteria and that 
rejecting the criteria approach’s division of the Jesus traditions into authentic and inauthentic 
does not mean one cannot make decisions about the historical accuracy of the traditions. 
1129  Hägerland, ‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (63). Hägerland (p. 63) concludes: ‘As long as 
the nature of historical inquiry is acknowledged – avoiding the confusion between historical 
reconstruction and the historical past itself – there is no reason why criteria should not be 
used for the task of judging whether a tradition whether a tradition has its primary basis in 
perception or invention; indeed, some criteria or principles are required for this task. Le Donne’s 
work, combining social memory theory with a use of conventional criteria, demonstrates that 
this can be done very well.’
1130  Cf. the five steps in Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 81-82.
1131  Cf. the numerous articles in Keith and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of 
Authenticity.
1132  Again, Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 87-91, application of the criteria thereafter. Hägerland, 
‘The Future of the Criteria’, pp. 43-65 (62-65), using in part Le Donne’s terminology, suggests 
three ways in which the criteria should be used more cautiously in the future: (1) an ‘authentic’ 
tradition must be redefined to mean a tradition that has ‘a basis in perception’ more than ‘a basis 
in invention’; this point involves the notion that there is no clear line between ‘authentic’ and 
‘inauthentic’; (2) the criteria must be cautiously selected, applied, and internally correlated; for 
instance, the so-called criterion of double dissimilarity must be abandoned, as ‘dissimilarity to 
Judaism cannot function as an argument in favour of historicity’; (3) the criteria alone cannot 
mean ‘a method’ for historical Jesus research, but ‘Jesus research has to involve a full method 
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 On the critical side, Le Donne’s treatment of the relevance of ‘memory’ to the 
study of the historical Jesus (namely, the period of when personal memories were 
still around) in The Historiographical Jesus does not address the question of 
eyewitness testimony, nor does it discuss the important works of Samuel Byrskog 
and Richard Bauckham in this respect.1133 Nonetheless, overall Anthony Le Donne’s 
view is nuanced; its conclusions regarding the Jesus traditions are cautious. It is 
also based on a solid view of first-century media culture,1134 relatively low literacy 
rates, and the oral nature of the culture with the important role of texts, although 
this is not explicitly expressed in The Historiographical Jesus.1135 While Le Donne 
surely could have strengthened his hermeneutical discussion by discussing 
more recent works1136 and Paul Ricoeur1137, he offers important hermeneutical 
considerations, such as the circularity and necessity of interpretation, that are 
sometimes neglected by historians of Jesus despite their necessity; on the basis 
of this discussion, Le Donne offers a middle ground regarding ‘historicity’, with 
a clearly defined method which takes seriously social memory theory, the nature 
of the Jesus traditions as early Christian social memory, and transmission as 
refraction; it is a method of triangulation which he puts to use in his discussion 
of the title Son of David. The contribution of Le Donne’s work to the study of 
the Jesus traditions and the whole field of historical Jesus research needs to be 
acknowledged and discussed by any well-informed scholar who attempts to make 
sense of the memory approach and its methodological diversity.
3.8 Importance of Eyewitness Testimony
After discussing the different views that apply social memory theory and studies 
for correlating [an ‘authentic’ tradition] to other ‘authentic’ items, to the general impression of 
the Gospels narratives and to the context of first-century Judaism’.
1133  Cf. e.g. Le Donne, Historiographical, pp. 60-64. Admittedly, Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, may not 
have been available for Le Donne at the time of writing. Le Donne, ‘The Problem of Selectivity 
in Memory Research’, pp. 77-97, addresses Bauckham’s view. These questions and scholarly 
views are tackled below in the final section of Chapter 3 (ch. 3.8).
1134  ‘First-century media culture’ is the term used by Anthony Le Donne and Tom Thatcher (eds.), 
The Fourth Gospel in First-Century Media Culture (European Studies on Christian Origins; 
LNTS, 426; London: T & T Clark, 2011).
1135  However, see Le Donne, Historical Jesus, pp. 65-71 (69-70).
1136  As noted by Hearon, review, pp. 163-65 (164).
1137  As noted by Keith, review, pp. 117-18. Le Donne, ‘The Problem of Selectivity in Memory 
Research’, pp. 77-97 (96) refers to Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, p. 221, in response to 
Crook’s critique against Le Donne’s use of the telescope as an analogy for memory distortion.
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on oral tra dition to the Jesus traditions, it is necessary to address the final 
question of eyewitness testi mony and individual eyewitnesses. What was the role 
of the original eyewitnesses of Jesus’ ministry, his words and deeds, in the process 
of the formation and transmission of the Jesus traditions? It has been indicated 
in the previous sections of this study that there were particu lar individuals who 
performed the Jesus traditions in early Christian communities; however, is there 
any way of knowing who these individuals were, how they exercised their authority 
in the case they indeed were authoritative? The long-standing influence of form-
critical as sumptions about the anonymous communities that freely transmitted 
the Jesus traditions in an uncontrolled fashion has been questioned with appeals 
to the importance of eyewitness testi mony and individual eyewitnesses by Samuel 
Byrskog (b.1957)1138 and Richard Bauckham (b.1946)1139. The final part of this 
research-historical section delves into their views which argue in their distinct 
ways that the testimonies of early eyewitnesses significantly influenced the early 
phases of the Jesus traditions until the writing of the Gospels.1140
3.8.1 Samuel Byrskog
Samuel Byrskog’s Story as History – History as Story (2000),1141 which lays out a 
broad framework of oral history and eyewitness testimony (autopsy) in ancient 
historiography and the environment of the New Testament, is his most thorough 
and relevant work regarding the question of eyewitness testimony and the 
transmission of the Jesus traditions in early Chris tianity.1142 Byrskog begins by 
1138  Professor of New Testament, University of Lund (2007–), Byrskog was a student of Birger 
Gerhardsson.
1139  Retired Professor of New Testament Studies and Bishop Wardlaw Professor in the University 
of St. Andrews.
1140  Limiting the discussion to Byrskog and Bauckham is reasonable, as the two scholars together – 
and despite their differences – seem to have become the ones most often mentioned in relation 
to the question.
1141  Byrskog, Story as History, is a continuation from Byrskog’s 1994 dissertation, Byrskog, Jesus the 
Only Teacher, where Byrskog argued extensively for the centrality of Jesus as the only teacher of 
his disciples in relation to the transmission of the Jesus traditions in the Matthean community; 
Byrskog built his thesis upon Gerhardsson’s model of comparison with rabbinic transmission 
and Riesner’s discussion on the transmission of the Jesus tradition. Further on the connections 
between Byrskog’s two books, see P. M. Head, ‘The Role of Eyewitnesses in the Formation of 
the Gospel Tradition: A Review Article of Samuel Byrskog, Story as History – History as Story’, 
TynBul 52.2 (2001), pp. 275-94 (275-83).
1142  In addition to Byrskog, Story as History, see also e.g. Byrskog, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-20; idem, ‘The 
Transmission of the Jesus Tradition’, in Holmén & Porter (eds.), Handbook, pp. 2:1465-95; idem, 
‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition’, pp. 459-71; idem, ‘Review of Rudolf Bultmann’, pp. 
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noting that the purpose of his project is not ‘to defend the relia bility of the gospel 
tradition’1143, but rather to provide a better historical understanding of the general 
problem of ‘the dynamics involved behind the past in the present and the present 
in the past as the gospel tradition evolved’. Byrskog’s work is triggered by what he 
considers a lack of nuance in previous scholarly treatments of the relationship 
between story and history, often wrongly conceived as a dichotomy.1144
 Based on his appropriation of the works of oral historians Paul Thompson 
(b.1935) and Jan Vansina (1929–2017), Byrskog argues for a theoretical framework 
of oral history as a valid historiographical way of understanding how ancient 
historians related to the past; oral history, he notes, is ‘a move from below’, an 
investigation of the oral evidence of the witnesses of an event as the historian’s 
raw material. Oral evidence is not generally to be considered superior to written 
evidence, but it can, to an extent, be more reliable than a written document because 
the historian is able to sense the social clues of her witnesses. The historian must 
recognize that ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are mixed in all human perception and 
memory, whether individual or collective; the notion of oral history avoids ‘the 
extreme documentary objectivity’ and ‘the relativistic subjectivity’. Byrskog notes, 
in line with Thompson, that ‘[o]ral history becomes oral tradition as the accounts 
are handed down by word of mouth to later generations’; while this process is 
subject to social pressures, Goody and Watt’s theory of homeostasis indicates that 
the story not only mirrors the present but also reflects ‘what happened before 
history became story’.1145
 According to Byrskog, the modern discipline of oral history is helpful because 
549-55; idem, ‘A Century with the Sitz im Leben’, pp. 1-27; most recently, idem, ‘Philosophical 
Aspects on Memory: Aristotle, Augustine and Bultmann’, in Byrskog, Hakola, and Jokiranta 
(eds.), Social Memory and Social Identity in the Study of Early Judaism and Early Christianity, 
pp. 23-47. Also see the accounts of Byrskog’s view in Eve, Behind, pp. 135-43; Head, ‘The Role 
of Eyewitnesses’, pp. 275-94 (283-92).
1143  Cf. the study with this very title by Byrskog’s teacher, Gerhardsson, The Reliability of the Gospel 
Tradition.
1144  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 1-17 (6). Italics are original. Some of the key concepts upon which 
Byrskog aims to shed light are ‘past and present’, ‘transmission’, ‘history’, ‘historicity’, ‘reliability’, 
‘objectivity’, and ‘subjectivity’.
1145  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 26-33 (26-30); cf. Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past. Oral 
History (Opus books; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 edn, 1988), passim; Vansina, Oral 
Tradition, passim. Despite Vansina’s strict distinction between oral tradition and oral history, 
Byrskog (p. 31-32) notes that for Vansina, oral tradition is both of the present and of the past. 
Byrskog refers to Thompson and some other oral historians constantly in the subsequent 
chapters.
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it resists the temptation of viewing only the contemporary materials as relevant 
for historical investigation; due to its interest in more than ‘the objective facts’, it 
can be placed in dialogue with ancient conceptions of historiography. For Byrskog 
‘history [is] an account of what people have done and said in the past, which 
means that various kinds of biased, pragmatic and didactic features can be part of 
the writing of history’. He studies ancient Greek and Roman historians and their 
culture-specific patterns of oral history in order to shed some light on the socio-
cultural setting of the inception and development of the Gospel tradition.1146
 An important concept in Byrskog’s investigation is autopsy which he defines 
as ‘a visual means to gather information concerning a certain object, a means of 
inquiry, and thus also a way of relating to that object’.1147 Byrskog demonstrates 
that for ancient Greek and Roman historians, such as Herodotus, Thucydides, 
Polybius, Josephus, and Tacitus, the ideal was to write about the past, based on 
direct or indirect autopsy, namely on what they had themselves seen or learned 
from eyewitnesses who functioned as oral sources. The pre-Socratic philoso pher 
Heraclitus’ dictum ‘Eyes are surer witnesses than ears’ was important for these 
ancient historians. A diachronic dimension was given to their historical writings, 
in other words, story as history was created by the use of eyewitness accounts. 
Byrskog argues that ‘the notion of the primacy of sight’ was in general ‘deeply 
embedded in the socio-cultural setting of the New Testament’.1148
 Regarding the interplay between orality and textuality, and more specifically oral 
sources and written sources, Byrskog notes that, despite the cultural preference of 
‘autopsy as orality’ and hearing over reading and writing, written sources were 
used by ancient historians to supply information that could not be had through 
autopsy. Attitudes toward writing were ambiguous but the permanent nature of 
written sources was appreciated, as they functioned as aids to memory and could 
preserve records about events for posterity.1149 While there were accusations 
against some ancient historians’ use of written sources, written sources were 
1146  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 40-47 (44). Italics are original. Byrskog (p. 44) argues that the New 
Testament Gospels ‘have certain generic resemblances with the bioi, though the bioi, being part 
of a very flexible encomiastic genre, usually lack any serious sensitivity to the factual pastness 
of history to testify to the existence of an anecdotal interest in personality’. 
1147  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 48.
1148  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 48-65 (65), 93-99.
1149  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 116: ‘Writing was not avoided as such, but finctioned mainly as a 
memorandum of what the person already should remember from oral communication’. Italics are 
original. Cf. Gerhardsson’s view above (ch. 2.2).
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sometimes used to supplement other visual and oral/aural sources. In contrast 
to the modern habit of reliance on written materials, ancient historians usually 
compared or cross-checked different oral accounts or hearsay and autopsy.1150
 As for the role of eyewitnesses as interpreters, Byrskog argues that autopsy 
was not passive observation, but that it always had to do with an understanding 
and interpretation of the events that were witnessed. With some conditions, 
Byrskog links the modern practice of oral history with ancient historians like 
Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, and Josephus, who not only generally viewed 
the involved testimonies of active participants as the most reliable sources, but 
also demonstrated by their own experiences that ‘the ideal eyewitness is the one 
who is closest to the events, involved and participating’.1151 For instance, Josephus, 
in his writing about the Jewish war, considered his own participation in the 
events and his eyewitness status to be of importance. Byrskog notes that both 
the eyewitnesses, through their social involvement and active participation, and 
the historians, who attempted to create coherent narratives on the basis of oral 
testimonies, were subject to the principles of interpretation; the ideological and 
conceptual frameworks, selectivity, and memory which was highly regarded but 
recognized as vulnerable by some historians, all influenced both the eyewitnesses 
as informants and the historians as narrators.1152
 In this regard, Byrskog recognizes the value of social memory theory, at least, 
to an extent.1153 The eyewitnesses and informants of the historians cannot be seen 
separately from their social identity and setting: ‘it is the “social memory” of that 
larger setting which constantly nourishes the interpretative drive of the eyewitnesses 
as their oral history emerges and develops into forms of oral tradition’.1154 Byrskog 
also acknowledges, in line with Halbwachs, that remembering always takes place 
in a social location, and the past is collectively nurtured by groups and cultures; 
1150  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 107-27. Byrskog (p. 123) notes: ‘The written text is not permanent 
in the sense that it is entirely stabilized, but in the sense that it is available as a fixed record for a 
longer period of time. It…can be repeated and embellished at a later point. That was the essential 
reason for consulting written material.’ Italics are original.
1151  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 156-57. Italics are original.
1152  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 145-65 (156-57), 254-265. Byrskog (pp. 254, 261) notes that, while 
the ancient historians ‘never strived for the kind of social understanding that Thompson speaks 
of [with regard to modern oral history]’, for them too ‘[w]riting history means interpreting it in 
an explanatory fashion’. The historian can only make sense of his own reality by the subjective 
elements of interpretation.
1153  A point made also by Eve, Behind, p. 140.
1154  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 153. Italics are original.
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however, despite noting that ancient authors (such as the early Christian ones) 
were not individualistic but rather part of collectivistic cultures, he rejects 
interpretations of Halbwachs which would undermine the distinctiveness of the 
individuals against the collective.1155
 Byrskog argues that the ancient historians were interested in historical truth; 
in fact they had to sometimes emphasize it due to their preference for the 
involvement and participation of the eyewitnesses and the biases and subjectivity 
of their accounts. Byrskog points to, for example, Thucydides and Polybius 
to demonstrate that some ancient historians were interested in factual truth in 
terms of accuracy, although their writing of history was by definition a writing of 
interpreted history: the notion ‘that an interest for factual truth did not exist in 
antiquity’ has to be rejected.1156 However, this does not mean that the influence 
of rhetorical techniques should be undermined. Although there was some kind 
of a standard against which ‘lying historians’ could be judged by some authors, 
rhetorical patterns of persuasion were integral parts of speaking and writing 
also in the first century, so much so that, for example, Quintilian (c.35–c.96 CE) 
indicated that the persuasion of the judge overruled factuality in legal cases and 
Livy (59 BCE–17 CE) engaged in historical writing which was mainly interested 
in a literary and rhetorical pursuit instead of genuine historical research.
 Nevertheless, Byrskog aims to resolve the apparent contradiction by noting 
that ‘the hard core of the past’ did not lose its character regardless of the reality 
that gifted rhetoricians would have been expected to place it ‘within the richly 
ornamented pattern of a story’, and that distinguishing ‘the hard core from the 
elaboration’ would sometimes have been very hard.1157 While Byrskog also 
acknowledges that claims of autopsy were used in an apologetic and rhetorical 
fashion to impress an audience all the way to the first century, some of Jose-
phus’ claims being examples of this (though Byrskog does not take this to imply 
Josephus’ complete untrustworthiness), he nevertheless maintains that valid 
claims to autopsy and fac tual truth were also made despite the narrativizing 
process. Byrskog reasons that ‘the most persuasive arguments will always be the 
ones that build solidly on knowledge derived from facts’.1158
1155  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 254-55. See the critical discussion below. 
1156  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 179-90 (183).
1157  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 200-213 (213).
1158  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 214-23 (223). Byrskog continues: ‘Persuasion and factual credibility 
were supplementary rhetorical virtues, not contradictory’. Italics are original.
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 Along the way, as the argument of Story as History develops, Byrskog applies 
the general discussion on autopsy and historical truth in the Greek and Roman 
environment to the early Christians and the Jesus traditions. Byrskog discusses 
the likely early Christian candidates for eyewitness status.1159 He argues that not 
many of the people who witnessed Jesus became informants, namely, people who 
shared what they had seen with those who were in touch with larger portions of 
the Jesus tradition.1160 Nonetheless, Byrskog argues that among the important 
eyewitnesses were (1) some anonymous Galilean village people who would 
spread rumors about Jesus based on their experiences of him (as evinced by 
Mark’s Gospel),1161 (2) certain individuals of the twelve disciples1162 of whom (3) 
Peter is the most prominent,1163 (4) Jesus’ family members (his mother Mary, his 
brother James),1164 and (5) Mary Magdalene along with other women witnesses 
to the crucifixion, burial, and the empty tomb, whose testimonies would have 
been viewed as embarrassing in that context but were nevertheless legitimated 
by ‘the authoritative witness of men’.1165 Regarding the role of eyewitnesses for 
1159  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 65-91, 101-7, 165-76, 190-98, 266-69. Byrskog (pp. 166-67) 
rejects Kelber’s notion of social identification and preventive censorship which ‘implies…the 
discontinuity and disruption f the past that emerges from the early Christians’ keen interest and 
involvement in the matters of the present’, and asks ‘Why would the involvement, the keen and 
enthusiastic attachment to the person and teaching of Jesus, be an obstacle to the truth for [the 
early Christians]?’
1160  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 65-67.
1161  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 67-69. Byrskog (p. 68) notes that the phenomenon of rumor is 
most evident ‘in the fact that sick persons come up to Jesus or are being brought to him’ (e.g. 
Mk 5.27, 10.47).
1162  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 69-70, 167-75. Byrskog does not question the historicity of the 
twelve. Peter, James, and John are said to have assumed important roles after Jesus’ death (cf. 
e.g. Gal. 2.9). Regarding James, ‘the Lord’s brother’, Byrskog (pp. 167-75), argues that the Letter 
of James was not only written by him but it also includes traces of his autopsy; while James 
would not have been involved with the Jesus movement from very early on, he would have later 
seen and heard his brother speak on several occasions, familiarizing himself profoundly with 
the teachings of Jesus also contained in the Sermon on the Mount/Plain (cf. e.g. Jas 5.12/Mt. 
5.34-37). Byrskog argues that a more primitive form of some Jesus traditions is to be found in 
the Letter of James, namely James’ autopsy in epistolary form.
1163  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 71-73. Byrskog (p. 73) states: ‘As the most prominent disciple, he 
is of course the most important eyewitness’. On Peter, see further Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 
269-99; also the discussion below.
1164  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 82-90; 266-69. However, Byrskog (p. 268): ‘It is significant that 
Jesus’ relatives, for all we know, do not appear as informants about any larger parts of the gospel 
narratives. Mary’s treasured memories concern only some aspects of Jesus’ birth [ie., Luke’s 
birth narrative], and they are entirely integrated into other items of information. James, the 
ideal informer according to ancient standards, limits himself to certain blocks of material which 
deal mainly with ethical issues recorded as Jesus’ teaching in the Sermon on the Mount/Plain.’ 
1165  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 73-78, 78-82, 190-98.
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the formation of the Jesus tradition and the inclusion of their autopsy into the 
oral history of early Christians, Byrskog concludes: ‘The historical Jesus event was 
experienced through their eyes and their ears and soon became historic by entering 
into the present, oral currencies of observers such as Peter, the women, James and 
Mary; it became their own oral history which they proclaimed to others.’1166
 Turning to autopsy in early Christian texts, Byrskog studies the autopsy claims 
in Paul, Luke, John, and 2 Peter. While recognizing that the early Christian writers’ 
narratives were not similar to those of ancient historians, Byrskog nevertheless 
sets out to study how ‘autopsy entered into the world of the early Christian stories, 
how it became narrativized, how it func tioned as a bridge between history and 
story’.1167 First, he argues that in Paul, history and au topsy serve as apostolic 
legitimation. While Paul did not deny the importance of the earthly Jesus, he 
claimed autopsy to the risen Christ to legitimate his own apostolic work (1 Cor. 
9.1, 15.5-8; Gal. 1.6).1168 Second, Byrskog notes that in Luke-Acts references to 
autopsy carry apostolic testimony. The Lukan prologue, which according to 
Byrskog covers both Luke and Acts, indicates that the tradition that was available 
to Luke from ‘the eyewitnesses and the ministers of the word’ was sufficient for 
his writing because it was rooted in the oral history of people who were present 
at the events (Lk. 1.1-4). Further, Acts 1.21-22 on the replacing of Judas indicates 
that an apostle had to be an eyewitness to Jesus. Also, the apostles’ special role as 
eyewitnesses is confirmed by Peter (Acts 10.39a, 41).1169 Third, despite an emphasis 
on seeing ‘with the eyes of faith’ in the Johannine literature, Byrskog contends 
that there are references to autopsy as authorial legitimation (Jn 19.35, 21.24; 1 Jn 
1.1-4).1170 Fourth, Byrskog explains how the pseudonymous 2 Peter, with Peter’s 
voice, refers to Peter’s autopsy of the transfiguration of Jesus to defend the reality 
of parousia.1171 Byrskog concludes the discussion by considering the question of 
1166  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 106. Italics are original.
1167  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 223-53 (224).
1168  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 224-28. Byrskog (p. 227) argues that, ‘[w]hile the autopsy of 
Paul…has an intrinsic revelatory character, it is a revelation…that is as real and historical as the 
ordinary observation of the other concrete persons and events. It is part of his own oral history, 
and it is a history that now enters in to the story of apostolic preaching – history as kerygma.’
1169  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 228-35.
1170  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 235-42. Byrskog (p. 242) comments on 1 John 1.1-4: ‘By 
understanding autopsy as part of oral history of a group, the author grounds and legitimizes the 
present writing in the real life of Jesus of history’. Italics are original.
1171  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 242-44. Byrskog (p. 244) concludes that Peter’s eyewitness 
testimony ‘has entered into the narrative substructure of an entirely pseudonymous writing, even 
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if the early Christian inclusion of autopsy into their narrativizing processes is 
an indication of ‘traces of real people who served as informants concerning the 
words and deeds of Jesus’; Byrskog contends that, while autopsy claims seem to 
become stronger with time and an increased need for establishing the reliability 
of the eyewitnesses (especially, in the later Luke and Matthew), this is only one 
side of the matter: both the scarcity and modesty of the autopsy claims in the NT 
suggest that elaboration for a purely apologetic purpose seems unlikely, and even 
the elaborated claims to autopsy show interest in the difference between past and 
present, and in historical truth.1172
 Byrskog also considers the relationship of Peter’s eyewitness testimony to 
Mark. He discusses Eusebius’ quote from Papias (the second-century bishop of 
Hierapolis) in which Mark is described as Peter’s interpreter, who wrote down 
what he could remember of Peter’s teaching which Peter had given ‘in the form 
of chreiai’ (Hist. eccl. 3.39.15).1173 Byrskog argues that the scholarly dismissal of 
the historical value of Papias’ note, which Papias claims to have received from 
John the Elder, is unfounded, as Papias’ writing does not say anything extremely 
peculiar in the context of ancient historiography and oral history; in fact, Byrskog 
contends, Papias seems to have done what an evangelist like Mark would do, 
namely ‘rely on an important eyewitness and interrogate him from the perspective 
of his own present concerns and conceptions’; on the basis of the lack of ‘explicit 
anti-gnostic polemic’ in Papias, Byrskog does not accept the popular view that 
Papias’ note would have been written against gnostic attempts to appeal to Peter as 
a champion.1174 Also, based on his argument of oral history and ancient historians’ 
use of autopsy, Byrskog indicates that the reference to what John the Elder was in 
the habit of saying places the tradition in the first century and does not appear 
historically implausible. Byrskog does not have a reason to doubt Papias due to 
fostering, it seems pseudonymous attribution and authorship’. Italics are original.
1172  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 246-53 (247). Byrskog (p. 248) repeats his notions that ‘the 
most convincing story is the one that truthfully interacts with history’. He (p. 215) also notes: 
‘Apologetics thus provides only part of the explanation why the notion of autopsy occurs in 
late texts. The essential factor is not merely the need for apologetics, but time.’ Italics are original.
1173  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 269-99 (272).
1174  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 272-75 (273-74). Byrskog (p. 274) argues that the dismissal of 
Papias as apologetic fiction results in part from a scholarly neglect of the fact ‘a close study of 
oral history of an eyewitness brings to the fore the complex interplay between historical truth and 
interpreted truth on all levels of tradition and transmission, from the eyewitness’ involvement in 
the event to the final story, and further’. Italics are original.
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the lack of proof to the contrary.1175
 Finally, Byrskog contends that there are many links between Mark and Peter 
in the NT traditions, and the Markan story reflects the relationship between the 
two.1176 He counters the arguments against the veracity of Papias’ note by noting, 
for example, that Mark’s ‘deficient knowledge’ of the geography of Galilee is due 
to his background in Jerusalem; also, his por trayal of Jewish rites is intentionally 
polemic and should not be considered ‘misguided’ ac cording to the standards of 
historians.1177 Regarding the Markan outline of Jesus’ ministry, Byrskog argues 
that Mark was familiar with Peter’s sermon in Acts 10.34-43, which contains ‘in 
some measure, not only the primitive kerygma, but the kerygma as preached by 
Peter’, and used it in his narrativizing process.1178 Finally, Byrskog entertains the 
possibility that the chreiai1179, mentioned in Papias’ note (and identified in Mark’s 
Gospel as ‘the Petrine chreiai’ by Vincent Taylor), can be taken to imply that Peter 
employed them in his preaching.1180 Byrskog’s conclusion is, however, cautious; 
he concludes that only a few of the Markan chreiai are directly related to Peter. 
His overall conclusion of the relationship between Mark and Peter emphasizes the 
complexity of Mark’s tradition history: 
While a Petrine influence behind the Markan narrative is likely, in 
my view, the evangelist, in accordance with the ancient practice, 
incorporated Peter’s oral history into his story by means of a subtle 
interchange between the eyewitness testimony and other traditional 
1175  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 275-80 (280): ‘One may indeed end up in total agnosticism in 
regard to the information provided by Papias…However, following the dictum that an ancient 
author is correct until proven otherwise, it is difficult to see any conclusive reason for labelling 
it as historically incorrect on all points.’
1176  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 280-92. Cumulatively, Byrskog (pp. 292-97) argues that Matthew 
also includes traditions based on Petrine autopsy in his account. He argues (p. 297) that the 
Markan and Matthean differences as concerns the Torah can be explained through Peter’s 
change of mind on the subject: ‘To simplify somewhat, what we have in Mark reflects Peter 
before Antioch; what we have in Matthew reflects Peter after Antioch.’ 
1177  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 280-84 (281).
1178  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 284-88 (286). Byrskog (p. 288) admits that the evidence is indirect.
1179  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 289, refers to the definition of chreia given by Aelius Theon of 
Alexandria (c. 50–100 CE), ‘a concise statement or action which is well aimed, attributed to a 
specified character or something analogous to a character’, and adds, for example, that using 
chreiai did not require rhetorical training; ‘[i]t could be unprompted or prompted by a specific 
situation, a statement or a response of varying character…it could be presented in various 
rhetorical patterns…’
1180  Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 288-92 (289).
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material available to him, on the one hand, and his personal, selective 
and interpretative perspective, on the other hand, at the end thus 
narrativizing his own existence by presenting history as story.1181
 
 In sum, regarding the early Christian eyewitness testimony, Byrskog argues from 
a viewpoint of oral history and ancient historiography that the New Testament 
documents imply that there were important early Christian eyewitnesses and 
informants who influenced the formation and transmission of the Jesus traditions 
in particular ways. However, this influence was not straightforward not least due 
to the complex interplay between orality and writing in the ancient context. While 
the notion of autopsy links the perceptions of the eyewitnesses and informants 
of the Jesus traditions, namely their oral history, with the Gospel authors who 
interpreted, narrativized, and wrote them down, the Gospel narratives are not in 
any simple sense ‘history’; they are rather ‘syntheses of history and story’.1182
Critique & Evaluation
Albeit published a few years prior to the rise of memory studies in historical Jesus 
re search,1183 Byrskog’s view has established its place within the scholarly discussion 
on the na ture and transmission of the Jesus traditions, drawing both appreciative 
and critical respons es.1184 This section of critique and evaluation briefly addresses 
three broad areas with regard to Byrskog’s view: (1) ancient historiography both 
in general and in relation to the Gospels and early Christians, oral history, and 
factual correctness; (2) individual memory and social memory; (3) the specific 
eyewitnesses and their relationship to the written Gospels, especial ly Mark. Finally, 
some evaluative comments are made regarding the importance of Byrskog’s view.
1181  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 292. Italics are original. Among the ‘other traditional material’, 
Byrskog would include, for example, a pre-Markan Passion narrative.
1182  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 305. It is in light of this dynamic that Byrskog approaches terms 
like ‘reliability’, ‘historicity’, ‘tradition‘, and ‘transmission’. Cf. Byrskog, Story as History, p. 306.
1183  I recognize that there were works like Schröter, Erinnerung, in the 1990’s but also acknowledge 
that memory as a conceptual category and social memory theory increasingly began to be 
applied to the study of the Jesus traditions and the historical Jesus after the turn of the millenium.
1184  See e.g. Head, ‘The Role of Eyewitnesses’, pp. 275-94 (292-94); R. Bauckham, ‘The Eyewitnesses 
and the Gospel Traditions’, JSHJ 1.1 (2003), pp. 28-60; idem, Eyewitnesses, pp. 8-11, 48-51, 119, 
262-63, 273, 281, 288, 304, 310, 331, 384, 406, 409-10, 479-80; Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 
5-6, 41-42, 46-47; Witherington, ‘”Christianity in the Making”: Oral Mystery or Eyewitness 
History?’, pp. 197-226 (213-17); McIver, Memory, Jesus, and the Synoptic Gospels, pp. 128-29; 
Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 198-99 n. 138, 340 n. 4, 843; idem, The Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 
54 n. 47, 232-33; Eve, Behind, pp. 135-43 (141-43); idem, Writing, pp. 44-46; Bird, Gospel, pp. 
96-97 n. 93, 106-107 n. 122, 107-108.
250
 First, it was noted in an early evaluation of Byrskog’s work by Peter Head 
that Byrskog’s investigation of ancient historiography, and his use of it as the 
comparative material in the study of the Jesus traditions, would be more balanced 
if it did not focus almost entirely on Greco-Roman historiography. Head notes 
that, despite discussing Josephus repeatedly, Byrskog does not address Jewish 
historiography in detail.1185 Furthermore, Head argues that Byrskog does not 
properly account for the distinction of genre between Greco-Roman ancient 
historiography and ancient biography, the category where he generally places 
the Gospels as bioi, lives of Jesus; for instance, contrary to Byrskog’s own view 
that the authors of the Gospels were indeed interested in the past, Byrskog also 
suggested elsewhere that in his com parative material from ancient historiography 
more attention was paid to factual comprehen siveness and thoroughness than 
in bioi. Head considers it ‘even damaging’ to Byrskog’s case that it does not 
further elaborate the distinction between the Gospels and ancient historiogra phy, 
suggesting that a more thorough account may offer further support for the notion 
of eye witnesses’ involvement in the process of transmission.1186
 Albeit not fatal to Byrskog’s case, this is a significant point of criticism, 
considering how important the comparison of the notion of autopsy in ancient 
historiography and the Jesus traditions of the Gospels is for Byrskog. If his view 
of autopsy in ancient historiography is not solid, his notion of early Christian 
oral history and autopsy also falters. As is implied by Byrskog’s lack of discussion 
on the dynamics of oral performance and transmission,1187 and has been noted 
by Dunn, Byrskog’s view rests on the notion of oral history and autopsy, and 
demands no concrete conception, model, or role for oral transmission ‘as itself a 
bridging fac tor between past and present’.1188
 Furthermore, Eve criticizes Byrskog’s use of ancient historians to shed light 
1185  Head, ‘The Role of Eyewitnesses’, pp. 275-94 (294); cf. Byrskog, Story as History, p. 43 n. 97.
1186  Head, ‘The Role of Eyewitnesses’, pp. 275-94 (294); cf. Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 44, 216. 
Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 11, similarly notes the criticism that ‘Byrskog assumes, rather than 
demonstrates, that the Gospels are comparable with the practice of oral history in ancient Greek 
and Roman historiography’. Bauckham’s further critique is addressed in more detail below in 
conjunction with his own view (ch. 3.8.2).
1187  I do not think that Byrskog pays sufficient attention to the dynamics of oral transmission. He 
only refers to Parry and Lord as well as Foley’s ‘oral-formulaic theory’ in passing. Cf. Byrskog, 
Story as History, p. 23 n. 26.
1188  Dunn, The Oral Gospel Tradition, p. 54 n. 47; similarly, idem, Jesus Remembered, p. 198-99 n. 
138. Regardless of the criticism that can be leveled against Dunn’s view of orality, he pays more 
attention to oral transmission than Byrskog seems to do.
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on the Gospel authors’ ways of writing and relating to accuracy. He notes, quite 
reasonably, that Byrskog’s own account of Greco-Roman historiography indicates 
that all ancient historians did not meet the criteria of Thucydides and Polybius; 
even Byrskog consistently admits that the early Christian writers were not 
historians,1189 which complicates the relation between the autopsy practiced by 
the most idealistic ancient historians and the authors of the Gospels. Eve suggests 
that the social situation of the early Christian authors, who were constrained by 
their roles in their Christian communities, must have been different from that of 
‘the more scrupulous’ historians like Thucydides and Polybius who could write 
more freely on subjects in which they took interest. This suggests, as Eve indicates, 
that the early Christian authors may have been more constrained by ideological 
appropriateness and rhetorical persuasiveness than factual accuracy.1190
 Eve also challenges Byrskog’s logic that, regardless of the narrativizing 
process, ancient historians would build their elaborated narratives upon a factual 
historical core, as facts would make an argument rhetorically more persuasive.1191 
Eve is right in contesting the idea that rhetorical persuasiveness or effectiveness 
as such has anything to do with the human regard for factual truth, historical or 
otherwise. He notes that ‘[a]ll Byrskog is really entitled to argue is that it is better 
not to be caught out in a lie’.1192 Eve generally refers to the nature of recurrent 
political propaganda and media distortion, but one could also give more specific, 
telling examples about the problematic relationship of ‘fact’ and ‘persuasion’ at a 
time when rather populistic tendencies seem to have increasingly regained favor 
in political discourse.1193 Eve further demonstrates that Byrskog’s distinction 
1189  Cf. e.g. Byrskog, Story as History, p. 223: ‘The early Christian writers did not produce historical 
narratives of the same kind as the ones of the ancient historians…They were keenly interested 
in past events, writing about matters that had occurred some years back in time, but they 
neglected to tell the audience of how they actually knew anything about those events’. Also, 
Byrskog, Story as History, p. 281: ‘The Markan author did not have the ambition of a historian, 
so one should not ask too much of him.’
1190  Eve, Behind, p. 141; pace Byrskog.
1191  Eve, Behind, pp. 141-42. Cf. Byrskog, Story as History, p. 223: ‘the most persuasive arguments 
will always be the ones that build solidly on knowledge derived from facts’.
1192  Eve, Behind, p. 141.
1193  The general disregard for factual truth in favor of persuasiveness in political discourse has 
become a major topic of discussion in Western democratic societies. Besides the typical political 
jargon and uttering of half-truths and factually incorrect statements of which almost any 
political candidate or politician could be accused, a new level of polemical and aggressive style 
of argumentation with no regard to ‘facts’ was strongly associated with the 2016 presidential 
campaigns and election in the United States.
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between factual core and narrative elaboration stands in contradiction with 
the view that eyewitness testimony is by definition always the eyewitnesses’ 
interpreted testimony; oral history has to do with perceptions of events, not with 
what ‘actually happened’. Often there is no agreement on what the facts even 
are.1194 Indeed, the requirement that the proper eyewitness actively participates 
and is socially involved in events, interpreting them, appears to undermine the 
notion of a factual core, despite that Byrskog admits that ‘on occasion it must have 
been extremely difficult to distinguish the hard core from the elaboration’.1195
 Secondly, regarding Byrskog’s understanding of memory and social memory, 
Eve speculates that Byrskog’s notion of ‘factual core’ may resonate with the notion 
of social memory theory that the past is not completely lost in the present, but 
continues to influence the present even when narrated within the frameworks of 
the present. Eve further surmises that if Byrskog’s notion of ‘factual core’ is taken 
to refer to ‘what is commonly believed to have happened’, instead of ‘what actually 
happened’, his view is reminiscent of the idea of a stable core in social memory 
theory, as espoused for example by Rafael Rodríguez and Barry Schwartz. This 
would be consonant with the idea that, say, Mark could not have contradicted 
what his audience knew about Jesus in order to be received as authoritative.1196 
However, regardless of how Byrskog would imagine the relation of his ‘factual 
core’ to the actual past, it is clear that his view of memory is not entirely 
consonant with how others, including Rodríguez, understand social memory 
theory. Rodríguez demonstrates that the initial criticism by Gerhardsson against 
the ‘collective’ nature of memory,1197 which was echoed in Story as History1198 and 
also later repeated by Byrskog in his dialogue with Dunn,1199 namely, that social 
memory downplays the role of individuals, is unfounded, as in Rodríguez’s words 
1194  Eve, Behind, p. 142; cf. Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 26-30 on oral history, pp. 145-53 on 
eyewitnesses.
1195  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 213. 
1196  Eve, Behind, p. 142. Eve admits that this is, however, probably not what Byrskog had in mind.
1197  Gerhardsson, ‘Secret’, pp. 1-18 (8-9).
1198  Byrskog, Story as History, p. 255: ‘Groups and cultures do not remember and recall; individuals 
do’. 
1199  Byrskog, ‘A New Perspective on the Jesus Tradition’, pp. 459-71 (463-67), where Byrskog 
attempts to recognize the interplay between individual and collective memory but nevertheless 
maintains that ‘[t]he popular stress on ‘collectivistic’ and ‘dyadic’ selves should not cause us to 
neglect the individualistic traits of the ancient Mediterranean world, but to appreciate individual 
consciousness within collectivistically conditioned contexts’, and (contra Dunn) indicates ‘[o]
ral history, with its attention to the individual self as part of a group or society, gives a more 
helpful framework for how Jesus was remembered than the vague notion of corporate memory’.
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‘social memory theory does not postulate a Durkheimian metaphysical “group 
consciousness” that acts independently of individual social actors comprising 
the group’.1200 It has also been noted by others that Byrskog’s view is in danger 
of downplaying the collective aspect of memory in favor of the individual 
eyewitnesses.1201
 Third, regarding Byrskog’s view of early Christian autopsy, specific points of 
Byrskog’s postulation of individual eyewitnesses in the Jesus traditions have come 
under criticism.1202 For example, within his conceptual framework of the impact 
of Jesus, Dunn finds it unlikely that the Lukan birth narrative (Lk. 1–2) contains 
Mary’s reminiscences and, therefore, questions Byrskog’s claim that ‘[i]t is entirely 
plausible that the Jerusalem community entertained a certain interest in Mary’s 
intimate memories concerning the birth of the risen Lord’.1203 McIver in turn 
criticizes Byrskog for underestimating the role of ‘the eleven surviving disciples of 
Jesus’ in his questioning of the possibility of a collective oral history in the group 
of the disciples.1204 Eve presents several critical points about Byrskog’s reasoning. 
He notes that the evidence for the autopsy status of James, Jesus’ brother, is 
conjectural: taking first the Letter of James to be written by Jesus’ brother and then 
arguing that it presents James as a close family eyewitness who nevertheless only 
echoes some parts of the Jesus traditions, included in the Sermon on the Mount, 
1200  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 41-42, 46-47 (46-47). Rodríguez (p. 42) notes the irony in Byrskog’s 
criticism of Dunn’s notion of ‘collective memory’, as ‘Dunn himself is sceptical of social memory 
theory’. The main problem with Dunn’s view is the lack of nuance in his original discussion on 
memory and remembering in Jesus Remembered. See my discussion on Dunn in ch. 3.2 and 
Rodríguez in ch. 3.4.
1201  See e.g. Bird, Gospel, pp. 96-97 n. 96, 106-7 n. 122. Bird (p. 107 n. 122), notes that ‘social 
memory refuses to treat individuals as isolated entities, analyzable apart from social contexts’. 
Cf. Byrskog’s recent defence in Byrskog, ‘Philosophical Aspects of Memory’, pp. 23-47 (24): 
‘I affirmed indeed the idea that memory is social, I also affirmed the idea that memory is 
individual, and I argued that social memory is closely related to the cognitive aspects of each 
person’s memory.’ Byrskog (p. 24) further charges ‘[b]iblical scholars, in reviewing the book’, 
including Eve, Behind, for missing ‘the point of trying to combine both perspectives’. 
1202  I present some of the criticisms here, but do not assess each one individually.
1203  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 340-48 (340 n. 4); pace Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer, p. 210; Byrskog, 
Story as History, pp. 89-90 (90).
1204  McIver, Memory, Jesus, and the Synoptic Gospels, p. 128-129 (129 n. 5); cf. Byrskog, Story as 
History, p. 70. However, Byrskog’s more cautious stance regarding the eyewitness role of the 
disciples as a group may be more plausible, as McIver’s appeal to the role of all eleven disciples as 
teachers and leaders in early Christian communities suffers from lack of evidence. As Byrskog 
argues, only Peter, John, and James are clearly recognized for their post-Easter roles in the early 
church. 
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is not a conclusive case.1205 Eve also points out that, in his search for links between 
Mark and Peter, Byrskog’s claim that Mark’s outline of Jesus’ ministry resembles 
Peter’s speech in Acts 10.34-43 is vulnerable to the charge that it does not take 
seriously Byrskog’s own conclusion about the complexity of Mark’s narrativizing 
process.1206 Eve makes a similar point regarding Byrskog’s efforts to argue for a 
direct Petrine influence on Matthew on the basis of explaining the differences 
between Mark and Matthew’s views of the Torah by Peter’s change of mind on the 
subject; this can be taken as Byrskog’s ignorance of the contribution of Matthew’s 
authorial ideology.1207 It is reasonable to ask with Eve whether the narrativizing 
of tradition, which Byrskog also attempts to emphasize, can be taken seriously in 
conjunction with such claims.
 On the other hand, Byrskog’s views of some of the other eyewitnesses can be 
viewed as more plausible. Dunn recognizes, for instance, that Byrskog’s argument 
in favor of the influence of Mary Magdalene and other women is justified; 
their witness would not have survived the ‘androcentric force of transmission 
and redaction’ had their witness not been influential in the early Christian 
community.1208 Also, regardless of the criticisms that are targeted against the 
specific aspects of it, Byrskog’s view of Mark’s relation to Peter’s preaching can 
be viewed as generally plausible. Eve notes that, while ‘far from proven’, Papias’ 
testimony combined with other more indirect traditions can be taken as evidence 
of the influence of Petrine autopsy on Mark.1209 However, there is no guarantee 
that Peter indeed was a reliable eyewitness; he could have been, however in light 
of memory studies one cannot imagine a straightforward access from Mark to the 
historical Jesus on account of Mark’s possible familiarity with Peter.1210
 In conclusion, while Byrskog’s view of the formation and transmission of the 
1205  Eve, Behind, pp. 140-41; cf. Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 167-75.
1206  Eve, Behind, p. 139-40; cf. Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 284-88. According to Eve (p. 140), the 
logic of Byrskog’s argument seems to demand that the narrativization of Jesus’ ministry is to be 
attributed to Mark.
1207  Eve, p. 141; cf. Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 292-97.
1208  Dunn, Jesus Remembered, p. 843 n. 75.
1209  Eve, Behind, p. 143. Eve (p. 143) makes additional points in favor of Byrskog’s suggestion: (1) 
Peter is known to have been a prominent leader in the early church (cf. Gal. 1.18; 2.16-14) 
(which is of course recognized by Byrskog) but he was also active late enough for the author 
of Mark’s Gospel to have encountered him (the early 60s CE); (2) his preaching was probably 
taken seriously due to his eyewitness status; (3) Mark’s possible relationship with Peter may 
explain why Mark’s Gospel was readily accepted in early Christianity (e.g. by Matthew and 
Luke).
1210  Eve, Behind, p. 143.
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Jesus traditions is rather conservative in the sense that it argues for a relatively 
direct relation between the ancient Greco-Roman notion of autopsy and autopsy 
in early Christian traditions, it does so with considerable nuance without lapsing 
into uncritical defense of the ‘historicity’ or ‘reliability’ of the Jesus traditions. 
While his use of ancient historiography and notions of oral history and factual 
accuracy may require some refinement, as they appear to contradict what Byrskog 
elsewhere argues, and his notion of memory somewhat undermines the collective 
nature of remembering in favor of individual eyewitnesses, Byrskog nevertheless 
presents a case that attempts to account for both the reality that the Jesus 
traditions exhibit an interest in the past and the fact that they have gone through 
processes of considerable theological interpretation. Despite the lack of a nuanced 
discussion on oral performance and oral transmission, Byrskog also attempts to 
take seriously the interplay between orality and writing in antiquity. His view also 
presents some plausible argumentation for some traces of eyewitness testimony in 
the Jesus traditions. Whether this evidence is enough to account for such a direct 
relationship between those eyewitnesses and, for example, the Gospel of Mark, is 
another matter. Richard Bauckham, as we shall see in the next section, presents 
a much bolder view for the role of early Christian eyewitnesses, attempting to 
correct what some have considered a deficiency in Byrskog’s view, namely the lack 
of sufficient criteria for defining eyewitnesses.1211
3.8.2 Richard Bauckham
In Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (2006), 
Richard Bauck ham takes some of Samuel Byrskog’s ideas much further, arguing 
that the eyewitnesses of Je sus’ ministry exercised considerable control over the 
transmission of the Jesus traditions, and that the Gospels of Mark, Matthew, 
Luke, and John are all directly based on eyewitness testi mony.1212 This argument 
is directly targeted against the general form-critical view of the de velopment of 
1211  See W. Carter, review of Samuel Byrskog’s Story as History – History as Story, CBQ 63 (2001), 
pp. 545-46; in Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 11.
1212  See Bauckham, Eyewitnesses. Unless otherwise stated, I refer to the first edition of the book 
in this chapter, since the main chapters remain unchanged in the second edition, which was 
published with three additional chapters in the spring of 2017. See R. Bauckham, Jesus and 
the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2nd edn, 
2017), pp. 509-615. Also, see Bauckham, ‘The Eyewitnesses and the Gospel Traditions’, pp. 28-
60; idem, ‘Gospel Traditions: Anonymous Community Traditions or Eyewitness Testimony’, in 
Charlesworth (ed.), Jesus Research, pp. 483-90. 
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the Gospel tradition, and the minor role it gave for the eyewitnesses.1213 Unlike 
Byrskog, who does not define his thesis in terms of defending the ‘reliability’ 
or ‘historicity’ of the Jesus traditions, Bauckham starts with a straightforward 
theological apologetic for his search of the Jesus of testimony in the Gospels on 
the basis of eyewitness testimony. Bauck ham criticizes what he considers a faulty 
project of methodological skepticism and historical positivism, namely the search 
and reconstruction of ‘the historical Jesus’ (or ‘the real Jesus behind the Gospels’), 
which has resulted in a plethora of historical Jesuses; this is, Bauckham indicates, 
an unfortunate situation for at least Christian theology. Instead of embarking on 
the reductionist road that leads to the separation of history and theology (and the 
false dichotomy between ‘the historical Jesus’ and ‘the Christ of faith’), Bauckham 
suggests that one should look for the Jesus of testimony, ‘testimony’ being both a 
theological and a historical concept, applied to the Gospels.1214 In support of his 
view, Bauckham presents a multi-faceted and rather complicated set of historical 
arguments in favor of the Gospels and the Jesus traditions as eyewitness testimony; 
he intends to further develop and in some ways correct Byrskog’s viewpoints.1215 
The aspects of Bauckham’s argumentation that are the most relevant for the 
purposes of this dissertation are presented below.
 First, regarding his basic argument that the Gospels of Mark, Luke, and John 
embody eyewitness testimony, Bauckham argues for the notion of inclusio, a 
literary device, which he finds in Mark, John, and Luke, as well as in the ancient 
authors Lucian (Alexander) and Porphyry (Life of Plotinus); the notion of inclusio 
refers to the idea that, in order to indicate who their eyewitness sources were, 
the authors named them at the beginning and end of their stories.1216 According 
1213  Throughout his work, Bauckham argues against the views of Bultmann, and regarding the 
eyewitnesses, Dennis Nineham. See e.g. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 241-49; cf. Dibelius, From 
Tradition; Bultmann, History; specifically on eyewitnesses, Dennis E. Nineham, ‘Eye-Witness 
Testimony and the Gospel Tradition, I’, JTS 9 (1958), pp. 13-25; idem, ‘Eye-Witness Testimony 
and the Gospel Tradition, II’, JTS 9 (1958), pp. 243-52; idem, ‘Eye-Witness Testimony and the 
Gospel Tradition, III’, JTS 11 (1960), pp. 253-64. 
1214  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 1-8, also pp. 472-508. Bauckham (p. 2) states from a distinctly 
(Christian) theological viewpoint, ‘it is hard to see how Christian faith and theology can work 
with a radically distrusting attitude to the Gospels’.
1215  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 8-11. For instance, by developing criteria for identifying eyewitness 
testimony. Bauckham is interacts with Byrskog throughout his study; see e.g. Bauckham, 
Eyewitnesses, pp. 8-11, 48-51, 119, 262-63, 273, 281, 288, 304, 310, 331, 384, 406, 409-10, 479-
80.
1216  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 124-47. In contrast with Byrskog, who emphasizes autopsy 
as a rather general historiographical category, Bauckham specifically stresses the nature of 
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to Bauckham, Mark’s references to Simon Peter at the beginning (1.16) and the 
end (16.7) of the story form a deliberate inclusio.1217 In John’s Gospel, Bauckham 
identifies an inclusio on the basis of John 1.35-40 and John 21.24; he argues that 
the anonymous disciple of the former passage is the Beloved Disciple, who is 
the ideal witness to Jesus, and the person whose testimony is embodied in John’s 
Gospel; he is also the author of the entire Gospel (21.24).1218 Bauckham argues 
that in Luke’s narrative the inclusio is formed by the women who followed Jesus 
(8.1-3) and visited the tomb (24.10); further, Luke has also, like Mark, ‘made sure 
that Simon Peter is both the first and the last disciple to be individually named in 
his Gospel (4:38, 24:34)’.1219 Bauckham does not find the literary device of inclusio 
in Matthew, which he indicates ‘seems not concerned to claim the authority of any 
specific eyewitnesses’; for Bauckham this does not, however, mean that Matthew 
would have had no basis in eyewitness testimony.1220
 In addition to the fact that Mark refers to Peter more than any other Gospel, 
and contains the inclusio of his eyewitness testimony, Bauckham argues that a 
further important indication of Peter as the main eyewitness source of Mark’s 
Gospel is its use of ‘the plural-to-singular narrative device’ and the specific Petrine 
perspective. By the narrative device, Bauckham refers to the specific ‘point of view’, 
a form of internal focalization, which ‘enables the readers to view the incident that 
follows from the perspective of the disciples who have arrived on the scene with 
Jesus’; this narrative device is indicated by ‘they’ (the disciples, notably Peter, also 
James, and John) and ‘he’ (Jesus).1221 Bauckham does not argue that Mark’s Gospel 
is Peter’s autobiographical reminiscence or a mere transcript of Peter’s teaching, 
but maintains that it carries a strong and carefully designed perspective of Peter’s 
teaching.1222
eyewitness testimonies as historical sources.
1217  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 124-27.
1218  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 127-29, also 358-411.
1219  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 129-32 (131). Bauckham (131) concludes: ‘[The] three Gospels 
all use the literary device of the inclusio of eyewitness testimony in order to indicate the main 
eyewitness source of their story’. 
1220  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, p. 131-32 (132). Bauckham argues rather that the pattern of names 
used in Matthew’s Gospel (and other Gospels) are typical and found in contemporary Jewish 
Palestine, which indicates that they are authentic and can be taken to refer to the eyewitness 
status of these individuals (e.g. the twelve) when combined with how important mentioning 
the names of one’s eyewitness sources was at the time. See Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 39-93.
1221  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 155-64 (163). Cf. Mk 5.1-2; 8.22; 11.12; 14.32.
1222  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 165-80. Bauckham (p. 180) summarizes: ‘The Gospel reflects the 
way Peter, as an apostle commissioned to communicate the gospel of salvation, conveyed the 
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 In addition to the relationship between Mark and Peter, Bauckham discusses 
arguments in favor of a pre-Markan passion narrative, and more specifically 
employs Gerd Theissen’s argument that some of the features in the major units 
in that narrative go back to the Jerusalem church around 40–50 CE, concerning 
both named and unnamed persons in the narrative. Bauckham argues in light of 
Gerd Theissen’s notion of ‘protective anonymity’ that the unnamed individuals 
can be viewed as eyewitnesses who were mentioned in the pre-Markan Jerusalem 
source and whose identity was not disclosed in order to protect them from the 
persecution by the high-priestly family. Among such people are the woman who 
anointed Jesus (Mk 14.3-9), and the disciple who struck the High Priest’s servant 
and the young man who fled naked (Mk 14.43-52).1223
 Secondly, the evidence from Papias provides a crucial basis for Bauckham’s 
argument of the Gospels as eyewitness testimony.1224 After first generally 
introducing Papias’ surviving writings (fragments of his Expositions of the Logia 
of the Lord) which are quoted in Eusebius (esp. Hist. eccl.) and noting that Papias 
was in his writing referring back to approximately the period when the Gospels 
were written (ca. 80 CE), Bauckham discusses the Prologue of Pa pias’ work 
(Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 3.39.3-4) and concludes from the distinction between the 
listed seven disciples (‘seven for complete witness’) and the two subsequently 
named wit nesses, Aristion and John the Elder, that the oral traditions of Jesus 
words and deeds were at tached to specific eyewitnesses. Bauckham argues in light 
of Byrskog’s notions about ancient historiography that Papias’ preference for ‘a 
living and surviving voice’ over written tradition belongs to the historiographical 
category of oral history, not to the category of oral tradition which spans over at 
least one generation (according to Jan Vansina’s terms); it shows Papias’ interest in 
eyewitness testimony, namely in what Byrskog calls autopsy. Bauckham maintains 
that the Gospel authors generally also practiced oral history.1225
 Bauckham further develops his argument regarding Papias in relation to Mark 
body of eyewitness traditions that he and other members of the Twelve had officially formulated 
and promulgated.’ This implies a view of rather formal and controlled transmission of tradition.
1223  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 183-201; cf. G. Theissen, The Gospels in Context (trans. L. M. 
Maloney; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), ch. 4.
1224  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 12-38, 202-39, 358-437 (412-37). 
1225  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 12-38; cf. Vansina, Oral Tradition, pp. 28, 29; Byrskog, Story as 
History, pp. 48-65. Bauckham (p. 24) writes ‘what Papias thinks preferable to books is not oral 
traditions as such but access, while they are still alive, to those who were direct participants in 
the historical events – in this case the “disciples of the Lord”’.
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and Matthew.1226 He turns to the two passages of Papias preserved in Eusebius 
(Hist. eccl. 3.39.14-16), rejecting the scholarly views that dismiss Papias’ evidence, 
and argues that Papias envisaged Mark as the translator of the Petrine anecdotes 
(chreiai), which had been used by Peter in his preaching and were remembered 
and communicated by Peter to Mark, who could then use them to form his Gospel 
narrative.1227 Moreover, Bauckham contends that in the cases of both passages, the 
one that relates to Mark and the other that relates to Matthew, Papias attempts to 
explain ‘why a Gospel with eyewitness testimony lacks proper “order”’; according 
to Bauckham, Papias was wrong in assuming that Mark was ‘not in order’; it could 
be Papias’ interpretation, not John the Elder’s eyewitness view. Bauckham explains 
that, in Papias’ mind, on the one hand, Mark did not attempt to put the material 
in order, as Peter had not related it that way, and Mark was not an eyewitness; 
on the other hand, Matthew was an eyewitness and could therefore ‘put the logia 
in order in his original Gospel’; this order was changed by those who translated 
Matthew’s original Gospel into Greek. Finally, Bauckham argues that Papias knew 
John’s Gospel and considered its historiographical quality superior to that of Mark 
and Matthew, contrasting their lack of order with John’s Gospel, which was also an 
eyewitness source, and presumably, so Bauckham argues, was used by Papias to 
order his own work.1228
 With regard to the evidence provided by Papias, Bauckham also argues that 
the Beloved Disciple, whom he identifies as the anonymous disciple called with 
Andrew by Jesus in John 1.35-40, is John the Elder of Papias.1229 Although he is 
not one of the twelve, he is an eyewitness of the events and testifies for this in 
John 21.24. Bauckham rejects the view that the Beloved disciple is a later narrative 
or theological construct; he is rather the ideal eyewitness who testifies for Jesus. 
Bauckham contends that the Beloved Disciple (John the Elder) is the author of the 
entire John’s Gospel, the end of the Gospel (Jn 21) is an integral part of the text, 
1226  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 202-39.
1227  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 202-17. Bauckham (p. 216) argues that ‘Papias evidently thought 
that Peter needed Mark to translate his Aramaic into reasonably good Greek’, and indicates 
(p. 217) against ‘the assumption of the form critics that the Gospel traditions functioned in a 
homiletic context in which their message was applies’ that ‘Peter…may simply have rehearsed 
the traditions’. Bauckham also contends in line with Byrskog that Peter would not have needed 
a formal rhetorical training in order to utter Jesus’ deeds and sayings in short anecdotes. 
1228  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 217-39 (223-24).
1229  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 412-37; for further evidence Bauckham draws on John from the 
slightly later authors Polycrates and Ireanaeus, see Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 440-71.
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and that John the Elder offers his authoritative ‘we‘ testimony in John 21.24.1230
 Thirdly, with regard to the model of transmission of the Jesus traditions, 
Bauckham follows Gerhardsson and others in postulating a foundational role for 
the twelve disciples whom he views, contrary to the form-critical notions about 
anonymous early Christian communities, as the guarantors, named controllers 
and authorizers of the Jesus traditions, led by Peter, during the early years of the 
Jesus movement until the writing of the Gospels. Bauckham considers the twelve 
as a collegium based in Jerusalem and originally formed by Jesus and believes 
that they stand for the ideal constitution of Israel and have a special role in Jesus’ 
mission of renewing or restoring God’s people Israel. The lists of the twelve 
confirm, according to Bauckham, that ‘the Twelve constituted an official body 
of eyewitnesses’ (Mt. 10.2-4; Mk 3.16-19; Lk. 6.13-16). Bauckham also addresses 
the identification of Thaddeus and Judas of James, rejects the identification of 
Levi with Matthew, and discusses the ‘epithets’ of the apostles, designed for 
distinguishing the members of the twelve from one another.1231
 In his treatment of the questions regarding oral transmission, Bauckham 
discusses and critiques three common views of of oral transmission: form 
criticism, the ‘Scandinavian approach’, associated with Gerhardsson, and Kenneth 
Bailey’s ‘informal controlled tradition’.1232 Bauckham recognizes the lasting value of 
the form-critical notion that ‘most of the individual pericopes in all three Synoptic 
Gospels retain broadly the shape in which they existed in oral transmission’, but 
fiercely criticizes other aspects of form criticism: (1) the assumption of Bultmann 
that traditions originated in pure form is highly questionable; (2) no strict 
correlation exists between a form and Sitz im Leben; (3) Jack Goody’s notion of 
homeostasis, namely the idea that traditions are in perfect correspondence with 
their use in society that transmits them, was greatly exaggerated by form critics; (4) 
as E. P. Sanders demonstrated, there are no laws operating consistently throughout 
the Gospel traditions; (5) the comparison between the oral transmission of Jesus 
traditions and folklore is questionable due to the different processes and time 
spans; (6) folklorists themselves no longer adhere to the ‘romantic’ idea of the 
folk that collectively creates folk traditions, but they rather recognize the role of 
1230  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 358-83.
1231  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 93-113 (96); cf. Riesenfeld; Gerhardsson. Bauckham bases his 
argument for the historicity of the Twelve on Meier, ‘The Circle of the Twelve: Did It Exist 
During Jesus’, pp. 635-72; idem, A Marginal Jew, III, pp. 125-97.
1232  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 240-63.
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authoritative individuals in interaction with the community; (7) the form critics’ 
predetermined picture of early Christianity, especially Bultmann’s distinction 
between Palestinian and Hellenistic communities, cannot be maintained; (8) 
the form critics claimed without evidence that the Jesus traditions circulated 
purely orally for decades; (9) the form critics, especially Bultmann, have come 
under attack for their use of a literary model for understanding the process of 
oral transmission.1233 Regarding Gerhardsson’s view, Bauckham comments on 
some the most common criticisms, such as the charge of anachronism in relation 
to Gerhardsson’s comparison of rabbinic tradition with the Jesus traditions, the 
claim that Gerhardsson’s view is too rigid to explain the variation in the Jesus 
traditions, and the criticism that there is no sufficient evidence for the controlling 
apostolic college that Gerhardsson imagined functioned in Jerusalem, but notes 
that many of the criticisms have been exaggerated.1234
 He also challenges Bailey’s terminology of referring to Bultmann’s view as 
‘informal uncontrolled tradition’, Gerhardsson’s view as ‘formal controlled 
tradition’, and Bailey’s own view as ‘informal controlled tradition’; Bailey’s model, 
and especially Dunn’s adoption of it, is problematic due to its confusion of the 
questions of formality and control. Bauckham argues that Bailey’s idea of stability 
and flexibility would be applicable to both a formal and an informal controlled 
tradition; it is not enough to refer to Bailey’s model as informal in order to account 
for the flexibility of the tradition, assuming at the same time that formal refers 
to stability. A more nuanced picture is needed for the transmission of the Jesus 
traditions. One must ask, Bauckham maintains, additional questions: granted 
the tradition was controlled, for what reasons was the control thought to have 
been necessary? What were the mechanisms of control? Were different kinds of 
traditions treated differently with regard to the degree of flexibility? If so, what 
was the relative balance between stability and flexibility? How are the Gospels 
related to the oral tradition? Bauckham notes that Bailey’s model, as well as 
Dunn, fails to account for the mechanisms of control. They both undermine the 
role of eyewitnesses, and especially the role of the twelve, although Bauckham 
does recognize that Dunn later moved to affirming the importance of individual 
1233  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 241-49 (243). Bauckham’s criticism’s of form criticism are largely 
consonant with ch. 2.1 above.
1234  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 249-52. Cf. ch. 2.2 above.
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eyewitnesses.1235
 Bauckham’s own proposal for ‘transmitting the Jesus traditions’ is not very 
different from Gerhardsson’s model, which emphasized the formal transmission 
in the sense that specific practices were used to ensure the faithful handing on of 
tradition. Bauckham refers to Paul’s letters as evidence for the formal transmission 
of the tradition; the proper terminology of tradition is used by Paul frequently 
(for instance, paradidōmi in 1 Cor. 11.2, 23; paralambanō, in 1 Cor. 15.1, Gal. 1.9, 
etc.). Bauckham presumes that Paul spent two weeks in Jerusalem with Peter and 
became ‘thoroughly informed of the Jesus traditions as formulated by the Twelve’ 
(Gal. 1.18). Again, he addresses the notion of oral history, namely, that early 
Christians were genuinely and from early on interested in remembering the past 
of the earthly Jesus. He also notes that memorization of the Jesus traditions must 
have been an important practice, not least due to the prevalence of memorization 
in ancient education.
 Bauckham answers the criticism that Gerhardsson’s position of memorization 
did not account for the variation of the Jesus traditions by listing the ‘five main 
factors’ that can be used to explain the variability of the traditions: (1) Jesus must 
have used varying versions of his own sayings on different occasions; (2) some 
verbal differences result from translation variants (from Aramaic to Greek); 
(3) many differences particularly in narratives are due to the variability of oral 
performance and to the degree that is considered appropriate for the type of 
material; (4) many differences in the sayings are due to the tradents interpretative 
alterations or additions in the post-Easter situation; (5) there are changes made 
by the authors of the Gospels in order to integrate traditions into their narrative. 
Bauckham also maintains that, while writing mainly served as an aid to memory 
in the first century, it is not unlikely that there were also some literate Christians 
who used notebooks to write down Jesus tradi tions.1236
 Bauckham’s work differs from Byrskog in that he discusses individual and 
collective memory, as well as eyewitness memory, more thoroughly from a 
1235  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 252-63, further on Dunn’s view, the question of anonymity/
eyewitnesses and the Gospels, pp. 290-310; cf. Dunn, ‘On History, Memory, and Eyewitnesses’, 
pp. 482-85 (484). Bauckham (p. 298) argues that ‘[i]t is a weakness of Bailey’s and Dunn’s models 
that they focus on the early transmission of Jesus traditions in Palestinian Jewish villages, 
ignoring the Jerusalem church’. Bauckham (p. 307) refers to 1. Cor. 15.3-8 as an example of a 
specific eyewitness tradition which Paul received from the Jerusalem church and handed on to 
the Corinthian Christians.
1236  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 264-89; cf. Gerhardsson’s view above (ch. 2.2).
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psychological viewpoint.1237 Regarding the individual and collective memories, 
Bauckham recognizes the significance of Halbwachs’ understanding of 
social memory, but criticizes it for its strong tendency to social determinism. 
Bauckham aims to find a balance between ‘social determinism’ and ‘the exces-
sive individualism that disregards the social dimension’ with the help of Barbara 
Misztal’s ‘intersubjective approach’ which, he believes, takes seriously the cultural 
forms and social constraints of remembering without undermining individuals’ 
role.1238
 Furthermore, Bauckham wants to make some differentiations between the 
different types of memory he considers relevant for his view. First, he distinguishes 
between recollective memory (in which the person can ‘relive’ the recollected 
experience) from memory for infor mation (which does not include one’s own 
experience). Second, Bauckham distinguishes be tween (1) the social dimension of 
individual recollection, (2) the shared recollections of a group, and (3) collective 
memory. Bauckham acknowledges that individuals always remem ber as members 
of the groups to which they belong, and agrees therefore with Misztal’s state ment, 
‘individual remembering takes place in the social context’.1239
 While Bauckham strongly emphasizes that the social dimension of individual 
recollection does not make one’s personal recollection less distinctive, he 
nevertheless recognizes the existence of group memory in the sense that Dunn 
argued, namely ‘already during the ministry of Jesus his disciples must have been 
sharing their memories of the events’. Bauckham remains very cautious about 
not ignoring the individual aspect of memory in favor of social memory, but 
admits that ‘collective memory’ refers to ‘the traditions of a group about events 
not personally recollected by any of the group’s members’; this kind of collective 
memory would have existed among those Christians who were not eyewitnesses 
but appropriated the testimonies of individuals and the shared memories of the 
twelve for their communities.1240
 Finally, in his discussion on eyewitness memory, Bauckham first points to the 
1237  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 310-18, 319-57; cf. Byrskog, Story as History, pp. 160-65 on the 
functions of memory in ancient historiography (with only a minor reference to ‘the psychology 
of memory’ on p. 165 n. 96), and pp. 153, 255 on ‘social memory’ and Halbwachs’ notion of 
collective memory.
1238  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 310-12; cf. Misztal, Theories, chapter 3.
1239  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 312-13; cf. Misztal, Theories, p. 5.
1240  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 313-14 (314); cf. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, pp. 239-41.
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fallibility of human memory, but nevertheless sets out to argue that generally 
eyewitness memory is reliable.1241 Bauckham indicates that most episodic Gospel 
narratives, if based on eyewitness testimony, fall into the category of personal or 
recollective memory. In support of the reliability of specifically recent recollective 
memories, Bauckham references William Brewer, who notes, for instance, that 
recent recollective memories ‘frequently predict objective memory accuracy’.1242 
Bauckham discusses reconstructive theories of memory, including Bartlett’s 
original work, and copy theories, and indicates that neither kind is sufficient on 
its own. He suggests a list of factors that, in his view, indicate the reliability of 
a recollective memory: (1) unique or unusual (‘memorable’) event; (2) salient 
or consequential event (also ‘memorable’); (3) an event in which a person is 
emotionally involved (though Bauckham notes this finding is less secure); (4) 
vivid imagery; (5) irrelevant detail; (6) point of view; (7) dating; (8) gist and 
details (gist is likely accurate, even when details are not); (9) frequent rehearsal. 
Bauckham argues that these factors can be applied to the Jesus traditions with a 
slightly varying degree of confidence.1243
 Bauckham also attempts to account for the problematic relation between 
fact and meaning, and past and present, in eyewitness memory. He uses 
psychologist John Robinson’s study of the subjective first-person perspective to 
argue for the inadequacy of a simplistic distinction between objective fact and 
subjective experience; Bauckham also discusses Robinson’s four factors for 
studying how meaning in personal memories changes or remains stable, and 
applies the discussion to the Jesus traditions, contending that it is not justified to 
suppose that interpretation takes the tradition further from the facts.1244 While 
acknowledging that memories are socially shaped at every stage, distortions can 
occur, and schemata can be flexible, Bauckham notes in light of his account of 
psychological studies of recollective memories that eyewitness accounts quickly 
1241  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 319-57.
1242  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 324-25; Brewer, ‘What is Recollective Memory?’, pp. 19-66 (60-61).
1243  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 325-35, 341-46. Bauckham (p. 346) concludes that ‘the memories 
of eyewitnesses of the history of Jesus score highly by the criteria for likely reliability that have 
been established by the psychological study of recollective memory’.
1244  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 338-41, 351-55; cf. John A. Robinson, ‘Perspective, Meaning 
and Remembering’, in D. Rubin (ed.), Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical 
Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 199-217: (1) the multiplicity 
of potential meanings; (2) deferred meaning; (3) changing meaning; (4) negotiating meaning. 
On Bauckham’s use of Robinson also see, Eve, Behind, pp. 156-57.
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take the narrative schemata (or ‘forms’) that are available in the social setting. This 
counters Dennis Nineham’s and the form critics’ supposition that the forms of 
the Gospel pericopae resulted from a long process of oral-traditional development 
in communities; Bauckham argues that the early Christian eyewitnesses were 
involved in the formation of the Gospel traditions.1245
Critique & Evaluation
Bauckham’s Jesus and the Eyewitnesses caused somewhat of a controversy at its 
time, evok ing a heated discussion with reactions varying from a complete rebuttal 
to positive adoption of its thesis.1246 Since it is impossible and unnecessary to 
1245  Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 335-38, 346-51; cf. Nineham. ‘Eye-Witness Testimony and the 
Gospel Tradition, I’, pp. 13-25; idem, ‘Eye-Witness Testimony and the Gospel Tradition, II’, 
pp. 243-52; idem, ‘Eye-Witness Testimony and the Gospel Tradition, III’, pp. 253-64. In the 
concluding chapter of Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, Bauckham returns to the the question of 
testimony from a theological and philosophical viewpoint, citing Paul Ricoeur in support of 
his notion that ‘[t]estimony…authorizes theology only as theologically understood history’. 
See Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 472-508 (508); cf. Ricoeur, ‘The Hermeneutics of Testimony’, 
in Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation (ed. Lewis S. Mudge; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1980, pp. 133-34: ‘There is therefore no witness of the absolute who is not a witness of historic 
signs, no confessor of absolute meaning who is not a narrator of the acts of deliverance’.
1246  See e.g. J. D. G. Dunn, ‘Eyewitnesses and the Oral Jesus Tradition’, JSHJ 6 (2008), pp. 85-105, 
also published in Dunn, The Oral Gospel, pp. 213-229 (referenced below); S. Byrskog, ‘The 
Eyewitnesses as Interpreters of the Past: Reflections on Richard Bauckham’s, Jesus and the 
Eyewitnesses’, JSHJ 6 (2008), pp. 157-68; David Catchpole, ‘On Proving Too Much: Critical 
Hesitations about Richard Bauckham’s Jesus and the Eyewitnesses’, JSHJ 6 (2008), pp. 169-81; 
I. H. Marshall, ‘A New Consensus on Oral Tradition? A Review of Richard Bauckham’s Jesus 
and the Eyewitnesses’, JSHJ 6 (2008), pp. 182-93; Stephen J. Patterson, ‘Can You Trust a Gospel? 
A Review of Richard Bauckham’s Jesus and the Eyewitnesses’, JSHJ 6 (2008), pp. 194-210; T. J. 
Weeden Sr., ‘Polemics as a Case for Dissent: A Response to Richard Bauckham’s Jesus and the 
Eyewitnesses’, JSHJ 6 (2008), pp. 211-24; J. Schröter, ‘The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony? A 
Critical Examination of Richard Bauckham’s Jesus and the Eyewitnesses’, JSNT 31.2 (2008), pp. 
195-209; C. A. Evans, ‘The Implications of Eyewitness Tradition’, JSNT 31.2 (2008), pp. 211-
19; Allison, Constructing, 1 n. 1; Kankaanniemi, Guards, pp. 59-62; Redman, ‘How Accurate 
Are Eyewitnesses?’, pp, 177-97; Witherington, ‘”Christianity in the Making”: Oral Mystery or 
Eyewitness History?’, pp. 197-226 (217-24); Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 6-7, 41, 43, 47, 58, 129-
30 n. 38, 130 n. 40, 224; idem, Oral Tradition, pp. 4-5; Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 49-50; idem, 
‘The Competitive Textualization of the Jesus Tradition in John 20:30-31 and 21:24-25’, pp. 321-
37; Foster, ‘Memory, Orality, and the Fourth Gospel’, pp. 191-127 (193-200); Kloppenborg, 
‘Memory, Performance, and the Sayings of Jesus’, pp. 97-132 (109); McIver, Memory, Jesus, and 
the Synoptic Gospels, pp. 5-9; idem, ‘Eyewitnesses as Guarantors of the Accuracy of the Gospel 
Traditions in the Light of Psychological Research’, JBL 3 (2012), pp. 529-46; Crook, ‘Collective 
Memory Distortion and the Quest for the Historical Jesus’, pp. 53-76; Le Donne, ‘The Problem 
of Selectivity in Memory Research’, pp. 77-97; Eve, Behind, pp. 143-58; idem, Writing, pp. 44-
46; Bird, Gospel, pp. 96-97 n. 93, 106-107 n. 122, 107-108; Hübenthal, Das Markusevangelium, 
pp. 60-67; Syreeni, ‘The Identity’, pp. 1-16 (12-13); idem, ‘Eyewitness Testimony, First-Person 
Narrration and Authorial Presence as Means of Legitimation in Early Gospel Literature’, pp. 
89-110; Ehrman, Jesus Before the Gospels, pp. 87-130 (100-118); Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, pp. 
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attempt to cover all aspects of Bauckham’s study here, only some of the most 
relevant issues are discussed. To begin with Bauckham’s conceptual category of 
‘testimony’, some scholars have argued that Bauckham confuses the categories of 
history and theology. For example, John P. Meier considers Bauck ham’s work one 
of theological apologetics, driven by a theological agenda and a methodology not 
suitable for ‘a strictly historical quest for the historical Jesus’.1247 Also, Kari Syreeni, 
while regarding Bauckham’s ‘Jesus of testimony’ as an attractive theological 
concept, views the notion of ‘testimony’ as questionable when brought into 
the field of Jesus scholarship; it appears to allow for the Gospels to be treated 
differently than other historical documents.1248 Jens Schröter also indicates that 
Bauckham’s category of ‘testimony’ is in danger of asking one to trust the Gospels 
uncritically.1249 Others find Bauckham’s introductory discussion on ‘testimony’ 
more helpful. Byrskog deems it ‘a remarkable and hermeneutically helpful 
achievement’,1250 and Rodríguez and Keith, who have espoused the application of 
memory studies to the historical Jesus, find the emphasis of Bauckham’s ‘testimony’ 
on the final form of the Gospels useful.1251 It is beyond the scope of this study to 
engage in a philosophical (not to mention a theological) discussion on ‘testimony’ 
as a conceptual category,1252 but it is sufficient to point out that, regardless of the 
motive behind his work, Bauckham attempts to provide a historical and social-
77-78 n. 57; Kirk, ‘Ehrman, Bauckham and Bird on Memory’, pp. 88-114. See also Bauckham’s 
responses to the articles published in JSHJ 6 (2008) and in JSNT 31.2 (2008): R. Bauckham, ‘In 
Response to My Respondents: Jesus and the Eyewitnesses in Review’, JSHJ 6 (2008), pp. 225-53; 
idem, ‘Eyewitnesses and Critical History: A Response to Jens Schröter and Craig Evans’, JSNT 
31.2 (2008), pp. 221-35. Further, see the additional chapters in Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, 2nd 
edn, pp. 509-615.
1247  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, p. 77 n. 57. Meier notes that he is not opposed to the idea of using 
both historical research and social sciences in theology, but objects to confusing theology with 
historical research, in particular Christology with the quest for the historical Jesus.
1248  Syreeni, ‘The Identity’, pp. 1-16 (12-13). While indicating that Bauckham’s notion of ‘testimony’ 
is not suitable for Jesus scholarship, Syreeni (p. 13) points out that, exegetically, testimony and 
remembrance are important themes in Luke, John, and Acts, which are all later than Mark and 
Matthew.
1249  Schröter, ‘The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony?’, pp. 195-209 (208).
1250  Byrskog, ‘The Eyewitnesses as Interpreters of the Past’, pp. 157-68 (158).
1251  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 6-7 n. 9, 224-25 (224): ‘Whatever problems…attend to Bauckham’s 
theses, “historical Jesus” scholars will have to account for the gospels as coherent, culturally 
conditioned and relevant portrayals of Jesus’. Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, pp. 49-50, regards Bauckham’s 
‘testimony’ useful as it does not imagine one can get ‘behind’ the Gospel texts to the historical 
Jesus. Cf. ch. 3.4; 3.5 above. 
1252  These themes are, of course, commented upon in relevant sections of the dissertation.
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scientific case for the Gospels as eyewitness testimony,1253 a case which can be 
assessed by historical and social-scientific methods.1254 In Bauckham’s defense, 
one may note that at least he has made his presuppositions clear from the start.1255
 As for the basic tenet of Bauckham, namely, that the Gospels of Mark, Luke, 
and John embody eyewitness testimony, the argument about the literary device of 
inclusio has come under severe criticism. It has been pointed out that Bauckham’s 
argument is especially weak in Luke, where the named women are not mentioned 
until Luke 8.1-3, which is far from the beginning of the narrative; also, with regard 
to John’s Gospel, the inclusio is far from obvious, as it is dependent upon the 
Gospel’s recipients’ ability to link ‘a completely unremarkable unnamed disciple’ 
(John 1.35-40) with the Beloved Disciple as the eyewitness source, as well as the 
author of the Gospel (21.24).1256 Although Bauckham insists that a close reading 
of John reveals subtle meanings in John’s Gospel in particular, his argument for 
the inclusio remains conjectural.1257
 In relation to Mark, Bauckham’s attempt to identify the eyewitness sources 
based on the individuals named at the beginning and at the end of the story faces 
1253  It is not difficult to recognize that Bauckham’s ‘Jesus of testimony’ has a lot in common with 
some of the views that combine orality studies and social memory theory with the study of the 
Jesus traditions in a framework that is critical of historical positivism and its alleged methods of 
getting ‘behind’ the text (e.g. Kelber, Dunn, Rodríguez, Keith, Allison, also Le Donne); however, 
Bauckham’s emphasis on the theological necessity of ‘testimony’ and of rejecting ‘methodological 
skepticism’ and ‘historical positivism’ is quite extraordinary within the field. Of course, the 
dichotomy between ‘the historical Jesus’ and ‘the Christ of faith’ has been discussed at length 
for centuries by Jesus scholars and theologians alike. Nevertheless, I share the criticisms by 
Meier and Syreeni as far as they express a concern about an uncritical mixing of theology with 
historical studies, wherein a theological concept can force unnatural or highly unlikely readings 
of historical documents. I do recognize, however, that a historical argument that appears 
‘unnatural’ or ‘unlikely’ to one person, may not appear so to another. Thus, critical assessment 
of proposed historical arguments that relate to the historical documents that are available to all, 
and are the same for all, is crucial. I do not believe in the possibility of conducting historical 
research in a vacuum with no influence by one’s presuppositions, religious or otherwise, and 
one’s existing social frameworks. In the end, anyone denying such influences is, as the saying 
goes, ‘entering a world of pain’.
1254  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, pp. 77-78 n. 57, also goes on to critique the historical arguments of 
Bauckham’s thesis.
1255  See Bauckham, ‘Eyewitnesses and Critical History’, pp. 221-35 (234), where he responds to Jens 
Schröter by noting that ‘it is a prejudice to suppose that regarding the Gospels as good historical 
sources is necessarily “uncritical”’. Bauckham (p. 225) also notes that ‘most weight must be 
placed on assessment of the general reliability of the sources’.
1256  Eve, Behind, pp. 144-45; also Catchpole, ‘On Proving Too Much’, pp. 169-81 (175-78); Patterson, 
‘Can You Trust a Gospel?’, pp. 194-210 (201-2); cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 127-29, 129-32. 
For Bauckham’s recent response to these criticisms, see Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, 2nd edn, pp. 
513-15.
1257  Cf. Bauckham, ‘In Response’, pp. 225-53 (243). See the discussion below.
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another significant challenge. The narrative device of inclusio, which Bauckham 
applies to Peter, can be applied, as Eve demonstrates, just as strongly to Jesus, 
who is named before Peter in Mark 1.9; although Peter is mentioned after Jesus 
in Mark 16.6, the next verse 16.7 goes on after mentioning Peter to explain what 
Jesus will do. Throughout the Gospel narrative, Jesus is presented as the main 
character, being present at more of the events than Peter. In some cases, there are 
no other witnesses (e.g. Mk 1.10-13, 35; 14.35-36). Eve also notes that the author 
shares Jesus’ thoughts and feelings (e.g. Mk 1.41; 2.5, 8; 3.5; 5.30; 6.6; 10.14, 21; 
11.12; 12.34; 14.33), and narrates some events from his perspective (Mk 6.45-
48; 9.25; 12.41-42; 14.37, 40). Thus, it can be argued that Mark is written from 
Jesus’ perspective, but this of course cannot mean, unlike Bauckham’s logic would 
demand if followed rigidly, that Jesus was Mark’s eyewitness source.1258
 Bauckham’s other arguments for Peter’s role as the main eyewitness in Mark’s 
Gospel have also been questioned. Weeden argues against Bauckham that Mark’s 
Gospel gives us the perspective of Mark on Peter, not the perspective of Peter; the 
‘plural-to-singular’ technique, upon which Bauckham bases his claim of Peter as 
the main eyewitness, simply demonstrates that ‘a major focus of Mark’s Gospel 
is upon Peter and his relationship with Jesus’.1259 This counter-argument is also 
recognized by others who contend that the literary device can be conceived as 
a typical way of narrating the activity of a significant person who is followed by 
disciples.1260 However, in response, Bauckham reasonably points out that Weeden’s 
view of Mark’s Gospel as a polemic against a theios aner Christology (based on his 
1971 book) has been seriously criticized, and that it can be argued that despite 
all of his failures and misunderstandings, Peter is depicted positively by Mark.1261 
Eve implies, nonetheless, that Bauckham still needs to explain the repeated 
discrediting of the main eyewitness source by Mark.1262
 Furthermore, Bauckham’s studies of the names in the Gospels have raised 
1258  Eve, Behind, p. 146.
1259  Weeden, ‘Polemics as a Case for Dissent’, pp. 211-24 (218-21).
1260  Patterson, ‘Can You Trust a Gospel?’, pp. 194-210 (202-3); Eve, Behind, p. 145: ‘[internal 
focalization] could surely just be an artistic device to draw the audience into the story, or to 
encourage the to identify with the disciples in a Gospel in which discipleship is one of the 
leading themes’.
1261  Bauckham, ‘In Response’, pp. 225-53 (251-52). In support of the last point, Bauckham refers 
to Timothy Wiarda, Peter in the Gospels (WUNT, 2.127; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000). For 
Bauckham’s most recent response, see Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, 2nd edn, pp. 510-12.
1262  Eve, Behind, pp. 145-46. Eve ignores Bauckham’s reference to Wiarda, Peter in the Gospels.
269
critical questions.1263 Byrskog, who is more interested in the eyewitnesses as 
interpreters than as sources for history, expresses skepticism about the names 
mentioned in the Gospels, which Bauckham takes as indicators of eyewitnesses; 
Byrskog indicates that even the names of the central figures of the stories appear 
in many ancient bioi with no implication for eyewitness testimony.1264 Eve also 
challenges Bauckham’s argument that the characters named for no obvious reason 
are to be viewed as the eyewitnesses of the particular event (for example, Jairus 
and Bartimaeus, who are named against the tendency for beneficiaries of Jesus’ 
miracles to remain unnamed). Bauckham does not explain how Mark got access 
to the eyewitness testimony of these people. This challenge is further strengthened 
by the fact that Bauckham’s argument indicates that Peter should be the eyewitness 
in Mark 5.37-39, where the raising of Jairus’ daughter is narrated with the ‘plural-
to-singular’ narrative device focusing on Peter, James, and John.1265
 Also, Bauckham’s conception of historical fact has been questioned in particular 
with regard to the Gospels of Mark and John. Due to the discrepancies between 
the Gospels, Patterson states that ‘[i]f both John and Mark relied on eyewitness 
testimony, one of the witnesses was very unreliable’.1266 Catchpole and Eve also 
point to the problem of viewing both Mark (with Matthew and Luke) and John 
as based on reliable eyewitness testimony. Whereas it could be argued that the 
coming of the kingdom of God is central to Mark and the other Synoptic Gospels, 
the Johaninne Jesus is depicted as focusing mainly on the incarnate Son who 
reveals the Father.1267 In response to this, Bauckham argues that John is much 
more interpretative than the Synoptics and based on the Beloved Disciple’s 
‘lifelong reflection on the meaning of the events’; while John’s Gospel cannot be 
read as ‘a straightforward chronicle’, its events are nevertheless ‘historical in a 
fairly straightforward sense (with the normal allowances for storytelling freedom)’. 
Bauckham further contends that the passages in which Jesus’ christological 
1263  Cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 39-92. I only mention this section of Bauckham’s work in 
passing above. Also see Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, 2nd edn, pp. 542-45. 
1264  Byrskog, ‘The Eyewitnesses as Interpreters of the Past’, pp. 157-68 (158-59). At the time of this 
debate, Bauckham, ‘In Response’, pp. 225-53, admitted that the topic of names needed more 
research. Evans, ‘The Implications of Eyewitness Tradition’ pp. 211-19 (215), indicated that the 
evidence on names did not prove as much as Bauckham wished, but was nonetheless important, 
as it shows that the Gospels are realistic stories.
1265  Eve, Behind, p. 146-47; cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 52-54.
1266  Patterson, ‘Can You Trust a Gospel?’, pp. 194-210 (200).
1267  Eve, Behind, pp. 148-49; Catchpole, ‘On Proving Too Much’, pp. 169-81 (178-80).
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significance is unveiled are creations of the author.1268 While Bauckham 
certainly allows for the author’s interpretations to play a role, he believes that 
this interpretation does not do away with historical facts.1269 However, in light 
of the very different accounts of Mark and John, one cannot help but wonder if 
Bauckham allows for too many qualifications for the notion of ‘historical fact’.1270 
Albeit in the context of rhetoric, Byrskog also views Bauckham’s thesis regarding 
historicity as somewhat uncritical: ‘Bauckham, while often perceptively critical of 
form criticism, reveals a similar and yet different tendency in that the Gospels—
at least Mark and John—are seen as more or less immediately transparent of the 
history behind them’.1271
 Objections have also been raised on Bauckham’s use of the evidence from Papias. 
For instance, Meier completely rejects Bauckham’s heavy use of the fragmentary 
statements to ascertain the reliability of the Gospels and the eyewitness testimony. 
The fragments that have yielded more numerous contradictory interpretations 
‘than many cruces interpretum in the NT’ cannot possibly carry the weight of 
Bauckham’s argument, which equals, according to Meier, to building on sand.1272 
Eve also maintains that Bauckham’s argument is forced.1273 Not only does it 
presuppose that Eusebius recorded the wording of Papias accurately, but it also 
requires that Papias in his later life remembered and recorded accurately what he 
had received from John the Elder when he was young, and that John the Elder’s 
account of the relation of Peter’s preaching to Mark is exactly accurate.1274 This is, 
Eve contends, difficult to combine with Papias’ views that Mark’s account was not 
in order, but John’s Gospel was. It is also difficult to see why Papias, if he thought 
that Mark had a direct access to Peter, did not suppose that Mark had ordered 
his Gospel according to Peter.1275 As can be seen from these criticisms, caution is 
1268  Bauckham, ‘In Response’, pp. 225-53 (239-40).
1269  Cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 305-10 (310): 
1270  On this also see Eve, Behind, p. 149: ‘The problem is that if Peter (through Mark) and the Beloved 
Disciple (in John) are both allowed to be sticking to the (albeit interpreted) historical facts, the 
notion of historical fact is in mortal danger from the death of a thousand qualifications’.
1271  Byrskog, ‘The Eyewitnesses as Interpreters of the Past’, pp. 157-68 (161).
1272  Meier, A Marginal Jew, V, pp. 77-78 n. 57.
1273  Eve, Behind, p. 147.
1274  See also Ehrman, Jesus before the Gospels, p. 112: ‘…Bauckham is especially enthusiastic about 
Papias’s testimony, in part because he believes that Papias encountered these people long before 
he was writing, possibly as early as 80 CE – that is, during the time when the Gospels themselves 
were being composed. Bauckham does not ask whether Papias’s memory of encounters he had 
many decades earlier was accurate.’ Italics are mine.
1275  Eve, Behind, p. 147.
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called for in relation to Papias’ writings.
 Those who take a more optimistic view of the matter challenge Bauckham’s 
interpretation of Papias’ phrase ‘a living and surviving voice’. Dunn criticizes 
Bauckham for taking the phrase to imply a contrast between ‘first-hand 
information’, that is, eyewitness testimony, and a long chain of unattributed 
oral tradition; while Dunn contends that Bauckham is right in arguing that the 
meaning of ‘living voice’ is ‘first-hand information’ for Papias, he insists that the 
contrast is between written tradition and first-hand information. Dunn posits that 
Papias had received what he knew about earlier days from the oral tradition of 
the communities, as well as from the eyewitnesses.1276 No such sharp distinction 
between oral history and oral tradition, as Bauckham envisages on the basis of 
Jan Vansina, is necessary. It has been noted by Byrskog that ‘[t]he testimony of an 
eyewitness is, in a sense, tradition as soon as it is communicated from one person 
to another; and by the same token, oral tradition is, in a sense, testimony, even if 
in an indirect way’.1277
 A few additional remarks on Bauckham’s view of the Beloved Disciple need to 
be made. Marshall notes the controversial nature of the disciple’s identification 
with John the Elder of Papias. He points out that it is problematic, for example, 
in light of the Synoptic narratives of the Last Supper, where only the twelve are 
with Jesus (Lk. 22.29-30), if one is to suppose that a disciple who was not one of 
the twelve was also there.1278 There are more factors that cause uncertainty about 
Bauckham’s notion of the Beloved Disciple as the eyewitness source in John’s 
Gospel. First, the absence of the Beloved Disciple in John 2–12 indicates that the 
au thor must have acquired much of his material from elsewhere, from someone 
who Bauckham supposes was a direct eyewitness; in any case, the Beloved Disciple 
was not a direct eyewit ness to many of the events in the Gospel. Secondly, the 
appearance of the Beloved Disciple is particularly cryptic; Bauckham’s explanation 
1276  Dunn, ‘Eyewitnesses and the Oral Jesus Tradition’, in Dunn, The Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 
213-29 (227-28). Schröter, ‘The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony?’, pp. 195-209 (201) similarly 
maintains that the passage underlines the primacy of oral tradition against written accounts: 
Papias employs the ancient topos of the viva vox in order to make this point.
1277  Byrskog, ‘The Eyewitnesses as Interpreters of the Past’, pp. 157-68 (159-60). 
1278  Marshall, ‘A New Consensus on Oral Tradition?’, pp. 182-93 (193). Bauckham, ‘In Response’, 
pp. 225-53 (241) responds: ‘My view is that it is pressing the evidence of the Synoptics too far 
to conclude that, because they only refer to the Twelve, only the Twelve were there. The nature 
of these kinds of narratives is that they focus on what interests the narrator and simply fail to 
mention other matters.’ I find Bauckham’s argument from silence unconvincing. 
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that the character is not known well enough, so he needs to hide his identity only 
to gradually reveal it, may function in John’s narrative world, but it may not meet 
Bauckham’s own criterion, according to which the eyewitnesses who transmit 
the testimony of Jesus are to be relevant.1279 I cannot escape the impression that 
Bauckham’s explanations for the absence and the hidden identity of the Beloved 
Disciple are just to beg the question. In the context of John’s Gospel, the identity of 
the anonymous disci ple is an important question, but Bauckham’s argumentation 
that this individual must have been the primary eyewitness of the Gospel is 
inconclusive.
 Regarding the authoritative status of the twelve, Bauckham is said to have 
overstated their influence beyond Jerusalem.1280 Both the existence of the twelve 
in Jerusalem and that they exercised control to some degree over the transmission 
of the the Jesus traditions need not be denied;1281 rather, the question is how far 
and for how long their influence could expand.1282 Dunn agrees with Bauckham 
on the notion that early Christian communities were interested in first-hand 
accounts of Jesus, which they received from the eyewitnesses; he also approves 
of the view that the Jerusalem leadership provided a primary reference point for 
the traditions (Gal. 1.18); however, Dunn imagines that the control exercised by 
the twelve was not as extensive as Bauckham argues, when the Jesus movement 
spread. The original eyewitnesses are given too great a role if, in addition to 
their role in the formulation of the tradition, they are viewed as bridging the gap 
between the formulation and the transcription of the tradition. Dunn argues, as 
in relation to Papias’ phrase ‘a living and surviving voice’, that no sharp distinction 
1279  See Eve, Behind, p. 148; cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 402-3, 407-8; for further debate, see 
Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, 2nd edn, pp. 550-89.
1280  Dunn, ‘Eyewitnesses and the Oral Jesus Tradition’, in Dunn, The Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 213-
29 (223, 225-29); cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 249-263.
1281  Cf. Gerhardsson’s view above (ch. 2.2); for the recognition of the twelve in Paul, see 1 Cor. 9.1-5; 
15.3-11; Gal. 1.11-19; 2.1-10. Also, Kankaanniemi, Guards, pp. 60-62 (62): it seems plausible 
that ‘the Jesus traditions Paul assumed that his churches knew derived mostly from Jerusalem’; 
Eve, Behind, p. 45: ‘it would be odd indeed if the Twelve ceased to have any function within a 
year or two of Jesus’ death or if certain persons did not come to have much more control over 
the tradition than others’.
1282  Byrskog, ‘The Eyewitnesses as Interpreters of the Past’, pp. 157-68 (167: ‘To the extent that 
Bauckham wishes to argue that the participating eyewitnesses remained influential also when 
they were no longer present in the transmitting groups and the Christian communities, he 
might wish to expound more clearly how that influence became manifest in those regular 
settings where certain people, probably teachers, in different cities around the Mediterranean 
area met together in order to remember and discuss the past.’
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should be drawn between the eyewitness information and the oral tradition, while 
positing that the reliability of the Jesus traditions was not based on the original 
eyewitnesses but on the reliability of the oral Jesus tradition in more removed 
contexts.1283 In his response to Dunn, Bauckham distinguishes between the early 
and the late work of Gerhardsson and suggests diverging from the former view, 
namely, that the twelve controlled the whole process of the transmission of the 
Jesus traditions, and speaks of ‘especially authoritative status’, rejecting ‘exclusive 
authority’.1284
 The final issue of Bauckham’s thesis has to do with his application of social-
scientific methods, namely the concepts of individual and collective memory, as 
well as eyewitness memory, to the question of eyewitness testimony in the Jesus 
traditions.1285 As was the case with Byrskog’s Story as History, Bauckham has also 
been criticized for undermining the collective aspect of memory in favor of the 
individual aspect.1286 Although he discusses Halbwachs’ ‘social determinism’ and, 
quite reasonably, uses Barbara Misztal’s ‘intersubjective approach’ to find balance 
between excessive individualism and social determinism, Bauckham seems 
to be countering a ‘presentist’ view of social memory, which may be congruent 
with a primary target of his criticism, namely the form-critical notion of flexible 
anonymous community tradition, although this is a view that is supported by few 
Jesus scholars.1287 None of the scholars placed within the memory approach in this 
dissertation subscribe to such a view of social memory theory.
 A few points need to be made on Bauckham’s application of eyewitnesses 
memory, and specifically recollective memory, to the question of eyewitness 
testimony. First, Bauckham’s argument that eyewitness accounts are rapidly honed 
into standard ‘forms’ is plausible, and it can be supported by the notion that each 
rendering of an oral-traditional story is a fresh per formance, not a revised version 
of the previous rendering; this can be taken to imply that the form of an account 
1283  Dunn, ‘Eyewitnesses and the Oral Jesus Tradition’, in Dunn, The Oral Gospel Tradition, pp. 213-
29 (223, 225-29).
1284  Bauckham, ‘In Response’, pp. 225-53 (243).
1285  Cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 310-18, 319-57.
1286  Rodríguez, Structuring, pp. 41-42, 46-47 (46-47); Bird, Gospel, pp. 96-97 n. 96, 106-7 n. 122; 
Eve, Behind, p. 154.
1287  Eve, Behind, pp. 153-54; cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 310-18. Bauckham’s discussion 
indicates that he is criticizing a presentist view of social memory in which the past is completely 
transformed by the present needs of the community. Cf. the other views discussed above in Ch 
3.
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is not an indicator of the length of the transmission process.1288 Eve indi cates, 
however, that Bauckham’s way of separating ‘the non-empirical quest for meaning 
from the empirical facts narrated’ is not justified. While narrativization is not 
simply distor tion, but rather a prerequisite for the communication of a memory, 
in the case of the Gospel pericopae, which are essentially events frequently 
narrated, it is hard to imagine how the quest for the meaning could have shaped 
the narrative form without also reshaping the empirical facts to some extent.1289 
Second, not all the factors that Bauckham lists in favor of the reliability of 
recollective memory are relevant. Eve points out that, for example, that ‘ir relevant 
detail’, and ‘point of view’ cannot be taken to support the accuracy of recall; ‘emo-
tional involvement’ is also uncertain, because a strong emotion can have either 
a distorting or preserving effect. Also, Bauckham argues that ‘unique or unusual 
events’ and ‘salient or consequential events’ can be memorable, but ignores the 
reality that fictitious accounts can also appear memorable. Third, Bauckham 
ignores the fact that the frequent rehearsal of the Gospel material by eyewitnesses 
does not equate to accurate rehearsal; through frequent rehearsal, a memory gets 
fixated in the standard form of the narration, which is not the same as the original 
experience. Eve concludes from these and other points that Bauckham has not 
demonstrated that eyewitnesses did or must have remembered everything with 
reasonable accuracy, even though they theoretically could have done so; he has not 
demonstrated that the Gospels are the result of accurate eyewitness testimony.1290
 In sum, Richard Bauckham presents a straightforward and bold argument for 
the view that the canonical Gospels are based on direct eyewitness testimony. 
1288  Eve, Behind, pp. 154-55; cf. Bauckham, Eyewitnesses, pp. 335-38, 346-51.
1289  Eve, Behind, p. 155. Eve notes that Bauckham could claim that such distortions may occur, but 
they would not affect the core meaning of the event.
1290  Eve, Behind, pp. 155-56. On these points see also Redman, ‘How Accurate Are Eyewitnesses?’, pp, 
177-97. Redman presents a case against Bauckham’s optimistic conclusions about the reliability 
of the eyewitness memory and testimony in light of eyewitness psychology and psychological 
research on telling stories. Redman notes that during the early period of eyewitness transmission 
of the Jesus traditions, the eyewitnesses to Jesus’ ministry functioned like any other eyewitnesses 
anywhere else, vulnerable to all distortions of memory. She contends that Bauckham’s claims 
to the accuracy of eyewitness testimony proves nothing and sheds no light upon the historical 
Jesus. Even if the parts of the Gospels were controlled by eyewitnesses for some time before 
they were written down, they are no more accurate than if we suppose heavy redaction. Besides 
arguing that Bauckham’s work does not provide empirical evidence for the historicity of the 
Gospels, Redman suggests as the main contribution of her investigation that the eyewitness 
effect can be taken into account when studying the variations of the tradition, often attributed to 
redactors. For a more optimistic view, see McIver, ‘Eyewitnesses as Guarantors of the Accuracy 
of the Gospel Traditions in the Light of Psychological Research’, pp. 529-46. 
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It was first noted that Bauckham’s argument should be evaluated on historical 
terms, although some have suggested that Bauckham’s category of ‘testimony’ 
allows for uncritical treatment of the Gospels. Some of Bauckham’s arguments 
are more persuasive than others, but the overall impression is that the connection 
between the Gospels of Mark, Luke, John, and Matthew and the early Christian 
eyewitnesses is not as strong as Bauckham envisages.
3.9 Conclusion
Some of the most significant representatives of the memory approach to the 
study of the historical Jesus were critically evaluated in this chapter. In order 
to draw some conclusions, the distinct ways in which the representatives of the 
memory approach attempt to distinguish themselves from earlier scholarship are 
recognized:1291 
 (1) There is a consensus within the memory approach that the form-
critical understanding of the pre-Gospel oral tradition as an anonymously and 
uncontrollably transmitted tradition that can be studied with a ‘literary mindset’ 
needs to be discarded. Also, the memory approach generally views Birger 
Gerhardsson’s view of the rabbinic transmission of the Jesus tradition as too rigid, 
although there is some variation in the harshness of the critique; the value of his 
notion of memorization is recognized within the memory approach. Werner H. 
Kelber’s original split between orality and textuality is deemed too sharp, but the 
value of Kelber’s contribution to the memory approach is generally recognized; for 
example, his rejection of the criteria of authenticity, as well as the formulation of 
the Jesus traditions, in light of the conceptual category of memory, are viewed very 
positively by some within the memory approach (for example, Rafael Rodríguez). 
The contribution of Kenneth E. Bailey’s view of the informal controlled tradition, 
which was based on an anecdotal evidence, is recognized especially by James D. G. 
Dunn, who employs Bailey’s basic model in his discussion on oral transmission. If 
it were not for Dunn’s (and N. T. Wright’s) use of Bailey, his model would probably 
not have gained much scholarly attention. Bailey’s model is not widely discussed 
by others within the memory approach.
1291  See Ch. 1.2:
  2. How does the memory approach attempt to distinguish itself from earlier scholarship, 
namely, form criticism and its alternatives, with regard to the question of the transmission of 
the Jesus traditions and the task of reconstructing the historical Jesus?
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 (2) The application of oral hermeneutics to the question of the transmission 
of the Jesus traditions is another area where the memory approach, or at least 
some scholars within it, challenge earlier scholarly viewpoints. Dunn’s notion, 
according to which the variation between the Synoptic Jesus traditions ought not 
to be explained simply through the authors’ use of literary sources but as a result 
of oral retellings of the Jesus traditions, undermines the age-old assumptions of 
source criticism; also, in light of John Miles Foley’s terminology, Rodríguez’s view 
of the Gospels as ‘Voices from the Past’, that is, as widely accepted traditional 
performances, leads Rodríguez to speculate about the necessity of the Two-Source 
theory but he chooses not to pursue the question much further. On the other 
hand, there is some common ground between the memory approach and earlier 
scholarship. Richard A. Horsley (notwithstanding his views on ‘the Q speeches’), 
Dale C. Allison, and Anthony Le Donne prefer not to distance themselves from 
the traditional source-critical theories but seem to accept the idea of Markan 
primacy and Two-(or Four-)Source theory. Chris Keith attempts to identify his 
study of the Jesus-memories with the earlier method of redaction criticism.
 (3) While applying social memory theory to the Jesus traditions and adhering 
to the idea that there is no uninterpreted past available for the scholar, the memory 
approach also distinguishes itself from any presentist interpretations of the pioneer 
of social memory theory, Maurice Halbwachs. The presentist view, namely, the 
idea that the present needs and interests of the community completely absorb 
and transform the past actuality of Jesus, is rejected and deemed reminiscent of 
the outdated early form-critical notions that correlated a form of tradition with a 
specific Sitz im Leben. For example, Keith argues that, while the actual past cannot 
be accessed, it can be discussed on the basis of the Jesus-memories. Rodríguez 
speaks of the continuity in terms of the historical reputation of Jesus and competing 
historical images. Also, Allison, who refers to memory studies, not foremost in 
terms of social memory but in terms of the (un-)reliability of human memory, 
argues for a continuity against naïve apologetic trust and hyper-skepticism. 
 (4) A major difference between the memory approach and earlier scholarship 
has to do with the question of the historicity and authenticity of the Jesus 
traditions. While maintaining that there is no access to an uninterpreted past, 
the memory approach also argues that there is no access ‘behind’ the text with 
the criteria of authenticity. For Chris Keith, the memory approach is about the 
return to the text (in terms of Ricoeur, ‘a second naiveté in critical Jesus research’). 
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Whatever their differences, most scholars within the memory approach find no 
use for the criteria of authenticity or the ‘authenticity language’. Dunn, Horsley, 
Rodríguez, Keith, Allison, as well as Richard Bauckham from the perspective of 
eyewitness testimony, are all very dismissive of the criteria-based earlier Jesus 
scholarship. In his study of ‘Jesus the apocalyptic prophet’, Allison suggests 
that instead of the authenticity of individual Jesus traditions one should focus 
on larger themes in the Gospels (hence, the principle of recurrent attestation). 
However, Anthony Le Donne’s work is an important exception to the rule, 
as it aims to appropriate the criteria of authenticity as a part of his method 
for studying the Jesus traditions from the perspective of memory. Le Donne 
attempts to refine the traditional language of ‘historicity’ and ‘authenticity’ by 
addressing whether a tradition has its basis in invention or memory/perception. 
 (5) The notion that the Jesus traditions can only be used to discuss ‘Jesus 
remembered’ leads the memory approach, some within it in more articulated 
ways than others, to downplay the age-old distinction between the historical 
Jesus and the Christ of faith; the levels of the historical figure of Jesus and the 
post-Easter Christ are merged, as it is only the impact Jesus had on his first 
followers that can be studied by the Jesus scholar. Bauckham is the most vocal 
scholar in this regard, advancing an argument about the Jesus of testimony 
which is not merely historical but also theological in nature, while the works 
of Dunn, Keith, and Rodríguez indicate that the historical Jesus is merged 
with the Christ of the early Christian faith in the Jesus tradition. This means, 
consequently, that the historical Jesus is beyond the scholar’s reach. In this sense, 
one may speak of a paradigm shift from the ‘historical’ to a ‘remembered’ Jesus. 
 (6) An obvious difference between earlier scholarship, including Gerhardsson, 
whose focus is not on memory per se but on the ancient teaching method of 
replication and memorization, and the memory approach has to do with what kind 
of language is used about the Jesus traditions; generally, the memory approach 
attempts to formulate historiographical methods of studying how ancient people 
preserved and appropriated the past in light of the conceptual category of memory. 
For example, Rodríguez applies such language (‘the installation of Jesus in early 
Christian memory’) to some of Jesus’ healings and exorcisms, Keith studies Jesus’ 
literacy and his conflicts with the Jewish scribal elite in light of the Jesus-memories, 
and Le Donne applies his hermeneutic of mnemonic triangulation to the title 
Son of David, which he views as a category of early Christian social memory. 
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 (7) Finally, contrary to form criticism’s neglect of important and authoritative 
individuals and eyewitnesses of Jesus, and building upon the foundation laid by 
Gerhardsson’s notion of the collegium of the Twelve as the early guarantors of 
the reliability of the transmission of the Jesus traditions, some scholars within the 
memory approach (in contrast to others) place a considerable weight on eyewitness 
testimony and eyewitness memory. For Samuel Byrskog, on the one hand, the 
ancient notion of autopsy (‘eyewitness testimony’) is an important concept, as he 
argues that there was an interest in ‘historical factuality’ among ancient historians, 
including the Gospel authors; Byrskog stresses certain individual eyewitnesses 
but does not downplay the importance of theological interpretation by viewing 
their testimony naïvely as a guarantor of the ‘historicity’ or ‘authenticity’ of the 
Jesus traditions. Richard Bauckham, on the other hand, distinguishes himself 
from much of earlier scholarship by beginning with a straightforward theological 
apologetic for ‘the Jesus of testimony’; albeit not far from Dunn’s notion of Jesus’ 
impact, this category is more specific. Bauckham is bolder than Byrskog in arguing 
that the Gospels are based rather directly on eyewitness testimony. Both Byrskog 
and Bauckham have been criticized by others within the memory approach for 
downplaying the social aspect of memory in favor of individuals and critiquing a 
presentist view of social memory theory which is supported by few scholars. The 
main research problem of the dissertation, namely, whether the memory approach 
constitutes a coherent school of thought in historical Jesus research, is addressed 
in the concluding discussion below.
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4 Concluding Discussion
This study has provided a broad perspective on the current state of historical Jesus 
research, especially regarding the recent methodological developments that have 
taken place. First, after discussing the history of Jesus scholarship and the idea of 
Quest as a research problem, four earlier views on the transmission of the Jesus 
traditions were outlined and evaluated in order to provide a meaningful context for 
the discussion on the memory approach. It was recognized that these predecessors 
of the memory approach, namely, early form criticism (Dibelius, Bultmann), the 
formal controlled tradition (Riesenfeld, Gerhardsson), the radical discontinuity 
view (Güttgemanns, Kelber), and the informal controlled tradition (Bailey), with 
their flaws and positive contributions, were important for understanding the 
memory approach. Secondly, with a necessary introduction to the conceptual 
category of individual and social memory, the different representatives of the 
memory approach (Dunn, Horsley, Rodríguez, Keith, Allison, Le Donne, Byrskog, 
Bauckham) were presented and critically evaluated. Finally, the main research 
question of the dissertation, namely, whether the memory approach constitutes a 
coherent methodological school of thought in historical Jesus research, remains to 
be addressed. The critiques of the various contributions of the memory approach 
are here discussed in light of the four subquestions.1292
 (A) With regard to the use of standard source-critical hypotheses for historical 
Jesus research, such as the Two-(or Four-)Source theory, the proponents of the 
memory approach represent a variety of views. In some cases, the adoption 
of oral hermeneutics leads to methodological disinterest in source-critical 
presuppositions. The explanation offered by Dunn (who does not discard the Q 
hypothesis altogether) of the variations between the Synoptic Jesus traditions as 
‘oral variants’ or ‘oral retellings’ instead of the results of literary copying is not 
entirely convincing; Matthew and Luke, if they knew Mark from memory, could 
1292  See Ch. 1.2:
  3. Does the memory approach constitute a methodologically coherent school of thought in 
historical Jesus research? 
  A. How are source-critical hypotheses, such as the Two-(or Four-)Source theory, viewed within 
the memory approach?
  B. What is the role of the criteria of authenticity in studying the Jesus traditions within the 
memory approach?
  C. Does the memory approach shed new light on the question about the distinction between 
the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith?
  D. Is the memory approach a new beginning or a dead end for historical Jesus research?
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have worked with Mark without direct access, and Dunn’s examples do not deviate 
from how ancient authors would have used literary sources. Not even visual 
contact with one’s literary sources would always ensure the copying of the exact 
wording. Albeit building upon the traditional views of Markan primacy and the Q 
hypothesis, Horsley’s case is also found somewhat wanting. He underestimates the 
role played by written texts in first-century Judea and Galilee, arguing for the far-
fetched view of the oral composition of Mark’s Gospel and vague settings for ‘the 
Q speeches’. Further, Rodríguez’s notion of the ‘variant instantiations’ of the oral 
Jesus traditions may be vulnerable to some of the same criticisms as Dunn; albeit 
not focused on the question of the literary relationships between the Gospels, 
Rodríguez’s view may still downplay the role of the Gospel authors as writers of 
texts.1293
 Since scholars have to work with the written Gospels, there remains a need for 
some historical hypotheses about their literary composition, even with everything 
that an oral hermeneutic can add to the discussion. The memory approach has not 
changed that. In fact, many within the memory approach take the standard solution 
for the Synoptic Problem at face value (Allison, Le Donne); there are others who 
can be placed within the memory approach and would argue that source criticism 
and its results are central after the rise of memory studies (e.g. Hübenthal, 
Kirk). This variety of views points to the conclusion that, regarding source-
critical hypotheses, the memory approach is not one coherent school of thought. 
 (B) As for the use of the criteria of authenticity for studying the Jesus traditions, 
most of the representatives of the memory approach are very critical and 
skeptical, attempting to redefine the principles of discussing the historicity of 
the Jesus traditions. Dunn, for one, initially lacked a theoretical framework for 
discussing social memory and memory distortion, which gave the impression that 
memory was referred to as a rather simple guarantor of continuity from Jesus to 
the Gospels. Rodríguez’s discussion on the notion of the historical reputation of 
Jesus offers a starting point of sorts but the idea could be developed further.
 With the criteria of authenticity gone, the question remains how the issue of 
historicity should be addressed. Keith’s rejection of the criteria of authenticity is 
1293  Cf. the critical statement from a scholar who is generally sympathetic towards Rodríguez’s view 
(in Rodríguez, Structuring) and can be viewed as a member of the memory approach: Kirk, Q 
in Matthew, p. 19: ‘[w]hile [Rodríguez] is able to deliver a robust account of variation in the 
synoptic tradition he struggles to explain, and therefore is forced to marginalize, its patterns of 
agreement, and his case studies are mostly of low-agreement parallels’.
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largely based on the criteria approach’s indebtedness to form criticism, specifically 
the post-Bultmannian scholars who developed form criticism on the basis of a 
specific notion of the transmission of the Jesus traditions as individual units; while 
Keith’s ‘return to the text’ does yield concrete results regarding Jesus’ literacy/
illiteracy and his conflicts with the religious elite of his time, and is by no means a 
rejection of a historical view of the Jesus traditions, relating all of the ‘mnemonic 
evidence’ of the gospels to the question of ‘historicity’ without reference to at 
least some principles behind the traditional criteria seems to be challenging. 
Albeit generally skeptical of the criteria, Keith is open to the possibility that some 
principles may still be useful, yet places the burden of proof on those who wish to 
integrate the traditional methods with the memory approach. 
 The challenge that occurs when the criteria of authenticity are altogether 
discarded becomes more evident in Allison’s work, which attempts to replace the 
criteria with the principles of recurrent attestation but ends up, in John P. Meier’s 
words, ‘muddling through’ the Jesus tradition with his ‘scholarly instinct’ (in other 
words, commonsense), not offering a viable overall method for the study of the 
historical Jesus. While Keith’s view offers a way forward with some distinctive 
contribution to the field and Allison’s principle of recurrent attestation cannot be 
entirely dismissed, there are unique events in Jesus’ life (Jesus’ baptism, his activity 
at the temple, his crucifixion), recorded in the Jesus tradition, the locations of 
which are hard to detect in a balanced picture of the historical Jesus without 
the criteria of authenticity (so Hägerland; cf. Allison, Keith, Rodríguez). In fact, 
Allison refers to some principles of the criteria despite seemingly rejecting them. 
 In contrast, Anthony Le Donne finds a plausible way of combining memory 
studies and the criteria of authenticity; he is able to discuss the ‘historicity’ and 
‘authenticity’ of the Jesus traditions after refining the terms in light of the memory 
approach; while a non-perceived or non-remembered Jesus is never to be 
achieved, one can postulate, through a careful application of the criteria, whether 
a Jesus tradition has its basis in memory/perception or invention. No matter how 
weak or strong the conclusions, some kind of defined principles are needed for 
discussion about ‘historicity’. 
 Of course, the need for defined principles is not denied by the proponents of the 
memory approach (although at least Allison can be criticized for incoherence in 
this regard). There is, however, a great difference between the different proponents 
of the approach when it comes to the nature of the needed principles. While many 
regard the criteria of authenticity epistemologically beyond repair, some hold on 
to them, yet not uncritically. Due to the difference, it remains, on the one hand, the 
job of those who dispense with the criteria to explain how the entire Jesus tradition 
can be discussed historically without recourse to the criteria; on the other hand, 
if one is to hold on to the criteria, their ongoing relevance and usefulness must be 
demonstrated with the necessary epistemological modification. In sum, the role 
of the criteria of authenticity is still up for debate within the memory approach. 
 (C) Concerning the question about the long-upheld distinction between the 
historical Jesus and the Christ of faith, the suggestion of some (in particular, 
Bauckham) within the memory approach – namely, that the ‘historical’ Jesus is 
merged with the Christ of faith due to there being only the Jesus remembered – is 
at risk of fideism; does such a hermeneutic mean that no historical Jesus can be 
reconstructed other than one seen through faith? It is recognized that one cannot 
objectively access the historical actuality of Jesus, rather only interpretations of it; 
however, this should not lead to an uncritical reading of the Gospels as historical 
sources. 
 While Dunn’s reassertion of Kähler’s notion may be somewhat misleading, 
his conclusions regarding the historical reliability of the Jesus traditions do 
not display such a problem to a large extent. The issue is more pertinent in 
Bauckham’s treatment of the ‘Jesus of testimony’. Albeit helpful as a theological 
talking point, Bauckham’s category (‘Jesus of testimony’) may have come in the 
way of the careful historical investigation of the Gospels, becoming more of a 
tool of harmonization than a useful theological/philosophical category that is 
willing to recognize, beside the unity, the simultaneous tension between history 
and theology; Bauckham’s reading of the Gospels becomes easily coerced (cf. 
his idea of ‘historical fact’ regarding John and Mark). Of course, this is always 
a matter of perspective to some degree; there is no historical research free from 
presuppositions. Nonetheless, some common principles against which different 
readings are evaluated are needed. 
 One may legitimately state that any scholar who emphasizes the merging of 
the historical Jesus with the Christ of faith is not studying the ‘historical’ Jesus 
in a traditional sense. The difference between Bauckham and some others 
within the memory approach (e.g. Keith, Rodríguez) is that the latter do not 
argue that, in general, the historical Jesus is merged with the Christ of faith, but 
rather that the historical Jesus is merged with the Christ of faith in the tradition. 
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Epistemologically, this is a different claim from what is indicated by Bauckham’s 
‘Jesus of testimony’. Thus, Keith, Rodríguez, and others in a similar vein do not 
become vulnerable to the criticism of fideism. Within the memory approach, 
there are different views on the relationship between the historical Jesus and 
the Christ of faith, which has different consequences for the historian’s task. 
 Can we, then, speak of a methodically coherent school of thought in Jesus 
scholarship? It has become clear in this dissertation that there are grounds for 
speaking about the memory approach as a school of thought of its own. However, 
regardless of its distinctive features, including an emphasis on epistemology and 
the hermeneutics of interpretation, the memory approach displays such a wide 
variety of methodological viewpoints that it cannot be deemed one coherent 
school of thought. Surely, if one still wants to adhere to a research-historical 
narrative of ‘Quests’ even in some qualified sense, naming the memory approach 
‘the Fourth Quest’ for the historical Jesus would be too bold a move.1294 
 The question of the historicity of the Jesus tradition cannot be avoided 
even after the introduction of social memory theory, with its hermeneutical 
consequences, and the serious study of oral tradition to historical Jesus 
research. Those placed within the memory approach would hardly claim to 
avoid tackling the question of historicity, but there remains some considerable 
differences regarding the question within the approach. Also, while many of 
the emphases of the memory approach are definitely to be welcomed by Jesus 
scholars, in the big picture, focusing on sociological and psychological issues is 
not a new thing in historical Jesus scholarship; it is commonplace to note that 
the scholarship of the so-called Third Quest period was especially interested in 
sociological viewpoints regarding the historical Jesus. One quickly runs into 
trouble trying to define the memory approach as a completely new beginning 
for historical Jesus research; this would be a hazardous move, as the career 
of, say, Richard A. Horsley spans well into the same period as much of earlier 
scholarship, for instance, the work of Werner H. Kelber. This only confirms 
that suggesting rigid research-historical outlines can be an arbitrary enterprise. 
 There is no turning back from the reality that the language that is used when 
1294  Cf. Bernier, The Quest for the Historical Jesus, p. 162: ‘[t]he Third Quest sought to dispense with 
the myth of rupture between Judaism and Jesus, and for the most part, it succeeded in this aim,’ 
and ‘[t]he Fourth Quest…is focused upon dispensing with the myth of a rupture between Jesus 
and Christianity’. However, see the discussion on the problematic nature of the Quest-language 
in ch. 1.1.
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referring to the Jesus traditions has changed; in this sense, one can speak of a 
methodological shift in historical Jesus research, a paradigm shift in a qualified 
sense. However, as long as there is a case to be made for the continuing necessity 
of some of the traditional methods rejected by many within the memory 
approach, even if considerably refined, there will hardly be a consensus that a 
new beginning is the proper nomenclature to describe the memory approach to 
the Jesus traditions and the historical Jesus. The variability of methods within 
the memory approach calls for more methodological clarification and helps 
to underline the reality that it is not meaningful to attempt to put together a 
number of scholars and call them ‘a Quest’ for the historical Jesus. While there 
are grounds for speaking of the memory approach as a school of thought, 
however diverse the methodological choices of its different proponents, the 
research-historical narrative ought not to be understood in terms of rigid 
and uniform ‘Quests’. Reality always tends to evade neat categorizations.1295 
 It has become clear that the memory approach attempts in many ways to 
distinguish itself from earlier scholarship, for example, through the redefinition 
of the Jesus traditions as instances or categories of early Christian social memory. 
This is as such a significant research-historical development in historical Jesus 
research. Nevertheless, the memory approach is a methodologically diverse 
approach which entails both (1) a tendency to distance itself from earlier methods 
of studying the Jesus traditions, as evinced, for example, by the large-scale 
rejection of the criteria of authenticity and the deemphasizing of source-critical 
hypotheses in light of an oral hermeneutic by some scholars, (2) and a tendency 
to appropriate older methods, such as the criteria of authenticity, in light of the 
hermeneutics of the memory approach. These tendencies cannot, however, be 
detected in a clear-cut fashion, as one memory-approach scholar can take the 
traditional source-critical solutions at face value, while abandoning the study of 
the authenticity of the Jesus traditions, and another scholar can offer a thorough 
hermeneutical framework for studying the historical Jesus in light of social 
memory theory, while attempting to appropriate the criteria of authenticity for 
discussing the historicity of the Jesus traditions in a modified sense. Furthermore, 
1295  Cf. Le Donne, ‘The Quest of the Historical Jesus’, pp. 63-86, who is skeptical of the Quest 
language, while acknowledging the importance of many of the same significant figures and 
turns in the history of research as within the standard story of historical Jesus research (i.e. First 
Quest, No Quest, New Quest, Third Quest).
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some scholars emphasize the questions of eyewitness testimony and eyewitness 
memory, while others do not discuss these matters at length. 
 Consequently, it is not reasonable to attempt to categorize different scholars 
within the memory approach based on a set of strict criteria. There are different 
strategies and methodological starting points within the memory approach. It 
can be concluded that the memory approach offers ways forward for historical 
Jesus research. While the memory approach displays a methodological shift in the 
sense that it redefines the language and categories used about the Jesus traditions, 
due to the methodological diversity, one ought to refrain from declaring it a new 
beginning for historical Jesus research (let alone ‘the Fourth Quest’).
 Whatever the flaws of the present study, I consider its main contribution its 
definition of the methodological viewpoints both within earlier scholarship (form 
criticism with its alternatives) and the memory approach with regard to the nature 
and transmission of the Jesus traditions in early Christianity. It is made clear in 
this study that the memory approach can only be properly understood within 
the context of ancient media studies and their bearing on the question of the 
transmission of the Jesus traditions; the diversity of scholarship conducted within 
the memory approach was demonstrated. It was also noted that, while the memory 
approach reasonably rejects any naïve notion about access to the historical actuality 
of Jesus, the concept of the remembered Jesus (or ‘Jesus of testimony’) ought not 
to be used to grant the Gospels a special status as historical sources. Neither 
naïve apologetic trust nor hyper-skepticism toward the material is warranted. 
Hopefully, the study has furthered the discussion on the role of the concept 
of memory, as well as memory studies, in the field of historical Jesus research. 
 Some future prospects for the study of the Jesus traditions and the historical 
Jesus may be presented. There remains a need for dialogue between the different 
methodological choices within the memory approach; can the traditional 
methods be combined with new insights, maybe redefining the former in light 
of the contribution of ancient media studies and social memory theory? As the 
new ways of conducting research can be subjected to some valid criticisms, it may 
be fruitful to apply, for instance, Anthony Le Donne’s method to a wider body 
of the Jesus traditions despite the fact that some of his views have been met with 
skepticism among other proponents of the memory approach. This would mean 
that the epistemology of historicity, authenticity language and the criteria of 
authenticity needs to be further addressed; if there is no role for the criteria, like 
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many would argue, how can the question of historicity be addressed? Is one left 
with no possibility of speaking about the historicity of singular events (for example, 
the temple incident, the crucifixion) described in the Jesus traditions? Can the 
historicity of the Jesus traditions be discussed in a modified sense, for example, a 
described event having its ‘basis in perception’? It is noteworthy that even some of 
those who reject the criteria due to their epistemological presuppositions either 
openly continue to refer to some of the principles behind the criteria or at least 
leave open the possibility that some principles may still be useful. The fact that the 
question of ‘historicity’ is not settled calls for further discussion.
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Svensk sammanfattning
Den här avhandlingen fokuserar på det aktiva internationella forskningsområdet 
där olika teorier om minne (t.ex. socialt/kollektivt och individuellt minne) och 
mediestudier (t.ex. studie av muntlig tradition och historia) tillämpas på studien 
av den historiske Jesus. Huvudsyftet är att undersöka om memory approach 
utgör en sammanhängande metodologisk forskningstrend. Avhandlingen 
undersöker hur de grundläggande principerna i memory approach skiljer sig 
från tidigare forskning och om en ny början inom Jesusforskning kan talas om. 
Undersökningen fokuserar på den forskningshistoriska diskussionen om naturen 
och processerna för traderingen av Jesustraditionerna i den tidigkristna rörelsen, 
vilket är ett centralt forskningsproblem för både tidigare historisk Jesusforskning 
och memory approach.
 Efter en kritisk diskussion om begreppet ‘quest for the historical Jesus’, 
diskuteras i kapitel 2 det gamla tyska formkritiska paradigmet (2.1: Martin 
Dibelius och Rudolf Bultmann), liksom några av deras viktigaste kritiker. 
Dibelius och Bultmanns grundläggande principer om muntliga Jesustraditioner 
är en meningsfull forskningshistorisk utgångspunkt, eftersom deras synpunkter, 
som har varit globalt mycket inflytelserika i årtionden, har framkallat 
starka kritiska reaktioner från memory approach. Tre alternativa modeller 
för det formkritiska paradigmet presenteras och kritiseras: den formella 
kontrollerade traditionen (2.2: Harald Riesenfeld, Birger Gerhardsson), 
den radikala diskontinuitetssynen (2.3: Erhardt Güttgemanns, Werner H. 
Kelber) och den informella kontrollerade traditionen (2.4: Kenneth E. Bailey). 
 Kapitel 3 är tillägnat åt memory approach, nämligen, forskare som på olika 
sätt använder teorier om minne på (re)konstrueringar av den historiske 
Jesus. Fokuset är på socialt och individuellt minne (3.1). Huvuddelen av 
kapitlet består av en analys och kritik av de studier som använder minnet som 
begreppsmässig kategori (3.2: James D. G. Dunn; 3.6: Dale C. Allison), social 
memory theory (3.3: Richard A. Horsley; 3.4: Rafael Rodríguez; 3.5: Chris Keith; 
3.7: Anthony Le Donne) och olika studier av muntlig tradition (särskilt Dunn, 
Horsley, Rodríguez) på frågan om traderingen av Jesustraditionen. Begreppet 
ögonvittnesbevis, de tidiga kristna ögonvittnens roll och den specifika kategorin 
av individuellt minne, ögonvittnesminne, är också behandlade (3.8: Samuel 
Byrskog, Richard Bauckham). Skillnaderna mellan memory approach och tidigare 
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forskning analyseras i förhållande till traderingsmodeller och rekonstruktioner av 
mediesituationen i den första århundradets kontext.
 Några av de viktigaste slutsatserna i studien är följande. Det finns ett 
samförstånd inom memory approach att den formkritiska förståelsen av 
Jesustraditionen som en anonym och okontrollerat tradition som kan studeras 
med en ‘litterär tankegång’ måste kasseras. Tillämpningen av en oral hermeneutik 
på frågan om traderingen av Jesustraditionen är ett annat område där memory 
approach utmanar tidigare forskningens synpunkter. Inom memory approach ses 
Jesustraditionerna som tidiga kristna minnen av Jesus. Det finns ingen tillgång 
till den faktiska historiska Jesus ‘bakom’ texten. Därför kan man tala om ett 
paradigmskifte från studien av den historiske Jesus till studien av minnets Jesus. 
 Sammanfattningsvis är memory approach en metodiskt varierad tankeskola 
som innebär både (1) en tendens att avstå från tidigare metoder för att studera 
Jesustraditionerna, vilket exempelvis framgår av en storskalig avvisning av de 
så kallade autenticitetskriterierna och en avbetoning av traditionella källkritiska 
hypoteser i ljuset av en muntlig hermeneutik, och (2) en tendens att omdefiniera 
äldre metoder i ljuset av hermeneutiken av memory approach. Det finns olika 
strategier och metodologiska utgångspunkter inom memory approach. Slutsatsen 
kan dras att memory approach erbjuder vägar framåt för Jesusforskning men det 
utgör inte en sammanhängande metodologisk forskningstrend. Medan memory 
approach visar ett skifte i den meningen att språket och kategorierna som används 
om Jesustraditionerna omdefinieras, borde man avstå från att förklara det en ny 
början för Jesusforsking (eller ‘the Fourth Quest’).
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